[
    {
        "id": 207645,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 33,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "18\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nWestern attire in Japan, although never complete, undoubtedly received some of its impetus from the military. Likewise, the wearing of Western-style military caps necessitated the cutting of top-knots, which quickly became a mark of \"enlightenment\" in Japanese society generally. As early as the 1870's, the emperor began wearing a military uniform in the fashion of European royalty.39 One can hardly imagine a Chinese emperor doing the same.\n\nAnother socio-cultural effect of military modernization was the boost given to music, drama, art, literature, and even the use of the Japanese vernacular by the Sino-Japanese War. Donald Keene has brilliantly summarized the impact of the war on these areas of Japanese life, emphasizing also the change in Japanese attitudes toward China, the growth of Japanese national pride, and the altered perceptions of Westerners toward Japan as a result of the war and Japan's resounding victory.40\n\nIn economic terms, the modernizing effect of the military is more difficult to judge. Ogawa's study of conscription, for example, sees the military as a mixed blessing in nearly every sphere of economic life, including labor, productivity, and consumption.41 Yet on balance, military development seems to have benefited the economy. Even the most outspoken critics of the military and its costs, such as Ono Giichi and H. T. Oshima, concede that there were at least some economic advantages to the Meiji program of military modernization—especially in the creation of military and military-related industries, which served as model plants, and in the increased demand for products through inter-industry linkages.42 Military needs, in other words, generated a demand for modern products produced by modern means, and contributed to the growth of economies of scale. The Sino-Japanese War brought Japan numerous economic benefits and a huge indemnity (231 million taels; nearly 368 million yen), which was put to effective modernizing use, although war expenditures and the indemnity did contribute to economic problems such as business fluctuations and inflation.43\n\nFor China, much of the foregoing discussion can be stated in reverse. Although the lack of a centralized military did not appreciably impair the Ch'ing government's authority as long as \"regional\" leaders remained loyal to the throne, it did prevent China from contending effectively with foreign aggression, and eventually undermined support of the dynasty. Furthermore, the fragmentation",
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    {
        "id": 207651,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18.\n\n44 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219-220; Yamagata, \"The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, \"Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;\" Rawlinson, 190.\n\n45 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.\n\n46 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218-219; Cavendish, 721.\n\n47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.\n\n48 Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions,\" 157, note 135.\n\n49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change,\" 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, \"Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.\n\n50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, \"The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).\n\n51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149.\n\n52 See Kublin.\n\n53 Smith, \"Foreign-Training:\" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.\n\n54 Dwight Perkins, \"Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
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