[ { "id": 204479, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1962", "page_number": 111, "title": "RAS-1962", "content_text": "100\n\nJ. W. HAYES\n\nexerts itself with unprecedented vigour and hardihood in local affairs. No dispute arises but one or more of these social pests thrusts himself forward between the contending parties, and no fraud on the revenue or wholesale extortion is free from their similar influence\". Lockhart (through Governor Blake) says that the New Territory's literati \"have hitherto lived by irregular \"squeezes\" from the people\" and he blamed the opposition to British rule to them and to \"gamblers and bad characters banished from Hong Kong\" and not to the people who were incited by the gentry and elders. See Papers 1899 pp. 520 and 554.\n\n26 Papers 1899 p. 194.\n\n27 Papers 1899 p. 554.\n\n28 Arthur H. Smith Village Life in China (Edinburgh, Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, about 1900) p. 121.\n\n29 These affected the coastal and riverine regions of Kwangtung. See C. F. Neumann's Translations from the Chinese and Armenian with notes. 1. History of the pirates who infested the China Sea from 1807 to 1810, (London, John Murray 1831). This includes, pp. 97-125, a very interesting account of an enforced stay of eleven weeks and three days with the pirate fleet in 1809 by Richard Glasbrooke, the mate of an East Indiaman. The pirates spent a considerable time on and near Lantau, which must have suffered from their depredations. The clan record of the HO family of San Tsuen, Pui O, on the south side of the island mentions pirate raids and a decision to fortify the village with walls which can still be seen, with several embrasures for cannon.\n\nPiracy continued until a much later date. The Cheung Chau police station was attacked and burnt in 1912, necessitating its removal and enlargement, one of the Cheung Chau ferries was pirated in 1923, and in 1925 a band of sixty robbers from the Delta entered Tai O by way of Po Chue Tam creek, killed a woman and made off with young men and a fair amount of booty without any difficulty. The Police Station is situated at the other end of the town and knew nothing of the attack until it was over. See Administrative Reports, District Officer, New Territories 1912, 1923 and 1925.\n\n30 Papers 1899 p. 528.\n\n31 Foreign Office Report 1606 on Trade of Canton 1894.\n\n32 Salt was smuggled into China from Tai O as the government monopoly and price ring made it profitable to do so. See also Enclosure D to Sir Matthew Nathan's despatch No. 59 of 11 January 1905 in Correspondence relating to Kowloon-Canton Railway which mentions rice smuggling from Shum Chun and Deep Bay into Hong Kong. The export of rice from China was forbidden, and checked by the Imperial Maritime Customs.\n\n**F O Trade Report No. 1778 for 1895.\n\n34 F O Trade Report No. 1983 for 1896.\n\n33 Papers 1899, p. 540.\n\nBrenan, with his thirty-two years' service wrote feelingly \"The Chinaman is happiest who never sees an official, who does not even know the name of one\". J N CBRAS XXXII (1897-98) 37.\n\n31 Foreign Office Trade Report for Canton No. 1606 for 1894.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204548, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1963", "page_number": 29, "title": "RAS-1963", "content_text": "24 \n\nLINDSAY RIDE \n\nS. \n\nSCHAEFFER, Walther \n\n24 U \n\nSCOTLAND, Thomas \n\n80 L \n\nSCOTT, Frank \n\n50 L \n\nSENHOUSE, Humphrey Le Fleming \n\n136 L \n\nSENN VAN BASEL, Hugo Rudolph Jacobus \n\n99 L \n\nSETH, Dishkoonc \n\n8 U \n\nSIMPSON, Nathaniel \n\n128 L \n\nSLATE, Shamgar H. \n\n13 U \n\nSMITH, Frederick \n\n135 L \n\nSMITH, Samuel \n\nSPEER, Cornelia Brackenridge \n\nSPEER, Mary Cornelia \n\nSPENCER, Jane \n\n147 L \n\n140 L \n\n140 L \n\n81 L \n\nSTEWART, Louisa \n\n44 L \n\nT. \n\nSTEWART, Patrick \n\nSUTHERLAND, Isabella \n\nSUTHERLAND, Mary Clark \n\nSWEARLIN, Valentine \n\nT \n\nTARBOX, Hiram \n\nTEMPLETON, Isabella Anne \n\nTURNER, Richard \n\n44 L \n\nH \n\n113 L \n\n15 U \n\n65 L \n\n101 L \n\n76 L \n\n153 L \n\n+ \n\n93 L \n\nU. \n\nUNKNOWN \n\n156 L \n\nURMSON, Arthur Wilham \n\nURMSTON, George B. \n\n37 U \n\n115 L \n\nV. VROOMAN, Elizabeth C. \n\n36 U \n\nW. \n\nWALDRON, Thomas Westbrook \n\n75 L \n\nWALKER, Christian Cathro \n\n144 L \n\nWARREN, R.V... \n\n74 L \n\nWEDDERBURN, Eliza S... \n\n145 L \n\nWEST, Joseph James \n\n4 U \n\nWHELER, Charles J. \n\n152 L \n\nWILLIAMS, John P. \n\n23 U \n\nWILSON, John \n\nWINTLE, Frederick \n\n67 L \n\n155 L \n\nWISHART, John Key \n\n117 L \n\nWOODBERRY, Charles \n\n19 U \n\nWOODBERRY, Joel \n\n163 L \n\nY. YOUNG, Margaret Hutchison \n\n150 L \n\n2. ZEEMAN, Bernardus \n\n114 L", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1963.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/4m90m091v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205977, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 57, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "52 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\n12 Malcolm Struan Tonnochy (1840-1882). Educated at Blackheath Proprietary School and Trinity College, Cambridge. Hong Kong Civil Service 1862; died in office while Superintendent of Victoria Gaol. Obituaries of Tonnochy are to be found in the Hong Kong Telegraph, December 14 and 15, 1882, and China Mail, December 15, 1882. The Telegraph tells us \"that yesterday the deceased was in good spirits and played tennis in the afternoon, dined out with a friend, and was in the Club until shortly after midnight\", A Chinese barber found Tonnochy dead in bed when he came to shave him in the morning. He was a bachelor. \n\n13 Walter Meredith Deane (1840-1906). Educated St. Paul's School and Trinity College, Cambridge. Hong Kong Civil Service 1862; Captain Superintendent of the Police, 1866-1891. Deane was severely wounded on duty in 1878 and resigned in 1891 on account of ill-health. \n\n14 Sir Cecil Clementi Smith (1840-1916). Educated at St. Paul's School and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Hong Kong Civil Service 1862; promoted from Colonial Treasurer, Hong Kong, to Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements, 1878. Administered Government 1884-85; appointed Lieutenant-Governor and Colonial Secretary, Ceylon, 1886; Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Straits Settlements, 1887; H. M. High Commissioner and Consul-General for Borneo and Sarawak, 1889. \n\n15 Alfred Lister (1843-1890). Educated at University of London. Hong Kong Civil Service 1865; prepared detailed index to the Ordinances of Hong Kong in 1870; Colonial Treasurer 1883-90. Died on board ship near Yokohama while on sick leave, Lister held the office of Treasurer as an adjunct appointment only, and with an almost nominal salary, in conjunction with his substantive appointment of Postmaster-General, Lister left a wife and four children in England. See Hong Kong Telegraph, 15 June, 1890. Governor Des Voeux referred to Lister as an \"excellent officer\". \n\n**\n\n16 Sir James Russell (1843-1893). Educated at Queen's University, Belfast. Hong Kong Civil Service 1865; private secretary to Governor Sir Richard MacDonnell 1868; Police Magistrate 1870; Chief Justice of Hong Kong 1888. The Hong Kong Telegraph, 4 September, 1893, in an editorial entitled \"Sir Judas' Russell: His History\" declares \"You could not have been much of an expert in the Chinese language two short years after your appointment to a cadet-ship, yet in 1867, you were Government ‘Interpreter'\". The editorial referred to Russell as \"the Gargantua of Hong Kong social life\" and \"the Jeffries of the Hong Kong Bench\". The writer of the editorial was the atrabilious Robert Fraser-Smith, who founded the Hong Kong Telegraph in 1881. Since Fraser-Smith had been jailed several times for libel, he had reason to dislike the Chief Justice. (See Frank H. H. King and Prescott Clarke A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers, 1822-1911, Cambridge, Mass., 1965). Russell, a bachelor like Lister, died at Strathpeffer, Scotland, shortly after resigning from Government. \n\n17 Henry Ernest Wodehouse (1845-1929). Educated at Repton School. Hong Kong Civil Service 1867; retired on pension as Police Magistrate in 1898. One son, Peveril, was the first baby born on the Peak and brother of P. G. Wodehouse, the novelist. Wodehouse was the last of the batch of officials originally appointed to the Colony in the capacity of student interpreter. \n\n18 Sir James Haldane Stewart Lockhart (1858-1937). Educated at King William's College, Isle of Man, Watson's Academy, Edinburgh (gold medallist), and Edinburgh University (Greek medallist), Hong Kong Civil Service 1878; attached to the Colonial Office for one year; Registrar General 1887; Colonial Secretary 1895-1902; Special Commissioner to Inspect and Report on the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong, 1898; representative of Great Britain to delimit the boundaries of the extension of Hong Kong; first civil Commissioner of Weihaiwei, 1902; retired 1921.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206934, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1974", "page_number": 5, "title": "RAS-1974", "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nPRESIDENT'S Report for 1974 · 1\n\nHON. TREASURER'S REPORT FOR 1974 · 8\n\nTHE LIBRARY, 1974 · 10\n\nTRANSACTIONS OF THE BRANCH: · 12\n\nThe Paper Chase-Archives and the Public Records Office of Hong Kong (A lecture given on 7th January, 1974) - A. I. DIAMOND · 28\n\nAdventurers in Hong Kong: the Marquis de Morès and David de Mayréna (A lecture given on 29th March, 1974) - HENRY JAMES LETHBRIDGE · 58\n\nDogs and Horses in Ancient China (A lecture given on 27th May, 1974) CAROLE MORGAN · -\n\nARTICLES: · -\n\nThe Craft of God Carving in Singapore- KEITH G. STEVENS · -\n\n\"Oh for the Joys of England\": Lt. Orlando Bridgeman's Letters from China and Hong Kong, 1842-1843– ROBIN MCLACHLAN · -\n\nFather Ernesto Gherzi, S. J., 1886-1973—G. J. BELL · 68\n\nNotes on the Sources of De Mailla, Histoire Générale de la Chine-Richard Gregg Irwin, with Introduction by L. Carrington Goodrich · 76\n\nThe Monuments of Vientiane and Luang Prabang (Report of the RAS Tour to Laos, 23-24 January, 1974)— MICHAEL SMITHIES · 85\n\nThe Hong Kong Region: its place in Traditional Chinese Historiography and Principal Events since the Establishment of Hsin-an County in 1573....-JAMES HAYES · 108\n\nREPRINTED ARTICLES · 136\n\nPlace Names of Hong Kong and the New Territories (1958) K. M. A. BARNETT · 160\n\nLegends and Stories of the New Territories: Kam T'in (1935-38) (continued) SUNG HOK-PANG · -\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES · 188\n\nThe European Grave on Shek Kwu Chau, Hong Kong JEAN MOORE · -\n\n\"Fung Shui\" Woodlands-L. C. SHEN · 190\n\nUnusual Trees in Hong Kong: the Cassia Bark Tree- L. C. SHEN · 191\n\nTraditional Farming Techniques and their Survival in Hong Kong-P. L. SIAK · 196\n\nProgramme Notes for Visits to Places of Interest in Hong Kong and Kowloon, 1974: Kennedy Town, Old Wanchai, Old Western District, the Diocesan Boy's School and La Salle College, and Ceramic Factory and Sam Tung Uk, N.T. JAMES HAYES, CARL SMITH, HELGA WERLE et. al. · -\n\nBOOK REVIEWS · 235\n\nLIST OF MEMBERS · 245", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1974.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/x633mp077", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207196, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1974", "page_number": 267, "title": "RAS-1974", "content_text": "LIST OF MEMBERS\n\nORDINARY MEMBERS:\n\nSAPSTEAD, G.\n\nSCHWARZ, W. H.\n\nSCOBELL, C. L.\n\nSELWYN, J. B.\n\nSHAW, Dr. & Mrs. B. C.\n\nSHOEMAKER, J. F.\n\nSHU, Dr. H. T.\n\nSIEGEL, H. W.\n\nSIU, Miss A. V.\n\nSLEVIN, Brian\n\nSMITH, Rev. Carl T,\n\nSO, Dr. Chak Lam\n\nSOLOMON, Mrs. Miriam\n\nSPAIN, Mr. & Mrs. E. J.\n\nSTAFFORD, Peter\n\nSTEINER, Henry\n\nSTEMPEL, A.\n\nSTEWART, Miss J. M. C.\n\nSTRANGER-JONES, A. J.\n\nSTRICKLAND, John E.\n\nSTUMPF, K. L., O.B.E.\n\nSU, Ming-Hsuan\n\nSU, Samson\n\nTAYLOR, Mrs. V.\n\nTHOMA, Dr. Richard\n\nTHOMAS, Rik\n\nTHOMAS, Mrs. S. E.\n\nHighways Office, Public Works Dept., Murray Building, H.K.\n\nc/o Achelis (HK) Ltd., Kowloon City P.O. Box 9334, Kowloon City, Kowloon.\n\nPolice Headquarters, Arsenal Street, H.K.\n\n2404 Connaught Centre, H.K.\n\n72, Middleton Towers, 140, Pokfulam Rd., H.K.\n\n73, Kadoorie Avenue, Kowloon.\n\n70, Mt. Davis Road, H.K.\n\nc/o Bayer China Co. Ltd., 1916 Union House, H.K.\n\nFlat A, Hing Mee Bldg., 13th floor, 25-31 Leighton Road, H.K.\n\nPolice Headquarters, Arsenal Street, H.K.\n\nChung Chi College, Shatin, N.T.\n\nDept. of Geography & Geology, University of Hong Kong, H.K.\n\n2 Wongneichong Gap Road, F5, Woodland Heights, H.K.\n\nD28 Burnside Estate, Repulse Bay, H.K.\n\nc/o The Mandarin Hotel, Connaught Road, C., H.K.\n\nGraphic Communication Ltd., Printing House, 6 Duddell Street, H.K.\n\nc/o Gilman Office Machines, 41st floor, Connaught Centre, H.K.\n\n28, Lancashire Road, Kowloon.\n\n12E, Cliffview Mansions, 25, Conduit Rd., H.K.\n\nc/o The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., G.P.O. Box 64, H.K.\n\nLutheran World Federation, Dept. of World Service, 33 Granville Road, Kowloon.\n\n28 Broadway, 10-B Mei Foo Sun Chuen, Kowloon.\n\nc/o Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd., 12 Queen's Road, C., H.K.\n\n6A Pekao House, 30 Conduit Road, H.K.\n\n44, Mt. Kellet Road, 3A, Mountain Lodge, H.K.\n\n31 Conduit Road, 9th floor, H.K.\n\nC-3, Clearwater Bay Apts, Clearwater Bay Road, Kowloon.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1974.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/x633mp077", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207237, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 5, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nPRESIDENT'S REPORT\n\nTREASURER's Report\n\nTHE LIBRARY: and the Library Rules\n\nTRANSACTIONS OF THE BRANCH :\n\nI\n\nPage\n\n1\n\n9\n\n13\n\n16\n\nA Hong Kong Spirit-Medium Temple-JOHN T. MYERS\n\nMerchant Organisations in Late Imperial China: Patterns of Change and Development-WELLINGTON K. K. CHAN\n\n28\n\nChina's Economic Planning and Changing Geography—CHIAO-MIN HSIEH\n\n43\n\n∞ NOA\n\n48\n\n61\n\n71\n\n88\n\nARTICLES:\n\nIncident between the Hong Merchants and the Super-cargoes of the British East India Company in Canton, 1811—J. L. Cranmer-BYNG\n\nThe Great Plague of Hong Kong-E. G. PRYOR\n\nNotes on Chiuchow Opera-Helga Werle\n\nCondition of the European Working Class in Nineteenth Century Hong Kong-HENRY JAMES LETHBRIDGE\n\nThe Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ch'ing Practice-RICHARD J. SMITH\n\n113\n\nThe Pacific Oyster Industry in Hong Kong-BRIAN MORTON AND P. S. WONG\n\nCaptive Surgeon in Hong Kong: the Story of the British Military Hospital, Hong Kong 1942-1945- DONALD C. Bowie\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES:\n\n...\n\nThe Pottery Kilns at Wun Yiu, Tai Po-J. W. HAYES\n\nThe Noon Day Gun-CARL T. SMITH\n\nThe German Congregation in Hong Kong until 1914-CARL T. SMITH\n\n139\n\n150\n\n291\n\n292\n\n292\n\n295\n\nBoat People's Ceremonies observed from Island House, Tai Po-D. AKERS JONES\n\n300\n\nThe RAS Photographic Survey in Hong Kong—H. A. RYDINGS\n\n311\n\nChief Marshal T'ien, patron of the stage, of musicians and wrestlers-East and South East China-K. G. STEVENS\n\n303\n\nChang Yu-tang and an old Hanging Scroll from Cheung Chau-FRANCIS S. Y. SHAM AND JAMES Hayes\n\nHung Hom: an Early Industrial Village in Old British Kowloon-Carl T. SMITH AND JAMES HAYES\n\nTyphoon Preparations in 1903\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\n318\n\n324\n\n327", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207353, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 121, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "THE EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT: \n\nCHINESE TRADITION AND LATE CH'ING PRACTICE \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH* \n\nDespite China's persistent and often pronounced Sinocentrism, and her general distrust of aliens in the interior, the theoretically self-sufficient Middle Kingdom in practice had to make almost continual use of foreign military talents. This was true not only of conquest dynasties and periods when martial values were disesteemed.2 The expansive Chinese dynasties of Han and T'ang also employed barbarians in a great number of civil and military capacities. It has been estimated, for example, that at times more than half of the T'ang military posts were held by men of foreign origin.3 So pronounced was Tang Wu-tsung's appreciation for foreign administrative and military talents that he commissioned his minister, Li Te-yü, to compile the biographies of thirty foreigners from Ch'in to T'ang times who had rendered \"meritorious and loyal\" service to China. This two chuan work, no longer extant, bore the title I-yü kuei-chung chuan (Biographies of Foreigners Who Returned to Loyalty), emphasizing the idea that it was natural for outsiders to come to the fold of Chinese culture and offer their submission and service to the Middle Kingdom.4 \n\nWe do not know who the thirty individuals who \"left [their] distant lands and returned to China\" were, but there are several likely candidates. By looking briefly at a few representative foreigners in the Chinese military service, and examining the foreword to the I-yü kuei-chung chüan (preserved in Li Te-yu's collected works) and other evidence, we may gain some idea of the theory behind employing barbarian officers, as well as the circumstances under which they were engaged, the standards by which their loyalty was judged, and the means by which they were controlled. Such a survey provides the necessary backdrop for a discussion of Chinese policy toward foreign employees in the late Ch'ing period, when China faced unprecedented challenges both within and without.5 \n\nAlthough by 1860 at least a few Chinese had come to see that China was entering a new stage in her foreign relations, Chinese \n\n* Dr. Smith is Assistant Professor of History, Rice University, Houston, Texas.