[ { "id": 205067, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1966", "page_number": 23, "title": "RAS-1966", "content_text": "18\n\nJOHN J. NOLDE\n\nlarger problem. That this may have been the case is reflected in a memorial to Peking from an “unknown writer\", a translation of which appeared in The Chinese Repository of April, 1838.24 The author states that the present sad state of affairs dates from the disastrous fire of 1822, the uprisings of minority tribes on the Kwangtung-Kwanghsi border (which I have not mentioned) and the devastating floods of 1833 and 1834. The memorialist urged Peking to take strong action, included in which should be the suppression of the opium traffic.25\n\nFrom 1840 to 1842, the Opium War probably dominated the day to day life of our Hong Kong-Macao-Canton area. The Royal Navy controlled the river from Canton to the sea. The city itself underwent a kind of siege in 1841, and British troops and elements of the local militia actually clashed on the heights north of the city in May of that year. Hong Kong became a British colony. The local histories report almost nothing but the activities of the barbarians, as do the official memorials and edicts.\n\nYet one wonders whether or not this is a case of the \"big news story stealing the headlines\". Except for the episode of May, 1841, the local populace was rarely and only peripherally involved. After the May incident, the British action was conducted in the north and Canton was outside the main stream of events. The best we can say is that we don't know,\n\nWhen we come to the late 1840's, the historian is faced with the same problem that confronted him in the 1820's and 1830's. The standard documents seem to suggest that the dominant theme was again barbarian-oriented, and the historian's emphasis has generally been on the post-war treaty settlement, the reopening of trade, and, especially, the anti-foreign movement which culminated in the \"Canton City Question” of 1849.26\n\nBut what was really happening?\n\nIt would seem rather obvious that the diplomatic negotiations of the time were of little concern to the average villager along the river. Similarly, the reopening of trade per se could have had only a minor impact. But the anti-foreign movement seemed to have been another matter, one in which the populace was directly involved.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1966.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/bz60k0811", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206394, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 211, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "THE COLONY OF HONG KONG\n\n185\n\nI hurry on to the month of October, 1856, when there occurred the affair of the lorcha Arrow at Canton, which grew out of the practice of granting sailing letters to native craft, adopted, I think in the previous year, by Sir John Bowring, and which was rendered necessary to save the holders of them from capture by the insurgent fleets in the neighbourhood of Whampoa. A more unfortunate occasion of hostilities could not have presented itself; it was almost as bad as the opium complications which brought on our former war. It was felt to be so by Sir Michael Seymour, into whose hands the management of the thing soon passed from those of the Governor, and he tried to shift the quarrel to the old question of throwing open the gates of the city. The sense of many at home was sufficiently declared by the decision of Parliament against going to war about the matter, and under any other prime minister than Lord Palmerston the adverse vote would have been final. He appealed from it, however, to the country, which supported his policy, and Lord Elgin was called to proceed to China, and square up all the accounts between it and Great Britain.\n\nBefore that, however, on the morning of the 15th January, 1857, occurred the diabolical attempt to poison a large number of the inhabitants of the Colony by means of bread supplied from the bakery of A-lum. I was one of those who partook of the poison. I did so twice; early in the morning, and again at breakfast time; soon getting rid, however, of all the noxious matter through violent paroxysms of sickness. Never was such a day of excitement in the Colony; and had A-lum been caught at once, he would have been lynched beyond a doubt; but he had gone off with all his family by the early steamer to Macao. Being pursued thither, and brought back, he was subsequently brought to trial and acquitted, the guilt of the deed being thrown by him on his foreman and another man, who had made their escape. He was subsequently kept in gaol at large for some time, and there I made his acquaintance. He was a tall, imposing-looking man for a Chinese, and had been well educated. The respect and deference shown to him by all the prisoners were wonderful. On the Sundays, when I went to conduct a religious service with them, he quite took me under his patronage, had the books ready, and maintained perfect order among all who attended.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206617, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 165, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "H.K.'S CENTRAL MARKET AND THE TARRANT AFFAIR\n\n159\n\nforces during hostilities against China to settle and allotted them small lots on the waterfront. The Upper Bazaar which lay in the area of Graham and Stanley Streets consisted also of relatively small areas granted to Chinese who were presumptively useful to the nascent colony as tradesmen. The Lower Bazaar was almost totally destroyed in the great fire at the end of 1851 and the Upper Bazaar was removed in 1844 and its inhabitants resettled in Taipingshan.\n\n3 See Gordon to Pottinger, 10 February 1844 [CO129/V/f.141].