[ { "id": 206329, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 146, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "140\n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE\n\n44 Sir Robert Ho Tung was never a member of the District Watch Committee although he was at one time chairman of the Tung Wah Hospital Committee. Sir Robert's brothers—Ho Fook and Ho Kom Tong—and other relatives became members of the Committee.\n\n45 Sir Chau Tsun-nin, who served on the Committee, was the son of Chau Siu-ki, a prominent financier and member of the Committee until his death. Chau Siu-ki (1863-1925) was killed in the collapse of a house during an abnormally heavy rainstorm.\n\n46 I think one may conclude that by the time the Committee met the Registrar General most of the problems to be discussed had been thrashed over previously, most likely at the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce or at the Chinese Club, both located in Connaught Road. There was also a Compradores' Club.\n\n47 For an account of Ho Kai's involvement in Chinese politics see Harold Z. Schiffrin, \"The Enigma of Sun Yat-sen\", in M. C. Wright, ed., op. cit., pp. 246 ff.\n\n48 The Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce was in close touch with the Canton Chamber of Commerce and members flitted between one and the other. Many members of the District Watch Committee had offices and businesses in Canton and invested heavily in Kwangtung enterprises. Many bought land.\n\n49 Ho Kai, however, believed in the 'Open Door' policy in China, which he thought would be beneficial to both China, Hong Kong and the West. See the letter sent to Lord Charles Beresford in Beresford's book, The Break-up of China, London, Harper and Brothers, 1899, pp. 216-233.\n\n50 This is made clear, I feel, by a perusal of the commissions of enquiry into the workings of the Po Leung Kuk and the Tung Wah Hospital. In both cases Ho Kai worked in concert with Lockhart to protect the interests of the Chinese community. Ho Kai was no yes-man. On the other hand, he did use his inside knowledge of government activities to line his own pockets. Endacott states that Ho Kai and his cronies were suspected of spreading rumours about British intentions in the New Territories before the takeover in order to reduce land prices. Endacott, op. cit., p. 263. See also Despatches and other papers relating to the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong, Sessional Papers, No. 32 of 1899, p. 20.\n\n51 For example, Ho Fook, Chau Siu-ki and Wei Yuk all died in office.\n\n52 This board was set up to oversee the working of the managing committee and to see that continuity in policy was maintained.\n\n53 See note 52. An important function of the Advisory Board was to see that money was spent wisely.\n\n54 The Committee controlled fee-paying cemeteries at Aberdeen and Tsun Wan. Burial was reserved for Chinese who had been permanently resident in the Colony.\n\n55 This Committee, like the others listed above, was under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. Chinese temples were controlled, in accordance with Ordinance No. 7 of 1928, by this Committee.\n\n56 The Chinese Recreation Ground was an open space situated off Hollywood Road. Funds derived from the rents of stalls in both Hollywood Road and the Yaumati Public Square in Kowloon.\n\n57 Before 1941 there were 9 Chinese Public Dispensaries controlled and maintained by a committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. They were originally established to help combat plague.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210567, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1985", "page_number": 174, "title": "RAS-1985", "content_text": "155\n\nloyal Chinese chroniclers did not claim any distinction for the town. A geography book published in Shanghai in 1931 found very little to recommend the town to its readers. The author devoted one brief paragraph to Taiho.\n\nEven the most bustling part of Taiho is unpleasant. Dust is flying everywhere. The climate is bad; with frequent and heavy rains. Local products consist mainly of silk cocoons, common sorghum, and some hemp. Transportation is dependent on the Ying River, which is silted. At the deepest point there is no more than a six or seven foot draft, barely adequate for local craft, 10\n\nThe China Inland Mission was unusual in several respects. The workers were not limited to any particular denomination or nationality. As long as one was Protestant and was comfortable with Taylor's fairly basic theology, one was eligible to be considered as a missionary with the China Inland Mission. Thus, workers came from such countries as England, Germany, Sweden and the United States. Dr. M. Searle Bates, a Rhodes scholar who had taught at the University of Nanking, found that the Mission did not publish lists of its field workers lest they showed the comparative strength of each nationality. The Mission organized no formal church or school, but sent missionaries to live among the people in interior China. From the beginning, there were women missionaries. The axiom of “letting women do women's work\" suited the social system of China. Women missionaries were to proselytize to women and children. By 1900, sixty percent of Protestant missionaries in China were women. Single women, including those unmarried and widowed, were to work alongside married missionaries.