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207354, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 122, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "114\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\npolicymakers tended to respond to the unprecedented situation in terms of their own sophisticated tradition of \"managing\" barbarians. The theoretical foundations of this tradition have been much discussed, although usually with reference to China's external relations. Its practical application has received little systematic study apart from inquiries into the structure and operation of the well-known tributary system. Against the background of Chinese tradition in both its dimensions--theory and practice--this article examines the major features of Ch'ing policy toward foreign military employees in the T'ung-chih period (1862-1874), when Western influences first became a significant factor in China's military affairs. It argues that behind the rhetoric of the Chinese world order throughout the imperial era lay realistic, sophisticated and generally effective policies of \"barbarian management,\" which were neither inherently \"unmodern,\" nor even uniquely Chinese. Furthermore, it suggests that the Ch'ing throne was more flexible in its outlook toward Western barbarians than is generally recognized, and that its failure to go further in abandoning its Sinocentrism may be explained largely by the behavior of the barbarians themselves.\n\nThe Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Policy\n\nClassical sanction for the use of foreigners to serve Chinese purposes may be traced to the Tso-chuan (Commentary of Tso), a work written during the chaotic Warring States period, which referred to the practice of using the talents (lit., materials) of the semi-barbarian Ch'u state for the purposes of the Chin state (Ch'u-ts'ai Chin-yung). As employed by later writers, the phrase usually implied the notion that barbarians would willingly turn toward or revert to Chinese civilization (hsiang-hua or kuei-hua) and offer their allegiance. Other classical literature reinforced this view of China's cultural superiority, emphasizing the natural gravitation of foreigners to the Middle Kingdom.10 Mencius provided the neat formula, \"using [the doctrines of] China to transform the barbarian\" (yung-Hsia pien-i), a phrase which became the standard expression of Chinese ethnocentrism for the next twelve hundred years.11 The reverse theme (yung-i pien-Hsia) served as a derogatory epithet to be hurled at those who had allegedly departed from the Chinese cultural tradition.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207356, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 124, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "116\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\ndeterioration of prospects in their homeland. Many foreign military men in the Chinese service came from aristocratic families, some as hostages. At times barbarians came to China as temporary allies, returning home after a limited tour of duty.\" Although the general tendency was to measure barbarian devotion by the yardstick of cultural submission, Chinese policymakers recognized that personal, bureaucratic and economic pressures necessarily complemented cultural controls. If an individual did not wholly accept the constraints of Chinese culture and the Confucian value system, he might still be ensnared by having a material stake in Chinese affairs or at least bound by personal relations and institutional limitations.\n\nEconomic inducements were particularly important, given the common stereotype of foreigners as \"animal-like\" and avaricious.18 In the eyes of many, barbarians could never possess what Ch'en Yen described as a “Chinese heart” (Hua-hsin). As the Han thinker Tung Chung-shu put it: \"People like the Hsiung-nu cannot be converted by humanity and justice, but can only be appeased with huge profit, and tied down by an appeal to Heaven.\"19 Chia I, another Han scholar, developed the strategy of the \"three standards and five baits” (san-piao wu-erh), designed to spoil the senses and win the hearts of barbarians through flattery, personal attention, imperial favor and material attractions.20 Yet another policymaker, the Ming statesman Chang Chü-cheng, sought to combine the carrot and the stick. In response to the question, \"How can one hold responsible the arrogant, bellicose barbarians who have surrendered only recently?\" Chang answered: Treat the foreigners like dogs, throwing them bones when they wag their tails and whipping them when they bark.21\n\nMultiple restraints were deemed essential to the effective management of foreign military employees, for military affairs remained a closely guarded sphere of imperial control. The use of aliens in a civil capacity involved comparatively few risks. Outsiders with administrative ability were often genuinely attracted by the refinements of Chinese culture and, in any case, were checked by the usual limitations of civil bureaucratic power. But foreign military men, more likely to be unlettered and unimbued with civil virtues, were less susceptible to cultural and bureaucratic restraints. Since such individuals might command or control large numbers of troops, it was of special concern to the Chinese that their loyalty be both", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207358, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 126, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "118\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nbeen a Jung envoy sent to observe Duke Mu's sagacious administration before taking service with Ch'in. Over two thousand years after Li Ssu outlined Yu Yü's achievements in a successful bid to forestall the expulsion of aliens from Ch'in, the Chinese still pointed to the former Jung subject as an example of China's profitable employment of foreigners who had “devoted [their] loyalty” (hsiao-chung) to the Middle Kingdom.26\n\nMuch of traditional practice regarding the employment of barbarians, like much of traditional Chinese foreign policy generally, derived from experience in the Han. From the time of Wu-ti on, phrases such as “using barbarians to attack barbarians” and “using barbarians to check barbarians” had become part and parcel of Chinese policy toward foreign tribes. Alliances were often formed with outsiders through marriage, and the use of native chieftains to govern border barbarians became an accepted practice—in time institutionalized as the fu-ssu system. Yu Ying-shih's masterful study of Han foreign relations is particularly useful in identifying these and other early forms of \"barbarian management.\"27\n\nFor much of the Han period, and especially during the reign of Wu-ti, open enmity existed between China and the fierce Hsiung-nu. Yet even so, the Chinese made abundant use of these dangerous but militarily useful barbarians, establishing an often-invoked precedent. Not only were surrendered Hsiung-nu soldiers incorporated into Chinese forces as cavalrymen, but individual barbarians also found employment in the Han army as officers.28 Those barbarian commanders who submitted to China (k'uan-sai, lit., to \"knock at the frontiers\") together with a large number of barbarian troops were particularly likely to receive substantial military appointments; but individuals with far different backgrounds might also rise to the heights of the Han civil or military bureaucracy on the whim of the emperor. Perhaps the most noteworthy example is Chin Mi-ti, a member of Hsiung-nu royalty who, at the age of fourteen, was captured by the Chinese and enslaved. Eventually, Chin gained Wu-ti's attention, won his confidence and affection, and rose to a high and influential position as a result. He served the emperor faithfully in a variety of important civil and military posts, including General of Chariots and Cavalry (ch'e-ch'i chiang-chün), and although certain members of the court resented his power and prestige because he was an alien, Chin conformed in every way to the dictates of Chinese society. It is not surprising that he married", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207360, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 128, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "120\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nbeen awarded the imperial surname in 869 for his military exploits. Although Li K’o-yung's loyalty was not as unwavering as either Ch'i-pi's or Kao's, his tribal and provincial armies were considered the best in the empire, and his services—particularly during the rebellion of Huang Ch'ao (875-884)—were therefore indispensable to the throne. He was given high rank and large financial awards in the hope of securing his fidelity, but in the end he became a virtually independent warlord.37\n\nLess prominent in the record, but no less significant, is the employment of Wen-mo-ssu (Ormudz), a Uighur prince who submitted, together with more than 2,000 of his troops, to the T'ang after the destruction of the Uighur capital by the Khirgiz in 840. It was his submission that inspired the compilation of the I-yü kuei-chung chuan as a monument to foreign loyalty and military merit.38 Descriptions of Wen-mo-ssu's \"return\" to China, and his career as a T'ang military officer, highlight the behavior patterns and attitudes of barbarian employees deemed most admirable by the Chinese: Loyalty and sincerity, “intuitive” knowledge of right behavior, respect for the throne, and admiration for Chinese ways. These were clear indications that the barbarian had \"turned toward Chinese civilization.\"39 But the Chinese could also admit freely the practical circumstances of the Uighur prince's submission. Li Te-yü, in fact, considered the decision to leave a “disordered state\" evidence of Wen-mo-ssu's wisdom—an additional attribute.40\n\nAs a Chinese officer, Wen-mo-ssu conformed to, and even exceeded, the expectations of his imperial masters. A zealous partisan, who devoted his \"utmost efforts\" to defending China, Wen-mo-ssu was also fully conversant with Chinese customs. As evidence of his complete \"return\" to China, the former Uighur aristocrat requested that he be allowed to marry and make his home in the Middle Kingdom. Obviously such loyalty could not go unrewarded. In addition to enfeoffment, high office and material awards such as banners and leopard tails, Wen-mo-ssu received the imperial surname as a mark of the throne's favor; henceforth he was known as Li Ssu-chung (lit., Li, whose thoughts are loyal). As might be expected of tradition-minded officials and the throne, requests for such honors, as well as the edicts in response, often looked to classic literature and precedent for sanction.41\n\nBut the employment of foreigners in the T'ang, as had been the case in Han times, was not without its hazards. Arab and Turkish", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207362, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 130, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "122\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nDuring the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty, a great many Indians, Sogdians, Uighurs, Persians and even Europeans occupied key positions within the Chinese civil and military bureaucracy. Marco Polo is perhaps the most famous of these individuals, but he is by no means the most important.46 Foreigners enjoyed a distinct advantage in obtaining official posts during the Yuan period owing to the Mongol policy of discrimination against Han Chinese. As a result, the percentage of non-Chinese in the Yuan bureaucracy was much higher than it would later be in the other great “barbarian” dynasty, the Ch'ing. According to the Institutes of the Yuan Dynasty (Yuan tien-chang), in the early fourteenth century foreigners held more than one quarter of all provincial posts and almost one half of those at court. It may be assumed that the majority of foreign employees within the Yuan bureaucracy were military men.47\n\nThe multi-national armed forces of the Mongols included not only troops and officers from the \"Western Regions” (hsi-yu), but also guards regiments stationed at Peking comprised of Alans (i.e., Ossetes), Tanguts, Jurchen, Koreans, Qipchaq and even Russians. According to the Yuan History (Yuan-shih), the total number of Russians in the Peking guard in 1330 was about ten thousand men. These troops were given land north of Peking and settled there as military colonists. Among the various other foreign forces in the Mongol service was a Mohammedan (Hui-hui) artillery corps.48\n\nBy the time of the first Ming emperor, resentment over Yuan (i.e., barbarian) rule had produced a particularly strong anti-foreign reaction. Chu Yuan-chang, founder of the dynasty, was openly hostile toward barbarians and did his best to limit their influence.49 Yet even during Chu's reign (the Hung-wu period), foreigners served the Ming as military and naval commanders, imperial advisers, diplomatic officers and civil bureaucrats. Surprisingly, despite a strong bias against them, Mongols were employed extensively in China during the Ming—mostly in the army, but also in other areas of Chinese administration. Although Mongol soldiers were generally separated from Chinese soldiers, high military posts were not in fact closed to men of Mongol origin.50\n\nNor were Europeans excluded from positions of military responsibility. Indeed, the Jesuits, who gained influence at the Chinese capital in the seventeenth century by virtue of their scientific skills and, significantly, their willingness to conform to Chinese customs,51", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207364, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 132, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "124\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nTo be sure, the Ch'ing dynasty was not blindly anti-foreign, having accepted both Russians and other Europeans (the Dutch) as allies, and having allowed a number of Russians to be \"naturalized\" (kuei-hua) and incorporated into the elite Banner forces.58 But the ever-tightening strait-jacket of neo-Confucian orthodoxy under the Manchus, and the rise of anti-foreign (particularly anti-Christian) propaganda, did not portend a friendly reception for Westerners when they attempted to \"open\" China by force in the nineteenth century.\n\nThe Nineteenth Century Context\n\nBy the mid-nineteenth century, the West had earned China's well-deserved distrust for its aggressiveness and intractability. Pronounced anti-foreignism (championed, ironically, by a scholar of Mongol extraction in the 1860's) blossomed after the Opium War of 1839-1842 and grew apace with further Western economic, military and religious activity in China. During the Opium War, the throne had countenanced, and even encouraged, limited and unobtrusive military assistance from Americans in the time-honored tradition of \"using barbarians against barbarians.