\n\n+ Evidence given by Colonel Malcolm to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China, answer to question 4633.\n\n5 Davis sought to let as many monopolies go as possible to private individuals for what they were prepared to give. Thus, in addition to the markets, he let out also opium, salt, and quarrying monopolies.\n\n6 Lease Register Volume C, f.94. The lot was leased as Marine Lot 38. The lease registers referred to are the Registers of the Land Office in which all dealings in crown land were recorded. The actual transactions themselves are also recorded separately as 'Memorials' and reference is made to them by number. The numbering was done according to the order in which they were registered. I am indebted to the Registrar General of the Government of Hong Kong for allowing me access to the records of the Land Office and for permission to publish material derived from that source.\n\n7 Memorial 122.\n\n8 Memorial 143.\n\n9 Memorial 258.\n\n10 Friend of China, 7 July 1847.\n\n11 Memorial 383.\n\n12 In this article, the romanisations found in the Land Office records are used even where they do not correspond to those either in the Wade-Giles system or current usage.\n\n13 Memorial 304.\n\n14 Ibid.\n\n15 Memorial 345.\n\n16 Hong Kong Register, 27 July 1847.\n\n17 Friend of China, 14 July 1847.\n\n18 And in so doing, incidentally, infringing the provision of the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, which allowed British subjects to proceed only to the \"Treaty Ports\" and to nowhere else in China.\n\n19 Friend of China, 14 July 1847. Tam Achoy's market was known as the Kwang Yuen and in the disastrous fire in December 1851, the fifty-one houses which comprised the market were destroyed: see Hong Kong Register, January 1852. Tam was referred to a few years later as the \"most respectable Chinaman\" who made a practice of going into the witness box to speak for the character of accused persons. He remained in Hong Kong until his death in the 1870's and was one of the founders of the Tung Wah organisation, a charitable body still functioning in Hong Kong.\n\n20 Hong Kong Register, 27 July 1847.\n\n21 Hong Kong Register, 19 October 1847; Friend of China, 23 October 1847 and 18 December 1847.\n\n22 The Editor of the Friend (John Carr) claimed to have seen Hwei's accounts and that they revealed the \"squeeze\" payment.\n\nPage 165\n\nPage 166", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208309, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 33, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n17\n\nspecial kind of society of its own, and men who had not experienced from the outset the hardships of military life were unable to handle the common soldiers.\n\nThe question remains: What kind of training was available to military men in traditional Chinese armies? All the evidence suggests that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in fact well before, military education in China was woefully inadequate by almost any standard. Officers were unacquainted with even the rudiments of warfare, and the rank and file received only the most perfunctory drill. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, an investigation ordered by the Ch'ien-lung emperor revealed the lack of basic training in Banner forces everywhere in China Proper. The situation was no better for the degenerate Army of the Green Standard. Yet prior to the twin challenges of internal rebellion and external aggression in the mid-nineteenth century, there was comparatively little incentive for military men to engage in serious professional study, and even less incentive for most Ch'ing scholars to concern themselves with military affairs. As the redoubtable scholar-general Hu Lin-i remarked in the Hsien-feng period: \"Under the established system of the dynasty, the military is controlled by the civil, but the civil often disesteems the military.\" The late Ch'ing period was perhaps the highwater mark of what Lei Hai-tsung describes as China's “a-military culture\" (wu-ping ti wen-hua),\n\nThe Opium War jolted at least some Ch'ing officials out of their complacency and ignorance. Unfortunately, however, many of those individuals who knew most about the Western military challenge and China's need to reform were least free to speak with complete candor. Lin Tse-hsü is, of course, the best-known example. One official who did speak his mind openly was Ch'i-shan's ill-fated and little-known successor as governor-general of Liang-kuang, Ch'i Kung. In 1842, Ch'i Kung memorialized the throne, suggesting that if China wanted the services of capable men in military affairs, it would be necessary to secure scholarly talent. The way to do this, he proposed, was to reform the traditional civil service examinations. Ch'i's plan was to test advanced candidates in five areas of military expertise: history, strategy and tactics, instrument-making and mathematics, meteorology, and geography as the final exercise (“discourses on policy,” ts'e-lun) in the three-part examination", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208929, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1980", "page_number": 91, "title": "RAS-1980", "content_text": "HONG KONG RIOTS OF OCTOBER 1884\n\n59\n\nNaturally the British Government protested this incitement to murder in its territories most strenuously. At British insistence an Imperial Decree was issued disavowing the proclamation and censuring the responsible officials for an excess of zeal. The censure did no damage to any of their later careers and amounted to barely concealed backhanded praise. When the British later asked for a re-publication of the decree of censure by Chang Chih-tung in the belief that it would calm Hong Kong, Chang refused. He justified his refusal, and the initial proclamation itself, on the grounds that he had merely been trying to encourage overseas Chinese to go to the areas of combat and help China in her struggle.10 That had, of course, been part of the original proclamation, but his explanation was no more convincing then than it is now. Interestingly, the Daily Press of October 1 pointed out that Commissioner Lin had issued a similar appeal in 1840 during the First Opium War.