[
    {
        "id": 207372,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 140,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "132\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nbecame American citizens,93 Meiji Japan held similar views and pursued similar policies. In short, China's response to the basic problems of employing foreign military men, although tinged with specific characteristics of Chinese political culture such as a special emphasis on personalistic relations, was reasonably enlightened, and not fundamentally different from that of other countries, Asian or Western.95\n\nChina's attempt to build a modern, Western-trained officer corps in the T'ung-chih period did not fail because the foreigners she employed refused to become Chinese subjects or to accept Chinese culture. It failed primarily because the Chinese did not use foreign military assistance in a systematic and sustained way, as did, for example, Meiji Japan. Plagued by continual foreign meddling, and unwilling to fundamentally restructure the existing military establishment with its carefully devised system of checks and balances, the weak Ch'ing government neglected to sponsor meaningful, centralized military reform, dooming itself to defeat at the hands of the Japanese in 1894-95.97\n\nNOTES\n\n1 See, for example, Edward Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), esp. p. 49, 291 note 75; Henry Serruys, \"Were the Ming against the Mongols settling in North China?,\" Oriens Extremus, 6 (1959), 136ff; etc.\n\n2 For the employment of foreigners under these circumstances, consult Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers (Leiden, 1965); Lei Hai-tsung, Chung-kuo wen-hua yû Chung-kuo ti ping [Chinese Culture and the Chinese Military] (Ch'ang-sha, 1940); Michael Loewe, Imperial China (New York, 1969), 182.\n\n3 Kuwabara Jitsuzo, “On P'u Shou-keng,” Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko, 7 (1935), 44-45; also Su Ch'ing-pin, (Liang Han ch'i Wu-tai ju-chi Chung-kuo chih fan shih-tsu yen-chiu) [Research on barbarian families residing in China during the period from the Han to the Five Dynasties] (Hong Kong, 1967), 2; Wai-ming George Yuan, \"Ko Son-ji (Kao Hsien-chih): A Korean in the Chinese Military Service,” Asea Yongu, 13.3 (1970), 160.\n\n4 See the forward to this work in Li Te-yü's collected writings, Li Wei-kung hui-ch'ang i-pin chih [The collected works of Li Te-yu] (Shanghai, 1937), chüan 2, 10-11 (consecutive pagination). The book is listed in the sections on literature in the T'ang-shu (2:20) and the Sung-shih (2:19a). All references to the dynastic histories are to the po-na edition.\n\n5 I have discussed these challenges and their implications in a forthcoming study entitled . (University of California Press).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207639,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 27,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA AND JAPAN: MILITARY ASPECTS\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH*\n\nPaul Cohen has recently warned against measuring nineteenth century China’s modernization by the yardstick of Meiji Japan. From the vantage point of Japan’s ‘success,’” he writes, “the late Ch’ing epitomizes ‘failure,’ and next to the dynamism of the Meiji era, China, during the latter half of the nineteenth century, appears as the very embodiment of stasis. The trouble with this perspective is that it glosses over a very important fact, namely that China and Japan, in their respective encounters with the West in the last century, did not start out at the same point.” Cohen suggests that a “much more valid way of measuring change in nineteenth century China is by internal points of reference.” “Modernization is not, after all, a horserace,” he maintains,2\n\nThis approach has much to commend it, if only as a reminder that China did not simply stand still in the nineteenth century. Thomas Kennedy correctly indicates, for example, that for all its weaknesses, the “self-strengthening” movement from 1860 to 1894-1895 brought “far more comprehensive and far-sighted [changes] than earlier studies infer.” Cohen notes that when we measure the modernizing experiences of China and Japan against those of the rest of the world, rather than against each other, “we find that both China and Japan come off relatively well.”+\n\nYet the knowledge that historians would eventually vindicate China’s modernizing efforts would have been small consolation to Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki. One doubts that he muttered at the signing table in 1895, “How far China has come in the last thirty years!” The fact is that Chinese modernizers continually viewed their progress in terms of Japan’s accomplishments. Li Hung-chang wrote as early as 1872: “Japan is just a small nation. Recently she has begun to trade with Europe; she has instituted\n\n* Dr. Smith is Assistant Professor of History, Rice University, Houston, Texas. His article “The Employment of Foreign Military Talent: Chinese Tradition and Late Ch’ing Practice” appeared in Vol. 15 of this Journal, pp. 113-138.