\" In the area of Canton, for example, a few individuals \"dressed in Chinese costume\" assisted the Chinese in building fortresses and casting cannon.59 But by the Hsien-feng emperor's reign, China had adopted a belligerent anti-Western stance, and despite the panic precipitated by the Taiping outbreak in 1850-1851, the throne seemed totally indisposed to accept any kind of foreign assistance against the rebels. The situation did not change appreciably until 1860, when the British and French occupied Peking in an attempt to enforce the provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858).60\n\nAfter the signing of the Peking Conventions in late 1860, which ushered in a new period of \"cooperation\" between China and the foreign powers, Western barbarians began playing a prominent role in Chinese military affairs. A number of diverse individuals became involved: Foreign military men and diplomatic officials, customs personnel, swashbuckling adventurers, and even missionaries.61 On the whole, the participation of these individuals fell within the bounds of China's long tradition of \"borrowing talent from foreign lands\" (chieh-ts'ai i-ti).62 But unlike alien employees in earlier periods of Chinese history, Westerners in the nineteenth century were a new breed of barbarian, confident of their own cultural and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207366, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 134, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "126\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nWhen Ward's employment was first reported to the throne in early 1862, the governor of Kiangsu, Hsueh Huan, took special pains to point out that Ward, in addition to being a courageous and seemingly invincible warrior, was also a loyal servant of the throne, who had petitioned to become a Chinese subject and to change to Chinese ways. Although Ward's petition had in fact been submitted almost a year earlier in a successful attempt to avoid prosecution (this was, of course, unmentioned in the memorial), Hsueh argued that it would be \"inconvenient to repress the sincerity\" of his \"wholehearted turning toward [Chinese] civilization\" (hsiang-hua). Hsüeh suggested that Ward should be granted the fourth rank button and peacock feather in order to encourage him to \"admire right behavior and establish merit” (mu-i li-kung). In response, the throne issued an edict conferring the honors, satisfied that the foreigner had indeed \"turned out of admiration toward Chinese customs\" (hsiang-mu Hua-feng). He was, in Peking's eyes, sincere, helpful and obedient, \"surely worthy of admiration and esteem.”67\n\nIn subsequent months, Ward received additional rewards: the third rank button, brevet rank as colonel, and finally \"expectant\" colonel status. By all accounts he was a brave and singularly effective commander. At the same time, however, he was a brash individual, whose independent spirit and flamboyant style offended, and occasionally alarmed, the Chinese. As Ward's prestige and self-confidence grew, criticisms of his behavior began to appear in memorials to the throne. Hsieh Huan, for one, began to complain of his arrogance and unmanageability. Prince Kung, a leading figure in both the Grand Council and the Tsungli Yamen, found Ward to be proud, boastful, and overly independent. The throne, for its part, expressed special concern over Ward's failure to shave his head and change to Chinese clothing. (Particularly damaging was Hsüeh's report that the barbarian commander had failed to conform to Chinese customs because he feared the ridicule of foreigners!) From Peking's vantage point, the acceptance of Chinese culture was the principal means of gauging the foreigner's receptiveness to imperial control. When Ward failed to conform to the dictates of propriety, his actions cast doubt on his sincerity, and perhaps more importantly, on the efficacy of traditional restraints.68\n\nAll Chinese did not view Ward's indiscretions as matters of great concern, however. Hsüeh's successor as governor, Li Hung-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207368, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 136, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "128\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nto his loyal soul” (i-wei chung-hun). The throne, for its part, expressed profound grief over Ward's death, and ordered that special posthumous honors, including the erection of memorial temples, be bestowed upon this upright, brave, and “irreproachable” warrior.72\n\nWard as a Model for Barbarian Employees\n\nIt is perhaps not surprising that Ward's employment became the standard for other foreign employees in the Chinese military service. Soon after his death, an imperial edict expressed the view that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops and be granted military authority, they had, like Ward, \"to petition requesting to be enrolled on the Chinese population register [p'an-t'u] and be willing to accept Chinese control [chieh-chih].\"73 At least in part because of such stipulations, Ward's second in command, Henry Burgevine, assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army in October, 1862. Like his predecessor, Burgevine had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, and expressed his willingness not only to accept Chinese control, but also to be bound by Chinese law.74 In the course of his career he had been granted honors similar to those bestowed upon Ward, and had also married a Chinese. But he did not enjoy a close personal or business relationship with any Chinese officials, and in time he clashed with his Chinese sponsors. After a quarrel with Yang Fang in early 1863, Burgevine was dismissed by the Ch'ing authorities and branded a “rebel” (ni).75 Eventually he joined the Taipings, and although subject to Chinese jurisdiction by the terms of his own petition, Burgevine avoided prosecution owing to the intercession of foreign officials. In 1865, he drowned under mysterious circumstances while in the custody of the Chinese authorities.76\n\nThe Burgevine episode highlighted the inadequacy of cultural controls in \"managing\" barbarian employees. But even before Burgevine's \"rebellion,\" the Chinese had begun to appreciate the limitations of cultural submission as a determinant of loyalty. On December 6, 1862, the throne received a joint memorial from Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang which spelled out these limitations on the basis of their experience with Ward. Hsüeh and Li harbored few illusions about the American commander and his motives. Pointing out that Ward had indicated his willingness to become a Chinese subject, but had never shaved his head or changed to Chinese clothing, the two officials went on to state that despite his", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207370, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 138, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "130 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\nArmy,83 Others, such as Captain Coney, Baron de Meritens, and William Winstanley, headed foreign-training programs established in treaty port areas. Still others, including John Pennell, Halliday Macartney, and William Mesny, served in Chinese armies as individual instructors or officers.85 Forced by circumstance to employ these foreigners, the Chinese became quite adept at handling them—despite China's disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the West. \n\nAs in the past, Ch'ing officials paid their foreign employees well, at the same time subjecting them to close surveillance, and fostering personal relationships with them as a means of control. In addition, however, they also took special pains to define regular channels of communication and command, and specified roles and responsibilities through the use of detailed regulations and written agreements.86 Furthermore, in rewarding loyal foreign service, the Chinese authorities went beyond simply arranging for edicts of praise and encouragement, the dispensing of ranks and titles, and the bestowal of traditional marks of imperial favor such as peacock feathers, silk, animal skins, and silver. They also began notifying foreign governments of the accomplishments of their respective nationals, and distributing foreign-style (as opposed to Chinese-style) medals—a rather significant departure from traditional practice. The throne even went so far as to acknowledge in 1864 that since Westerners especially esteemed foreign-style medals, these awards were the most generally appropriate expression of imperial gratitude.87 \n\nTo be sure, Peking continued to reward evidence of cultural submission, casting it in traditional terms of imperial condescension. The cases of Pennell and Mesny provide striking examples of this tendency.88 Moreover, throughout the nineteenth century, even as the Chinese world order crumbled about them, Ch'ing policymakers continued to use expressions such as \"turning toward Chinese civilization,\" \"cherishing and soothing men from afar,” and “using [the doctrines of] China to transform the barbarian.\" Policymakers also persisted in referring to both ancient and more modern precedent in order to justify (or argue against) the employment of barbarians in Chinese military affairs. Allusions to the use of foreign \"allies\" as the Hsiung-nu and Uighurs, as well as references to such diverse individuals as Yu Yü, Chin Mi-ti, Ch'i-pi Ho-li, and Gordon, continue to crop up in Ch'ing documents of the 1890's", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207372, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 140, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "132\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nbecame American citizens,93 Meiji Japan held similar views and pursued similar policies. In short, China's response to the basic problems of employing foreign military men, although tinged with specific characteristics of Chinese political culture such as a special emphasis on personalistic relations, was reasonably enlightened, and not fundamentally different from that of other countries, Asian or Western.95\n\nChina's attempt to build a modern, Western-trained officer corps in the T'ung-chih period did not fail because the foreigners she employed refused to become Chinese subjects or to accept Chinese culture. It failed primarily because the Chinese did not use foreign military assistance in a systematic and sustained way, as did, for example, Meiji Japan. Plagued by continual foreign meddling, and unwilling to fundamentally restructure the existing military establishment with its carefully devised system of checks and balances, the weak Ch'ing government neglected to sponsor meaningful, centralized military reform, dooming itself to defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1894-95.97\n\nNOTES\n\n1 See, for example, Edward Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), esp. p. 49, 291 note 75; Henry Serruys, \"Were the Ming against the Mongols settling in North China?,\" Oriens Extremus, 6 (1959), 136ff; etc.\n\n2 For the employment of foreigners under these circumstances, consult Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers (Leiden, 1965); Lei Hai-tsung, Chung-kuo wen-hua yû Chung-kuo ti ping [Chinese Culture and the Chinese Military] (Ch'ang-sha, 1940); Michael Loewe, Imperial China (New York, 1969), 182.\n\n3 Kuwabara Jitsuzo, “On P'u Shou-keng,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, 7 (1935), 44-45; also Su Ch'ing-pin, (Liang Han ch'i Wu-tai ju-chi Chung-kuo chih fan shih-tsu yen-chiu) [Research on barbarian families residing in China during the period from the Han to the Five Dynasties] (Hong Kong, 1967), 2; Wai-ming George Yuan, \"Ko Son-ji (Kao Hsien-chih): A Korean in the Chinese Military Service,” Asea Yongu, 13.3 (1970), 160.\n\n4 See the forward to this work in Li Te-yü's collected writings, Li Wei-kung hui-ch'ang i-pin chih [The collected works of Li Te-yu] (Shanghai, 1937), chüan 2, 10-11 (consecutive pagination). The book is listed in the sections on literature in the T'ang-shu (2:20) and the Sung-shih (2:19a). All references to the dynastic histories are to the po-na edition.\n\n5 I have discussed these challenges and their implications in a forthcoming study entitled . (University of California Press).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207374, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 142, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "134\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n15 Cited in Mary Ferenczy, \"Chinese Historiographers' Views on Barbarian-Chinese Relations (14-16th C.), Acta Orientalia, 21.3 (1968), 356-357.\n\n16 See Su Ch'ing-pin, 1-2, 596-597. As might be expected, the vocabulary of submission was highly refined, and often connected with the idea of return (kuei): Some common terms included: \"[to come to] adhere to China' (nei-fu); “return and submit” (kuei-fu or kuei-chiang); “return to loyalty\" (kuei-chung); “turn toward [Chinese] civilization” (hsiang-hua), etc. Related terms referring to specific values included \"return to sincerity\" (kuei-ch'eng), \"return to right behavior\" (kuei-i) and “return to virtue\" (kuei-te). For the use of these various expressions in the context of employing foreigners in military affairs, consult Li Te-yü, chüan 2, 8, 10-11; chüan 5, 31, 34; chüan 7, 56-57; chüan 8, 59, 60-61; chüan 13, 101-103, 104, 108-109; chüan 14, 117; chüan 19, 159-160. See also Michael Loewe, \"Chinese Relations with Central Asian, 260-90,\" in the Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies, 32 (1969), 100.\n\n17 For a discussion of the circumstances under which a foreigner might gravitate to China, see Su Ch'ing-pin, 1-3 and especially 596-597; also Ch'u Tung-tsu, Han Social Structure (Seattle and London, 1972), 138-139; L. S. Yang, \"Hostages in Chinese History,\" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 15 (1952), 512; Wang Yi-t'ung, \"Slaves and Other Comparable Social Groups during the Northern Dynasties (386-618),\" HJAS, 16 (1953), 295; Yu Ying-shih, Trade and Expansion in Han China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967); Colin Mackerras, trans., The Uighur Empire (Columbia, S.C., 1972) and the numerous works by Henry Serruys in HJAS 17 (1954) and 22 (December, 1957), Oriens Extremus 6 (1959) and 8 (1961), Monumenta Serica 25 (1966), etc.\n\n18 See the informative discussion of Chinese stereotypes regarding barbarians in Earl Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbarians (New Haven, 1951), 43-53.\n\n19 Cited in Yang, \"Historical Notes,\" 28.\n\n20 Ibid., 28-29.\n\n21 Ibid., 31.\n\n22 Ch'ien and Goodrich, 8. \"Before the Yuan, people of the Western Regions who served as officials in China were mostly military men; very few distinguished themselves in cultural affairs.\"\n\n23 See Henry Serruys, \"Mongols Ennobled during the Early Ming,” HJAS, 22 (December, 1957). For the use of the term \"turning toward Chinese civilization” (hsiang-hua) with reference to the submission of Chinese rebels, see IWSM, TC 12:26.\n\n24 See, for example, Serruys, \"Were the Ming against the Mongols,\" 136ff.; also note 43.\n\n25 Cited in Derk Bodde, China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as Seen in the Life of Li Ssu, 280 (?)-208 B.C. (Leiden, 1938), 14-15. For background on Yu Yü, consult Edouard Chavannes (trans.), Les mémoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien (Paris, 1895-1905), II: 40-45; also Shih chi, 5: 15b-17b; 68: 7b-8; 83: 13a-b; 87: 3a-b; 110: 4b.\n\n26 IWSM, TC 79; 11; Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao [Historical materials on late Ch'ing foreign relations], (Peiping, 1932; hereafter WCSL) 129: 17.\n\n27 See Yu cited in note 17.\n\n28 See Michael Loewe, \"The Campaigns of Han Wu-ti,” in Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 79 and 89; Chun-chu Chang, \"Military Aspects of Han", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207375, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 143, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n135\n\nWu-ti's Northwestern Campaigns,\" HJAS, XXVI (1966), 170, 172-173; Yü, 14; Lattimore, 485. Northern barbarian cavalry units were designated Hu-ch'i; southern barbarian units were called Yueh-ch'i.\n\n29 Michael Loewe, \"The Case of Witchcraft in 91 B.C.,\" Asia Major, XV.2 (1970), 180-181 traces Chin's career, major offices, and impact. See also Han-shu, 7: 1b; 38: 21ff; 68: 2a-b, 20b; 112: 16a-b.\n\n30 G. Haloun, \"The Liang-chou Rebellion 184-221 A.D.,\" Asia Major, I (1949-1950), 119; 121. Note the interesting case of Chao Hsin, discussed in Loewe, \"The Campaigns,\" 79.\n\n31 WSM, TC 79; 11; WCSL, 129: 17.\n\n32 Cited in Ch'ien and Goodrich, 9.\n\n33 See, for example, Yü, 205; Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History (New York, 1963), 99; Eberhard, 126; etc.\n\n34 Mackerras, 56-61, especially 60-61.\n\n35 See Su Ch'ing-pin, 399; Yüan, 160; Gabriella Molé, The T'u-yü-hun from the Northern Wei to the Time of the Five Dynasties (Rome, 1970), 157, 163, 167, 169, 180.\n\n36 See Yüan, 153-163; Su Ch'ing-pin, 589.\n\n37 See Wang Kung-wu, The Structure of Power in North China During the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur, 1962); also Su Ch'ing-pin, 399.\n\n38 The preface to this work is very illuminating. Therein, Li Te-yü describes the general circumstances of Wen-mo-ssu's submission, making repeated reference to past experience with submissive barbarians and lauding the present emperor's virtue. After extolling Wen-mo-ssu's merits, Li suggests that just as the Hsiao-ching (Classic of Filial Piety) defines the proper relationship of ruler and minister, father and son, so the I-yü kuei-chung chuan defines the proper behavior of foreign employees in the Chinese service. Implicit in the comparison is the idea that Li is to T'ang Wu-tsung what Tseng Ts'an was to Confucius. For further information on Wen-mo-ssu, see Chang Ch'ün, T'ang-tai hsiang-hu an-chih k'ao [An examination of the treatment of surrendered barbarians in the Tang dynasty]. Hsin-Ya hsieh-pao [New Asia College Journal], 1.1 (August, 1955), 310-311; James R. Hamilton, Les Ouïghours à l'époque des Cinq Dynasties d'après les documents chinois (Paris, 1955), 69, 71, 153-154; Su Ch'ing-pin, 397; Hsin T'ang-shu, 217(B) [lieh-chuan, 142 hsia]: 1-3; T'ang-shu, lieh-chuan, 145: 13-14.\n\n39 Li Te-yü, 2: 10-11; see also ibid., 7: 56; 8: 57; etc.\n\n40 Ibid., 2: 11.\n\n41 Ibid., 5: 29, 31; 5: 33-35; 7: 56; 8: 59-60; 13: 101-109; 19: 159-160.\n\n42 See Mackerras, 14-47; also Li Te-yü, 14: 116-119. Tseng Kuo-fan undoubtedly had the T'ang experience in mind when he wrote: \"Since ancient times outer barbarians (wai-i) have assisted China; but in each case, after success, there have been unexpected demands,\" IWSM, HF 71: 10b.\n\n43 Howard Levy, Biography of An Lu-shan (Berkeley, 1961), 17-20.\n\n44 See Richard J. Smith, “Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860,\" Journal of Asian History 8.2 (1974), 124-125; also Lo Jung-pang, \"The Decline of the Ming Navy,\" Oriens Extremus, 5 (1958), 165-168.\n\n45 Sung-shih, 472: 18-21; Liu Sheng-mu, Ch'ang-ch'u-chai hsü-pi [Supplementary writings from the Ch'ang-ch'u study] (preface date 1929), 5: 146.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207376, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 144, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "136\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n46 See K. A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society, Liao (907-1125) (Philadelphia, 1949), 8-10; also Igor de Rachewiltz, “Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189-1243); Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman\" in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, Confucian Personalities (Stanford, 1962).