[
    {
        "id": 204745,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1964",
        "page_number": 48,
        "title": "RAS-1964",
        "content_text": "JOURNAL OF OCCURRANCES AT CANTON\n\n37\n\nNOTES ON HUNTER'S JOURNAL\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG and Sir LINDSAY T. RIDE\n\n1 Snow. Peter Wanten Snow, Consul for the United States in Canton. He surrendered the opium in American possession as demanded by Commissioner Lin, and was ready to promise that Americans would cease importing opium, but refused to have anything to do with the bond as the penalties were too severe. (See also note 43, bond.) (L.T.R.)\n\n2 Mr. Forbes. Joined the American firm of Russell & Co. in Canton in October 1838, became a partner 1 January 1839 and eventually was made chief of the house. Robert Bennett Forbes (1804-1889), first arrived in China in 1817. After some years back in the States he returned to China in October 1838 and was admitted a partner of Russell & Co., China on 1 January 1839. He retired in 1844 but had an interest in the firm till 1857. (L.T.R.)\n\n3 Mr. Green. John C. Green of Trenton, New Jersey, first went to China as an agent of N.L. & G. Griswold. In 1834 he was admitted a partner of Russell & Co., China, and retired to New York on 31st December 1839. At the time of the disturbances he was Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce at Canton. He died in 1875. (L.T.R.)\n\n4 Mr. Delano. Warren Delano, Jr. of Fairhaven, Mass., came to China 1834 to join the house of Russell, Sturgis & Co., of Canton and Manila. He was a partner of Russell & Co., China for two terms, 1 January 1840 to 31 December 1846, and January 1861 to 31 December 1866. He was a great-uncle of ex-President F. D. Roosevelt. (L.T.R.)\n\n5 Mr. King.\n\nThis is most likely to be Edward King of Newport, R.I., who was taken into the firm of Russell & Co., as a clerk on his arrival at Canton in 1834 in the Silas Richards. On 1 July 1834 he became a partner and retired in 1842 to Newport where he died in 1876.\n\nThere was a Charles W. King of Olyphant & Co. in Canton at the time, but as this firm had nothing to do whatsoever with opium, he may not have been confined to the Factory. (L.T.R.)\n\n6 Mr. Low. Abiel Abbott Low (1811-1893) was born in Salem, Massachusetts, and became a leading figure in both the New York and China shipping world. He first worked as a clerk in shipping firms in Salem and in New York and then went to China in 1833 as a clerk in Russell & Co. of which house his uncle, Wm. Henry Low, had been head for some years. He was made a partner in 1837, retired to New York where he founded the firm of A.A. Low & Brothers, famous for its clipper fleet. In 1863 he was President of the New York Chamber of Commerce. (L.T.R.)\n\n7 Spooner. Daniel Nicholson Spooner of Plymouth, Mass. was at this time a clerk in Russell & Co., Canton. He became a partner in January 1843 and retired to Boston on 31 December 1845. He returned to China again as a partner in January 1852, finally retiring in 1857. (L.T.R.)\n\n8 Gilman. Joseph Taylor Gilman of Exeter, New Hampshire, joined Russell & Co., Canton as a Clerk about the same time as Spooner. His dates of partnership and retirement were the same, too, as Spooner's. (L.T.R.)\n\n9 Mouqua. Also spelt Mowqua in pidgin English. His official name as Hong merchant was Lu Ch'i-kuang Lu Wen-wei✰✰ The suffix \"qua\" signifies \"an official\". (J.L.C.-B.) and his family name was (kuan in mandarin)",
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    {
        "id": 207488,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 256,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "248\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nThere was no lift. By now we were caring for 15 patients with active pulmonary tuberculosis. The medical officer staff was slightly different from what it had been in Bowen Road (See Appendix C) and contained one new member, Captain Coombs. The changes had been made by the Japanese and I was not consulted, though Coombs was a valued and welcome member of the staff.\n\nThe building was arranged in two wings, and looked at from the front the left hand wing was given over to Japanese quarters. In the centre was a large Assembly Hall while our hospital occupied the right hand wing. The Assembly Hall was out of bounds to us except on special occasions. I had hoped to get a member of the Hong Kong Volunteers to come with us from Sham Shui Po as a rice cook, but he did not turn up, and Corporal J. O'Grady took charge. Our practice was now to cook all our food in bulk and not by wards and messes in their own containers as in the past. The kitchens had shallow rice boilers and our rice from now on improved considerably. The electricity generator had been damaged during the move but repairs were started by our engineers. The church was sited in the Central Clock Tower room. Saito gave us a Hongkong News from which on the 14 April we learned of the death of President Roosevelt and we held a memorial service for him on the following day.\n\nA refrigerator was converted to act as a steamer, steam being delivered through the top, and the cooks baked some very good so-called cake and made some experimental bread without flour which turned out to be excellent when judged by our standards. We even began to fry the bread sometimes when we had enough oil. On 19 April four blinded men and two old men arrived, the former with attendants to look after their needs. On 20 April Colonel Tokunaga made an afternoon inspection and we were ordered to remove all beds from verandahs and all staff except the steward and one cook were required to sleep in the barrack room. Visitors arrived to deliver parcels the same day but they had to leave them for collection by us some distance away from our front door. With 134 patients and no beds on verandahs our space was pretty crowded. By now our non-medical staff was building up and we had one shoemaker, two tailors, one barber, two cooks, three rice grinders, four vegetable men and three wood men. We also used two men for pots and pans and two appear in my diary as having duties connected