\n\nThe United States in 1900 was ready to expand in Asia. Victorious in the Spanish-American War and bulging with the Philippines, the Americans were looking to China. The value of American exports in 1870 was about $392 million. By 1900, it had increased to almost $1.4 billion. American producers, therefore, were looking for foreign markets. By then, European interests were already carving China into spheres of influence. After the Open Door Policy and the Boxer Protocol were", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1985.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gt54s866x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210797, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 148, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "131\n\npeople applied themselves enthusiastically to the task, insufficient capital, the rigid application of ultra-Left policies such as the lop-sided emphasis on developing grain production which did not best utilize Hainan's tropical conditions, and poor technical support are all blamed for the slow progress in Hainan. During the Cultural Revolution in particular, the establishment of new plantations was discontinued, while large areas of mature coconut, rubber and coffee trees were felled to release land for grain production. Forests did not escape indiscriminate clearing: when liberated, there were 863,000 ha of tropical forest on Hainan, but by 1979 only 245,000 ha remained (Smil, 1983). Besides roads, one of the few benefits remaining from the ten turbulent years are the reservoirs and canal networks constructed to provide water for irrigation and generation of electricity.\n\nSome of these problems were caused by inadequate communication between the central government and the grass-roots level, while others are a direct result of ignorance of the biological potential of the tropical environment. The latter was undoubtedly aggravated by debasement of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. Further, following the withdrawal of Soviet experts and technical aid to China in 1960, the fostering by Mao of an isolationist policy from both Eastern and Western blocs meant that technical and economic development had to rely exclusively on Chinese talents and expertise. Given the dearth of experience with tropical agriculture amongst the Hainanese, overseas Chinese who had worked on plantations in Malaya, Indonesia and Thailand, but returned to Hainan in the 1950's and 60's, brought a great number of skills with them and deserve credit for much of the achievement made in planting tropical crops. Returning farmers brought with them seeds of crops never before grown in Hainan, and after some nursery testing, pepper, oil palm, new coconut varieties and traditional medicines were sown commercially, initially on overseas Chinese state farms.\n\nThe \"open door\" policy\n\nWith the ousting of the \"Gang of Four\", a resolution on Hainan's development was passed by the State Council in 1980 which placed primary stress on tropical agriculture and associated", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210798, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 149, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "132\n\nD.L. MICHALK\n\nlight industry. Given the high profitability of tropical crops relative to grain production, this emphasis makes good economic sense, especially when Hainan accounts for about 60 percent of China's tropical land. For the implementation of this policy, however, it was obvious that restructuring of the agricultural base to raise the development of Hainan to full potential would require injection of large amounts of capital and new technology.\n\nTo assist modernization programmes, Mao's isolationist policy has been discarded, and China has embarked on a promotion of economic co-operation and technological exchanges with foreign countries, with the proviso that such relationships do not compromise China's national independence (Zhao, 1982). As part of this Open Door policy, Hainan Island was opened to investment from foreign and overseas Chinese companies in 1981 (China Daily, December 4, 1981), and to facilitate investment Hainan authorities have been granted decision-making powers similar to those operative in Special Economic Zones (Anon., 1982a). These powers enable Hainan officials to approve joint-ventures with no investment limit, provided such projects do not impinge on the State Plan and do not require finance, energy or any other resource from the mainland (Anon., 1982a).\n\nForeign investment in tourist-related facilities and industrial projects is being actively encouraged by incentives such as tax breaks and import duty waivers. China will grant a two-year income tax “holiday” on enterprises undertaken and will levy an income tax of only 15 percent thereafter (Bulletin, May 10, 1983). Production equipment and machinery imported in the first five years of a project may be brought in duty-free and imports relating to accommodation for foreign business executives will receive favourable tax breaks.\n\nTo create an infrastructure that will attract foreign investment and tourism, the Central Government has placed emphasis on development of Hainan's transport network and energy supply. As part of a Five Year Plan, new ports will be built while the capacity of existing harbours will be increased. The first step will be the extension of ports at Ba Suo, Haikou and Qinglan, and later a deep water port will be constructed at Yangpu. A regular passen-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211725, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 140, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "115\n\ncheapest tenements, on the upper floors.