\n\n47 Wittfogel and Feng, 9.\n\n48 See Herbert Franke, \"Sino-Western Contacts under the Mongol Empire,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 6 (1966), 52.\n\n49 Kuwabara, 96-99.\n\n50 See Henry Serruys, \"Mongols Ennobled during the Early Ming,” HIAS, 22 (1959); also Serruys, \"Landgrants to the Mongols in China: 1400-1460,” Monumenta Serica, 25 (1966), especially 394. As had been the case with other barbarians in China's past, the use of Mongol and Jurched troops in the Ming could be a liability as well as an asset. See Serruys, \"Sino-Jürched Relations During the Yung-Lo Period (1403-1424),” Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen (Weisbaden, 1955); 67-68, 71.\n\n51 See the summary discussion in Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (London and Toronto, 1975), 138-139; also George L. Harris, \"The Mission of Matteo Ricci, S.J.: A Case Study of an Effort at Guided Culture Change in China in the Sixteenth Century,” Monumenta Serica, 25 (1966).\n\n52 James B. Parsons, Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty (Tucson, 1970), 129.\n\n53 C. R. Boxer, \"Portuguese Military Expeditions in Aid of the Mings Against the Manchus, 1621-1647,\" T'ien-Hsia Monthly, VII (1938); S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923 (New York, 1970), 13; North-China Herald, January 10, 1852. Boxer, 32, offers the explanation that the expedition was undermined by Cantonese who feared that the Portuguese, if successful, would be granted extended trading rights, while the North-China Herald suggests that when the men reached Nan-ch'ang they were ordered to return because \"the contemptible figure they presented completely disappointed expectation.\" It is probable that each of these interpretations has a measure of validity.\n\n54 Serruys, \"Were the Ming,” 136.\n\n55 Boxer, 35.\n\n56 Wills, Guns, Pepper and Parleys, especially chapter 2; Fu Lo-shu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820) (Tucson, 1966), I: 32-33, 58; Teng and Fairbank, 34.\n\n57 The Ch'ing did, however, ally with the Russians against the Dzungars during the K'ang-hsi period and the Ch'ien-lung emperor did make good use of Western cannon (Hsi-yang p'ao) in his famous campaigns. See, for example, IWSM, TC 9: 30a-b; also Teng and Fairbank, 34; Swisher, 697.\n\n58 See Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, \"Russia's Special Position in China during the Early Ch'ing Period,\" Slavic Review, 13.4 (December, 1964).\n\n59 Chinese Repository 11: 64; Swisher, 98-99.\n\n60 See Masataka Banno, China and the West, 1858-1861 (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), especially 45-53, 207-209; Swisher, 683-697.\n\n61 See, for example, IWSM TC 22: 11b-13b; also Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873,” Modern Asian Studies, 10.12 (1976).\n\n62 For the use of this expression (or a variant) as late as the 1890's see WCSL 101: 9 and 129; 16.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207378, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 146, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "138\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n86 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training;\" also Yang-wu yün-tung [The “foreign matters\" movement] (Shanghai, 1961), 3: 463, 469, 492, 599, 613, etc.\n\n87 IWSM, TC 22: 12-13b; 23: 42-43.\n\n88 See the IWSM references cited in note 85. Pennell became fully sinicized, shaving his head, changing to Chinese clothing, learning Chinese, marrying a Chinese, and finally petitioning to be registered as a native of Ho-fei, Anhwei. Mesny, too, was attracted by Chinese civilization, thus reinforcing the persistent notion of barbarian \"transformation\". See especially the memorial by Wu Tang and Ch'ung-shih in 1870 requesting that Mesny be advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (ts'an-chiang) and awarded the peacock feather for his efforts against the Miao. This memorial was in many respects a replica of Hsueh Huan's request for similar awards to be granted to Ward in 1862.\n\n89 Examples in IWSM and WCSL abound. See also Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System,\" esp. 264-265; John Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 50. Traditional attitudes were, of course, reinforced by the examination system. One of the topics for the metropolitan examinations in 1880 was the following quotation: \"By indulgent treatment of men from a distance they are brought to resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of the states, the whole empire is brought to revere him.\" Cited in the North-China Herald, May 18, 1880.\n\n90 See, for example, WCSL 101: 9; 129: 17.\n\n91 See especially K. C. Liu, \"The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,\" HJAS, 30 (1970); David Pong, \"Confucian Patriotism and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877,\" Modern Asian Studies, 7.4 (1973).\n\n**\n\n92 For a discussion of the concept of r'i-chih, see Immanuel Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).\n\n93 See Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1940) and Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, 1951).\n\n94 See, for example, Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1965); Noboru Umetani, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n95 What differed was China's international situation. China had to endure far more political, economic and military pressure from the European powers than either the United States or Japan in the nineteenth century.\n\n96 The great majority of Japanese military employees in the latter half of the nineteenth century neither became Japanese subjects nor accepted Japanese culture. See, for example, Presseisen, 112.\n\n97 See the discussion in Smith, \"Foreign-Training.\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207626, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 14, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nPage\n\nPRESIDENT'S REPORT\n\nTREASURER'S REPORT\n\nTHE LIBRARY\n\nARTICLES:\n\n· Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan - RICHARD J. SMITH\n\n· The Teochiu: Ethnicity in Urban Hong Kong - Douglas W. SPARKS\n\n· Interethnic Interaction-a matter of Definition: Ethnicity in a Housing Estate in Hong Kong DOUGLAS W. SPARKS\n\n· \"Patterned Bands\" in the New Territories of Hong Kong - ELIZABETH L. JOHNSON\n\n· A Hawaiian King Visits Hong Kong, 1881 - TIN-YUKE CHAR\n\n· In Search of the Chinese Name for \"Li Sun\"-TIN-YUKE CHAR\n\n· Chan Lai-sun and his Family: a 19th Century China Coast Family - CARL T. SMITH\n\n· Notes on Friends and Relatives of Taiping Leaders - CARL T. SMITH with Additional Notes by JEN YU-WEN\n\n· Operation and Maintenance of a Road Transport System in West China 1942-46 — W. A. REYNOLDS\n\n· Land and River Routes to West China - A. D. BLUE\n\n· In the Path of the Ancient Mon: Pagan, Pegu and Nakom Pathom - MICHAEL SMITHIES\n\nREPORT:\n\n· A Report on Social Research in the New Territories of Hong Kong, 1963 - MAURICE FREEDMAN\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES:\n\n· Visit to Tung Wah Group of Hospitals' Museum, 2 October 1976 — CARL Smith and JAMES HAYES\n\n· Political and Pugilistic Freemasonry? - Y. F. LAM\n\n· Sandal Wood Mills at Tsuen Wan - JAMES HAYES\n\n· Chinese in the Volunteer Forces of Hong Kong — James HAYES\n\n· A Missing Chinese Library? - JAMES HAYES\n\n· Notes on Ho Chung-a 19th Century Artist in Kwangtung - CHUANG SHEN\n\n· Chinese Preserved Monks - KEITH STEVENS\n\n· Preliminary List of the Baker Collection of New Territories Genealogies in The British Library — H.G.H. NELSON\n\n· The Occurrence of Troides Helena (Linn.) in Hong Kong - J. CAREY-HUGHES AND J. B. PICKFORD\n\nPage\n\n1\n\n6\n\n10\n\n12\n\n25\n\n57\n\n81\n\n92\n\n107\n\n112\n\n117\n\n135\n\n162\n\n179\n\n191\n\n262\n\n281\n\n282\n\n283\n\n284\n\n285\n\n292\n\n297\n\n301", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207639, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 27, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN: MILITARY ASPECTS\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH*\n\nPaul Cohen has recently warned against measuring nineteenth century China’s modernization by the yardstick of Meiji Japan. From the vantage point of Japan’s ‘success,’” he writes, “the late Ch’ing epitomizes ‘failure,’ and next to the dynamism of the Meiji era, China, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, appears as the very embodiment of stasis. The trouble with this perspective is that it glosses over a very important fact, namely that China and Japan, in their respective encounters with the West in the last century, did not start out at the same point.” Cohen suggests that a “much more valid way of measuring change in nineteenth century China is by internal points of reference.” “Modernization is not, after all, a horserace,” he maintains,2\n\nThis approach has much to commend it, if only as a reminder that China did not simply stand still in the nineteenth century. Thomas Kennedy correctly indicates, for example, that for all its weaknesses, the “self-strengthening” movement from 1860 to 1894-1895 brought “far more comprehensive and far-sighted [changes] than earlier studies infer.” Cohen notes that when we measure the modernizing experiences of China and Japan against those of the rest of the world, rather than against each other, “we find that both China and Japan come off relatively well.”+\n\nYet the knowledge that historians would eventually vindicate China’s modernizing efforts would have been small consolation to Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki. One doubts that he muttered at the signing table in 1895, “How far China has come in the last thirty years!” The fact is that Chinese modernizers continually viewed their progress in terms of Japan’s accomplishments. Li Hung-chang wrote as early as 1872: “Japan is just a small nation. Recently she has begun to trade with Europe; she has instituted\n\n* Dr. Smith is Assistant Professor of History, Rice University, Houston, Texas. His article “The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ch’ing Practice” appeared in Vol. 15 of this Journal, pp. 113-138.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207641, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 29, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "14\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nforeign military aid reaped few long-term gains. Western officers from \"Chinese\" Gordon to Constantin von Hanneken introduced a measure of modernity to at least a few armies in the late Ch'ing period, but none of these individuals was able to promote more basic institutional reform.10 The effects of Japan's success and China's failure in this regard were far-reaching.\n\nGenerally speaking, China's approach to military reform in the years from 1860 to 1895 may be compared with that of Japan in the years from 1853 to 1868. In each instance, foreign assistance was acquired piecemeal by both the central government and local governments, with no real coordination between the two. Similar rationales were offered, and similar results obtained, although in the case of China the new knowledge and technology acquired was used to bolster rather than to undermine the existing central government.11\n\nA high priority for both pre-Meiji Japan and late Ch'ing China was the training of troops and officers in Western techniques. In each country, the use of foreign military assistance followed similar lines. The training program established for the Bakufu by the French Minister, Leon Roches, at Yokohama during the mid-1860's, for example, may be compared with the central government training program set up by the British Minister, Frederick Bruce, at Tientsin in the early 1860's.12 Similarly, the various foreign-training efforts begun in Chōshu and other han during the 1860's bear a basic resemblance to the post-Taiping training camps established at Shanghai, Canton, Foochow and elsewhere.13 The Japanese even had their own rough equivalent of China's famous Ever-Victorious Army.14 Common problems in these early military improvement programs included language difficulties, foreign rivalries, financial limitations, lack of standardization in arms and training, and foreign meddling.15\n\nChina never overcame these problems. From the 1860's to the early 1890's, a handful of foresighted individuals, most notably Li Hung-chang, undertook a variety of modernizing enterprises aimed at building up China's “wealth and power.” Their efforts succeeded in a limited way, but were severely hindered by obscurantism, official opposition, bureaucratic inertia, and the deliberate policies of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, who carefully manipulated political factions in order to maintain and enhance her own power.16", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207643, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 31, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "16\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\npolicies, the Meiji government managed to avoid most of the difficulties that had plagued the Chinese effort to use foreign assistance efficiently.\n\nBuilding on the foundation of pre-Meiji experience, Western-trained and Western-oriented leadership,24 and strong central government direction and support, Japan made rapid strides in the modernization of her military after 1868. A leading figure in this effort was Yamagata Aritomo, who became Vice Minister of Military Affairs upon his return to Japan after a year-long tour of Europe in 1869-1870.25 With French advice and assistance, the Meiji government created an Imperial Guard in 1871, which not only made possible the abolition of the feudal han in the same year, but also set the stage for the introduction of conscription in 1872. By 1875, the Japanese had established a centralized military academy at Tokyo, with branch schools in veterinary medicine and other subjects.26 At the same time, numerous officers were sent abroad for further military education.27 By 1893, Japan had a total of sixteen military schools instructing over 2,600 students per year.28 Overseas-educated officers returned in a steady stream to assist in teaching these individuals.\n\nIn 1878, following the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the Japanese established an independent General Staff on the German model. This marked the eclipse of the French in Japanese military affairs and the rise of Germany. Presseisen attaches profound significance to this development: \"So long as French influence prevailed, Japan's army remained under unified civilian control, her law code owed much to French legal opinions, and her government might have evolved toward a liberal, parliamentary system. After Germany's triumph the command structure, the constitution, and the Imperial Court followed the German ideological style.”\n\n19\n\nThe outstanding contributions of Jacob Meckel's German military mission to Japan in 1885 have been described in detail by Presseisen,30 The salient point is that by the early 1890's, Japan had built a modern, centralized army and had eliminated the need for further foreign military assistance. China, meanwhile, had done neither. The Sino-Japanese War underscored the stark contrast between the Chinese and Japanese reform efforts.31\n\nArmies, like individuals, can both reflect and effect change in society. Sir Lewis Namier has offered the opinion that \"the social", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207645, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 33, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "18\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nWestern attire in Japan, although never complete, undoubtedly received some of its impetus from the military. Likewise, the wearing of Western-style military caps necessitated the cutting of top-knots, which quickly became a mark of \"enlightenment\" in Japanese society generally. As early as the 1870's, the emperor began wearing a military uniform in the fashion of European royalty.39 One can hardly imagine a Chinese emperor doing the same.