[
    {
        "id": 204500,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1962",
        "page_number": 132,
        "title": "RAS-1962",
        "content_text": "BRITAIN AND CHINA\n\n117\n\nnot altogether the fault of the author, who has written the book as part of a series on Britain in the world today—though it detracts slightly from its value, does not in practice make it any the less interesting.\n\nThe question of recognition of the Communist government by Britain is very ably dealt with; the whole trend of opinion at the time, both in Britain and in the rest of the world is summed up. In 1949 Britain's commerce with China still far exceeded that of any other western country, and since the division into blocs was less rigid then than now, (though Britain consulted both the U.S. and the major Commonwealth countries) recognition was still a matter for each country to decide for itself. Happily the British government waited only three months to take this step; had it delayed another six, it would never have been taken, for the Korean war broke out. At the time international comment, even from the United States, was fairly favourable. It was realised that Britain had followed her usual pragmatic policy of recognition where a government was clearly in control as opposed to the U.S. ideological path of recognising only where it approved. Commercial groups and other British residents in China were influential in bringing this about; strangely enough, looking back over the last thirteen years, this was because the Communists appeared more honest and efficient than the KMT, and it was hoped that after recognition British interests would be able to expand.\n\nMr. Luard shows how quickly this hope became vain. For with the Korean war the new China entered on to the world stage with a vengeance, and came face to face with the United States.\n\nIn this conflict the British government always seems to have been slightly more aware of possible Chinese sentiments than the U.S., and to have hesitated rather more than the U.S. at the 38th parallel; and when President Truman began to talk of extending the war to Manchuria and of using the atom bomb, Mr. Attlee at once flew to Washington to make certain that U.N. forces were not to be committed to any extension of the fray without consultation with the other powers involved. Mr. Luard relates this episode in a particularly effective deadpan style which contrasts vividly with the drama of the events.\n\nThis British intervention epitomises the new role that Britain has since played in the world; she has been a mediator between",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207515,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 283,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n275\n\nA direct assault on the Japanese homeland using conventional weapons was being prepared at the time the bombs were dropped. In spite of their reduced nutrition and lack of supplies of all kinds, there seems little doubt that an Allied invasion of Japan would have been bitterly resisted and would have proved very costly. The cost of the invasion of the sacred territory will now never be known. It seems quite possible that in the prevailing mood at that time, reprisals of all kinds might have been ordered to be taken upon any Allied personnel in Japanese hands. The execution of the airmen captured in the Doolittle air raid on Japan in 1942 comes to mind.\n\nI do not intend to examine the morality or the political implications of the use of the atomic bomb at all, nor the fact that two were dropped. Opinions on these matters will always differ. I confine myself here to what I see as the facts as they affected us. A Japanese-Chinese war in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong would have been prolonged; situations would certainly have arisen in which our safety would have been jeopardised, and at best, many of us might not have survived at all. The decision by President Truman to use the atomic bombs resulted in our release almost overnight. Seen in contrast with the other possibilities which might have been envisaged, this was a wonderful outcome.\n\nA VIEW IN PERSPECTIVE\n\nThirty years after the events and after making allowances for the discreet phrasing of my diaries and for the effects of the passage of time in scaling down the few peaks of elation and levelling up the much more numerous troughs of depression, I conclude that we, the staff and patients in the British Military Hospital, Hong Kong, fared better than many other prisoners in Japanese hands. The published accounts of others, most of them written nearer to the events than my present story and so perhaps more influenced by passion, are far too numerous and ring true. I am allowing myself now to speculate on the somewhat privileged position we enjoyed, privileged that is by the standards of those who were Japanese prisoners.\n\nFirstly, our unit fell into Japanese hands as a fully equipped and staffed hospital with a full complement of patients seriously wounded in action, and hence, perhaps, in the eyes of our captors, more worthy of consideration than men who had surrendered, even though",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208547,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 4,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212534,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 88,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "68\n\ncan demonstrate the relationship between arts exchanges and political, and cultural developments in domestic-bilateral terms. To meet that end, I will analyse the stimulus for arts exchanges between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America and examine the consequences of these exchanges. I maintain that arts exchanges, the product of foreign and cultural policies, are generated by political and international developments. They are affected by these developments, though there may be some time lag between major policy changes and a consequent development in the area of arts exchanges. On the other hand, the two governments, consciously and sometimes directly, were involved in this enterprise, aiming at creating a cultural imagery in order to promote what they consider their respective national interests. Nevertheless, I hold that arts exchanges are not passive. Rather, they have their own impact on affairs in domestic cultural and political life as well as in bilateral relations. In certain cases, this impact generates a new political international environment.\n\nArts exchanges in Sino-American relations are seldom mentioned by political leaders, nor are they sufficiently explored in academic writings. This is because arts exchanges hold a very low position in the two countries' foreign policy priorities. There are always more urgent and apparently bigger issues to handle. However, arts exchanges as part of cultural relations stand for a major facet of the Sino-American general relationship and they often serve as a barometer of the development, and more importantly, the nature of such a relationship. In the period between 1949 and 1972, arts exchanges were non-existent. Artists in the United States were biased against a communist China or hindered by the U.S. government from visiting China. Simultaneously, China made few efforts to send performing groups or arts exhibitions to the United States. In a like manner, there were no exchanges of movies.\n\nBefore 1972, the United States regarded China as a major antagonist. Anti-Communism and hostility to China had characterized every president's foreign policy since Truman. In American domestic politics, anti-Communism had been a constant theme, especially dominating politics in the early fifties when McCarthyism was strong. When writing later on his experience in this period, John King Fairbank reflected: \"It became second nature to indicate that one was safely anti-Communist.\" McCarthyism did not last long, but it left a shadow over the succeeding decades.\n\n114",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215663,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 440,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "392\n\nMs. Han did not practice medicine in China in the 1950s or at any other time\n\n*\n\nMs. Leon Comber was a superintendent (not assistant superintendent) with the Malayan police, and acted as assistant commissioner\n\nOn the morning of Sunday, 25 June, 1950, communist forces from North Korea crossed the border into South Korea. The next day, on 26 June, President Harry S. Truman ordered American air and naval forces to go to the assistance of South Korea, and Clement Attlee in the House of Commons expressed support for Mr. Truman's actions.\n\nOn 27 June, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution recommending that all members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to meet the armed attack.' The Korean War had begun.\n\nThe unexpected outbreak of the Korean War took all newspapers by surprise but The Times had Ian Ernest McLeavy Morrison, a member of its staff, in the Far East at that time. By August of that year he would be dead.\n\nBorn in Beijing on 31 May 1913, he was the son of the famous Australian journalist, Dr. George Ernest Morrison (4 February 1862-29 May 1920) and a New Zealander Jennie Wark Robin (1889 – 20 June 1923), Dr. Morrison's former secretary who he had married in 1912. Dr. Morrison was known as \"China Morrison\" and was himself a correspondent for The Times during 1897-1912 and later political adviser to the Chinese Government.\n\nHis brother, Alastair Gwynne Morrison was born on 24 August 1915. He ultimately joined the Diplomatic\n\nDr. Morrison and his three sons, Ian, Colin and Alastair, 1917, (Mitchell Library)",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    }
]