with beds though I cannot now remember",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208547,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 4,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208572,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 29,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "2\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nThe American sense of guilt was largely attributable to three factors: United States' military defeats in Southeast Asia, the American commitment to the policy of defeating Germany first before concentrating on Japan, and the American failure in delivering the bulk of lend-lease and other war materials promised to China. On the first point, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck who was political adviser to the Department of State, reports from American sources from or through Chungking indicated that the American defeat in the Philippines, together with the rapid collapse of the British position in Southeast Asia, had bred \"a sense of frustration and defeatism” among the Chinese.4 To be fair, however, one must add that China had been vastly more appalled and disillusioned by, and consequently more contemptuous of, the British performance.\n\nOn the second point, it was only natural that China was disappointed and embittered by the American policy of “Germany First”. Support for this order of priority was by no means unanimous within American government circles. Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy, General Douglas MacArthur (at his new headquarters in Australia), and Stanley Hornbeck, to give some examples, all expressed doubt about it and urged that a greater military effort should be directed against Japan. While President Roosevelt was firm on his decision to stand by the agreement reached at the 'Arcadia” Conference it did not mean that he was entirely free from embarrassment when faced with his Far Eastern ally, Chiang Kai-shek.\n\nM4\n\nOn the third point, immediately after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt had been generous in promising China war materials, including planes, mainly through lend-lease channels. However, the Americans soon realized that it was easier to make the promise than to implement it. Two difficulties were involved. The first was the problem of transport. After the fall of Burma and the seizure of the southern part of the Burma Road by the Japanese early in 1942, air transport became the only feasible means of getting supplies into China. Until the opening of the well-known Ledo Road (later on re-named Stilwell Road) early in 1945, the bulk of the supplies flown from India to China was transported by the Tenth United States Air Force between April and December 1942, and thereafter by the United States Air Transport Command in what Joseph W. Ballantine, who became director of the Office of",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208573,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 30,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\nFar Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944, terms “the most difficult supply operation of the entire war\" over the towering hump of the Himalayas. The second difficulty was connected with the priority given to the European theatre. The result was that much of the promised materials to China was often diverted, much to the distress of Hornbeck and others, from its original destination for the European fronts.? Speaking in more specific terms, by late September 1942, US$3.1 billion worth of lend-lease materials were sent to the British Empire, $750 million to Russia, and only $112 million to China. The disparity became even more remarkable by early June: $7,030,000,000 to the British Empire, $1,899,000,000 to Russia, and only $133,000,000 to China.8\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is understandable that the United States should entertain grave anxiety regarding China, especially over a possible collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. This concern, which the Chinese did everything to keep alive, was universally shared by senior men in the Washington government, including the president himself, H. L. Stimson, then secretary of war, Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the Treasury, Leahy, and many involved in Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, principally Hornbeck.9 While some doubt was expressed as to how much China could and was willing to contribute to the war effort in the east, the consensus was that her collapse would be a fatal blow to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the Pacific theatre. This event, therefore, must be prevented at all cost.\n\nIt was only natural that the United States, torn by anxiety, should be obsessed with the desire to compensate China as best she could. Consequently, the American government announced at the beginning of 1942 a loan of 500 million dollars to China, with next to no strings attached.10 Meanwhile, the move to push for the allies' recognition of China as one of the great powers, of which Hornbeck claimed himself to be the originator, became increasingly prominent in the American government.11 The outcome was the American insistence that China be included as a signatory, together with Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on 30 December 1943, and that Chiang Kai-shek, together with Roosevelt and Churchill, be a party to the Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943.12 The American eagerness to compensate naturally did not allow Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States,\n\nPage 30\nPage 31",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208574,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 31,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "CHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nOstensibly for medical reasons, at the end of 1942 and early in 1943, to pass unutilized. No effort was spared to make the visitor feel welcomed and cherished. She was a guest at the White House and at President Roosevelt's home at Hyde Park. She was invited to address the Senate