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207640,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 28,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n13\n\niron factories and built many steamships. She has changed to the use of Western weapons. [...] Perhaps she is merely planning for self-protection. But if Japan seeks only self-protection, she is nevertheless oppressing and looking down on our China. Should not China plan for herself?\"5\n\n6\n\nThe outcome of the Sino-Japanese War perhaps causes us to cast the \"success\" of Japan and the \"failure\" of China in too sharp relief. But Cohen's protests to the contrary, modernization is a horserace. It involves the notion of catching up, or at least maintaining competitive presence. And nowhere is the race more evident than in military affairs. Yet curiously, very little attention has been given to the military as a perspective from which to view the comparative modernization of China and Japan. This is especially surprising in light of the importance attached to military reform by modernizers in both countries, the common threat posed to each by Western imperialism, and the same basic access to foreign military technology and assistance in the nineteenth century. This research note, based on my own preliminary investigations, suggests two tentative conclusions: First, that Japan's modernizing advantages in the military sphere on the eve of the Western encounter do not explain her military \"success\" in the Meiji period;7 and second, that the modernizing implications of Japan's successful military reforms, and the relative \"failure\" of China's, extend well beyond the sphere of military affairs.\n\nFour main stages have been identified with the responses of China and Japan to the Western \"impact”: (1) Recognition of Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of the need to train native personnel in Western military technology; and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West also had to be introduced. These phases unfolded relatively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simultaneously.\n\nA common feature of the effort to achieve national strength and self-sufficiency in both China and Japan was the employment of foreigners in military affairs. This policy, which entailed certain obvious risks, brought substantial benefits to Japan in the Meiji period, as Ernst Presseisen has indicated. In China, however,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207641,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 29,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "14\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nforeign military aid reaped few long-term gains. Western officers from \"Chinese\" Gordon to Constantin von Hanneken introduced a measure of modernity to at least a few armies in the late Ch'ing period, but none of these individuals was able to promote more basic institutional reform.10 The effects of Japan's success and China's failure in this regard were far-reaching.\n\nGenerally speaking, China's approach to military reform in the years from 1860 to 1895 may be compared with that of Japan in the years from 1853 to 1868. In each instance, foreign assistance was acquired piecemeal by both the central government and local governments, with no real coordination between the two. Similar rationales were offered, and similar results obtained, although in the case of China the new knowledge and technology acquired was used to bolster rather than to undermine the existing central government.11\n\nA high priority for both pre-Meiji Japan and late Ch'ing China was the training of troops and officers in Western techniques. In each country, the use of foreign military assistance followed similar lines. The training program established for the Bakufu by the French Minister, Leon Roches, at Yokohama during the mid-1860's, for example, may be compared with the central government training program set up by the British Minister, Frederick Bruce, at Tientsin in the early 1860's.12 Similarly, the various foreign-training efforts begun in Chōshu and other han during the 1860's bear a basic resemblance to the post-Taiping training camps established at Shanghai, Canton, Foochow and elsewhere.13 The Japanese even had their own rough equivalent of China's famous Ever-Victorious Army.14 Common problems in these early military improvement programs included language difficulties, foreign rivalries, financial limitations, lack of standardization in arms and training, and foreign meddling.15\n\nChina never overcame these problems. From the 1860's to the early 1890's, a handful of foresighted individuals, most notably Li Hung-chang, undertook a variety of modernizing enterprises aimed at building up China's “wealth and power.” Their efforts succeeded in a limited way, but were severely hindered by obscurantism, official opposition, bureaucratic inertia, and the deliberate policies of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, who carefully manipulated political factions in order to maintain and enhance her own power.16",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207643,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 31,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "16\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\npolicies, the Meiji government managed to avoid most of the difficulties that had plagued the Chinese effort to use foreign assistance efficiently.