\n\nSeveral of the Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong published Chang's original proclamation when it was issued. The colonial authorities were so concerned about the potential effect of the proclamation that they brought charges against the newspapers for incitement to murder. Eventually the prosecutions failed in court, but the days following the publication of the proclamation were filled with incidents of Chinese refusing to provide services to the French, either to the ships of the Messageries Maritimes or to French naval vessels calling at Hong Kong for repairs and supplies after the battles with the Min forts. There were also incidents involving clashes between French naval personnel and local Chinese reported from Singapore.11\n\nThere is no question that the reported incidents were not simply anti-foreign, though later that would enter into them. Unlike incidents in other areas of China, only the French were affected. Even in Canton the incidents nearly ceased when it was announced that there were no more French in the city.12 On September 7 when Admiral Lespés, who had bombarded Keelung before the Foochow attack, was ashore in Hong Kong the local authorities were so concerned that some of the large numbers of Cantonese in the city might try to collect the rewards offered for the deaths of French officers that they assigned the admiral an escort of Sikhs.13\n\nWhen the cargo-boatmen were fined for refusing to work the French ships the action triggered a strike against all ships of what-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210896, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 247, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "230\n\nCARL SMITH\n\nplague, the Hongkong Government cleared most of the district of Taipingshan. This had been the city's most congested area, and its removal displaced a large number of people.\n\nTo provide needed housing, Ho A-mei explained that the Fuk Tin Co was building houses across the harbour, where it was still rural. There would be fresh air, wide streets and better sanitary conditions.\n\nSome several scores of houses were almost completed and site formation for others was in progress. The houses were of brick with tile roof, two storeys high and with ample room between the blocks. The intention was to build several hundred. Built in bulk, the properties could be sold at a bargain price, at the same time the promoters could realise a substantial profit.\n\nThe hope was that \"many respectable Chinese will buy land and houses over the way as family residences and that thus many well-to-do Chinese who have houses in the interior will find it convenient and pleasant to 'pitch their tent' in the neighbourhood of this thriving colony.\" Nor need there be any anxiety about security as there were military personnel at the Chinese custom's station at Laichikok.\n\nBut looking ahead only a little farther, there was the prospect of the area becoming British, for as the interviewer stated, “such an extension of Hongkong has long been needed, and, I am glad to say, the day when it will be un fait accompli is now within measurable distance.\" The distance was three more years.\n\nOPIUM MONOPOLY AND HO CONNECTION\n\nSomehow Ho A-mei became involved in a Chinese scheme to solve the opium question. Some background will aid in understanding his role in the scheme.\n\nIn 1875 the British took the opportunity presented by the murder of a member of a British exploratory expedition in the province of Yunnan to press China for a treaty revision. As a consequence, the Chefoo Agreement was negotiated the following year.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210898, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 249, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "232\n\nCARL SMITH\n\ntal to their people, and it will thus be in their power to cut off the supply altogether by a pecuniary sacrifice, far less than that voluntarily taken by England in the emancipation of slaves in the West Indies.\n\nA number of historians have regarded Li Hung-chang's attitude towards the opium problem as ambiguous. However that may be, he took a strong stand in a letter he addressed to the Anglo-Oriental Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade.\n\nHis statement was couched in a high moral tone.\n\n\"Opium is a subject of discussion of which England and China can never meet on common ground. China views the whole question from a moral standpoint; England from a fiscal. England would sustain a source of revenue in India, while China contends for the lives and prosperity of its people. The ruling motive of China is to repress opium by heavy taxation everywhere, whereas with England the manifest object is to make opium cheaper, and thus increase and stimulate the demand in China.”\n\nLi recognised that the crux of the issue was the importance of opium for the revenue of India, and thus indirectly of Britain. He contended that China did not tax opium because of the revenue it produced, but “the present import duty on opium was established, not from choice, but because China submitted to the adverse decision of arms. The war must be considered as China's standing protest against legalising such a revenue.