\n\nConclusion\n\nFollowing the boom period in the 1970s, the joss stick industry is having a hard time in the 1980s. The failure of the industry to mechanize constitutes the major stumbling block to its future development. Faced with the problems of rising labour costs and labour shortage, the industry is now increasingly left in the hands of an aging labour force which averaged over 60 years of age in 1987. This decrease in overall productivity caused by aging would cope very well with the dwindling market if not for the increased competition from China. Since China's open door policy was announced in 1978, joss sticks were allowed to be produced again and production quickly resumed in Hsin-hui, Tung-kuan and Shao-hsing. The incomparably lower wages demanded in China and the availability of large pieces of cheap land enable the incense products of China to be more competitive. Though only two-grade products are currently being produced there, the potential of the Chinese supply is strongly shown in its dominance of the Hong Kong and South-East Asian markets for low-grade incense. It is generally felt that the aging of the labour force, shortage of capital, failure to mechanize factories and external competition will result in the inevitable decline of the industry in Hong Kong. The general attitude of the industry is pessimistic and a total collapse of the industry in Hong Kong within 20 years is anticipated.\n\nAcknowledgements:\n\nThis paper is based in part on an undergraduate thesis written by the author in the Department of Geography and Geology, University of Hong Kong. The author would like to thank Dr. Richard T.A. Irving for his supervision, and Dr. Elizabeth Y.Y. Sinn and Dr. P.H. Hase for their comments and suggestions.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212178, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 120, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "97\n\nmade a very good shewing, which drew the admiration of all neutral observers. The Japanese soon brought reinforcements and extended their front down towards the Yangtze in an attempt to dislodge the Chinese from their grip on the suburb of Chapei; but despite the overwhelming superiority of the Japanese equipment, especially in the air, the Chinese stuck to their ground all through August and September, until well into October, when they began to crack, and were finally dislodged by a successful landing on the flank in Hangchow Bay,\n\nThese operations at first led to a complete breakdown in communications between Nanking and Shanghai. Towards the end of August, however, it was found that cars could cover the 200 miles to Shanghai by turning off the main road at Soochow, and passing through Kashing to the Hangchow road, which entered Shanghai from the south. As I was badly in need of instructions I decided to motor down. On arrival in Shanghai I was astonished at the state in which I found popular foreign opinion. There appeared to be no adequate appreciation of the meaning of these new Japanese encroachments in China, or of the Japanese threat to the \"open door\" system of trading the Far East, the traditional British policy expressed in Lord Palmerston's instructions to Admiral Elliot in 1840, when he said \"You will bear in mind that Her Majesty's Government do not desire to obtain for British subjects any exclusive privileges of trade which should not be equally extended to the subjects of every other power\".\n\nShanghai had for some years been the object of much factious interference and petty vexation on the part of Chinese officials in their campaign to recover their \"lost privileges\". The municipal council of the International Settlement found itself continuously involved in arguments, mostly sterile, over all sorts of questions of local interest, such as roads, police, taxes, jurisdiction, and so on, providing occasions where the Chinese aptitude for obstruction had full play. The consequence was to alienate the sympathies of many of the leading foreigners in the main stronghold of foreign interests in China. (According to Professor Remer, an American economist who made a study of foreign investments in China in 1931, British business investments were distributed as follows:\n\nIn Shanghai £130,000,000\n\nIn Hongkong £36,000,000\n\nIn the rest of China £30,000,000\n\nPage 120\n\nPage 121", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212538, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 92, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "72\n\nfrom an emphasis on merely material modernization to structural changes in the Chinese system, which in turn brought about the realization of the need for cultural modernization. Starting in 1982, stress was laid on building up a socialist spiritual and cultural civilization, alongside the building of a socialist material civilization. This move was intended to a large extent to resist what was perceived as incoming “unhealthy influences”. The term \"unhealthy influences\" has never been precisely defined, but it roughly refers to the Western socio-political values which ran counter to the party leadership and socialist system in China. This new approach did show a shift from the notion of partial modernization to an overall modernization.