[
    {
        "id": 211671,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 86,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "61\n\nTHE KIUKIANG INCIDENT OF 1927\n\nP. H. MUNRO-Faure\n\nThe turgid waters of the Yangtze rolled by to the sea, four hundred and eighty miles away. They swirled past the two hulks, alongside which river steamers came to discharge the cargoes of cotton material, hardware, salt, and those edible sea-products so dear to the heart of the Chinese gourmet; loading in return tea, porcelain, grass-cloth, and camphor.\n\nInshore small wavelets glistened in the wintry sun, and lapped along the edge of the dark mud, which sloped down to the water in front of\n\n* Editor's Note. Paul Hector Munro-Faure was born in 1894 of Swiss/Scottish parentage. Educated in England, he entered the Supplementary Army Reserve in 1912, and volunteered on the outbreak of War, being commissioned in the Sherwood Foresters. He was wounded on the Somme in 1916, and, on his recovery, was attached to the King's African Rifles, with whom he saw action in Tanganyika. By the end of the War he had risen to the rank of Captain. He was Mentioned in a Despatch for distinguished services in the field, and was commended in writing by the Secretary of State for War.\n\nAfter the War, he joined the Asiatic Petroleum Company, and remained in their service until the outbreak of the Second World War, as Manager of one or other of their offices in China. In 1937 he established a Chinese Refugee Safety Centre in Shanghai, and was later decorated for this by the Chinese Government with the Brilliant Star with Ribbon. In 1938 he was connected with the International Relief Committee in Nanking, by whose Chairman he was commended for his work for the displaced. He was also commended at this date by the Secretary of the Admiralty for his work in evacuating from that city civilians at risk.\n\nOn the outbreak of the Second World War he was commissioned as Major (shortly afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel) in the Special Operations Executive. He worked at first in the Bush Warfare School at Maymyo, Burma, which trained Chinese guerillas for behind-the-lines work. (For this school, see \"Prisoners of Hope\", Michael Calvert, (London, 1951), where Lt. Col. Munro-Faure is mentioned at p. 11). He then opened a similar school near the front lines in the Hangchow-Nanking area. For this he was awarded an OBE in 1943. Later still he worked between the front lines on the north-east frontier of Burma, attempting to ensure the continuing support for the British of the native princes of the region, in the face of Japanese, and particularly Chinese, attempts to replace the British as the dominant local power. He was commended for this work by his Commanding Officer. In 1944, he was recalled to England. After the War he was seconded as Oil Attache to the British Embassy in Romania. He retired in 1949, and died in 1956.\n\nLt. Col. Munro-Faure wrote a book of Memoirs in 1944-1945, in 11 chapters, covering his experiences in the Kiu Kiang Incident (1927), and between 1937 and 1944, together with an exposition of his views on the proper role of foreigners in China. The text is in the Imperial War Museum, London,\n\nBecause of the immensely valuable picture these Memoirs paint of the Kiu Kiang Incident (in which the writer was closely involved), of China during the early War years, and of the border areas of Burma during the period when the present troubles in the area were first developing, it is proposed to print them as a series in this and the next several issues of the Journal.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215934,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 233,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "167\n\nsocieties in the Japanese Army, though in his memoirs he downplayed this role. When Mrs Bush, a Japanese, was later forced to work as a Kempeitai interpreter, she talked to a prisoner who was in American Naval Intelligence about their mutual friend Charles Boxer. Bill Kendall, of whom more below, was told by Boxer that the Japanese were on the move: when he saw the zeros flying overhead, and knew that the attack had finally started.\n\nBeyond military intelligence\n\nFW Kendall was a Canadian from Vancouver who had lived in Hong Kong since childhood, and spoke not only fluent Cantonese but other dialects as well. He had had a mining business in China, but after the Japanese occupied east Guangdong and Chekiang his business was cut off. He then moved back to Hong Kong and worked for the Government organising refugee relief, building and running the main large camp at Kam Tin. Early in 1940 Kendall was approached by Col LA Newnham, in his capacity in charge of Military Intelligence, and asked to set up a small unit of civilians and volunteers. Being non-military personnel, they could undertake training in the use of sabotage and \"ungentlemanly warfare,\" which the official armed services could not legitimately carry out. The unit was given the cover name Z Force. Allocating £1,500 for this 'unit for independent action behind enemy lines' had to be done outside normal accounting channels, GOC Hong Kong told the War Office in September 1941, because of the need for absolute secrecy in a small place like Hong Kong.\n\nThe Special Operations Executive, under the Ministry for Economic Warfare, had been established in Europe for some years to assist resistance. They trained agents for the specific purpose of operating behind enemy lines using espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare. Specialist SOE units created miniature code machines, wireless facilities and concealed weapons, known by the cheerful name of 'toys.' Where strategically useful, SOE created facilities for specialised sabotage. The whole point of SOE was to facilitate war in situations such as in occupied countries where traditional warfare was impractical. Its methods were ideally suited to the situation in China, where the front was so large and diverse that Japanese supply lines were stretched to vulnerability. The populace was strongly motivated for resistance, and the Japanese, whose control was weak beyond urban areas, were",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]