\n\nA Shanghai paper did not believe the letter was composed by Viceroy Li. It stated: \"It bears the impression of foreign --- we had almost written missionary penmanship throughout.” It was perhaps the product of one of the Viceroy's advisers trained in a missionary school, such as Wu T’ing-fang (Ng Choy) or Chan Lai-sun. Whoever wrote it, it went out under Li's name and must have represented his opinions.\n\nThe letter became the subject of a question in Parliament to the Secretary of State for India as to whether the Indian Government was taking any steps to review Britain's position on the opium", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210899, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 250, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "233\n\nquestion.\n\nThe reply was properly evasive and noncommittal.\n\nIn 1881 when Ma Kei-chung, Li's representative to India, passed through Hongkong, he was most anxious to confer with Governor Hennessy. According to local notices, the Governor played hard to get, though it was rumoured that they had discussed the formation of a syndicate which would buy opium in India, bring it to Hongkong and from there distribute it throughout China.\n\nIt is here that Ho A-mei enters the story. According to Eitel's history of Hongkong, Europe in China, A-mei was to arrange for the $20 million proposed as capital for the new syndicate. Just which capitalists would back the project was not stated. Undoubtedly a number of wealthy Chinese in Hongkong were interested.\n\nNot long after Ma's stopover in Hongkong, Sir John Pope Hennessy, Governor of Hongkong, made a trip of a “private” nature to Peking. A John Pitman went to Peking at about the same time. He was a financial adventurer who became involved in several big schemes backed by Chinese capital. In one of these, the bid for the Wei Sing gambling monopoly at Macau, Ho A-mei had been associated with Pitman. Pitman was an intimate friend of Sir John Hennessy and it is possible that the Governor was presenting a scheme in Peking in which his friend had an interest.\n\nIn January 1882, a report was circulated that Li Hung-chang had done a turnabout and appealed to the Emperor not to establish an opium syndicate.\n\nFast upon this news came the rumour that the Tsung-li Yamen (the Chinese Foreign Affairs Bureau) was so pleased with Ma Kei-chung's negotiations, after his return from India, with Sir Thomas Wade, the British Minister, that it was going to recommend him for the post of superintendent of the syndicate should it be established in Hongkong. The authenticity of the report was put in doubt by the comment that a British Minister had never previously negotiated with anyone under the rank of a Viceroy, a position", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210900, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 251, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "234\n\nMa had not reached.\n\nCARL SMITH\n\nThere was gathering opposition to the idea of a Chinese monopoly syndicate. Provincial officials viewed it as a step towards centralisation and a curb to their autonomy. Conservative forces were opposed to any scheme which might give more power to the Cantonese compradore element and feared they would combine with foreign speculators. Some of the Chinese capitalists behind the scheme were suspect. In addition some of the Chinese officials had vested interests in the cultivation of opium in China. The scheme contemplated phasing out such production.\n\nFor all the rumours, speculation and negotiation, the scheme was never realised. Attempts to solve the opium question dragged on for many decades.\n\nWith the scheme's failure, Ho A-mei lost a chance to become a national figure. The stage of his future activities was to remain the Hongkong-Canton area.\n\nMOVES TO BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN THE RULER AND RULED\n\nHe was ambitious\n\nHo A-mei was a public figure by nature and enjoyed being under the spotlight of public attention. By ability he was innovative, energetic and determined. By education he had an excellent command of English. And by financial interest, his fortunes were linked with the business affairs of the wealthy Li Sing family of Hongkong.\n\nHis public activity was in a period when the Chinese were coming to an awareness of their importance for the progress of Hong-kong. This gave them a new sense of dignity and a desire to participate more fully in the total life of the community.\n\nAccording to Ho A-mei things were different in the old days. In a speech he delivered in 1883, he said: \"In times gone by the mutual intercourse between Chinese and foreigners was of such a nature as to render communication between those who were looked down upon as being the lower classes of the Chinese, and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211120, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 181, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "156\n\nIn its memorial the Chamber of Commerce maintained that both foreigners and Chinese who were British subjects, when travelling or reading in China, needed the protection of a consul and the right to be tried in a British Consular Court.\n\nOn the other hand, the Chinese on the British soil of Hongkong needed no such protection. They could rest confident in the fair administration of British justice. In addition it was pointed out, \"they have an important official in the Registrar General, to whom as 'Protector of Chinese' they can always have recourse for advice and assistance.\n\nThe Chefoo Convention was never ratified by Britain. Therefore China could not claim by treaty rights the privilege of appointing a consul for Hongkong.\n\nThe question arose again in 1874 as the result of the so-called \"blockade of Hongkong.