\n\nAnother socio-cultural effect of military modernization was the boost given to music, drama, art, literature, and even the use of the Japanese vernacular by the Sino-Japanese War. Donald Keene has brilliantly summarized the impact of the war on these areas of Japanese life, emphasizing also the change in Japanese attitudes toward China, the growth of Japanese national pride, and the altered perceptions of Westerners toward Japan as a result of the war and Japan's resounding victory.40\n\nIn economic terms, the modernizing effect of the military is more difficult to judge. Ogawa's study of conscription, for example, sees the military as a mixed blessing in nearly every sphere of economic life, including labor, productivity, and consumption.41 Yet on balance, military development seems to have benefited the economy. Even the most outspoken critics of the military and its costs, such as Ono Giichi and H. T. Oshima, concede that there were at least some economic advantages to the Meiji program of military modernization—especially in the creation of military and military-related industries, which served as model plants, and in the increased demand for products through inter-industry linkages.42 Military needs, in other words, generated a demand for modern products produced by modern means, and contributed to the growth of economies of scale. The Sino-Japanese War brought Japan numerous economic benefits and a huge indemnity (231 million taels; nearly 368 million yen), which was put to effective modernizing use, although war expenditures and the indemnity did contribute to economic problems such as business fluctuations and inflation.43\n\nFor China, much of the foregoing discussion can be stated in reverse. Although the lack of a centralized military did not appreciably impair the Ch'ing government's authority as long as \"regional\" leaders remained loyal to the throne, it did prevent China from contending effectively with foreign aggression, and eventually undermined support of the dynasty. Furthermore, the fragmentation", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207647, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 35, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "20\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nplayed an historic role similar to that played in the West in late Tokugawa Japan, first precipitating a political crisis, and then helping to resolve it in favor of revolution. It would not be the last time Japan would play the part in China.\n\nViewed from the perspective of military modernization in China and Japan, two factors seem crucial to Meiji Japan's domestic and international success: (1) A sustained sense of crisis, sufficient to justify fundamental institutional change; and (2) strong central government leadership and support in implementing reform, together with the systematic use of foreign assistance. Paul Cohen is obviously correct in pointing out that pre-Meiji Japan enjoyed a number of distinct advantages in responding quickly and creatively to the Western \"impact.\"51 But we may question whether without the self-conscious and concerted modernizing policies of the Meiji central government Japan could have achieved \"wealth and power\" so quickly, even with these advantages. An examination of military change in Japan during the period 1853-1868 indicates, for example, that Bakumatsu military reform efforts were in fact no more effective than those of the T'ung-chih era.52\n\nIn China, the Manchus refused to sponsor basic institutional change, fearful of upsetting the system of military checks and balances that had preserved their rule in China for over two hundred years. More concerned with the maintenance of internal control than with the problem of external defense, the Manchus had little incentive to go beyond the limited military changes that had enabled them to suppress the major rebellions of the 1860's and 70's. It was not until 1907 that the throne took the first concrete steps to dismantle the costly, cumbersome and worthless Manchu Banner system-steps that even then were soon retraced.53\n\nIt should be noted that Manchu rule was less significant in other areas of Chinese life, notably the economy. Dwight Perkins insists, for example, that the Ch'ing government's sins in the economic realm were less those of commission than of omission, that the policies of the Chinese government \"were not so much wrong as inadequate.\"54 But in comparing Japan's economic success with China's failure, Perkins attributes China's difficulties primarily to \"lack of funds.\" Sapped of money by foreign and domestic wars, heavy indemnities, the sustenance of huge and useless \"regular\" standing armies, and the high cost of maintaining irregularly financed \"temporary\" imperial armies, the Ch'ing government...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207648, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n21\n\nvernment was, in Perkins' words, \"an almost unbelievably weak [financial] instrument.\"\n\nEven if the Ch'ing government had been moved to undertake more fundamental military reform, China's transition to modernity would have been painful; but without such reform, it was virtually impossible.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4.\n\n2 Ibid.; see also 148-149.\n\n3 Thomas Kennedy, \"Self-Strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings,” Ching-shih wen-t'i, 3.1 (November, 1974), 27.\n\n4 Cohen, 149.\n\n5 Quoted in S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923 (New York, 1966), 109.\n\n6 See, for example, William Lockwood, \"Japan's Response to the West: The Contrast With China,\" World Politics, 9.1 (October, 1956); Marion Levy, \"Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,\" Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2 (October, 1953); Marion Levy, \"Some Structural Problems of Modernization and High Modernization: China and Japan,\" Proceedings of the Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East (1962); Allan Cole, \"Contrasting Modernization in China and Japan,\" Ch'ung-chi hsieh-pao, 4.2 (May, 1965); E.O. Reischauer, “Modernization in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan,\" Japan Quarterly, 10.3 (July-September, 1963), etc. A partial exception is the fine article by John K. Fairbank, et al., entitled \"The Influence of Modern Western Science and Technology on Japan and China,\" Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 7 (1954).\n\n7 Two of the most obvious advantages were, of course, Japan's greater and more immediate awareness of the Western military challenge (a product of geography and historical timing), and the military orientation and ethos (bushido) of the Japanese elite, as compared to the civil orientation and ethos (wen-te) of the Chinese elite. Other factors were also important, including the absence of opium smoking among Japanese officers and the rank and file, which again contrasts so markedly with the case in China. See Jonathan Spence, \"Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China,\" in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and Carolyn Grant, eds., Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1975).\n\n8 See Fairbank, et al., \"The Influence,\" 192-194, esp. 193.\n\n9 Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1955), 139.\n\n10 See Richard J. Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army: Foreign Assistance and Military Modernization in Nineteenth Century China (manuscript).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207649, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 37, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "22 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n11 Comparative studies on selected aspects of modernizing change in these two time periods would be illuminating. One might compare, for example, the aims and accomplishments of the Peking Tung-wen kuan (established in 1862) and the Bansho Shirabesho (established in 1858). On the former, see Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York, 1967), 241-248; on the latter, consult Marius Jansen, \"New Materials for the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Japan,\" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20 (1957), 569-582. On the use of Westerners in military affairs in Japan from 1853-1868, see Presseisen, 1-23; H. J. Jones, \"Bakumatsu Foreign Employees,\" Monumenta Serica, 29.3 (Autumn, 1974).\n\n12 Presseisen, chapter 1; Smith, , chapter 4.\n\n13 Albert Craig, Chôshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 131-136, 201-203, etc.; Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Fenghuang-shan, 1864-1873,” Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976).\n\n14 Presseisen, 22-23.\n\n15 See notes 7 and 8; also Hyman Kublin, \"The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan,\" Far Eastern Quarterly, 9.1 (November, 1949), 24-26; Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 125-133.\n\n16 For a discussion of Li's modernizing efforts, his extensive use of foreign assistance, and the obstacles he encountered, see S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (New York, 1966), 111-112; K. C. Liu, “The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970); Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 152-157; and K. C. Liu, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli,” in Albert Feuerwerker, et al., eds. Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967).\n\n17 See, for example, Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China (New York and London, 1899), 267-289, esp. 270-280; Major A. E. J. Cavendish, \"The Armed Strength (?) of China,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 42 (June, 1898), 709-710, 713-714, 717; Richard J. Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860,\" Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 127.\n\n18 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 212; Cavendish, 709-710, 713-714.\n\n19 See, for example, Cavendish, esp. 720-723; Captain W. R. E. Gill, \"The Chinese Army,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 24 (1881), 371-377; Chester Holcombe, China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 81-88; \"The Chinese and Japanese Armies,\" reprinted from the Army and Navy Gazette in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 15 (1894), 1258; James Scott, \"The Chinese Brave,\" Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1 (1886), esp. 240; etc.\n\n20 See Smith, , Chapters 8 and 9.\n\n21 See Yang-wu yün-tung cited in Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218. On Chinese resistance to foreign instructors and officers, see ibid.; also Cavendish, 720-721.\n\n22 See, for example, L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes (London, 1931), 18; Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast, 1950), 478-481; John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 65-78, 93-94, 163; Holcombe, 80-85, esp. 83.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207651, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 39, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18.\n\n44 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219-220; Yamagata, \"The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, \"Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;\" Rawlinson, 190.\n\n45 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.\n\n46 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218-219; Cavendish, 721.\n\n47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.\n\n48 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 157, note 135.\n\n49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change,\" 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, \"Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.\n\n50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, \"The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).\n\n51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149.\n\n52 See Kublin.\n\n53 Smith, \"Foreign-Training:\" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.\n\n54 Dwight Perkins, \"Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208291, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 15, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nEDITORIAL -\n\nPRESIDENT'S REPORT -\n\nHON. TREASURER'S REPORT -\n\nTHE LIBRARY -\n\nPage\n\n1\n\n3\n\n9\n\n12\n\nArticles :\n\nThe Reform of Military Education in Late Ch'ing China, 1842-1895 -- RICHARD J. SMITH\n\n15\n\n41\n\nAltar Images from Hunan and Kiangsi KEITH STEVENS Is Face the Same as Li? — A critical note on Agassi and Jarvie, 'A Study in Westernization' MARGARET N. NG\n\n49\n\n0 Ancestors in the Spring -- The Qingming Festival in Central China GÖRAN AJMER\n\n-\n\n59\n\n(83\n\nThe Politicization of Chinese Craft Organization in Post World War II Hong Kong - EUGENE COOPER Shiwan Pottery Explored-FREDRIKKe Skinsnes ScollaRD\n\n101\n\nVillage Government in China [1933]—C. MARTIN WILBUR\n\n113\n\nWoodblock Printing, an Essential Medium of Culture Inheritance in Chinese History — DAVID H. S. CHAU\n\n175\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES:\n\n=\n\n国\n\n-\n\nMissing Maps: Sowerby's \"Sport & Science on the Sino-Mongolian Frontier\" - H. A. RYDINGS Brook's Gecko Found in Macau - J. D. ROMER Mud Skis or Scooter, Deep Bay, Hong Kong The Saintly Guo- KEITH STEVENS - The Immortal Fan - KEITH STEVENS\n\nAncestral Images - KEITH STEVENS StevENS Marble Hall Peter Wesley-Smith Distribution of Forts and Guard Stations on Lantau Island during the late Ch'ing period -\n\nThe Cannons on the Wall of the Tung Chung Fort, Lantau Island, Hong Kong\n\n-\n\nThe Fat Tong Mun Fort (or the Tung Lung Fort)\n\n-\n\n- 190\n\n191\n\n·\n\n-\n\n· 192\n\n-\n\n- 193\n\n-\n\nANTHONY K. K. SIU\n\nFirst Record of the Pelobatid Frog-J. D. ROMER Two Bibliographical Notices JAMES HAYES\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\n-\n\n-\n\n- 198\n\n200\n\n- 202\n\n205\n\n607 (09\n\n- 211\n\n- 213\n\n214\n\nV\n\nPage 15\n\nPage 16", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208307, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 31, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "THE REFORM OF MILITARY EDUCATION IN LATE CH'ING CHINA, 1842-1895\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH*\n\nThroughout much of the nineteenth century, Chinese and Westerners alike perceived the need for meaningful reform in Chinese military education. The problem could hardly be ignored, especially after the disastrous Opium War of 1839-1842. But change in this key area of late Ch'ing administration came slowly. Not only did it involve sensitive political issues, such as internal security, civil-military relations, and central versus local government responsibility; it also raised basic questions of educational policy, including the relationship between elite and popular instruction, between Confucian moral cultivation and technical specialization, and ultimately between Chinese and Western forms of civil and military knowledge. Complicating matters were the usual practical problems facing Chinese modernizers in the nineteenth century: widespread and entrenched vested interests, bureaucratic inertia, scarcity of revenue, and foreign pressure.\n\nThe Ch'ing dynasty's basic approach to military education can be seen clearly in the Ch'ing-ch'ao t'ung-chih, officially compiled during the Ch'ien-lung period: \"Our Emperor, succeeding and exalting the sages, treats the selection of talents as most important. In the literary arts, elegance and refinement is the aim. In military examination, familiarity with riding and shooting is [most] important.\" During the Tao-kuang reign, this emphasis on technical military skills received special stress. In 1833, for example, the emperor issued an edict stating that the education of Bannermen should be in horsemanship and archery, so that they would be kept \"simple and straight and not exposed to weakening [literary] influences.\" Similar statements abound in the dynastic record,\n\n* Professor Smith writes: S. A. M. Adshead has recently remarked that while \"China's failure to industrialize is well known, her failure to professionalize is less often commented upon.\" (See his review of John Fairbank et al \"The I.G. in Peking\" in the Journal of Asian Studies, 36.4 (August, 1977). This paper may be viewed as a brief comment on China's early effort to professionalize in military affairs.\n\nThe author is Associate Professor of History at Rice University, Houston, Texas.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208308, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 32, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "RICHARD J. SMITH\n\nBut Bannermen were not the only ones encouraged to avoid literary pursuits and concentrate on riding and shooting. The official military examinations, which paralleled, but did not come close to equalling in prestige, the civil service examinations, tested these and related skills almost exclusively, requiring only the reproduction of a hundred or so characters from one of three ancient military classics as a literary \"test.\" At none of the three basic levels of examination did the literary exercise determine whether an individual would pass or not. Overall, there was simply no premium placed on the acquisition of knowledge concerning military history, strategy, tactics, and so forth.\n\nAside from a few so-called academies for Bannermen in Peking and other key locations, there were virtually no institutions that provided systematic military education for Chinese officers. Local \"schools\" for military examination graduates in the provinces provided much less educational breadth and depth than their civil service counterparts in the shu-yuan system; and many, if not most, of these schools were overseen by literary men who had little interest or expertise in military affairs. Private tutors were available to give military instruction to examination hopefuls, but the cost of equipment—bows and arrows, stones, swords, horses, and practice facilities—often put tutorial assistance beyond the financial reach of many individuals. By default, the most valuable form of military education in China was army service itself.\n\nContrary to accepted opinion, most Ch'ing officers were not military examination graduates. The reasons are not hard to find. In the words of Shen Pao-chen: In the consideration of military promotions, \"those selected by examination are... put after those who began their career in the rank and file, or have risen because of military merit. The knowledge of military affairs among the former group cannot at all be compared with those from among the rank and file. Their spirit and bravery and ability to bear hardship cannot at all be compared with those who rise because of military merit. The reason is that what they learn is not of practical use.