\n\nBuilding on the foundation of pre-Meiji experience, Western-trained and Western-oriented leadership,24 and strong central government direction and support, Japan made rapid strides in the modernization of her military after 1868. A leading figure in this effort was Yamagata Aritomo, who became Vice Minister of Military Affairs upon his return to Japan after a year-long tour of Europe in 1869-1870.25 With French advice and assistance, the Meiji government created an Imperial Guard in 1871, which not only made possible the abolition of the feudal han in the same year, but also set the stage for the introduction of conscription in 1872. By 1875, the Japanese had established a centralized military academy at Tokyo, with branch schools in veterinary medicine and other subjects.26 At the same time, numerous officers were sent abroad for further military education.27 By 1893, Japan had a total of sixteen military schools instructing over 2,600 students per year.28 Overseas-educated officers returned in a steady stream to assist in teaching these individuals.\n\nIn 1878, following the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), the Japanese established an independent General Staff on the German model. This marked the eclipse of the French in Japanese military affairs and the rise of Germany. Presseisen attaches profound significance to this development: \"So long as French influence prevailed, Japan's army remained under unified civilian control, her law code owed much to French legal opinions, and her government might have evolved toward a liberal, parliamentary system. After Germany's triumph the command structure, the constitution, and the Imperial Court followed the German ideological style.”\n\n19\n\nThe outstanding contributions of Jacob Meckel's German military mission to Japan in 1885 have been described in detail by Presseisen,30 The salient point is that by the early 1890's, Japan had built a modern, centralized army and had eliminated the need for further foreign military assistance. China, meanwhile, had done neither. The Sino-Japanese War underscored the stark contrast between the Chinese and Japanese reform efforts.31\n\nArmies, like individuals, can both reflect and effect change in society. Sir Lewis Namier has offered the opinion that \"the social",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207644,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 32,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n17\n\nhistory of nations is largely moulded by the forms and development of their armed forces.\"32 In so-called underdeveloped countries, especially those facing an immediate military challenge, armies can perform a crucial modernizing function. Ike Nobutaka indicates that during the Meiji era \"the armed forces were probably more modern than the rest of the nation in terms of technology and organization,\" but it was not only in these areas that the Japanese military made its modernizing influence felt.33\n\nIn the political sphere, it is clear that the new-style army of Meiji Japan contributed to the consolidation of the regime, and to the further development of a national political consciousness. Conscription at once solidified government authority and enhanced national security. Throughout the nineteenth century, moreover, the military provided a deep pool of bureaucratic talent. From 1885 to 1912, for example, over thirty-five percent of all Japan's civilian ministries were under military men (41 of 112). The balance of generals and admirals in the cabinet did not shift in favor of civilians until 1898.34 In the lower echelons of the bureaucracy, too, the military provided talented and disciplined personnel. At yet another level, the rank and file acquired at least a heightened sense of political participation, as well as a vibrant nationalistic spirit. Educational opportunities within the army only increased this tendency.35\n\nIn the social realm, the military also promoted modernizing change. Conscription, for example, helped level society, giving greater meaning to concepts such as social equality and the idea of mobility based on performance.36 The growth of the military, which continued throughout the nineteenth century, contributed to urbanization, with all its concomitant changes.37 Living standards and health care improved for large numbers of traditionally disadvantaged individuals who were now entering the army. Individual expectations were naturally raised. Recruits acquired new tastes and personal needs. It is said that the habit of cigarette smoking was spread in Japan by soldiers who had picked up the practice in the army. Many recruits also developed a taste for beef, a mark of cultural refinement in the Meiji period.38\n\nOther new influences in the army spread rapidly to Japanese society at large. Western-style uniforms, for example, became standard in the army; soon they were adopted for policemen, train conductors, and other civil functionaries. The shift to wearing",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207645,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 33,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "18\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nWestern attire in Japan, although never complete, undoubtedly received some of its impetus from the military. Likewise, the wearing of Western-style military caps necessitated the cutting of top-knots, which quickly became a mark of \"enlightenment\" in Japanese society generally. As early as the 1870's, the emperor began wearing a military uniform in the fashion of European royalty.39 One can hardly imagine a Chinese emperor doing the same.