\" This development had been anticipated by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the British Minister to China, at the time China had first asked for permission to station an official in Hongkong as a check to smuggling.\n\nIn 1868 the Viceroy of the Two-Kwangs had opened customs stations near Hongkong to collect provincial duties on goods carried by Chinese junks sailing from Hongkong.\n\nTwo of them were near the eastern and western approaches to the Hongkong harbour. Another was on the island of Cheung Chau. In 1871 the stations began collecting the treaty tariff duty on opium,\n\nIn addition, armed revenue cruisers were introduced to see that the stations were not bypassed. They patrolled Chinese junks, chased smugglers and attempted to ensure that proper duties were paid. The foreign merchants in Hongkong labelled this effort of the Chinese to protect their interests as a \"blockade.”\n\nThe Chinese, however, had not given up their wish to have a consul in Hongkong. The expense of maintaining a fleet of armed vessels near Hongkong was heavy. There was always the danger", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211140, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 201, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "176\n\nBefore the public meeting could be held, the Home Government changed its mind about the appointment.\n\nTHE DAY AN ADMIRAL TRIED TO STEAL THE SHOW\n\nIn an attempt to solve the blockade question, Sir Brooke Robertson, the British Consul at Canton, suggested in 1878 that a European be appointed as Chinese Consul in Hongkong. He could check on cargoes of junks and make reports to the Customs authorities in Canton.\n\nIn this way the Chinese could exercise better control over the collection of duties on goods shipped in and out of Hongkong on Chinese vessels. Presumably he would not be prone to engage in all the irregularities allegedly practised by all Chinese officials.\n\nHongkong, however, resisted such an appointment and the matter was dropped at that time.\n\nThe Opium Agreement between Britain and China signed in September 1886, provided for a Chinese Maritime Customs collecting station at Kowloon. The Hongkong Government unofficially condoned the residence of its Commissioner, a British national, in Hongkong.\n\nIn view of this arrangement and the easing of the tensions created by the Chinese blockade of Hongkong, the appointment of a Chinese Consul for Hongkong continued to lay dormant.\n\nIn 1891, however, the Colonial Office suddenly informed Hongkong that a Chinese Consul had been appointed for the port. There was an immediate outcry of indignation. The opposition hauled out the same arguments they had used against any arrangement with China that would have assisted it in collecting customs duties.\n\nIn an editorial comment, the China Mail stated that the arrangement made with China for the Imperial Customs to collect its duties directly had been mutually beneficial, for \"smuggling had been discouraged and legitimate trade promoted, and the Col-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211358, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 74, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "50\n\nBut Mr. Scholfield stuck to his opinion. \"I would not give a single thought to it. The only thing I would think of was the ten cents I would receive at the end of the day.\"\n\nWhen the resolutions proposed by Mr. Bowley were put to the meeting, only Mr. Scholfield voted against him. He told the meeting that if the suggestions were to be implemented it would mean money **and would depend on the maintenance of the opium revenue**. If that was stopped, what would they do?\" Up to that date Hong Kong had depended upon the income from the opium trade to finance itself, now there was heavy pressure from the Home Government to abolish the traffic in opium.\n\nThe editor of the Daily Press commended the small group of Hong Kong expatriates who were concerned about social problems, though his views were expressed in the colonial attitudes of the day.\n\nFar removed from the centres of civilization and surrounded by people alien to us in manners, customs and ideas, there is a natural tendency to lose that sense of communal responsibility which is steadily developing in the land from which we spring. It is well, therefore, that we have in our midst some whose interests are not limited by sport or commerce to remind us of the thoughts and aspirations of our more progressive fellow countrymen at Home.\n\nProposals of the Sanitary Board 1919\n\nMr. Bowley was a member of the Sanitary Board and used his position to try to get passed some regulations on child labour. He used a back door approach by proposing that the regulations be based on sanitary grounds. As the name of the Board suggests such concerns came within its province.\n\nOn the 19 March 1919 Mr. Bowley had posed the following question, **Does the Medical Officer of Health consider it desirable in the interests of public health of the Colony that the ages, hours and conditions of employment of women and children in factories, workshops and work-places in the Colony should be regulated and controlled?** The Medical", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212851, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 160, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "145\n\nand probably compelled them to increase the area of opium cultivation. Obviously the crop was being passed on through the Chinese officers at the Puppet's headquarters. I had found there that they used his office as if it were their own. This may have been another reason for the grip the Chinese had taken of this small state. When Allied government is re-established in Burma it is to be hoped that serious attention will be paid to the question of opium. On the barren slopes of Kokang it is one of the only crops which grow, and so the problem is chiefly economic, the finding of a substitute crop. I noticed that no opium was planted in the Lihsaw villages; they were all Christians, converted by the American Baptist Mission—a mission which does the same as Dr. Seagrave's very excellent work in Burma, and they had been taught to grow potatoes instead. But the Lihsaws are not numerous, there are limits to the demand for potatoes, and further alternatives will be required.