\" In short, military graduates who had not come up through the ranks were viewed by most of their peers as incompetents and outsiders. Ichisada Miyazaki notes: \"The influential leaders in the army were generals who had worked themselves up from the ranks and had shown their mettle in actual combat. The army was a", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208310, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 34, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "18\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nprocess. Ch'i's view was that by seeking \"genuine scholarship,\" badly-needed military talent might be secured for the defense of the dynasty.' His proposal was blocked however — undoubtedly in part because Ch'i fell out of favor as a negotiator with the British, but also because the proposal itself was so revolutionary in spirit.\n\nIn late 1851, the censor Wang Mao-yin resurrected Ch'i's innovative proposal. His memorial, dated November 11, stated baldly that \"for seeking talent within the examination system, there is nothing better than Ch'i Kung's five categories to encourage scholars to study military affairs.\" The memorial was forwarded by the emperor to the Board of Rites for deliberation, but Wang's suggestion regarding the reform of the examination was not approved, on grounds that Chinese scholars were men of breadth and “need not be specialists\" (pu-pi chuan-men ming chia),16 Once again Ch'i's proposal died a swift death. It had no other prominent advocates.\n\nSeveral more years passed, during which time Wang Mao-yin attained the rank of senior vice-president of the Board of War. In the midst of both the \"Arrow War\" negotiations and the Taiping Rebellion, Wang again memorialized the throne (July 9, 1858), once more requesting meaningful military reform. Making pointed reference to the abortive proposals put forward by Ch'i Kung and himself over the past decade and a half, Wang suggested that they might now be reconsidered together with the policy of recommendation (pao-chi) as a means of recruiting badly needed military talent. He did not mince words. Reminding the throne that many of China's best military commanders were not in fact products of the examination system, he went on to criticize the appointment of imperial relatives to positions of military responsibility, and the throne's tendency to place military affairs in the hands of officials schooled only in essay-writing, poetry, and other literary skills. He ended with a highly moralistic appeal for self-cultivation (hsiu-shen) on the part of the emperor, replete with quotations from the Shu-ching and Ta-hsüeh, but his proposals fell on deaf ears,17 Wang retired from office within months of writing this bold but fruitless memorial.\n\nEfforts to reform or abolish the nearly useless military examinations met with no more success than this. During the Hsien-feng emperor's reign, a number of officials advocated changes in the outdated system, including dispensing with the military examinations", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208312, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "20 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\ntingents such as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün) brought Western drill and tactics to literally thousands of Chinese soldiers. Officers from these forces not only instructed their own men, but also trained large numbers of troops for Chinese officials, most notably Li Hung-chang.23 At about the same time, foreign-training programs arose in several port areas, including Tientsin, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow and Canton. A number of Green Standard forces at the capital (and eventually elsewhere) were transformed into Western-armed \"retrained armies\" (lien-chün) on the yung-ying model, and several thousand Bannermen were molded into the famous Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), established by Wen-hsiang and others.24 \n\nThe Peking Field Force was an especially interesting experiment. Until the late 1860's, selected members of the force were drilled by foreign instructors using English words of command but thereafter, Western-trained Bannermen carried on instruction independently in Manchu. Nominally 20,000 strong throughout most of the late nineteenth century, the Peking Field Force usually numbered closer to half that amount. According to Major A. E. J. Cavendish, a British military attaché in China, the force as late as 1894 was considered to be an elite organization with \"higher pay and quicker promotion\" than in any other Banner units at the capital. Officers in the force were described as \"the pick of the Banners,\" and posts in it were \"eagerly sought after.\" Yet Cavendish formed a decidedly negative opinion of the force, which he described as poorly armed and superficially trained, with emphasis on form rather than content. One can imagine the shape of the rest of the traditional Ch'ing military establishment.25 \n\nA major deficiency in all of the early foreign-training efforts was lack of centralized direction and support. In the absence of adequate central government guidelines, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely from force to force and area to area. There was virtually no effort on the part of the Ch'ing government to co-ordinate its military programs, or to expand foreign-training in a systematic way.26 In fact, the Manchus seem to have been intent on compartmentalizing Western military knowledge as much as possible—presumably for reasons of internal control. In 1863, for example, the Tsungli Yamen stated explicitly that in the provinces only Bannermen should learn to make", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208314, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 38, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "22 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\nLi's approach to officer education during his tenure as governor-general of Chihli from 1870 to 1895, at the apex of his power, may shed some light on the many problems involved in China's late nineteenth century effort to create a modern officer corps.34 \n\nThroughout his illustrious career up to 1895, Li continually drew upon foreign talent to instruct (and occasionally to lead) his forces.35 But in 1876, he took the unprecedented step of sending Chinese military men abroad for training, entrusting seven petty officers to one of his best German drill instructors, a man named Lehmayer. Li's plan was to employ these men as instructors in the Anhwei Army upon their return to China.36 Li had as early as 1874 inquired into the possibility of sending Chinese students to West Point, and in 1875 had discussed the establishment of a military academy in China with the American general Emory Upton.37 But political difficulties in the United States stood in the way of the first plan, and financial constraints made the second impossible.38 Li's writings in the mid-1870s indicate a full awareness of the value of military academy education, but apparently the need at the time was not sufficiently great to justify the cost of establishing a full-fledged military academy on Chinese soil.39 \n\nOf the seven men sent to study in Germany, two were recalled before completion of their planned three-year program of study because of their frivolous attitude and poor progress. One became sick and died, three successfully completed their infantry training, and one—Wang Te-sheng—stayed on in Germany until 1881, receiving additional specialized instruction in Berlin. Of the seven, only Wang emerged as a prominent figure in the Anhwei Army, heading Li's crack “personal guard unit” (ch'in-ping), and eventually achieving the rank of tsung-ping. Overall, the educational experiment fell far short of complete success, and was marked by numerous problems, including disputes with the German supervisor, language difficulties, and, of course, high costs.40 \n\nAs one of the three regular graduates of the German training program, Cha Lien-piao's experience as an instructor in the Anhwei Army is illuminating. Cha served in Chou Sheng-ch'uan's 10,000-man Sheng-chün—perhaps the best detachment of the Anhwei Army in all of China up to the time of Chou's death in 1885.41 Convinced of the value of Western training and drill from long exposure to foreign instructors in Li's force (dating from the Taiping period),", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208316, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 40, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nphasized that it would “not be necessary to teach many commanders\":\n\n52 but he did encourage Li to establish a \"public office\" (kung-so) as soon as possible to provide systematic instruction for Chinese soldiers under German supervision.53 The immediate incentive was three-fold: the military demands of Sino-French conflict, the support of other Anhwei Army commanders, and the presence of a core group of capable German instructors,54\n\nLi's initial proposal for a military academy (Wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang) at Tientsin was quite modest. In part because of financial limitations, but also because of military exigency (and perhaps in deference to Chou), Li decided to train about one hundred petty officers and troops (pien-ping) selected from the Anhwei Army and lien-chün units, as well as some civil personnel (wen-yuan) who were \"willing to learn about military affairs.\" The simplified curriculum, taught by German officers with the aid of Chinese interpreters, consisted of astronomy, geography, science, surveying, drafting, mathematics, fortifications, and military drill and operations. Li expected the students to complete their education in one year (it actually took two), after which time they would return to their original units to transmit the newly-acquired information to their comrades.55 In all, about 1,500 \"cadets\" were probably trained in this fashion from 1885 to 1900. Most served only as instructors, however; few became ranking officers. On the whole they were neither given authority nor esteemed by their older colleagues and superiors.56\n\nIn the spring of 1887, Li added a five-year program to the Tientsin Military Academy. In contrast to the short course, this program aimed at producing officers. Stringent requirements were imposed on the applicants, who ranged in age from thirteen to sixteen.57 Forty students were accepted at first. Each had to guarantee to study for five full years without asking for leave, taking the civil service examinations, or getting married. The five-year course of study was comparatively demanding. During the first three years, the students took a foreign language (German or English), arithmetic, algebra, geometry, mechanics, astronomy, natural science, geography, map-making, and, of course, Chinese history and the Classics. During the last two years, they studied gunnery, military drill, fortifications, and other technical subjects. Periodic examinations determined class standing, and provided the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208318, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 42, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "26 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\nweaknesses. Inspired by a vibrant form of nationalism, the Japanese were assured of widespread popular support at home, and heroic dedication on the part of both officers and men in battle. It was a truly national war. Overseas Japanese also rallied to the cause, establishing patriotic associations to discuss the issues, collect contributions, and even to train brigades of student soldiers.68 China's immediate response to the conflict, which has not been as fully studied,69 appears to have been less uniform and extensive, both in China and abroad. To be sure, patriotic voices could be heard even prior to news of China's humiliating capitulation, and Chinese forces occasionally performed heroic deeds on the battlefield. But in the main, China lacked the national cohesiveness of Japan, and her officers were not inspired by the same sense of national duty and self-sacrifice.70 \n\nOwing partially to abysmal lack of preparation and poor internal communications, but also to the natural hesitation of \"province-minded\" Chinese officials, the mobilization of China's military forces during the war was agonizingly slow. Many Chinese troops summoned from the south arrived in the north only tardily or not at all. Li Hung-chang complained bitterly that \"one province, Chihli, is dealing with the whole nation of Japan.\" Ch'en Pi-kuang's effort to secure the release of the captured warship Kuang-ping after the battle at Wei-hai-wei, on grounds that the ship belonged to the Canton squadron which had not taken part in the war, is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of Chinese provincialism; but it is not the only one.72 The preponderance of Ch'ing forces sent against the Japanese in Korea, Manchuria and China Proper were individual yung-ying, each with its own particularistic loyalties and provincial identifications. These diverse military forces, differently armed, trained and led, often had difficulty cooperating with one another.73 In the navy, provincial rivalries and lack of cooperation between Admiral Ting and his subordinates obviously hindered operations at sea, in addition to adversely affecting morale.74 Uniform military and naval education undoubtedly would have diminished these problems. \n\nJapan's rapid and demoralizing offensive drive into Manchuria and China Proper was aided immeasurably by an extremely efficient General Staff, excellent transport facilities, and a well-organized commissariat service.75 China, however, lacked all three. The", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208320, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 44, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "28\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nagainst a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battlefield, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or outlandishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.\n\nAnother serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since \"it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers.\"88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90\n\nAt sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208322, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "30\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nthey are fierce and they can fight. But Chinese women have bound feet, and are too weak even to bear the weight of their own clothes.98\n\n99\n\nNowhere was the burst of patriotic sentiment and the impulse to reform more obvious than in military affairs. In the years from 1895 to 1898, a spate of memorials on the question of military change reached Peking. Many dealt with the problem of military education. Chang Chih-tung, in particular, became an ardent advocate of military schools as a means of improving the Chinese army. Chang and others also put forward additional reform proposals touching on a wide range of pressing military problems. A number of officials agitated for the elimination of corruption, incompetence, and nepotism in Chinese military forces. Others suggested revisions in the traditional military examinations. Still others proposed drastic cuts in the Green Standard army and the reinvigoration of the degenerate Eight Banners. Not all of these proposals bore immediate fruit, but together they indicated a heightened awareness on the part of many of the need for basic military reform.100 The Sino-Japanese War had begun to teach its lessons.\n\nIn the post-war era, the Chinese navy no longer occupied a position of prominence. Limited and largely uncoordinated efforts were still made by various provincial officials to acquire modern vessels and other types of naval material, but only about half of the naval academies established in China prior to 1895 survived past the first decade of the twentieth century. By contrast, Chinese military schools and academies grew rapidly during the late 1890's and especially the early 1900's.101 This demonstrated interest in military education suggests a new attitude toward the profession of arms, inspired by rising Chinese nationalism. To be sure, ingrained prejudices did not disappear overnight—especially since the civil service examinations continued to offer an almost irresistibly attractive alternative to military service. When Li Hung-chang established his long-term officers' training program at the Tientsin Military Academy in 1887, he was fortunate to find enough capable applicants to fill the allotted forty positions; whereas by 1896 Chang Chih-tung's announcement of the first entrance examinations for his newly-founded Hupei Military Academy attracted 4,000 applicants for only 120 positions.102\n\nChinese military academies, including Li's pioneering Tientsin establishment, eventually came to exert a profound influence on", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 48, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "32 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\npractice of \"interchangeable commanders\"--a striking departure from the personalistic command structure of yung-ying armies such as Chou's. Moreover, the Tientsin academy provided a large pool of new talent for modernizing purposes, men whose \"careers were grounded in change\" and whose \"qualifying education and . . . prominence were owed to reform.