[
    {
        "id": 215668,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 445,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "397\n\nNayar had been a journalist on the The Statesman Calcutta before the outbreak of the Second World War. He was appointed a temporary delegate to the United Nations Commission in Korea, replacing another Indian member who was ill, and was in Korea only a few weeks before he was killed. Buckley was 47 and married with no children. He had begun life as a schoolmaster and then turned to freelance journalism. He had joined The Daily Telegraph shortly after the outbreak of the Second World War.\n\nThe Times was informed of Mr. Morrison's death on the same day by Reuters agency, and on August 15 the British Legation in Korea provided a more detailed account of the events leading up to the tragedy:\n\n'I have the honour to report on the tragic accident on the 12th August, which led to the deaths of Colonel M. K. Unni Nayar, the Indian delegate on the United Nations Commission on Korea, and the two British War Correspondents, Mr. Christopher Buckley, of the Daily Telegraph and Mr. Morrison of the “Times”, in so far as the facts are known to me. A South Korean engineer officer also met his death at the same time.\n\n*At about 2.30 p.m., I saw Colonel Nayar off from my house in one of the United Nations Commission's Jeeps. He said that he was going up to the Republican First Division Sector in the Waegwan area. At that time, he was alone. He must have proceeded to the Press billets to pick up two correspondents.' I understand that a North Korean tank was lying knocked out in front of the South Korean line and it is surmised that the party were going forward to...\n\nThe Kimch'on\n\nProbar\n\nKYONGI\n\nTAEQU\n\nUlsan\n\nChangwin\n\nChimuva Kimhae\n\nChanhap\n\nKYONGSANG\n\nMAMIC\n\nPUSAN\n\nWaegwan area, South Korea",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215672,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 449,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "401\n\nin August 2002.\n\nThe North Koreans quickly crushed South Korean defences at the 38th parallel. The main North Korean attack force next moved down the west side of the peninsula toward Seoul, the South Korean capital, thirty-five miles below the parallel, and entered the city on June 28. Secondary thrusts down the peninsula's centre and down the east coast kept pace with the main drive. The South Koreans withdrew in disorder; those troops driven out of Seoul were forced to abandon most of their equipment because the bridges over the Han River at the south edge of the city were prematurely demolished. The North Koreans halted after capturing Seoul, but only briefly to regroup before crossing the Han.\n\nWhen MacArthur received word to commit ground units, the main North Korean force had already crossed the Han River. By July 3, a westward enemy attack had captured a major airfield at Kimpo and the Yellow Sea port of Inch'ŏn. Troops attacking south repaired a bridge so that tanks could cross the Han and moved into the town of Suwon, twenty-five miles below Seoul, on the 4th.\n\nThe speed of the North Korean drive coupled with the unreadiness of American forces compelled MacArthur to disregard the principle of mass and commit units piecemeal to trade space for time. Where to open a delaying action was clear, for there were few good roads in the profusion of mountains making up the Korean peninsula, and the best of these below Seoul, running on a gentle diagonal through Suwon, Osan, Taejon, and Taegu to the port of Pusan in the southeast, was the obvious main axis of North Korean advance. At MacArthur's order, two rifle companies, an artillery battery, and a few other supporting units of the 24 Division moved into a defensive position astride the main road near Osan, ten miles below Suwon, by dawn on July 5.\n\nComing out of Suwon in a heavy rain, a North Korean division supported by thirty-three tanks reached and, with barely a pause, attacked the Americans around 8:00 a.m. on the 5th. The rain cancelled air support, communications broke down, and the task force was, under any circumstances, too small to prevent North Korean infantry from flowing around both its flanks. By mid-afternoon, the task force was pushed into a disorganised retreat with over 150 casualties and the loss of all equipment save small arms.\n\nThe next three delaying actions, though fought by larger forces, had similar results. In each case, North Korean armour or infantry assaults against the front of the American position were accompanied by an infantry double envelopment.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215673,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 450,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "402\n\nBy July 15, the 24th Division was forced back on Taejon, sixty miles below Osan, where it initially took position along the Kum River above the town. Clumps of South Korean troops by then were strung out west and east of the division to help delay the North Koreans.\n\nWhile pushing the 24th Division below Taejon, the main North Korean force split, one division moving south to the coast, then turning east along the lower coastline. The remainder of the force continued southeast beyond Taejon toward Taegu. Southward advances by the secondary attack forces in the central and eastern sectors matched the main thrust, all clearly aimed to converge on Pusan. North Korean supply lines grew long in the advance, and less and less tenable under heavy United Nations Command (UNC) air attacks. The U.S. Far Eastern Air Force meanwhile achieved air superiority, indeed air supremacy, and UNC warships wiped out North Korean naval craft.\n\nAlarmed by the rapid loss of ground, Walker ordered a stand along a 140-mile line arching from the Korea Strait to the Sea of Japan west and north of Pusan. His U.S. divisions occupied the western arc, basing their position on the Naktong River. South Korean forces, reorganized by American military advisers into two corps headquarters and five divisions, defended the northern segment. A long line and few troops kept positions thin in this **Pusan Perimeter**. This line was, essentially, the front on August 12, the day that Mr. Morrison was killed.\n\nMr. Morrison's movements in Korea before his death are unknown. Seoul had fallen several days before his arrival, so he would have been forced to arrive in the south of the country, perhaps at Taegu. One assumes he spent the next five weeks, or so, behind the retreating UNC frontline.\n\n\"Morrison, a Daily Telegraph correspondent, and a great friend of mine, Uni Nair (sic), acting as a UN observer, were all killed together. I have always been convinced that Nair probably got them all into trouble. He was notably fearless. While with the Indian army in Italy during WW2, as a PR officer, he thoroughly enjoyed taking visitors into particularly dangerous sectors where their jeep attracted hostile fire. Towards the end of the war, in Burma, he volunteered without training to jump with paratroops in the drop on the outskirts of Rangoon.\n\n'Nair was fond of palm reading. My own, that I would reach a ripe old age, turned out pretty true. But if we asked Uni what sort of future he read in his own palm he always said, after a pause, “A short life and a merry one.”\" (Russell Spurr -- personal communication with the author)\n\nPage 450\n\nPage 451",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215676,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 453,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "INTELLIGENCE Pohang is the only port on the east coast of Korea held by the allied forces capable of taking ships of any size. It was here that the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked with all its equipment early last month. More important than the port is the airfield known as K3, the best natural airfield possessed by the allies in Korea. Mustangs based here have been giving constant support to ground troops in this coastal sector. Its loss would mean that air craft henceforth would have to operate either from Taegu, 49 miles to the west, or from Pusan, 60 miles to the south.\n\nThis Pohang affair, even if the situation is restored once again, shows up the whole weakness of the allied position in Korea. Intelligence must have been gravely at fault to permit such a situation to develop. Held on the coastal road between Yongdok and Pohang the North Koreans simply worked their way round the flanks as they have done on many other occasions in the campaign. Strategically and tactically, the northern command, exploiting the terrain and their superior man-power, have shown considerable skill in avoiding a full-scale frontal battle where superior American fire-power would tell, and in concentrating on feeling out the weak point in the allies' flank and rear.\n\nThe Naktong River line, which is being held only with difficulty, guards the western flank of the allied bridgehead in Korea. Across the north there is no such natural barrier, only 30 miles of mountain ridges. Again one is obliged to wonder exactly how large a bridgehead the allies can expect to hold with the forces at their disposal.\n\n405",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    }
]