\n\nKokang was not self-supporting in rice. The normal flow of commerce is along the motor road from Kunlong to Hsenwi and Burma; that road was now cut by Japanese occupation, and Kokang had to depend on China for additional supplies. I believe the Puppet did his best to exchange part of his opium for rice, but not very successfully. Yunnan itself had inadequate supplies to feed the large forces of the C.E.F. for whom quantities of rice had to be imported from further afield. It was a difficult situation for the Puppet and one which put him the more under Chinese obligation.\n\nI got to know many of the headmen personally and well; with two exceptions, men recently appointed by the Puppet, they were hostile to him, and anxiously awaited the return of the Myosa, whose fair and just administration had left happy memories.\n\nI did not fathom the system of appointing circle and village headmen. The Myosa appeared to have the authority to make appointments, but I found in many places that the post was hereditary; many of the headmen too were of the Myosa's family. They often had managers, or Prime Ministers, who managed their affairs for them; and in at least some instances the function of manager to a circle headman was hereditary too.\n\nI returned from Sincheng to Lunghtang with a baffled feeling; the Bren gun teams were sent for training, but I felt they were the last the Chinese would allow to come, and the event was to prove my doubts justified. The despatch of further men was delayed on one pretext after", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213316, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 138, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "119\n\nTHE TAKING OF CHAPU\n\nKEITH STEVENS\n\nRecently my daughter and I visited Chapu, a town which for a moment in history was the scene of one of the first encounters between British Forces and the Tatars of the Imperial Chinese Army.\n\nChapu, sometimes recorded as Chapoo but now romanised as Zhapu, is a small town lying almost exactly half way between the cities of Shanghai and Hangchou, the latter being the provincial capital of the central Chinese province of Chekiang. It used to be an important port on the north coast of the Bay of Hangchou noted for its connections with the Japan trade during earlier times; however, by the 1840s it had become a backwater garrison town for the Chinese army of the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty in support of the small Manchu garrison. The original Ch'ing fighting force, the Tatar Banners from Manchuria and Mongolia, had become effete through soft living, whilst the provincial forces of Chinese so-called soldiery, the Green Banners, were ill-equipped, ill-trained, and under strength.\n\nDuring the eighteen thirties, China wanted nothing of foreigners, whilst the Europeans, seeing a vast land teeming with millions of potential customers, wanted admission into China and its lucrative trade. Europeans, and to a certain extent the Americans too, were becoming more and more frustrated by the Chinese attitude towards foreigners in general, refusing to accept them under what was considered in the West as normal international relations.\n\nMisunderstandings were centred around China looking upon Great Britain and other European countries as tributary states, and the British East India Company, which had had its monopoly abolished in 1833, had entered the opium trade. Opium was banned by the Chinese authorities, and after an official was sent from Peking to Canton—the only port open to foreigners for trade in general—especially to put an end to the opium trade. British officials became involved due to confusion over recognition of their status and the question of the illicit trade of opium. A further quarrel broke out over the jurisdiction of Chinese courts in cases involving British subjects.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 146, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "127\n\n1\n\n# NOTES\n\nThe Manchus established the Ch'ing dynasty in AD 1644, having overthrown the native Chinese Ming rulers. The Manchus were related to the central Asian group speaking a language akin to Mongol who settled in Manchuria many centuries earlier. They were usually referred to by Europeans as Tatars.\n\n2. Lach garrison town, including Chapu, contained a Tatar walled city separate from the Chinese city.\n\nIn 1840 HMS bug Algerine paid a flying visit to Chapu and was fired upon from some batteries near the town. During the attack on Chapu in 1842, these batteries were quickly put out of action by the Royal Navy.\n\n4. Under command of Vice-Admiral Sir William Parker.\n\n*The Westmorland Regiment was granted the China Dragon superscribed “China” for service during the China War of 1840-42.\n\n*The Nemesis was the first iron steamer to round the Cape of Good Hope. She was never commissioned as one of HM's vessels of war, yet was generally commanded by Royal Navy officers. She was of the greatest use throughout the First China War and after the Treaty of Nanking returned to Bombay.\n\nA joss-house is the Victorian name for a Chinese temple or shrine, the house where the joss (god, from the Portuguese \"Deos\") was situated. From contemporary sketches and descriptions, the joss house in question would appear to have been a medium-sized Buddhist establishment, and although there were no references to priests, monks, or nuns, it had residential accommodation in addition to the usual altar halls.