\n\nAnother socio-cultural effect of military modernization was the boost given to music, drama, art, literature, and even the use of the Japanese vernacular by the Sino-Japanese War. Donald Keene has brilliantly summarized the impact of the war on these areas of Japanese life, emphasizing also the change in Japanese attitudes toward China, the growth of Japanese national pride, and the altered perceptions of Westerners toward Japan as a result of the war and Japan's resounding victory.40\n\nIn economic terms, the modernizing effect of the military is more difficult to judge. Ogawa's study of conscription, for example, sees the military as a mixed blessing in nearly every sphere of economic life, including labor, productivity, and consumption.41 Yet on balance, military development seems to have benefited the economy. Even the most outspoken critics of the military and its costs, such as Ono Giichi and H. T. Oshima, concede that there were at least some economic advantages to the Meiji program of military modernization—especially in the creation of military and military-related industries, which served as model plants, and in the increased demand for products through inter-industry linkages.42 Military needs, in other words, generated a demand for modern products produced by modern means, and contributed to the growth of economies of scale. The Sino-Japanese War brought Japan numerous economic benefits and a huge indemnity (231 million taels; nearly 368 million yen), which was put to effective modernizing use, although war expenditures and the indemnity did contribute to economic problems such as business fluctuations and inflation.43\n\nFor China, much of the foregoing discussion can be stated in reverse. Although the lack of a centralized military did not appreciably impair the Ch'ing government's authority as long as \"regional\" leaders remained loyal to the throne, it did prevent China from contending effectively with foreign aggression, and eventually undermined support of the dynasty. Furthermore, the fragmentation",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207647,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 35,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "20\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nplayed an historic role similar to that played in the West in late Tokugawa Japan, first precipitating a political crisis, and then helping to resolve it in favor of revolution. It would not be the last time Japan would play the part in China.\n\nViewed from the perspective of military modernization in China and Japan, two factors seem crucial to Meiji Japan's domestic and international success: (1) A sustained sense of crisis, sufficient to justify fundamental institutional change; and (2) strong central government leadership and support in implementing reform, together with the systematic use of foreign assistance. Paul Cohen is obviously correct in pointing out that pre-Meiji Japan enjoyed a number of distinct advantages in responding quickly and creatively to the Western \"impact.\"51 But we may question whether without the self-conscious and concerted modernizing policies of the Meiji central government Japan could have achieved \"wealth and power\" so quickly, even with these advantages. An examination of military change in Japan during the period 1853-1868 indicates, for example, that Bakumatsu military reform efforts were in fact no more effective than those of the T'ung-chih era.52\n\nIn China, the Manchus refused to sponsor basic institutional change, fearful of upsetting the system of military checks and balances that had preserved their rule in China for over two hundred years. More concerned with the maintenance of internal control than with the problem of external defense, the Manchus had little incentive to go beyond the limited military changes that had enabled them to suppress the major rebellions of the 1860's and 70's. It was not until 1907 that the throne took the first concrete steps to dismantle the costly, cumbersome and worthless Manchu Banner system-steps that even then were soon retraced.53\n\nIt should be noted that Manchu rule was less significant in other areas of Chinese life, notably the economy. Dwight Perkins insists, for example, that the Ch'ing government's sins in the economic realm were less those of commission than of omission, that the policies of the Chinese government \"were not so much wrong as inadequate.\"54 But in comparing Japan's economic success with China's failure, Perkins attributes China's difficulties primarily to \"lack of funds.