\n\nChina's open-door policy, inaugurated in 1979, was intended to promote the material modernization program. This policy could be traced back to 1972 when trade relations with industrialized countries were restored. In the following few years, China further expanded her international trade relations gradually. During the period 1978-1980, these trade relations were expanded to other areas of economic relations at an astonishing pace. However, the massive expansion of foreign trade and economic cooperation did not lead to any extension of the open-door policy towards large-scale cultural exchanges, not even to the present. Rather, the political report at the 12th Party Congress only emphasised the importance of \"spiritual civilization”, in the building of \"socialist modernization\", but cultural exchanges were not referred to, as foreign economic relations were, as a positive contributor to the process.\n\nDespite the notion that cultural exchanges were not to carry as much weight as foreign economic relations in the building of socialist modernization, arts exchanges with foreign countries experienced a rapid and large-scale increase in the years between 1979 and 1981. In those years, there was a large presence in China of foreign culture, particularly Western culture, including that of the United States.\n\nAs has been pointed out, high culture was a part of the “spiritual civilization”, as affirmed at the 12th Party Congress, but international arts exchanges were not emphasised. In fact, a culturally open policy had never been wholly adopted as a general policy. This contradiction shows a tentative balance between policy preferences. These were sufficient reasons to promote international arts exchanges and there were considerations to limit them; both may be put forward in the national interest.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212540, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 94, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "74\n\nWhile the artistic level of the performances was important, balance between countries and art forms were secondary considerations. There was no \"quota\" of any kind.10\n\nActive, too, in hosting American performing artists in this period was the Central Philharmonic Society of China (CPSC). From 1979 to 1981, the CPSC invited 22 American musicians to China on 11 occasions, and co-performed with them.11 Like the CPAA, CPSC's invitations were merely based on the merit of the musicians who were willing to come. The policies of the CPAA and the CPSC demonstrated China's urgent need for quality cultural performances which could help China raise her artistic level, either for prestige or for fulfilling the demand of the society for a better cultural life, at very marginal expense. Equally important, these programmes of exchanges provide an illustration of the position of international arts exchanges under the open-door policy.\n\nThis cultural opening-up was also stimulated by the establishment of closer ties with other countries to improve general relations and win better international economic co-operation. This dynamic came from the Chinese leadership, within which it was widely accepted that economic co-operation from Western countries for China's modernization programme could not be gained without solid Chinese commitments in the international community. Cultural exchanges can be taken as expressions of such commitments.\n\nChina's international cultural exchanges were conducted on the basis of bilateral ties rather than as a function of a general policy in favour of a large-scale influx of foreign culture. Throughout the years between 1972 and 1986, there was no major speech, public announcement or publicized decision in favor of any foreign cultural presence in China comparable with those regarding foreign economic relations. On the other hand, China signed 63 cultural agreements with foreign governments between 1978 and 1986. It also renegotiated more than a dozen cultural agreements in this same period, making those old agreements compatible with China's new objectives in the new era.12 More significantly, bilateral cultural exchanges were reinforced through frequent signings of implementing accords under the agreements to consolidate cultural relations.\n\nTo foster official relations through arts exchanges, two state agencies, the CPAA and the China Exhibition Agency (CEA), were established", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212546, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 100, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "80\n\nstage, the possibility was raised that the campaign would be expanded to other spheres and made nationwide, which would affect the economic reform and the open-door policy, the campaign was gradually brought to an end in early 1984.24 In the meantime, \"modernism\" in art was discouraged after an intense debate.\n\nFollowing a period of uncertainty, an air of relaxation emerged again and this air developed into a new policy to encourage freedom of artistic and literary creation. At the Fourth Congress of Writers held in early 1985, Hu Qili, a Politburo member and member of the secretariat, addressed the congress on behalf of the party central committee and called on the writers to write freely. In his speech, he claimed that **(artistic and literary) creation must be free.**\n\nThis policy of greater freedom was soon echoed in major literary journals. In 1986, this optimism even blossomed into talks of making strategies for cultural development. In an article in the Red Flag, Shanghai party secretary Rui Xingwen elaborated that socialist modernization should not be interpreted as being merely economic modernization: economic development must be accompanied by development in culture. He also advocated a more liberal approach to international arts exchanges.25 The position of Rui largely conformed with the efforts of artists and writers made before and the publication of this article showed that a new atmosphere of relaxation over cultural activities, started by Hu's speech, was still in place.