\"112 Many Tientsin Military Academy graduates became instructors in other military schools established after 1895;113 several prominent engineers were produced by the academy;114 and of course many of the most famous political and military leaders of the early Republic—including Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Juo-chang, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, Chang Huai-chih and many others—were Tientsin Military Academy graduates.\n\n \nIn short, significant changes in Chinese military education took place prior to 1895, despite the absence of meaningful reform in either the civil or military examinations and numerous other problems.116 Nonetheless, it took the successive humiliations of the Sino-Japanese War, the \"Scramble for Concessions,\" and the Boxer fiasco to prompt the Ch'ing dynasty into fundamental military reform,117 And even then, \"national\" policies were often implemented piecemeal at the local level.118 \n\nIn retrospect, it seems evident that the obstacles to meaningful reform in Chinese military education were less ideological than institutional. To be certain, Confucian critics of new-style training programs could always be found, especially after the establishment of modern military academies in China during the 1880's.120 But the throne's lack of enthusiasm for military reform along Western lines certainly cannot be explained in terms of ideology alone. In the first place, it must be remembered that little if anything in the way of Confucian learning had ever been expected of regular Ch'ing military officers. Paradoxically, it was in the innovative yung-ying armies, about which the throne had very mixed feelings, rather than the Green Standard and Banner forces of the empire, that the inculcation of Confucian virtues received special stress. Moreover, officials such as Chang Chih-tung, and even the pragmatic Li Hung-chang, emphasized the importance of Confucian education not only in their own \"personal\" armies but also in their new-style military academies.12 Surely, the subordinate officers of Chang and Li were no less \"Confucian\" than their Green Standard and Banner counterparts.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208326, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 50, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "34\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n1 Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, informed Western observers repeatedly pointed to the lack of a modern, Western-trained officer corps as the key deficiency of the Chinese army. See, for example, Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (New York, 1967), 201; Major A. E. J. Cavendish, \"The Armed Strength of China,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 42.244 (June, 1898), 720-722; NCH, July 6, 1880; Chinese Times, December 3, 1887; etc. For an interesting and informative discussion of officer education in the West, consult Correlli Barnett, \"The Education of Military Elites,\" Journal of Contemporary History, 2.3 (July, 1967).\n\n2 Cited in Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry (Seattle, 1955), 174.\n\n3 Helmutt Wilhelm, \"Chinese Confucianism on the Eve of the Great Encounter,\" in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965), 288-289.\n\n4 Etienne Zi, Pratique des examens militaires en Chine (Shanghai, 1896), 111-112. For other critiques of the traditional military examinations, see Chang Chung-li, 181, 187-190; William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 178-182; Ichisada Miyazaki, China's Examination Hell (New York and Tokyo, 1976), chapter 8.\n\n5 Richard J. Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860,\" Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 128.\n\n6 Hsieh Pao Chao, The Government of China, 1644-1911 (Baltimore, 1925), 311-312; Chang Chung-li, 187.\n\n7 Cited in Chang Chung-li, 181.\n\n8 Miyazaki, 106. See also Robert Marsh, The Mandarins, (New York, 1961), 149-151.\n\n9 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 135.\n\n10 Wu Wei-p'ing, \"The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners\" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), 1969), 84-88.\n\n11 Lo Erh-kang, Li-ying ping-chih (Chungking, 1945), 199-200.\n\n12 Cited in ibid., 53.\n\n13 Lei Hai-tsung, Chung-kuo wen-hua yi Chung-kuo ti ping (Changsha, 1940).\n\n14 W. T. deBary, et. al., eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York and London, 1960), 2: 9-10.\n\n15 IWSM, Hsien-feng, 28: 46b-47.\n\n16 Ibid., 28: 47a-b.\n\n17 Ibid., 28: 47b-49.\n\n18 Zi, 112.\n\n19 Chang Chung-li, 181 and note 69. See also Chang Pe'i-lun's reform proposals in 1889, YWYT, 3: 527-530, and Chang Chih-tung's in 1898, Ayers, 178-182.\n\n20 Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 93.\n\n21 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 150-156; see also Wang Erh-min, Huai-chün chik (Taipei, 1967) 191-193, 207-208.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208327, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 51, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n35\n\n22 See Jonathon Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy (Berkeley, 1972), 74-76, 127.\n\n23 Consult Richard J. Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China (Millwood, New York, 1978).\n\n24 Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873,\" Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976), 196-197; also Kwang-ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, \"The Military Challenge: The Northwest and the Coast,\" in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, Part Two, Chapter 4, forthcoming.\n\n25 Cavendish, 709-710. See also the sources cited above, note 24.\n\n26 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,” 196, 220-223.\n\n27 IWSM, Tung-chih, 25: 3.\n\n28 Smith, “Foreign-Training,” 220-223; also Richard J. Smith, “Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan; Military Aspects,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (1976).\n\n29 Ibid., (both sources); Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapters 8 and 9.\n\n30 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 215-223. See also Mark Bell, China (Simla, 1884), 2: 58; William Bales, Tso Tsung-tang Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai, 1937), 339; K. C. Liu, \"Nineteenth-Century China,\" in Tang Tsou and P. T. Ho, eds., China in Crisis (Chicago, 1966), 120.\n\n31 On the relationship between modern weapons and tactics and officer-training in the West, see Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York, 1878), 270-271, 318-319, 324, 328-330 and passim. See also NCH, July 28, 1866, cited in Wright, The Last Stand, 201. For Upton's critique of Chinese tactics and training in the mid-1870's consult The Armies, 20-23. For the use of lien-chün in suppressing internal rebels, see Kung-chung tang Kuang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che, 2: 302, 664, 667; 3: 172, 318, 323, 399, 445, 518, 753, etc. I am indebted to Professor K. C. Liu for supplying this reference. For a critique of yung-ying and lien-chin forces in the 1890's, consult Cavendish, 712-714.\n\n32 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 216 and notes.\n\n33 Bell, 2: 4. The standard works on Li's army are: Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, 1964); Wang, Huai-chün chih (Hong Kong, 1973).\n\n34 See Chang Chih-tung's somewhat comparable effort in the 1880's and 1890's, discussed in Ayers, chapter 5. For a brief overview of the problems connected with officer education in late Ch'ing China, consult Powell, 40-45.\n\n35 Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapter 9.\n\n36 Wang, Huai-chün, 203; LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39-41, 41-43; LWCK, Memorials, 27: 4-5.\n\n37 On the West Point inquiry, see Chester Holcombe, China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 82-83; FRUS, 1875, part 1, 227-228. On Li's negotiations with Upton, consult LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39a-41a; YWYT, 3: 592; Peter Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York, 1885), 29-298, 309-310.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208328, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 52, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "36 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n38 Holcombe, 82-83; LWCK. Memorials, 27: 405. See also Wang Chia-chien, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang ti chuang-she chi ch'i yin-hsiang,\" Kuo-li T'ai-wan shih-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-pao (April, 1976), 3. \n\n39 LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39-41. \n\n40 Wang, Huai-chün, 203 and passim; LWCK Memorials, 35; 33b-34, 34b-35. On Wang, see also Bell, 2: 49. \n\n41 On Chou's army, see Japan, Ministry of War, comp. Rimpō heibi ryaku (1882), 3: 45b-46b; Bell, 2: 4, 57-59; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 128-130; FRUS, 1873, part 1, 182-188; CWCK, 1.4: 36b-32; etc. Chou's nien-p'u is included in CWCK. His writings and nien-p'u indicate a rather progressive outlook, including an appreciation not only of Western weapons and military methods, but also of certain aspects of Western science and medicine. \n\n42 CWCK, 2.2: 13a-b; also 1.4; 2b-3, 32-33. \n\n43 Ibid., see also 2.2: 1-8. On the attractiveness of Green Standard rank, consult K. C. Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal,\" Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 10.2 (July, 1974), 210, and esp. 218. \n\n44 See, for example, CWCK 1.1.2: 24b; 1.4: 2-3, 5-13b, 19-24, 26b-27, 32-33b; 2.2: 1-2b; \"supplement,\" 1: 11-23, 44; etc. \n\n45 See, for example, CWCK, 1.1.2: 16b-17, 23-24, 27-28; 1.4: 3b-4, 10a-b, 27, 30-32; \"supplement,” 1: 7-24. \n\n46 CWCK, 1.1.2: 17b-18; 1.4: 30-41; etc. \n\n47 Ibid., 1.4: 33b. \n\n48 Bell, 2: 57; see also Cavendish, 721. \n\n49 Bell, 2: 57, 197; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 129, \"The Army of Li Hung-chang\"; CWCK, “supplement,\" 1: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b-37b; see also CWCK, 1.4: 36b-37. \n\n50 CWCK, 1.1: 19b; 1.1.2: 41b-42; 2.2: 22b. \n\n51 Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang,\" 3-4, 23-24, note 18. \n\n52 CWCK, 1.4: 34. \n\n53 CWCK, 1.4: 33b-34; also 1.1.2: 41b-42. \n\n54 See note 40. \n\n55 Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca, 1961), 61-62; Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York, 1932), 10-12; Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang,\" 7-8. \n\n56 Ibid. (Wang), 7-8. \n\n57 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887. The entrance examination consisted of three parts. The theme for the essay was: \"(When the people have been taught patriotism and loyalty) they may easily overcome their enemies.\" The theme for the discourse was: \"Much planning brings success.\" And the subject for the poetry exercise was: \"Though summer has come, nature is still mild and pleasant.\" Ibid. \n\n58 Biggerstaff, 63; NCH, April 13, 1887; Chinese Times, April 23, 1887, \"The Tientsin Military School\"; etc. The most complete discussion of the establishment, rise, structure, administration and influence of the Tientsin Military Academy is Wang Chia-chien's, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang.\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208330, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 54, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "38\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n1: 15-24; Japanese Imperial General Staff, History of the War between Japan and China, 1: 26-29; Vladimir, 255; Wallach, 718.\n\n74 CJCC, 1: 63; Japanese Imperial General Staff, History of the War between Japan and China, 1: 30-32; Rawlinson, 174-177, 180.\n\n75 See, for example, Presseisen, 140-141; Vladimir, 112, 118, 164, 242-243, 260; Wallach, 718-719.\n\n76 Wang Chia-chien, \"Ch'ing-chi ti Hai-chün ya-men (1885-1895),\" Chung-kuo li-shih hsüen-hui shih-hsien chi-k'an, no. 5; Rawlinson, 186; Vladimir, 281.\n\n77 See, for example, Chang Yin-lin, \"Chia-wu Chung-kuo hai-chün chan-chi k'ao,\" Ch'ing-hua hsüeh-pao, 10.1 (January, 1935); also CJCC, 4: 72-82, 166-244, 245-271, etc.\n\n78 See Dorwart, 112-113; Cavendish, 717.\n\n79 NCH, January 14, 1898; Vladimir, 267-268,\n\n80 NCH, January 14, 1898; Vladimir, 243.\n\n81 For the participation of Tientsin Military Academy graduates in the early stages of the war, consult CJCC, 1: 18.\n\n82 Vladimir, 126, 193, 248.\n\n83 For criticisms of China's officer corps by foreign contemporaries, consult Du Boulay, 8, 11, 160; Bujac, 217; Brassey, 128-129, 139, 143; NCH, October 19, 1894; etc.\n\n84 Cavendish, 722.\n\n85 Vladimir, 124, 153-154, 192, 198-199, 208, 217, 277; also Wallach, 695, 719; CJCC, 1: 236, 256, 276, etc.\n\n86 Wallach, 709, 712-713; Vladimir, 109, 150, 231, 256; Sauvage, 221.\n\n87 Brassey, 139,\n\n88 Cavendish, 721.\n\n89 Brassey, 127.\n\n90 Vladimir, 251-252; Du Boulay, 73.\n\n91 See Rawlinson, 174-185; CJCC, 1: 34, 63-69, 239-245.\n\n92 Rawlinson, 188-190.\n\n93 See ibid., 175-187; Brassey, 90, 92, 99-101, 110, 115, 120, 124, 127; NCH, February 1, February 8, and March 22, 1895.\n\n94 NCH, January 25 and February 1, 1895.\n\n95 See Powell, 71-72; WCSL, 101: 6b-10; Liu Feng-han, Hsin-chien fu-chün (Taipei, 1967), 45-46.\n\n96 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 108, 232.\n\n97 Roswell Britton, The Chinese Periodical Press 1800-1972 (Shanghai, 1933), esp. chapter, 8.\n\n98 Cited in NCH, October 2, 1896. See also Wang Erh-min, Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang shih (Taipei, 1977), 122-123, 124.\n\n99 Ayers, 130-136.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208332, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 56, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "40\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n116 I have discussed many of these problems in Mercenaries and Mandarins and \"Foreign-Training,\" 215-223 and notes.\n\n117 Powell, chapters 2-8; Hatano, \"The New Armies\"; Young, “Nationalism,\" etc.\n\n118 Powell amply documents this point. See also the discussion by Sue Fawn Chung, \"The Image of the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi,\" in Paul Cohen and John Schrecker, eds., Reform in Nineteenth-Century China (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), esp. 105-106.\n\n119 For the importance of ideology in other areas of reform, however, see K. C. Liu, “Politics, Intellectual Outlook, and Reform: The T'ung-wen Kuan Controversy of 1867,\" in Cohen and Schrecker, Reform.\n\n120 See Wang Chia-chien, cited in note 104; also Rawlinson, 89.\n\n121 See note 104; also Ayers, 111.\n\n122 The civil service examination system continued to be a nearly irresistible lure to the best minds of the empire, and even Li Hung-chang encouraged foreign-trained military and naval personnel to seek identification with the civil service. See Rawlinson, 203. Biggerstaff, 85, maintains that vested interests were more pervasive in military organizations than the navy.\n\n123 On these problems, see Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapter 9.\n\n124 See Smith, \"Reflections\"; also Liu and Smith, \"The Military Challenge.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209037, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1980", "page_number": 199, "title": "RAS-1980", "content_text": "BOOK LISTS\n\n167\n\nFor these reasons the work is thoroughly recommended. It is to be hoped that, when he finds time, Dr. Baker will produce similar work on the city, which is just as fascinating as the countryside. A last word of thanks goes to Mr. Robin Hutcheon, Editor of the South China Morning Post, who saw a good thing and made it all possible.\n\nOne regret perhaps? Each volume cites its own guide to reference books and the third has a useful index to the whole, but I'm lazy and would have liked page references to help me track down the originals of quoted passages.\n\nHong Kong, 1981.\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nCHINESE WALLED CITIES: A COLLECTION OF MAPS FROM SHINA JŌKAKU NO GAIYŌ, Benjamin E. Wallacker, Ronald G. Knapp, Arthur J. Van Alstyne, Richard J. Smith, eds. (1979, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press). 266 pp.\n\nThe reader who wants one hundred sketch maps of traditional Chinese walled cities—as they stood in the 1930's—will find them in this book.\n\nLest this brief statement seems to do less than justice to a volume of 266 pages, let me quote from the description of Chinhsiang (page 130) in Shantung: \"The city is 45 kilometers southwest of Chi-ning. Population is given as 3,000 households and 15,000 individuals.\" On the right-hand side of the page, there is also a drawing of the city wall, noting that it is 8.0 m. high, 3.0 m. wide at the top, and 10.0 m. at the bottom. On the map of Chin-hsiang, you can also see that there is a north gate, an east gate, a south gate, and a west gate.\n\nThe Introduction notes that these maps were made by Major Ishiwari Heizō of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China, and were originally published by the Imperial Japanese Army in 1940 under the title Shina Jōkaku no Gaiyō (General outline of the walled cities of China). The editors added a few photographs to break up the monotony, but no extra research.