and the House, and was welcomed by huge gatherings at all the stops she made from the east to the west coasts.13 A further and significant gesture of American friendliness was embodied in the United States' renunciation early in 1943 of her extraterritorial rights in China,14 a subject to be further dealt with later. One last example of the American compensatory effort during the first two years of the Pacific War was the passing of an act in December 1943, by large majorities of both Houses of Congress, repealing the longstanding Chinese exclusion laws, establishing an annual Chinese immigration quota, and making legally admitted Chinese eligible for naturalization as American citizens.15\n\nIt is imperative to spell out in some detail the general American attitude vis-a-vis China, not only to serve as background to the subject under discussion, but also because such attitude unavoidably influenced Britain in her dealings with China, including those over the question of Hong Kong. Ever since Pearl Harbour, China had made no secret of her resentment of Britain for having rejected China's offer of assistance in the defence of Hong Kong and Burma, for having been so catastrophically defeated by Japan in such a short time, and for, according to Chou En-lai who was then representative of the Chinese Communist Party at Chungking, having “discriminated against and treated as inferiors the Chinese who fought with the British at Hong Kong and in Malaya.”16 Britain, on her part, was anxious to improve relations with China and to collaborate closely with the United States in relation to their Far Eastern ally. She was, not unlike the United States, \"obsessed” for the greater part of 1942 with the fear that China might \"throw up her hands.\" The Foreign Office decided that all that Britain could do was to \"adopt an apologetic and ingratiating attitude towards the Chinese.\" However, the United States, much to Britain's annoyance, stole the limelight from all the major British attempts at appeasing China. Britain's offer of a loan of £50,000,000, with stringent regulations regarding expenditure to maintain equilibrium in her post-war balance of payments, was a clear anti-climax to the Chinese after the unconditional American loan.18 Although Britain renounced her extraterritorial rights in China simultaneously",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208575,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 32,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "The U.S. and the Question of Hong Kong 1941-45\n\nwith the United States, \"very little credit accrued to Britain, the assumption in Chungking being that Washington had pressed a reluctant London to agree to rendition.\"19 As opposed to the glamour of Madame Chiang's visit to the United States, Britain's “cordial invitation” to her to visit Britain, issued by the King himself, was decidedly ignored.20 Britain felt that her already difficult relations with China were aggravated by the fact that the “Americans [were] pathological about China, and keenly suspicious of any possible unfriendliness towards her on the part of others”.21 It was naturally feared that anything China demanded would have the sympathetic hearing of the United States, even at Britain's expense.\n\nBritain's future position in Hong Kong became all the more difficult to defend in view of the American wholesale denunciation of Britain's imperial and colonial policies. The American mentality towards the matter has been thus summarized: \"The idea became prevalent in America that the war the United States and the United Nations were fighting was not merely for self-preservation, but for the greater qualities of human rights and decency. There was a growing cry for a ‘Pacific Charter', to be on the lines of the Atlantic Charter, to guarantee freedom after the war to the non-self-governing countries in the Pacific. Or, at least, the Atlantic Charter should be extended to cover the Pacific region.”22 This mentality was shared by the president as well as the general public. It has been asserted that Roosevelt had been an anti-imperialist before the Pacific War, but he began a vigorous attack on colonialism everywhere early in 1943 after his trip to Casablanca, which apparently had a profound effect on his attitude towards colonialism.23\n\nTurning specifically to the American attitude towards Hong Kong, interest in the British colony was evident early in the War. There was clear indication that American public feeling \"would feel itself cheated if the outcome of the victory of the United Nations were to be simply the restoration of the status quo ante in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, India and the Netherlands East Indies.\" There had been widespread speculation about the future of Hong Kong, stimulated by the speeches of such high officials of the administration as Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles. Critics in the United States frequently raised the question why Britain did not give up Hong Kong and relinquish her extraterritorial rights in China. It seemed almost certain that in the event of China demanding the return of Hong Kong, she could be confident of American sympathy",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208579,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 36,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n9\n\nHong Kong, stated without authorization but from his \"knowledge of the movement of opinion in England\", he felt confident that when the time came to deal with Hong Kong, the Chinese would be completely satisfied.