\" Sapped of money by foreign and domestic wars, heavy indemnities, the sustenance of huge and useless \"regular\" standing armies, and the high cost of maintaining irregularly financed \"temporary\" imperial armies, the Ch'ing government...",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207649,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 37,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "22 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n11 Comparative studies on selected aspects of modernizing change in these two time periods would be illuminating. One might compare, for example, the aims and accomplishments of the Peking Tung-wen kuan (established in 1862) and the Bansho Shirabesho (established in 1858). On the former, see Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York, 1967), 241-248; on the latter, consult Marius Jansen, \"New Materials for the Intellectual History of Nineteenth-Century Japan,\" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 20 (1957), 569-582. On the use of Westerners in military affairs in Japan from 1853-1868, see Presseisen, 1-23; H. J. Jones, \"Bakumatsu Foreign Employees,\" Monumenta Serica, 29.3 (Autumn, 1974).\n\n12 Presseisen, chapter 1; Smith, , chapter 4.\n\n13 Albert Craig, Chôshu in the Meiji Restoration (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 131-136, 201-203, etc.; Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Fenghuang-shan, 1864-1873,” Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976).\n\n14 Presseisen, 22-23.\n\n15 See notes 7 and 8; also Hyman Kublin, \"The 'Modern' Army of Early Meiji Japan,\" Far Eastern Quarterly, 9.1 (November, 1949), 24-26; Meron Medzini, French Policy in Japan during the Closing Years of the Tokugawa Regime (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 125-133.\n\n16 For a discussion of Li's modernizing efforts, his extensive use of foreign assistance, and the obstacles he encountered, see S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West (New York, 1966), 111-112; K. C. Liu, “The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 30 (1970); Kenneth Folsom, Friends, Guests and Colleagues (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968), 152-157; and K. C. Liu, “Li Hung-chang in Chihli,” in Albert Feuerwerker, et al., eds. Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967).\n\n17 See, for example, Lord Charles Beresford, The Break-up of China (New York and London, 1899), 267-289, esp. 270-280; Major A. E. J. Cavendish, \"The Armed Strength (?) of China,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 42 (June, 1898), 709-710, 713-714, 717; Richard J. Smith, \"Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1850-1860,\" Journal of Asian History, 8.2 (1974), 127.\n\n18 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 212; Cavendish, 709-710, 713-714.\n\n19 See, for example, Cavendish, esp. 720-723; Captain W. R. E. Gill, \"The Chinese Army,\" Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, 24 (1881), 371-377; Chester Holcombe, China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 81-88; \"The Chinese and Japanese Armies,\" reprinted from the Army and Navy Gazette in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 15 (1894), 1258; James Scott, \"The Chinese Brave,\" Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1 (1886), esp. 240; etc.\n\n20 See Smith, , Chapters 8 and 9.\n\n21 See Yang-wu yün-tung cited in Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 218. On Chinese resistance to foreign instructors and officers, see ibid.; also Cavendish, 720-721.\n\n22 See, for example, L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes (London, 1931), 18; Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast, 1950), 478-481; John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 65-78, 93-94, 163; Holcombe, 80-85, esp. 83.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207650,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n23\n\n23 See Umetani Noboru, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n24 Ibid., 5-6.\n\n25 See Roger Hackett, \"The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo,\" in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965).\n\n26 Yamagata Aritomo, \"The Japanese Army,\" in Okuma Shigenobu, comp., Fifty Years of New Japan (New York, 1909), 206.\n\n27 Ibid., 206.\n\n28 Ibid., 206-208.\n\n29 Presseisen, vii; also chapters 2 and 4.\n\n30 Ibid., esp. 135-136. As a professor at the Army Staff College and an adviser to the General Staff, Meckel helped to reorganize the Army Ministry, refine the General Staff, improve the system and content of Japanese military education, and develop the Japanese system of logistics and medical services. In addition, he helped restructure the army into divisions and taught the Japanese \"the demands of full-scale mobilization, which included a strategic railroad network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises.\"\n\n31 Mary Wright, The Last Stand, 220-221; Rawlinson, 167-204; Presseisen, 139-143; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, etc., 1975), 418-420; Yamagata Ariyoshi, \"The Army,\" in Albert Stead, ed., Japan by the Japanese (London, 1904), 107-109; etc.\n\n32 Cited in Roger Hackett, \"The Military: Japan,\" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), 328.