\n\nAmerican attitudes\n\nI\n\nIn contrast with the situation in China, the government of the United States has much weaker control over political and cultural developments. An administration cannot influence domestic cultural development by direct or political means. Nevertheless, the U.S. government does exercise some control over its external cultural relations, through its handling of bilateral relationships with specific countries and through the USIA, an agency of the executive branch of the U.S. government which shoulders the responsibility for promoting American interests by cultural, educational, and informational exchanges. The government is also able to influence non-government organizations active in cultural exchanges to act along the same lines as the government pursues.\n\nSince 1949, cultural exchanges as a foreign policy instrument in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212554, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 108, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "88\n\nthe United States and further raise suspicion of the American cultural inflow.\n\nIn a deeper sense, the negative impact of this incident may have been even worse. Obviously, the proposed ban on the abstract paintings was part of the campaign to oppose \"bourgeois liberalization\", a campaign which itself shows that liberal policies regarding culture had become controversial. As the United States benefited considerably from such a policy, it is understandable that it was not happy with the launching of this campaign. But the consequence of the strong American position on the abstract paintings left the already controversial open-door policy on culture even more vulnerable to criticism.\n\nThe vulnerability of arts exchanges to an unfavorable climate in bilateral political terms can also be demonstrated by the management of the Hu Na case which grew into a symbolic confrontation between the United States and the People's Republic of China. As a measure of retaliation, the Chinese government cancelled the entire schedule of officially arranged cultural exchanges for the remainder of 1983. Together with the campaign in China to oppose \"spiritual pollution\" beginning in October 1983, this unfavorable climate in Sino-American relations contributed to the decline of Sino-American exchanges of performing groups and art exhibitions to the lowest ebb since 1980.\n\nAlthough there have been ups and downs in Sino-American cultural relations in the fields of performing groups and arts exhibitions, an American cultural presence in movie presentations in China has enjoyed a relatively steady increase since 1981. By examining the films the China Film Export and Import Corporation (CFEIC) directly purchased from American corporations for public showing, we find that the increase in the number of American films shown in China has grown steadily from one in 1981 to nine in 1984. The number of films purchased in each year roughly doubled. Both of the movies imported in 1982 were shown in the following year, while all four in 1983 got to the public in 1984 and 1985. In 1981 an American movie week was held. In June 1982, 40,000 film workers gathered in Beijing and Shanghai to see six movies shot by James Wong Howe, which were provided by the American embassy to Beijing, in memory of this famous Chinese American film maker. There were also screenings of American movies that the CFEIC purchased from other countries and products of other countries reflecting American life, such as the movie Uncle Tom's Cabin.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213386, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 208, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "196\n\nCambridge History of China, edited by Denis Twitchett et al, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978+\n\nCampbell, Charles S. Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951\n\nCarlson, Evans Fordyce. Twin Stars of China, the Behind the Scenes Story of China's Valiant Struggle for Existence by a US Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1940\n\nCarr, Henry. Riding the Tiger: An American Newspaper Man in the Orient, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934\n\nChang, Sul-jeung. The Jews in Kaifeng. Reflections on Sino-Judaic History, Monographs of the Jewish Historical Society of Hong Kong, vol. II, Hong Kong: Jewish Chronicle, 1986.\n\nChardin, Pacifique Marie. Les Missions Franciscaines en Chine, Paris: Auguste Picard, 1915\n\nCh'en, Yuan. Western and Central Asians in China Under the Mongols, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Ch'en Hsing-hai and L. Carrington Goodrich, Los Angeles: Monumenta Serica, 1966\n\nChester, Ruth (Professor of Chemistry and Associate Dean of Ginling College), 'Women in Wartime China', broadcast May 1941 from Chengtu, in United China Relief Series Inc.