\n\nLung Fu was a company commander, Iso-ling (grade 4a), of one of the Eight Manchu Banners.\n\n*Parker, L. II. Chinese Account of the Opium War.\n\nA Tao-tai was an imperial Circuit Intendant, a member of the hierarchy controlling several prefectures.\n\nI-li-pu (1770-1847) was a member of the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner and an Imperial Clansman. He was banished for disobedience in 1841 but recalled and appointed acting assistant military lieutenant-governor at Chapu in early 1842, his predecessor having died of wounds during the British attack. Chapu was still occupied by the British, and I-li-pu had to remain in Hangchou, where he received orders to move to Soochou as it was understood that he was respected by the British, and the Court wished him to be on hand to carry out negotiations.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214832, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 247, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "214\n\nForce conceded that there were reasons for beginning hostilities against China, whilst others were openly critical of a war opened on behalf of opium traders, badly treated or not.\n\nAn anonymous military writer in Colburn's United Service Magazine observed bitterly at the time that \"the poor Chinese - with their painted paste-board boats - must submit to be poisoned, or must be massacred by the thousand, for supporting their own laws in their own land.\" Another military officer, Lieutenant John Ouchterlony of the Madras Engineers in his history of the War, conceded: \"That the quarrel was an unhappy one and for many reasons to be deeply deplored, does not admit of a doubt.\"\n\nAt the same time, Ouchterlony introduced a wider consideration for his readers. However plausible the view taken in England by those opposed to a war which, as they thought, was being undertaken to enforce the opium traffic, it was, he said, “on our part just and unavoidable\" due to the \"vindictiveness and insufferable arrogance of the Chinese government\" during the past half-century. \"The opium question,\" to his mind, was to be \"regarded merely as a spark blown into a mine, and no more to be considered the primary cause of the war than the match which ignites the train...\" This was a view shared by another young officer, Lieut. Wyndham Charles Baker of the Madras Engineers, as we see from one of his published home letters.\n\nNot all their brother officers were convinced. The naval surgeon Edward Cree, was more concerned with the results of the War. Noting in his journal for Monday 29th [August] 1842 that \"the articles of the treaty [were] signed this day,\" he commented:\n\n“So ends the Chinese War. About the justice and policy of it I leave to more competent judges, but one thing I dislike in connection with it is the opium question. It has cost the lives of many thousands of human beings, and great destruction of property and misery and sorrow to many.\n\nWaging War in European Style\n\n11\n\nIn official circles in Britain, China's Court and Government were blamed for bringing on the War. Perhaps because of this, the British", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214844, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 259, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "226\n\nconcerning the Opium Question and have come to the conclusion that we have no right to date the present eruption to that cause, as we have been insulted, our Trade interfered with, and British subjects have been maltreated long before Opium was mentioned and we have only been too tardy in seeking redress.” Letter of August 21st 1840 from Chusan, from “An Artillery Officer in China, 1840-1842”, Blackwood's, 1964, p. 80.\n\n\"The Cree Journals, The Voyages of Edward H. Cree, Surgeon R.N., as Related in his Private Journals, 1837-1856 Edited and with an Introduction by Michael Levien. (Exeter, Webb & Bower, 1981), p. 117.\n\n12\n\nAs, e.g. in Bingham, op.cit., Vol.I, p. 187: \"Captain Elliot assured the Chinese, by proclamations in their language, that no harm was intended to the peaceable inhabitants by the present expedition; that it was caused by Lin's bad treatment of the English; and that the force would only act against the mandarins, officers, and soldiers of the government.\"\n\n13 Bingham, Vol.II, p.171, and Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (Hutchinson of London, 1975), p.129.\n\n14 Beeching, p.149. They had done the same in Lower Burma in 1824-26 (George Bruce, The Burma Wars 1824-1886 (London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1973) pp.33-35.\n\n15 See Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Sheridan (Eds), The Laws of War, Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994), chapter 6, \"The Age of Napoleon”, in which Gunther Rothenberg wrote (p.97) that \"Professional soldiers were well aware of the laws and customs of war between civilized states, and by and large observed them,” and that despite atrocities and violations, their \"basic existence and validity” were never challenged.\n\n16 The most notable example being the firing of a salute of minute guns by the flagship, HMS Blenheim, when Admiral Kuan's body was recovered by his family after the battle of the Bogue in January 1841: see Bingham, Vol.II, p. 151, and Beeching, p. 128.\n\n18\n\nBeeching, pp. 147, 151. Wyndham Baker in Blackwood's p.79. By way of comment he added, “The", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214950, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "ARTICLES\n\nTEA AND OPIUM\n\nSOLOMON BARD\n\n“Thank God for tea! What would the world do without tea?