\n\n33 Ike Nobutaka, \"War and Modernization,\" in Robert Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), 209.\n\n34 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 346-348.\n\n35 See, for example, Ike, 196; also Shibusawa Keizo, ed., Japanese Life and Culture in the Meiji Era (translated and adapted by Charles Terry; Tokyo, 1958), 303-309, esp. 308-309.\n\n36 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 335.\n\n37 Ogawa Gotaro, The Conscription System in Japan (New York, 1921), chapter 3.\n\n38 Shibusawa, 306-307.\n\n39 H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture: A Short History (New York, 1973), 163-164.\n\n40 Donald Keene, \"The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,\" in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971).\n\n41 Ogawa, part 2.\n\n42 See Harry T. Oshima, \"Meiji Fiscal Policy and Economic Progress,\" in William Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1968), esp. 372. See also Shibusawa, 305, 315; Fairbank, et al., 199-200; Ike, 205.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 207723,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 111,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "96\n\nTIN-YUKE CHAR\n\ncountries in the hope to find suitable people to replenish our population. We have the productive land. Sugar and rice are our main and most profitable crops.\" The letter also mentioned that the Chinese did not bring their women and that it was dangerous to give them franchise because their numbers would be a threat to the Kingdom. The suggestion was to try India where the British had been successful in using their coolies in agricultural development of the colonies. Armstrong, however, later sent a report that the East Indians were not suitable nor desirable as immigrants to Hawaii. Minister Green had also written on January 18, 1881 to William Keswick, Hawaiian Consul General in Hong Kong to expect King Kalakaua's arrival and to assist Armstrong in obtaining a good class of Chinese immigrants to be accompanied by wives and children.\n\nFrom Hawaii the party first started for San Francisco where the Chinese Consul General entertained the Royal party at Hang Fen Lou Restaurant and took the occasion to thank the King for his kind treatment of the Chinese in Hawaii.\n\nSailing for Japan on the Oceanic, the Royal party arrived after twenty-four days at the Bay of Yedo on March 4, 1881 and landed at Yokohama. King Kalakaua wrote back from Tokyo on March 15, 1881, “Our reception has been most cordial and pleasant with the Emperor [Meiji]. He extended the hospitality of being his guest during our stay in the City of Tokio, occupying the same buildings that General Grant did when he was here and other distinguished guests, Prince Henri of Germany and the Duke of Genoa.”\n\nThe subject of possible Japanese emigration to Hawaii received some consideration by the Japanese officials. And on February 8, 1885, the first group of Japanese immigrants (676 men, 159 women, and 108 children) came to Hawaii. Major credit for this successful endeavor was due to \"the personal friendship of the Emperor of Japan for King Kalakaua.\" commented the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser.\n\nTo proceed to China, the party sailed on the Tokio Maru. Upon arrival at Shanghai, they were furnished the Pautah by the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company to take the Royal group to Tientsin. They had hopes of being received at Court in",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208325,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 49,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n33\n\nThe major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted support to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills.122 It is true, of course, that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-particularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces.\n\nIronically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchu sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynasty might have been able to build a Meiji-style system of military education and dispense with foreign instructors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch'ing government by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style military force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on internal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time \"dwarf bandits\" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences.\n\nNOTES\n\nAbbreviations:\n\nCJCC - Chung-Jih chan-cheng\n\nCWCK - Ch'ou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu\n\nFRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States\n\nIWSM - Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo\n\nLWCK - Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi\n\nNCH - North-China Herald\n\nYWYT - Yang-wu yün-tung",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209933,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1983",
        "page_number": 192,
        "title": "RAS-1983",