\n\nChesterton, Ada Elizabeth (Jones). Young China and New Japan, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1933\n\nChina in the Sixteenth Century, the Journal of Matthew Ricci 1583-1610 translated by Louis J. Gallagher, SJ, New York: Random House, 1953\n\nChina Miscellany, pamphlets and reprints, Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1864-1948\n\nChinese Repository, Macao and Canton, 1832-1851\n\nChinese Travellers, the. Containing a Geographical, Commercial and Political History of China, etc. collected from Du Halde, Le Comte, and other modern travellers, second edition, London: printed for E. and C. Dilly, 1772\n\nChitty, J.R. Things Seen in China, London: Seeley, Service, 1912\n\nChristmas, Margaret C.S. Adventurous Pursuits: Americans and the China Trade 1784-1844, Washington, DC: National Gallery, 1984\n\nClark, Robert Sterling and Arthur de C. Sowerby. Through Shen-Kan: The Account of the Clark Expedition in Northern China, London: T.F. Unwin, 1912", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215816, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 115, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "48\n\nfor Tolo Harbour), its entrance faced the northeast, which was like an open door for a typhoon. The 1937 typhoon took advantage of such a tailor-made entrance to surge through it with a tidal wave.3\n\n30\n\nIf a typhoon during peacetime could cause so much damage, then one of similar magnitude during wartime, when the stakes are higher, could really set back the Allied timetable. The Tai Po Road would likely have served as a conduit to funnel supplies north to China, and a disruption to its service (even temporarily) would do much to hurt the supply situation. Moreover, if LoC by land into China were that vulnerable, then LoC by sea to Hong Kong would be even more precarious. Such a supply line would likely come from the southeast and pass through the strait between Luzon and Formosa. This region also happened to be a major alleyway for typhoons, not to mention an area of strong Japanese concentrations if either Luzon or Formosa (or both) continued to be in enemy hands.3\n\n31\n\nDue to their extensive commitment in the Atlantic, Allied merchant shipping and its escorts were more precious commodities in the much larger Pacific. The Japanese had not made it a policy to attack supply vessels thus far in the war, but that did not mean they would not alter this policy as the Allies pushed closer to the home islands. A typhoon, however, would not wait nor discriminate. While ships at harbour enjoy a little bit of protection from a typhoon, ships at sea don't have this benefit. The only option was evasion, and that depended on knowing the whereabouts of the typhoon. As noted earlier, this was an extremely difficult task during World War II.\n\n32\n\nAnother category of shipping in which the Allies weren't as well endowed as they would have liked was landing craft. These vessels were mandatory for Allied operations in the Pacific. But Europe received first priority for landing craft for much of the war, leaving just enough for the Allies to take to the offensive in the Pacific. Hong Kong's ability to serve as a lifeline into China depended entirely on a secure LoC that could be established to it by sea, and this in turn depended on the ability of the Allies to secure Hong Kong from the sea by an amphibious assault. The more landings the Allies carried out, the greater the toll on their landing craft, as the same craft would be used over and over. But landing craft were rather lightly-protected ships, which also made them prone to attrition through enemy action, breakdowns, and the weather.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216109, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 408, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "342\n\nthey would have provided (had they been left) and for the urban lineage they would have represented. Those wonderful old buildings are no longer with us to provide anchors in times of need.\n\nThey were replaced within a few years by high-rise air-conditioned buildings. Many depend upon artificial lighting and ventilation and have windows which do not open. Today, so many live and work in an artificial atmosphere. This major change led long ago to people discarding shorts and open-necked shirts and wearing two-piece suits and more formal and more uncomfortable clothing. The new lifestyle meant the better off were stepping from their air-conditioned homes, carrying brief cases, into their air-conditioned cars and then being conveyed to their air-conditioned offices.\n\nAt the end of World War Two the Chinese Nationalist Government was waiting in the wings just over the border to take over Hong Kong. But the British beat them to it. If the Americans had had their way, and British rule had been terminated in Hong Kong in 1945 and the place had been returned to China, it is possible to speculate what would have happened. In 1949 Hong Kong, like other big cities in China, would have been taken over by the People's Republic Government. This would have meant that, after 30 or so years of communist rule, Hong Kong would have been as backward economically as the rest of China. There would have been no 'Hong Kong miracle'. After 1978 the Territory would not have been able to form a nucleus for the economic development for the rest of China with its 'Open Door Policy.'\n\nPigeons\n\nUp until 1914 every marine launch of Hong Kong's Water Police (as the Marine Police were known then) took a few pigeons on board. These were used to fly messages back to headquarters in Tsim Sha Tsui, Kowloon. But in spite of the introduction of radio the pigeons were kept on strength. Members of the force contributed to buy them food. The flock of about 50 birds came to be looked upon much like the Barbary Apes at Gibraltar or the Ravens at the Tower of London. It was said when the pigeons departed from Marine Police Headquarters so would the British from Hong Kong.\n\nThe pigeons disappeared during the Japanese occupation but were", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]