[
    {
        "id": 208021,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 60,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "44\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nfacing the Japanese. Consequently it was part of American policy, especially from 1944 onwards, to re-create a united front against Japan and promote agreement on a form of Constitutional Government for China which would include the Communist Party. To this end Chairman Mao Tse Tung was escorted to Chungking in August 1945 by the US Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. No real agreement was reached in some 41 days of talks and Chairman Mao returned to Yenan in October. Hurley resigned and in November the United States appointed General George Marshall as special negotiator, a truce was signed on January 10, 1946 and all-party Peoples Consultative Conference began*.\n\nHaving set the scene we may consider what this meant on the ground; specifically in terms of medical supplies to the Liberated Areas. These contained between 80-100 million people and perhaps 350,000 men under arms. Apart from supplies purchased and smuggled in from the Japanese occupied areas or captured, no UNRRA, International Red Cross, or other supplies had been allowed through from Chungking since the beginning of 1941, and the medical services were dependent on traditional medicines and drugs derived from available herbs. The situation was therefore very serious.\n\nThe UNRRA charter required that supplies be distributed to those in need regardless of race, religion, and party and UNRRA therefore applied pressure to the Chinese Government, via CNRRA, to allow supplies to go to the Liberated Areas. This pressure finally succeeded in January 1946 at the time of signing the truce and a permit for a total quantity of about eight tons of medical supplies was granted.\n\nDuring the period from the end of 1941 to 1946, the Friends Ambulance Unit, China Convoy, had been responsible for the transport of most of the civilian medical and relief supplies in the\n\n* For those desiring more detail of this period the following give different approaches:\n\nKenneth S. Chern, \"Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia\". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 4 Winter 1976-7.\n\nJohn S. Service, Lost Chance in China. Random House, 1974. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50. 2 vols, Chicago, 1964.\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209466,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 123,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "101\n\nlawyers two months training in \"New Democracy\" and placing them under Communist cadres.\n\nWhen the People's Political Consultative Conference, organized by the victorious Chinese Communist Party, issued its \"Common Programme\" formally establishing the People's Republic in September 1949, it also adopted an Organic Law of the Central People's Government, Article 5 of this document provided for a Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, but no action was taken on the establishment of a system of lower courts until September 1951. In fact, during this period, civil and criminal courts left over from the Kuomintang period continued to function alongside military, revolutionary, and people's tribunals. Article 17 of the Common Programme had done away with the six codes of the Kuomintang, but new laws were published in rapid order, some 3,452 of them by September of 1954, including major laws dealing with land reform, marriage, the punishment of counter-revolutionaries and corruption. However, no systematic codes were issued and there were many gaps in areas which lawmakers in most societies would consider of prime importance, including such crimes as homicide. When appropriate laws and regulations were lacking, judges were supposed to use the general policies of Mao's \"New Democracy.\" Such ambiguity naturally led to great inconsistency in judgments, and judges were forced to make wide use of analogy even to the point of secretly basing their decisions on Kuomintang legal precedent.\n\nIn the autumn of 1952 a National Judicial Conference was called to launch a reform of the courts. By the time the movement came to an end in April 1953, many former Kuomintang officials had been removed from the judicial system, but the problem of judicial decision making continued to persist. A Chinese Political Science and Law Association was established in the spring of 1953 which in May of the following year began publishing its national legal journal, Zhengfa yanjiu [Researches in Political Science and Law]. At the same time, a special legal publishing house was established and began producing annual collections of laws. Several law schools or institutes for training judicial cadres were also opened. Finally a second National\n\n--",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    }
]