\n\nChinese University of Hong Kong, 1980.\n\nDAVID FAURE", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209326, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 229, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "SALMON, Mrs P.A.\n\nSAPSTEAD, Mr Gordon A.G. SCOTT, Dr. Ian\n\nSEARLS, Mr M.W., Jr. SHAM, Mr Francis SHANNON, Major J.M. SIDDLE Mr Oliver R.\n\nSIEGFRIED, Mrs Stephanie S. SIU, Mr Anthony Kwok-Kin SMITH, Mr Reginald C. SMITH, Mr Stewart P. SMITH-ROBERTS, Miss Karen A.\n\nSO, Dr Chak Lam STEAD, Miss S.M.\n\nSTEINER, Mr Henry STEWART, Miss Jessie STRICKLAND, Mr John E. STUMF, Mr Karl L., O.B.E. SU, Mr Samson SURECK, Mr Joseph SURECK, Mrs Joseph\n\nTAM, Miss Adelaide Chiu-hor TANG, Mr David TANG, Mr Hai Chiu\n\nTANG, Mr Stephen Wing-hung TAYLOR, Mrs V.V. THATCHER, Mr Melvin Paul THOMAS, Mr Reginald THOMAS, Mrs S.E. THOMPSON, Mr F. John TING, Mr Joseph Sun Pao TING, Mr Thomas Kam-Shu TISDALL, Mr Brian TOCHRANE, Miss Vera TOH, Miss Esther\n\nTOOGOOD, Mr C.W.\n\nTRETIAK, Professor Daniel\n\nTSANG, Mr Augustin Chung-Kong\n\nTSANG, Mr Hin Sum\n\nTSO, Miss Priscilla\n\nTURNER, Mr H. David\n\nTWITCHETT, Miss Yvonne VINE, Mr P.A.K.\n\nWALKER, Mr A.P. WALKER, Mrs Prudence WALTERS, Mrs Sandra L. WATERS, Mr D.D. WATT, Mr James WATT, Mr Mo-Kei\n\nWEBB, Mrs Susan M. WEI, Miss Peh T'i\n\nWHITTAM, Mr Anthony R. WHOLEY, Mr. J.W. WILLIAMS, Miss Stephanie WILLIS, Mr David Nye WILLOUGHBY, Prof. P.G. WILSON, Mr Brian D. WILSON, Miss Elinor WIN, Mr Oliver\n\n215\n\nWINKLER, Mrs Rowena WONG, Miss Marion WONG, Mr Siu-Lun WOODS, Mrs Rowena WORKMAN, Dr Gillian WRIGHT, Mr D.A.L. WRIGHT, Dr Leigh R, WRIGHT, Miss V. Moya YANG, The Hon. Mr Justice YEUNG, Mr Michael Wing Chiu YOUNG, Dr John D. YOUNG, Mr Richard YUNG, Mr David C.W. ZIGAL, Mrs Irene\n\nOVERSEAS LIFE MEMBERS ARMERDING, Mr Ludwig E. BAKER, Dr Hugh David R. BAKER, Mr William Ernest BALL, Mr John M. BARNETT, Mr K.M.A. BENNISON, Mr Larry L.\n\nBERTUCCIOLI, Dr Giuliano\n\nBLACKMORE, Mr Michael\n\nBLACK, Sir Robert BLAKER, Mr D.J.R. CAPLAN, Mr Malcolm\n\nCARLSON, Miss R.E. CATER, Sir Jack\n\nCLARKE, Rev. Cyril S. COCKELL, Miss Juve V. COLLIN, Mr P.H.\n\nCOSBY, Mr Ivan P.S.G. COSTANTINI, Dr Giulio COSTANTINI, Mrs G.\n\nCRANMER-BYNG, Prof. J.L.\n\nCUMMING, Mrs Dorothy M.\n\nDUNCANSON, Mr J.D.\n\nEWING, Miss E.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209327, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 230, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "216\n\nFABER, Mrs G.A.G. FAWCETT, Mr B.C. FRASER, Mr A.P. GALVIN, Mr J.A.T.\n\nGEORGE, Mr Timothy J.B. GIEDROYC, Mr Michael J.H. GOLDNEY, Miss C.M. HARDEN, Mrs Guy T., Jr. HAYDON, Mr E.S. HECHTEL, Mr F.O.P. HOWARTH, Mr Richard H. HUGHES, Mrs Marion HURT, Miss Evelyn J. INGLES, Miss Jean M. IRETON, Mrs Polly H. JOHNSTON, Mr James J. JORDAN, Dr David K. KIDD, Mr S.T.\n\n7\n\nKNOWLES, Miss Moria G. KNOWLES, Mrs W.C.G. KURATA, Mrs Lucien LANCHESTER Mrs G.W. LAUFER, Mr E.M. LAUFER, Mrs B.M. LI, DR Choh-Ming LINDSAY, Mr T.J. LOTHROP, Mr Francis B. MANSFIELD, Miss M.B. MICHAELIONES, Miss E.O. MILL, Major C.S., USMC MILLER, Mr Carl F.O. NICHOLS, The Hon. Mr E.H. O'BRIEN, Father J.R. PLAG, Rev. Albrecht POLAND, Mr Thomas D. RITCHIE, Mr Douglas J. ROBINSON, Prof. K.E. ROTHE, Mr Ulrich. SINFIELD, Mr G.HC. SPERRY, Mr Henry M. STEVENS, Mr Keith G. SWIRE, Mr A.C.\n\nTILL, The Very Rev. Barry TURNER, Sir Michael WARD, Miss Janet E.A. WELCH, Mr Holmes H. WHITELEGGE, Mr D.S. WOLF, Mr John\n\nORDINARY OVERSEAS MEMBERS\n\nANDERSON, Dr Eugene N., Jr.\n\nBARR, Mr J.W. BEVERIDGE, Mr R.J. BOND, Mr Michael W. CHAR, Mr Tin Yuke CHINN, Mrs Caroline Lee CLARK, Mrs A.T. COOPER, Dr Eugene\n\nDE FAZIO, Mr & Mrs M.F. EASTON, Ms. Linda\n\nFESSLER, Mr Loren FITZGIBBON, Mr Desmond GARD, Dr Richard A.\n\nGILMAN, Ms Claudia\n\nGOODRICH, Prof. L. Carrington\n\nHARRISON, Prof, B.\n\nHEMMING, Miss Janet M. HODGSON, Mr A.F.\n\nHODGSON, Mrs Kirsty Hamilton HOGAN, Mr James HUYSMAN, Mr J.\n\nKNEEBONE, Mrs Susan\n\nKRAMERS, Dr R.P. LIU, Prof. Ts'un Yan LU, Mrs Sylvia MACLEAN, Mr Roderick MATHIAS, Dr John R.G. McCOY, Mr John\n\nMORGAN, Mrs Carole MYERS, Mr John T. PARR, Mr M.J.\n\nREDFERN, Mr O'Donnell S. REID, Mr A.J.H. SCHWARZER, Mr C.A. SELWYN, Mr J.B. SMITH, Dr Ralph B. STEEDS, Mr David\n\nSTOKES, Mr John\n\nSTRAUCH, Dr Judith STURM, Prof. Fred Gillette VILLIERS, Dr John WATSON, Dr James L. WICKBERG, Professor Edgar", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209428, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1982", "page_number": 85, "title": "RAS-1982", "content_text": "63\n\nNationality\n\nMembers\n\n1855 (March)—1856 (January)\n\n(23.3.1855)\n\nWilliam Shephard Wetmore\n\nWilliam Thorburn\n\nWilliam Herbert Vacher\n\nHenry Alexander Ince\n\nClement D. Nye\n\n1856 (January)—1857 (January)\n\n(14.1.1856)\n\nGeorge Griswold Gray\n\n \n Firm\n Nationality\n \n \n Wetmore & Co.\n American\n \n \n Hargreaves & Co.\n British\n \n \n Gilman, Bowman, Dent, Beale & Co.\n American\n \n \n Bull, Nye & Co.\n British\n \n \n (Treasurer)\n \n \n \n James Lawrence Man\n \n \n \n Andrew Arch. Ranken\n \n \n\n1857 (January) — 1858 (February)\n\n(31.1.1857)\n\nGeorge Watson Coutts\n\nHugh Bold Gibb\n\nCharles W. Orne\n\n \n Russell & Co.\n American\n \n \n Geo. Barnet & Co.\n ?\n \n \n Smith, Kennedy & Co.\n British\n \n \n Watson & Co.\n British\n \n \n Gibb, Livingston & Co.\n British\n \n \n Russell & Co.\n American\n \n\nNote: In February 1858 G. W. Coutts is no longer mentioned as member.\n\n1858 (February) — 1859 (February)\n\n(4.2.1858)\n\nWilliam Wetmore Cryder\n\nHugh Bold Gibb\n\nJohn Thorne\n\nNote: In February 1859 only J. Thorne is mentioned as member.\n\n1859 (February) — 1860 (February)\n\n(31.1.1859)\n\nRobert Reid (Chairman)\n\nWilliam Wetmore Cryder\n\n \n Wetmore, Williams & Co.\n American\n \n \n Gibb, Livingston & Co.\n British\n \n \n ?\n ?\n \n \n Birley, Worthington & Co.\n British\n \n \n (Treasurer)\n \n \n \n Hubert Marshall Murray Gray\n \n \n \n Wetmore, Williams & Co.\n American\n \n \n Smith, Kennedy & Co.\n British\n \n\n1860 (February) — 1861 (February)\n\n(15.2.1860)\n\nRowland Hamilton (Chairman)\n\n \n Smith, Kennedy & Co.\n British\n \n\nJames Whitlow (Treasurer)\n\nRichard R. Tyers\n\n \n Holliday, Wise & Co.\n British\n \n\n2\n\n \n British\n 2\n \n\n1861 (February) — 1862 (April)\n\n(2.2.1861)\n\nWilliam Howard (Chairman)\n\nJ. Priestley Tate (Treasurer)\n\nChartered Bank\n\nBlain, Tate & Co.\n\n \n William Shephard Wetmore\n British\n \n \n ?\n ?\n \n \n Wetmore, Williams & Co.\n American\n \n\nNote: In April 1862 only J. P. Tate is mentioned as member.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213402, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 224, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "212\n\nStockholm Statens Etnografiska Museum, 1866\n\nSkrine, CP, Chinese Central Asia, London. Methuen, 1926 (Hong Kong Reprint Oxford University Press)\n\nSladen, Douglas Brooke Wheelton, The Japanese at Home, 5th edition, with Bits of China, London and New York Waid, Lock and Bowden, 1895\n\nSmedley, Agnes, Chinese Destinies - Sketches, New York Vanguard, 1933\n\n- China Correspondent, London Routledge and Kegan. 1934\n\n- Battle Hymn of China, New York Knopf, 1943\n\n+\n\nSmith, Carl T, Chinese Christians Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 1985\n\nSmith, Richard J, Mercenaries and Mandarins: the Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China, New York KTO Press, 1978\n\nSmith, Ronald Bishop, A Projected Portuguese Voyage to China in 1512 and New Notices Relative to Tome Pires in Canton, Bethesda (Maryland) L Decatur Press, 1972\n\nSpence, Jonathan, To Change China: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960, Boston Little Brown, 1969\n\nThe Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci, New York Viking Penguin, 1984\n\nStaunton, Sir George Leonard, An Authentic Account of An Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China, London G Nicol, 1798\n\nStein, Sir Mark Aurel, Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia and Westernmost China. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1921\n\nStern, Simon Adler, Jettings of Travel in China and Japan, Philadelphia Porter and Coates, 1888 (WB11894)\n\nSzczesniak, Boleslaw, The Writings of Michael Boym, Monumenta Serica XIV (1949-55), 481-538\n\nTaylor, Francis, mss (Bodleian Library Ms Rawl D391/95-98) Letters of Francis Taylor to Dr Edward Browne April 25, 1703 off Ancuago on coast of China,\n\nTeignmouth, Henry Noel Shore, (b 1847), The Flight of Lapwing, a Naval Officer's Jottings in China, London Longmans, 1881\n\nThomas, James A, A Pioneer Tobacco Merchant in the Orient, Durham NC Duke University Press, 1928.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214402, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 260, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "226\n\n1\n\nNOTES\n\nUndated Minute made available by Mrs Margaret Leeds, formerly Research Officer with the Royal Hong Kong Police.\n\n2 Henry J. Lethbridge, \"The District Watch Committee: The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong?\", in Hong Kong: Stability and Change, (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1978).\n\n3 This paper is based on a chapter of the author's PhD thesis, Private Security and Government: A Hong Kong Perspective, 1841-1941, awarded by the University of Hong Kong in 1999. In the interests of space, most of the end notes contained in the thesis have been omitted from this paper.\n\n4\n\n5 Kaifongs were local Chinese welfare associations. As early as 1857 a sworn mutual aid association known as the U-lan-shing is claimed to have united the four smaller kaifongs of the Tai-ping-shan, Sai-ying-pun, Sheung-wan and Chung-wan districts. Henry J. Lethbridge, op. cit., pp. 105-106.\n\n6 China Mail, 8 February 1866; China Mail, 22 February 1866; J.W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, (Hong Kong, Vetch and Lee Ltd., 1971, first published 1898), 2, p. 86.\n\n7 Annual Report of the Registrar General for 1867, Blue Book 1867, p. 248, §20 - §21.\n\n8 The Baojia or Native Chinese Peace Officers scheme, which was introduced in 1844, was discontinued by 1861.\n\n9 Trevor Bennett and Richard Wright, Burglars on burglary: prevention and the offender, (Aldershot, Gower, 1984), pp. 50-53.\n\n10 Minute by Cecil C. Smith, 22 December 1871: CO129/156, pp. 117-118.\n\n11 Hongkong Government Gazette, 6 January 1872, p. 2. Henceforth HKGG.\n\n12 Report of the Police Commission, 27 June 1872: CO129/164, p. 290 (20, §60).\n\n13 Brenda Yeoh, Contesting Space: Power Relations and the Urban Built Environment in Colonial Singapore, (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 117; Under the heading 'Asian Counter-strategies against Municipal Sanitary", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216165, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 464, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "398\n\nbeen a famous well in front of the temple, with a reputation for aiding fertility, its water being reputed to guarantee the birth of sons. It was still there, and the soldiers reported that by the 1970s, if not before, many people were again coming to the temple by the bus load from neighbouring counties in the third lunar month. Though the temple had been destroyed and the images of its deities removed, country folk were still believers and they particularly liked to take water back to their homes. During our visit, the soldiers fetched two buckets of water from the well for us to drink. It was very clean and sweet, though the well is neither large nor deep.\n\nFinally, and to remind, a more general but detailed overview of the culture of late imperial times, is provided in Richard J. Smith's excellent China's Cultural Heritage: The Qing Dynasty 1644-1912, 2nd revised edition (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1990).\n\nPOSTSCRIPT\n\nMy old friend Mr. Wan On of Pui O, South Lantau, has reminded me of the close analogy between the treatment of present day SARS and of the infectious diseases causing deaths in local village communities of old, which often struck during the late winter and early Spring. The isolation and quarantining of infected persons and their contacts was, in the latter case, extended to whole villages. No one was allowed to come in, and no one was allowed out, usually for around two to three weeks. In addition, a protective ritual (a ta chiu/dajiao) was performed by a Daoist priest, and vegetarian food and sexual abstinence were prescribed.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216376, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 135, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "84\n\nfrom China. Hart complained that it was difficult to get proper private tutors for their elder daughter, Evey. In his letter to Campbell on 2 July 1875 he said: \"I fancy Evey will be a grandmother by the time you find my rara avis!” (ibid: 198) Hart also wanted to concentrate on his work without disturbance. When he was finally reunited with his wife and children after almost a quarter of a century's separation, he did not feel completely comfortable and even hoped that they would be gone soon \"for I want to be alone to attend to the hundred and one things.\" Thus, during the period 1879-1881 when Lady Hart lived with Hart in Beijing, the couple must have discussed seriously future plans for her to return to settle in London. This is when Hart wrote to Campbell and insisted that his three wards should not be sent back to London to live with the Davidson couple.\n\nFrom this it can be seen that it wasn't just a matter of kindness, generosity, or even love that motivated Hart to make such expensive provisions for his three wards by Ayaou. Hart had always been cautious and gave mature consideration to his arrangements for his wards, not just in 1866 when he prepared to go home and marry a European, but also during the period 1875 to 1879 when he began to make plans for his wife's return to live in London permanently. He was kind to his wards; but he was also rational and determined to prevent both his married life and his career from being troubled by the wards.\n\nREFERENCES\n\nBell, Stanley. 1985. Hart of Lisburn. Lisburn: Lisburn Historical Press.\n\nBell, Gertrude. 1903. The Gertrude Bell Archive.\n\nBickers, Robert. 1999. Britain in China. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.\n\nBruner, Katherine F, Fairbank, John K, Smith, Richard J. 1986. eds. Entering China's Service - Robert Hart's Journals, 1854-1863. Cambridge and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.\n\nFairbank, John K, Bruner, Katherine F, Matheson, Elizabeth M. 1975. eds. The I.G. in Peking - Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\n\nFerguson, Niall. 2002. Empire: the rise and demise of the British world order and the lessons for global power. London: Allan Lane. Pp 185\n\nPage 135\n\nPage 136", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216377, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 136, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "85\n\nGraveson, R. H. and Crane. F. R., A Century of Family Law. 1957.\n\nLondon: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd.\n\nKing, Paul. 1980. In the Chinese Customs Service - A personal record of forty-seven years.\n\nNew York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc.\n\nLittle, Lester K. 1975. Introduction in Fairbank, John K, Bruner, Katherine F, Matheson, Elizabeth M. 1975. eds. The I.G. in Peking - Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs 1868-1907. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.\n\nMcCusker, John J. 2003. “Comparing the Purchasing Power of Money in the United States (or Colonies) from 1665 to 2002.” Economic History Services, 2003, URL: http://www.eh.net/hmit/ppowerusd/.\n\nSmith, Richard J, Fairbank, John K, Bruner, Katherine F. 1991. eds. Robert Hart and China's Early Modernisation - His Journals, 1863-1866. Cambridge and London: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.\n\nWang, Hongbin. 2000. He De Jue Shi Zhuan - Da Qing Hai Guan Yang Zong Guan. (The Biography of Sir Robert Hart - The Foreign I.G. of Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs) Beijing: Culture and Arts Press.\n\nWright, Stanley F. 1950. Hart and The Chinese Customs. Belfast: WM. Mullan & Son (Publishers) Ltd.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Transcribed by Deirdre Wildy, 18 September 2003\n\n2 Transcribed by Lan Li and Deirdre Wildy, 15 August 2003\n\n3 It is supposed that Hart had made Declaration 1 as a legal document, as in his letter to Campbell dated 11 August 1905 he added a post script dated 19 August - the same date that Declaration I was written: \"Yours 7th July received: herewith cover with statement for Murray Hutchins.\" (Fairbank, Bruner and Matherson 1975: 25, 1479) Murray, Hutchins & Co. was Hart's private solicitor, in Declaration I he mentioned: \"The children were sent to England and it was arranged that W. Hutchins my lawyer should take charge of them...\" Transcribed by Deirdre Wildy, 18 September 2003\n\n* In Declaration 1 Hart wrote: \"Anna died some seventeen years ago\". In his letter to Campbell on 8 July 1906, he wrote: \"The enclosed from Mr. Anderson, announcing the death of a former ward, Herbert Hart, has just reached me here through the Legation.\" (Fairbank, Bruner and Matheson 1975: 1513) \"Gertrude Bell in her diary on 5 May 1903 recorded that she went to Sir Robert", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]