\" The Foreign Office was naturally most displeased by such an utterance,36\n\nBy contrast, the American behaviour at the conference was dis-coordinated. While much of the criticism of British imperialism and skepticism regarding the British attitude and intention in respect to the Atlantic Charter were expressed by the American participants, and while they generally supported the Chinese stand on Hong Kong, the pressure they succeeded in exerting was considerably discounted because they failed to function as a closely coordinated team. Stanley Hornbeck, a delegate to the conference, commented specifically on the organization of the American group in a memorandum on his observations of the conference: \"It needs to be kept in mind with regard to I.P.R. Conferences that, whereas, as a rule, the Groups from most countries... attend and function as “delegations” (with a certain amount of guidance if not definite instructions from their Governments), the members of the American Group attend the function simply as members (without a \"group\" organization and without express guidance and with no instructions from their Government.)\" This disjointed approach was to largely characterize the American stand regarding the question of Hong Kong during the war,\n\nSuch an approach did not long escape Britain's attention. In March 1943 Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, paid a visit to Washington, apparently on Churchill's prompting. Eden's conversations with Roosevelt and senior American officials only \"provided an exchange of views with regard to such matters as cooperation between the Governments with respect to political questions arising in connection with the prosecution of the war\"; there was no intention of commitment on either side.38 Early in Eden's visit Harry Hopkins, special assistant to Roosevelt, made the general remark, in front of the president, to the British visitor that he \"thought no useful purpose would be served at this stage of the war, and surely no useful purpose at the Peace Table, by Great Britain and [the United States] having no knowledge of [their] differences of opinion” regarding Hong Kong, Malayan Straits, and India.39 Eden could do no harm in agreeing to this comment.40 Roosevelt, however, was much more direct about Hong Kong. He",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208581,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n11\n\nBritain of Hong Kong, and the development by Great Britain of a great port which he felt had benefited the whole world. He said that it was British territory and he saw no good reason why it should cease to be such. He went on to say that perhaps some arrangement could be made with the Chinese whereby the question of sovereignty could be adjusted but the political control and administrative responsibility remain with Great Britain. He referred to public utterances of his own to the effect that he was not Prime Minister for the purpose of being a party to a liquidation of the British Empire. He said that he had convictions on that subject and that he was perfectly willing to say so frankly to anybody.\"45\n\nIt might well have been his own weak performance in London, among other things, which prompted Hornbeck early in January 1944 to urge the Secretary of State not to repeat Woodrow Wilson's mistake in being too much of a \"gentleman\". The American government must obtain from Britain agreement and cooperation in any reasonable course of action upon which the United States might choose to insist, especially in relation to colonial matters, before the defeat of Germany when Britain still depended on the Americans for their preservation.46\n\nThe Secretary's reaction to the advice is not known. But it appears from his memoirs that he was not in favour of coercion in dealing with the Anglo-American differences, and specifically with the question of Hong Kong.47 In any case, the Department of State had become less and less consulted by the President with regard to general war and foreign policies. The War and Navy Departments and the Treasury were far more important in the President's mind. On the personal level, moreover, Hull was certainly not one of Roosevelt's trusted few. Hull himself was conscious and sensitive of the truth: that FDR was his own Secretary of State.\"48 In fact, many of Roosevelt's utterances at the major Allied conferences, beginning with the Cairo Conference late in 1943, were made without prior reference to and consultation with the Department of State. Hull resigned late in 1944, frustrated and in poor health.\n\nDespite Roosevelt's well-known anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stand and his interest in Hong Kong, his behaviour regarding the future of the British colony was generally characterized by weakness and the lack of persistent and direct pressure on Britain. At the",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208582,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "12\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nCairo Conference at the end of 1943, Roosevelt offered Chiang Kai-shek, behind Churchill's back, American support in preventing Britain from getting back Hong Kong if Chiang would cooperate with the communists in fighting against Japan and establish a representative government in China. Roosevelt's idea was that on regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong, Chiang should \"make a grand gesture and make it a free port.\"49 At Teheran in November 1943, during a break in the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt raised with Churchill the question of the possible return of Hong Kong to China, and the latter refused even to discuss the question.50\n\nAt his secret meeting with Stalin during the Yalta Conference, on 8 February 1945, Roosevelt again mentioned his hope \"that the British would give back the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China and that it would then become an internationalized free port.\" He added, however, that he knew Churchill \"would have strong objections to this suggestion.” At the conference proper, however, Roosevelt did not raise the question of Britain's return of Hong Kong, although references were made to the colony on several occasions.52 Later, in the spring of 1945, Roosevelt used Bernard Baruch, a financier and a friend of both Roosevelt and Churchill, as a messenger to press the British prime minister on the matter of Hong Kong. Roosevelt was now additionally concerned that the Soviet Union might make use of Britain's presence in Hong Kong as an argument for opening a port of her own in China.53 In April 1945 when General Patrick J. Hurley was sent by Roosevelt to talk with Churchill over the retrocession of Hong Kong to China, among other subjects, the latter replied that the colony would not be yielded \"over [his] dead body.