\n\nHow did it exist? I am glad I was not born before tea.”\n\nPreamble\n\nSidney Smith, clergyman and author (18th cent.)\n\n2\n\nThe tragic events and the underlying causes of the Anglo-Chinese Conflict of 1839-1860, known as the Opium Wars, have been analysed in many scholarly publications and debates from various, sometimes opposing viewpoints. To the Chinese, the opium question seemed its principal cause. For the British, opium was only an immediate pretext; the issues were much deeper, such as opening the gates more fully to all manner of foreign trade and forcing China to engage in commercial and diplomatic intercourse according to Western rules. The West sought after Chinese goods; in particular, the demand for tea and silk was immense, and China was for the present the sole source of tea. In return, the Chinese demand for British goods was insignificant. The resulting imbalance in trade was an unsound practice then as it would be today. The strength of this argument can be judged by the fact that Britain was prepared to go to war with China to force bilateral trade relations. India offered Britain a solution in the way of opium and, to a lesser extent, raw cotton, both accepted by the Chinese. Even when consideration is given to different knowledge existing at the time regarding the harmful effects of opium, it is clear that the opium trade, backed as it was by force, was evil and unjustified. By the end of the 18th century, the consumption of tea in Britain had become phenomenal. It has been pointed out on occasions that the value of tea exported from and of opium imported into China appeared to be linked. The critical role played by opium in the Anglo-Chinese conflict has never been in doubt. The role of tea, however, has been less obvious. It is intended in\n\n1", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216340, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 99, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "48\n\nsubordinate status in all things, including the favour of tribute missions and foreign trade.76\n\nRev. W. Ellis, in Gutlaff's Three Voyages (1834) wrote, ‘A grave Chinese author, profoundly skilled in the literature of his own nation, congratulating himself that he was not born in our barbarous countries of the West observes, \"for then I must have lived in a cave under-ground, - eaten the bark and roots of trees, worn leaves and long grass for my covering, - and been really a beast though in the shape of a man.\"77\n\nWestern sojourners in China could not fail to observe the fact that, as the great missionary translator-scholar W. H. Medhurst wrote in 1838, 'The Chinese assume to be...the only civilised and powerful nation in the world ...,'78 an attitude that appears to have characterised official and peasant, merchant and coolie alike. As Parkinson commented in 1937, 'With such invincible ignorance it is difficult to cope.'+79\n\nAt the same time, trying to be objective about Chinese disdain, Lord Macartney, England's first ambassador to China, wrote in 1794 of his own countrymen: 'Is there any country on the globe that Englishmen visit where they do not display that pride of themselves and that contempt of others which conscious superiority is apt to inspire?'80\n\nThe Impending war\n\nBy 1839, the situation had not changed a whit. Each party to the impending hostilities was boxed in by its own ideas and limitations, in the case of the Westerners fanned by the many irritations accompanying their lives and mercantile dealings at Canton under the restrictions imposed by Chinese officials.\n\nThese prompted one of the historians of the military side of the War to opine that 'The opium question was to be regarded merely as a spark blown into a mine, and no more to be considered the primary cause of the war than the match which ignites the train...'81 But at least one of his brother officers had deplored going into a war in which the opium question was an unworthy element.82\n\nAnd at this point, on the verge of War, we must regretfully take leave of the China of the old China Trade,83", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216348, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 107, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "56\n\n80 Macartney's Journal, January 1794. See (editor) Cranmer-Byng, J.L.(1962). An Embassy to China, Being the Journal kept by Lord Macartney during his Embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung 1793-1794. London, Longmans, p.215.\n\n#1\n\nOuchterlony, Lieutenant John (1844). The Chinese War: An Account of All the Operations of the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty of Nanking (London, Saunders and Otley, p.37. Wyndham Baker of the Madras Engineers wrote home: \"I have read every work I can get hold of concerning the Opium Question and have come to the conclusion that we have no right to date the present eruption to that cause, as we have been insulted, our Trade interfered with, and British subjects have been maltreated long before Opium was mentioned and we have only been too tardy in seeking redress\". Letter of August 21st 1840 from Chusan, from (1964) An Artillery Officer in China, 1840-1842, Blackwood's, p. 80.\n\n$2 Levien, Michael Levien. (Edited and with an Introduction by). The Cree Journals, The Voyages of Edward H. Cree, Surgeon R.N., as Related in his Private Journals, 1837-1856. Exeter, Webb & Bower, 1981, p.117.\n\n* This section should be read in conjunction with my article (1999-2000). \"That Singular and Hitherto Almost Unknown Country': Opinions on China, the Chinese, and the ‘Opium War' among British Naval and Military Officers who Served During Hostilities There, in JHKBRAS Vol.39, pp.211-233.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]