[
    {
        "id": 215776,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 75,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "The EIC and relations with the Malay states\n\nIn the merchants' own words, 'The Supreme Government of India had uniformly discouraged the local Government at Singapore from interfering with matters beyond the limits of the Island. The cultivation of friendly relations with Native States and Chiefs has been neglected.'44 In this section, I will examine the merchants' reasons for this complaint, and also assess the accuracy of their claim. Rupert Emerson, a historian, calls the period during the Indian government's administration of the Straits Settlements 'a half-century of inactivity.' This is arguably the truth but not the whole truth, because DGE Hall, another historian, tends to disagree with Emerson's assertion. He says that 'one only has to glance through the many volumes of records relating to the period to realise that even if there was little or no spectacular achievement there was plenty of activity.' 'Even if by inactivity is meant the pursuit of non-intervention policy in native affairs, the term is misleading.\n\nPage 48\n\nThe Calcutta administration, wherever possible, adhered to a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. This policy had its roots in Pitt's India Act of 1784,49 which stipulated that the EIC's aim was peace, not interference in local politics or extension of the company's territories.50 The main reason for this policy was to avoid any form of entanglement in the internal troubles or wars of the Peninsula which could incur unnecessary expenses for the EIC,51 As it was, the EIC had lost its monopoly over the China trade in 1833 and, with this, the Straits Settlements ceased to be a source of direct profits, and were maintained at an annual loss.52\n\nPage 51\n\nYet despite the law on non-intervention, there was evidence that in some cases concerning threats to British interests, whether commercial, political or involving prestige, local administrators often found it necessary to intervene. In such cases, the actions were often condoned by the Supreme Government. Thus, there was a violation of Pitt's India Act (which eventually did lead to the change in British policy of non-intervention to intervention in 1874),54\n\nPage 53\n\nThio summarises the politico-legal scenario thus:\n\n...when responsibility for the Straits was transferred from the Government of India to the Colonial Office in 1867, the British were already bound by treaties with four of the five states south of Kedah, two of whom they\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215777,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 76,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "were pledged to protect and three over whose external relations they had a right of control.\"55 Hall strongly claims that, 'the Malay States were in a state of chronic unrest, external and internal,56 and had become completely incapable of putting their house in order. Intervention, therefore, could not be avoided. There was indeed constant intervention, notwithstanding all the rules to the contrary and all the thunders of Calcutta and the East India House, '57\n\nHowever, in spite of Thio's and Hall's assertions, the truth of the merchants' complaint is not invalidated, because between 1824 and 1873, British rule in Malaya was indeed ‘inactive,258 as their official policy was still in accordance with Pitt's India Act. In several cases, the actions of the Straits Settlements government implied some form of intervention, or at least limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States, when they violated the policy of non-intervention; but even then, nothing more elaborate was undertaken than the occasional punitive expedition, which was not enough, in 'the interests of British commerce.'60 Insofar as this was concerned, it would appear that the Straits merchants did have a legitimate complaint to the House of Lords, because their statement would appear to have been bona fide and to hold a substantial amount of evidential truth. The influence of Pitt's India Act (that is, EIC non-intervention) remained until 1874, when a new law was passed, and the British took on an active, intervening role in the Malay states.\n\n59\n\nJudicial system!\n\nThe main complaints of the merchants were that the Law was administered by unprofessional persons, that is, the administration of justice was in the hands of local officers of government, civil or military servants of the EIC, and the 'impractical schemes [that] were propounded' (for example, the Currency Act, port dues and stamp duties). LA Mills renders a counter attack to this point; he argues that 'although there were delays in dealing with problems which caused the Straits Settlements to suffer at times, on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few were of importance, so that injury caused in the delay in settling them was not great. The population was small and generally law-abiding. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations (the main task of the government was to watch Siam and Holland,\n\n63\n\n262",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215787,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 86,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "19\n\nfrom Pitt's India Act. The EIC accordingly found itself guaranteeing some states protection from attacks, or pledging to uphold boundary settlements. (Thio, supra, p xvi-xvii)\n\nThere were cases of intervention for example, in Kedah, Perak and Selangor, brought about by Robert Fullerton, Burney, Anderson and James Low:\n\nWhen Robert Fullerton was governor of the Straits Settlements in 1824, he completely reversed the earlier British attitude of giving in to the claims of Siam, thus embarking on protection and expansion of British interests in the Malay Peninsula by checking Siamese attempts at extending their influence over the northern Malay states. Thus, when Ligor prepared to invade Perak and Selangor in 1825, he sent a Penang squadron to patrol the river mouths to prevent any attacks. (Mills L A, British Malaya 1824-1867, Chap 8 p 141; other examples of intervention included the following: Burney's Preliminary Treaty with Ligor in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8 p 143-146); the Anderson Treaty (involving Selangor and Perak) in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8, p 145-146; Purcell, supra, Chap 6, p 70)\n\nThe Burney Treaty of 1826 saw British attempts to secure independence for Selangor and Perak (Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca Vol. 2 p 26); and later, the Low Treaty of 1826 promised British assistance in maintaining Perak's independence. These two treaties had more effect on the Malay States than any other treaties, the greatest consequence being a marked ending of Siamese southward ambitions, and thus securing the British position in expanding further into the Malay States at a later stage. However, signing these treaties showed non-compliance with Pitt's India Act. Thus, where Low's Treaty was concerned, the Supreme Government continued for some time to condemn it as unauthorised and never really ratified it. In effect, the intervention in the Malay States was still somewhat restricted by the Government's policy. (Mills, Op Cit. Chap 8 p 162) Other examples include Fullerton's challenge of Ligor's claim to the Kurau District in 1826, and the Burney Treaty of 1826 after which the British ceased to intervene in Kedah. (Mills, Ibid. Chap 8 pp 160-161)\n\nOther examples of intervention included those in Naning and Sungei Ujong: The British fought the Naning War in 1831-2 to establish British right to collection of revenue in Naning. In Sungei Ujong, the British squadron was called in 1857 to destroy the village of Pengkalan Kempas, in order to punish the chiefs who had been extorting British subjects. And again in 1860, Governor Cavenagh",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
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]