\"54 The truth is that already by 1944 Roosevelt had become increasingly reluctant to offend the sensitivity of Churchill who by then was no longer \"subservient to the friendly strength of the United States\" as he clearly had been in 1941-42.55\n\nBritain was not slow to perceive the American weakness. Moreover, by 1944 American enthusiasm about China and Chiang Kai-shek had somewhat cooled down. Roosevelt, as it has been mentioned, had for some time been troubled by the disunity between the nationalists and the communists, and by growing criticism of the autocracy of the Chiang regime. Discussion and criticism of the Chungking government and its conduct of the war increased remarkably in the United States following the American recall of General Joseph Stilwell under pressure from Chiang Kai-shek,56",
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    {
        "id": 208587,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 44,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n17\n\n◄ Hornbeck to Cordell Hull, secretary of state, 20 May 1942, Hornbeck Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 465.\n\n* Generally see Thorne, op. cit., p. 163, and note 51 on pp. 168-9, referring to Leahy's diary and the King Papers. Also Hornbeck's memorandum, 3 October 1942, Hornbeck Papers, box 180.\n\n• Ballantine's diary in Ballantine Papers (Hoover Institute, Stanford University), box 1. Also see Tung Hsien-kuang, Chiang Tsung-t'ung ch’uan (Biography of Chiang Kai-shek; Taipei, 1954), II, pp. 343-4; and B. W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York, 1971), p. 352.\n\n'Hornbeck's memorandum, 20 May 1942, op. cit.\n\n8 The two sets of statistics are available in Hornbeck Papers, box 466 and box 467 respectively.\n\n\"Thorne, op. cit., pp. 175-6.\n\n1o Announcement of the loan was made on 1 February, but the agreement was not signed until 21 March. For details of the loan and its use during subsequent years, see Department of State, United States Relations with China (hereafter US and China; Washington, 1949), pp. 470-71.\n\n11 Hornbeck's autobiography, Hornbeck Papers, box 497.\n\n12 For more details, see US and China, p. 37,\n\n1a Madame Chiang, however, was intensely disliked by Roosevelt's household staff at Hyde Park who found her \"arrogant and overbearing\", W. D. Hassett, then aide to President Roosevelt, Off the Record with F.D.R. (Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 181-2, 288.\n\n14 For text of the relevant treaty between the United States and China, see US and China, pp. 514-7.\n\n15 For more details, see ibid., p. 37.\n\n1 Chinese leaders freely expressed their anti-British sentiments to the Americans; see, for example, H. Morgenthan, Morgenthau Diary (China; Washington, 1965), II, pp. 862-895.\n\n17 Minute of Sir John Brenan, a veteran official in the Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office, on Anglo-Chinese relations since the outbreak of the Pacific War, 3 November 1942, Foreign Office (hereafter FO) 371/31627.\n\n18 For elaboration on this point, see author's article, \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American Chinese Relations\", Modern Asian Studies, 11, 2 (1977), pp. 262-3.\n\n19 Thorne, op. cit., p. 195.\n\n20 Details of the British discussion leading to the invitation are available in FO 371/31627. The British government was understandably embarrassed by the Chinese response. Ashley Clarke, an official in the Far Eastern Department, confided this point to Stanley Hornbeck, his opposite number in the Department of State. See Hornbeck's attempt to explain for Madame Chiang, Hornbeck to Clarke, strictly confidential, 27 February 1943, Hornbeck Papers, box 467.\n\n21 Thorne, op. cit., p. 161.\n\n22 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)\", p. 58.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
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    {
        "id": 208588,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 45,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "18\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\n23 W. Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (University of Georgia Press; 1959), p. 105.\n\n24 This is according to the observation of Ashley Clarke, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, during his one month visit to the Department of State early in the summer of 1942; see his report on his visit to A. Eden, secretary of state for foreign affairs, 11 June 1942, FO371/31804. See also Ministry of Information to Colonial Office, 22 October 1942, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/31774.\n\n25 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", pp. 266-272.\n\n26 Brenan's minute, 3 December, on J. G. Winant, American ambassador to London, to Eden, 2 December 1942, FO371/31664.\n\n27 Eden to Winant, 7 December 1942, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), China, 1942 (Washington, 1956), p. 390.\n\n28 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", op. cit., pp. 284-5.\n\n29 Ibid., pp. 287-8.\n\n30 Ibid., pp. 288-9.\n\n31 War cabinet conclusions 173 (42), 28 December 1942, Cab65/28. Also Eden to Winant, 29 December; and Eden to Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, tel. 8264, immediate, 29 December 1942, FO371/31665.\n\n32 Thorne, op. cit., p. 179, and note 53, p. 198, referring to G. Atcheson to Hornbeck, 29 December 1942, Department of State, Decimal and Other Files, National Archives (Washington D.C.) 793.003/12-2942.\n\n33 W. L. Tung in his book V. K. Wellington Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy (New York, 1977), based on the Wellington Koo Papers deposited with Columbia University, gives a possible explanation: \"Koo was then Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain and returned to Chungking for consultations. As an experienced diplomat well familiar with the attitude of British official and unofficial circles, he counselled the government to conclude the treaty on the relinquishment of extraterritoriality but reserve the right of later negotiations on the Kowloon question”, p. 53.