        "content_text": "170\n\nGlassburner, Bruce, and James Riedel. 1972. “Government in The Economy of Hong Kong\", Economic Record 48, No. 1: 58-75.\n\nHeilbroner, Robert Louis. 1964. \"The View From The Top: Reflections on a Changing Business Ideology\". In The Business Establishment, ed. by E.F. Cheit, New York, John Wiley and Sons, pp. 1-36.\n\nHirschmeier, Johannes. 1964. The Origins of Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.\n\nHo, Ping-ti. 1962. The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911. New York and London, Columbia University Press.\n\nHong Kong Cotton Spinners Association. 1973. \"Annual Reports of The General Committee\". Hong Kong, The Association, mimeographed.\n\nKing, Ambrose Y.C., and Davy H.K. Leung, 1975. \"The Chinese Touch in Small Industrial Organization\". Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Social Research Centre, occasional paper.\n\nLevy, Marion J., Jr. 1955. “Contrasting Factors in The Modernization of China and Japan\". In Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan, ed. by S. Kuznets, W.E. Moore, and J.J. Spengler, Durham, Duke University Press, pp. 496-536.\n\nMcClelland, David C. 1963. \"Motivational Patterns in Southeast Asia with Special Reference to the Chinese Case\". The Journal of Social Issues 19, No. 1: 6-19.\n\nMannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.\n\nMarx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (1888) 1967. The Communist Manifesto. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.\n\nMayer, K. 1953. \"Business Enterprise: Traditional Symbol of Opportunity\". British Journal of Sociology 4, No. 2: 160-180.\n\nMiners, Norman, 1981. The Government and Politics of Hong Kong. Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.\n\nNichols, Theo. 1969. Ownership, Control, and Ideology: An Inquiry Into Certain Aspects of Modern Business Ideology. London, George Allen and Unwin.\n\nOksenberg, Michel. 1972. \"Management Practices in The Hong Kong Cotton Spinning and Weaving Industry.\" Paper read at seminar on Modern East Asia, Columbia University.\n\nOlson, Stephen M. 1972. \"The Inculcation of Economic Values in Taipei Business Families\". In Economic Organization in Chinese Society, ed. by William F. Willmott, Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 261-296.\n\nOwen, Nicholas C. 1971. \"Economic Policy in Hong Kong\". In Hong Kong: The Industrial Colony, ed. by Keith Hopkins, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.\n\nPan, F.K. 1974. \"The Simple Truth of Management and Maintenance”, a lecture delivered on 21st June, Hong Kong.\n\nRyan, Edward, 1961. \"The Value System of a Chinese Community in Java\". Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.\n\nSeider, Maynard S. 1974. \"American Big Business Ideology: A Content Analysis of Executive Speeches\". American Sociological Review 39, No. 6: 802-815.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215468,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 245,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "194\n\nSpread before us was a buffet of rice and vegetables, fish, veal and, for those who wanted them, green chillies. All this was followed by strawberry pancakes. To help lunch go down we had half an hour to wander round the grounds. There was a cool breeze singing in the pine trees. Everything was beautifully fresh and clean. Numerous little sitting-out areas with wooden seats and benches made it possible just to sit and enjoy it all, accompanied by the distant sounds of an off-duty member of the hotel's staff sitting under a tree and strumming a guitar.\n\nA cash-less society\n\nBefore setting off, we were told that we could change money at the hotel, but there was none to be had as we had to wait for the man to come up from Paro with the cash. There were post cards and local handicrafts in the hotel shop, but this was well and truly locked with a large pad-lock. Perhaps the absence of local money was not going to be a problem if this stronghold masquerading as a shop was anything to go by.\n\nWe all piled on to the minibuses with much discussion about what to wear. Sure enough it was warm in the sunshine, but in the shade was an entirely different matter. Dozens of traditionally dressed staff were standing around with big smiles to see us off. It looked as though they were ready to stand down as soon as the two small buses and their contents disappeared for an explore.\n\nUntil the 1970's Bhutan had been more or less closed to outside influences. Even so, the spread of 'western civilisation' has not had a very pronounced effect in the last 20-30 years. Similar to pre-Meiji Japan, there are rules on a number of aspects of everyday life, including what Bhutanese people must wear - the go. I heard that for this reason, Bhutan is a popular holiday destination for Japanese; it reminds them a bit about their past. As I noted earlier, there are other regulations about building styles - they all have to follow the same traditional pattern. This makes for a very attractive and orderly appearance, but it also means that when a 16th century monastery is pointed out to us it does not look particularly old; a brand new one would look pretty much the same.\n\nOur first destination as a group of tourists was the National Museum",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    }
]