\n\n34 Halifax to Eden, tel. 6310, immediate, 31 December 1942, FO371/35679.\n\n35 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)\", pp. 58-68.\n\n34 Ibid., p. 68.\n\n*7 See memorandum in Hornbeck Papers, box 466.\n\n** Cordell Hull, secretary of state, to United States chargé d'affaires in London, tel., 4 April 1943, in FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, The Far East, 1943 (Washington, 1963), III, pp. 46-7. Also see R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 707.\n\n30 For American interest in India, especially early in the war, see for example, M. S. Venkatramani and B. K. Shrivastava, \"The United States and the Cripps Mission\", India Quarterly, XIX, no. 3 (July-September, 1963), pp. 214-65. See also author's article, \"Britain's Reaction to Chiang\n\nPage 45\n\nPage 46",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
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    {
        "id": 208589,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 46,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n19\n\nK'ai-shek's Visit to India, February 1942\", The Australian Journal of History and Political Science, XXI, no. 2 (1975), pp. 52-61, in which the American attitude is discussed.\n\n40 Memorandum by Hopkins, 15 March 1943, in FRUS, the British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, the Far East, 1943, III, p. 17.\n\n41 Sherwood, op. cit., p. 719, and H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States (London, 1954), p. 828.\n\n42 For a summary of the allied military situation at the end of 1943, see J. M. Burns, Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), p. 464. **Hornbeck to Ashley Clarke, 16 December 1943(?), in Hornbeck Papers, box 469.\n\n44 Hornbeck's autobiography, op. cit.\n\n46 Hornbeck's memorandum, 15 November, on his conversation with Churchill, Hornbeck Papers, box 468.\n\n10\n\n16 Hornbeck to Hull, 3 January 1944; also see Hornbeck's memorandum, 3 December 1943, Hornbeck Papers, box 181.\n\n47 C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), II, p. 1599, 4 Hornbeck's autobiography, op. cit., and J. Bishop, FDR's Last Year (New York, 1974), p. 40.\n\n**E. Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), pp. 163-4, 203-4, 249-50; J. T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New York, 1948), p. 349; Hull, op. cit., II, p. 1596; and T. H. White (ed.), The Stilwell Papers (New York, 1976), p. 252. Stilwell was summoned to the conference to discuss China.\n\n50 See SWNCC III, secret, 17 April 1945, in ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) see 32, National Archives.\n\n01 See minutes of the meeting in FRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955), p. 769. Also F. L. Loewenheim (ed.), Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York, 1975), p. 656.\n\n52 FRUS, ibid., pp. 664-5, 676.\n\n53\n\n58 Thorne, op. cit., p. 549.\n\n54 Tung, op. cit., p. 61.\n\n55 Bishop, op. cit., p. 95.\n\n56 Division of Public Liaison and Office of Public Information, Department of State, \"Fortnightly Survey of American Opinion on International Affairs\", Survey no. 13, confidential, 18 October, Survey no. 14, confidential, 6 November, and Survey no. 15, confidential, 20 November 1944.\n\n57 Examples of these booklets are: \"The British Commonwealth and Empire\" (May 1944), and \"Britain and Japan\" (June 1944).\n\n**See paragraph six of the Chapter of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee at Washington, FO371/46251.\n\n**SWNCC 111, 17 April 1945, op. cit.\n\nSWNCC 111, 17 April 1945, ibid.\n\n61 SWNCC 111/2, top secret, 14 June 1945, in ABC 014 Japan (13 April 44) see 32.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
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    {
        "id": 211343,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1988",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1988",
        "content_text": "35\n\nanimals as trophies, not in conservation of wildlife. As a result, concerted efforts were made to hunt giant panda in the Chinese mountains as big game was hunted in Africa.\n\nThe Roosevelt brothers\n\nThe first successful expedition to shoot a giant panda in its natural habitat was sponsored by the Field Museum of Chicago in 1928. Kermit and Theodore Roosevelt, sons of the irrepressible Teddy, undertook the task to \"collect the strange raccoon bears in the mountains of Yunnan and Sichuan\". It was a journey troubled by hostile weather, and equally treacherous terrain, further disturbed by intermittent encounters with marauding bandits. Local officials proved to be singularly unhelpful. Information provided by the populace turned out to be unreliable as well. The expedition gave credit to members of a local semi-agrarian Tibeto-Burman tribal people, the Lo-lo, for leading them to their prey on April 13, 1928.\n\nOn that day, the men had followed tracks on snow for three hours, finally detecting a giant panda asleep in a fir tree. Kermit Roosevelt wrote in an article in the Journal of the American Museum of Natural History:\n\n'Three hours' trailing through dense jungle brought us to the spot which (the giant panda) had selected for his siesta. We (Kermit and Theodore) caught sight of him emerging from the hollow bole of a giant fir tree, and fired simultaneously.\n\nTheir prize, the pelt of this giant panda, the first ever of the species to be shot by outsiders, was put on exhibition at the Field Museum. The Roosevelt brothers were hailed as innovative explorers who had contributed greatly to the advancement of zoological knowledge”.\n\nThereafter, similar expeditions sponsored by other learned institutions were launched.\n\nThe Sage expedition\n\nIn 1934, an expedition was sponsored by the American Museum of Natural History in New York. Led by Dean Sage Jr., the expedition",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211351,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1988",
        "page_number": 67,
        "title": "RAS-1988",
        "content_text": "43\n\nHarkness. Ruth, The Baby Giant Panda, New York: Garrick and Evans, 1938.\n\n1\n\nHu Jin Chu, \"Daxiongmao kao” [On giant pandas], Sichuan Kejibo 24 (Sichuan Journal of Science and Technology) 103 (3 July, 1980).\n\nKang Chingliang and Bi Fengzho, \"Wolong qu-wen\" (Interesting tidbits from Wolong), Sichuan Linyebao (Sichuan Forestry Ministry News), 254, 255, 256, (22, 25, 29 October, 1980).\n\nMorris, Romona and Desmond, The Giant Panda (1966), revised by Jonathan Barzdo, London: Macmillan, 1981.\n\nPei Wenzhong, \"Daxiongmao fazhan jianshi” (An outline of the development of the giant panda), Acta Zoologica Sinica 20:2:188-190 (June, 1974)\n\nRoosevelt, Kermit, \"The Search of the Giant Panda“, Journal of American Museum of Natural History XXX:3-6 (New York, 1930).\n\nSage, Dean Jr., \"In Quest of the Giant Panda”, Journal of American Museum of Natural History XXXV:309-320 (New York, 1935).\n\nSung edition of the Thirteen Classics, 1816 edition.\n\nSynthesis of Books and Illustrations of Ancient and Modern Times, first printed in 1722.\n\nSowerby, Arthur de C., \"The Pandas or Cat Bears\", China Journal of Science and Arts 17:6:296-299 (Shanghai, 1932).\n\n\"Hunting the Giant Panda\", China Journal of Science and Arts 21:30-32 (Shanghai, 1934).\n\n\"A Baby Panda Comes to Town\", China Journal of Science and Arts 25:6:335-330 (Shanghai, 1936).\n\n+\n\nWang Tsiang-ke, \"Guanyu daxiongmao zong di huafeng, dishe fengbu jichi yenhua lishe di tantao\" (On the Taxonomic Status of Species, Geological Distribution and Evolutionary History of Ailuropoda), Acta Zoologica Sinica 20:2:191-201 (June, 1974)\n\n+\n\nZhu Jing and Long Zhi, \"Daxiongmao di xingshuai\" (“The Vicissitudes of the Giant Panda\"), Acta Zoologica Sinica 29:1:93-104 (March, 1983).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211488,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1988",
        "page_number": 204,
        "title": "RAS-1988",
        "content_text": "180\n\nsafer for them to spend the night with us, as we were farther away from the seacoast.\n\nWhen I went to work the next day, I found that our office had been converted into a kitchen to feed the many volunteers (reportedly many ladies of the night) who had come to help. Our morgue was filled with bodies of civilian victims. The wounded were treated in several hospitals. The enemy planes had strafed some on land and some at sea in their fishing sampans, most of whom ironically were ethnic Japanese. Rumours were rampant about spies and sabotage, and of Japanese citizens being sent away to relocation camps. On the whole the Japanese wanted to show their loyalty to the United States and many Nisei volunteered to serve in the European theatre, forming the famous 442nd Battalion that fought so bravely in Italy and with such a great loss of lives. Among them was Samuel Sakamoto, husband of my good friend, Edna Sakamoto. A quiet gloom settled over the city and even the skies remained cloudy and depressing for weeks. It was not until after the Battle of Midway that the heavens seemed brighter and our spirits lighter. During the war years we found it so stifling with all windows covered to ensure total darkness that we chose to go to bed early and spend our waking moments listening to the radio. Amos and Andy and Allen's Alley were my favourite programmes. Occasionally I could catch Tokyo Rose's propaganda over the air.\n\nIn 1945 I was granted a leave of absence from work and clearance from the military to leave for the mainland to visit Mrs. Johnson. I left on 16 March 1945 on a small vessel, the S.S. Permanente, which was escorted by an armed submarine chaser. Because of the threat of being torpedoed, everyone was required to wear trousers and to carry an emergency kit. About twenty hours out to sea, an alert sounded. Although most of the passengers kept calm, my roommate became hysterical. She was a Jewish woman taking her infant daughter back to New York, leaving her husband, a defense worker, in Honolulu. It was rumoured that an enemy submarine had been sighted. Fortunately nothing happened. It took us eight days to cover a distance that normally took four and a half days. I left San Francisco for Lincoln, where I stayed with Mrs. Johnson for three months. While there, on 12 April 1945, we heard the sad news of President Roosevelt's death over the radio. I took this opportunity to visit Dora, Tso-chien and Eugene in Chicago before",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q",
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    {
        "id": 212403,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 345,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "322 \n\nwas also the proximate cause of American entry into World War II. Not until 1959, however, did it become one of the United States. \n\nIn Hawaii there was an important, American-backed annexationist movement; the Philippines, by contrast, were acquired largely due to the accident of the Spanish-American War of 1898, when Commodore (later Admiral) George Dewey sailed south from Hong Kong and defeated the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay. American troops initially cooperated with the Filipino insurgents who had for some time rebelled against Spanish rule; within a few months, however, Congress, after fierce debate, decided to keep the islands, the beginning of the most significant formal colonial episode in United States history. American involvement in the Philippines would illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the American approach to international affairs. The Filipino insurrection, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, was brutally suppressed by Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas), yet American rule was in many respects benign; indeed, the supposed American overlords were frequently manipulated by members of the Filipino elite for their own political ends. Even so, American possession of the Philippines fostered an unhealthy sense of dependency among Filipinos, still not entirely dissipated today, while overextending the United States strategically. As Theodore Roosevelt had foreseen more than thirty years earlier, in World War II the islands would prove indefensible, a military hostage and the United States' \"Achilles' heel\". \n\nAlthough Dudden fails to cite recent works by Ralph Eldin Minger on William Howard Taft's and Jack C. Lane on Leonard Wood's gubernatorial efforts in the Philippines, the early sections of the book are thorough and well-researched. Regrettably, the standards slip in his chapters on American relations with China and Japan in the decades before Pearl Harbour. Here, indeed, his determination to deal with each country in turn is a defect, since by World War I, if not before, United States policies towards China, Japan, and the Philippines were closely inter-related. The resulting repetition leads to a somewhat confused narrative. Dudden's grasp of the financial dealings between the United States government and private American bankers and China and Japan is shaky; the American Group of the Second China Consortium had not collapsed by the end of World War I, but was about to be established. His understanding of the complexities of interwar American State Department and governmental \n\nPage 345\nPage 346",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213401,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1994",
        "page_number": 223,
        "title": "RAS-1994",
        "content_text": "Roc, A S, China As I Saw It, London Hutchinson, 1910\n\nRomer, Charles Frederick, Foreign Investments in China, New York Macmillan, 1933\n\nRoosevelt, Kermit, The Search of the Giant Panda, Journal of American Museum of Natural History XXX 33-16(1930)\n\nRoss, Edward Alsworth, The Changing Chinese, The Conflict of Oriental and Western Cultures in China (Taipei Reprint Ch'eng-wen Publishing)\n\nRowbottom, Arnold H, Mission and Mandarins, the Jesuits at the Court of China, Berkley, University of California Press, 1942\n\nRoy, Jules, Journey Through China, London Faber, 1967\n\nRoyal Asiatic Society, Journal of Hong Kong Branch\n\nRoyal Asiatic Society, Journal of North China Branch\n\nQuested, R. K.I., The Expansion of Russia in East Asia 1857-1860, Kuala Lumpur University of Malaya Press, 1968\n\nSaeki, P Y, The Nestorian Monument and Relics in China, Tokyo. Toho Bunkwa Gakuin, 1937\n\nScidmore, Eliza Ruhamah, Westward to the Far East, a Guide to the Principal Cities of China and Japan, Montreal Canadian Pacific Railroad, 1894\n\nScott, Roderick, Fukien Christian University. Historical Sketch, New York United Board for Christian Colleges in China, 1954\n\nSebes, Joseph S.J., The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), Rome Institutum Historicum S.I., 1961\n\nSewell, William Gowan, The People of Wheelbarrow Lane Chengtu 1931-41, London Alfred and Unwin, 1972\n\nShaw, Robert, Visits to High Tartary, Yarkand and Kashgar, London John Murray, 1871 (Hong Kong Reprint. Oxford University Press)\n\nShaw, Samuel (1754-1794), The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, the First American Consul at Canton with Life of Author by Joseph Quincy, Boston W Crosby and H P Nichols, 1847\n\nSilverstein, Joseph and Lynn, David Marshall and Jewish Emigration from China, China Quarterly (London 1979)\n\nSino-Swedish Expedition 1927-1935, Reports from the Scientific Expedition to the North-Western Provinces of China Under the Leadership of Sven Hedin, with 54 folded maps,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216420,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 179,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "129\n\nChemulpo (later Inchon). This would drive north along thawing and impassable roads, across the Yalu River into Manchuria, heading for Liaoyang and Mukden (now known as Shenyang) north of the Liaodong peninsula. Then, with what remained of the Russian fleet bottled up in the harbour at Port Arthur, the second and main force would be landed some thirty miles north of Dalny (Dairen to the Japanese and now known as Dalian) cutting off Port Arthur at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula. The final stage was the landing of a third Japanese army in January 1905 and its assault on Port Arthur. The war began as planned with a Japanese 'Pearl Harbor' bombardment at Port Arthur, taking the Russian fleet by surprise.\n\nAlthough the Japanese met with a number of set-backs their overall plan succeeded. The crowning moments were the Fall of Port Arthur at the beginning of January 1905 and the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, the titanic clash between the Japanese fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet, the latter having made its slow progress across the world from Latvia in October 1904 to Tsushima seven months later, and to its fate and destruction. News of the devastating Japanese victory alarmed a number of Chinese officials who, whilst they did not wish Japan to lose, had not wanted her to gain such an overwhelming victory.\n\nFinally, after the eighteen month campaign the land war ended with the destruction of the Russian army before Mukden. The succeeding months were a matter of Japanese mopping-up operations and the capture of Liaoyang and Mukden.\n\nDuring the final stages of the war the Japanese finally took the fighting on to 'sacred' Russian territory when they invaded the large island of Sakhalin. This was of great political importance as it was regarded as Russian territory and, with rioting on the streets of the Russian major cities, the Russians realised that they had lost. Also at that point, Japan now holding most of the cards, but militarily and financially exhausted, sought President Roosevelt's good offices to bring about a peace conference. This took place in September 1905 concluding with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in the United States. The Russians ceded the Guandong peninsula (Chinese territory) and half of the island of Sakhalin to Japan but without having to pay any indemnity. The Russians, so the Japanese believed, had been allowed by the Americans to get away without paying any financial compensation.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390",
        "rank": 0
    }
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