[
    {
        "id": 215773,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 72,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "5\n\nalso study how the English system of law was introduced into a largely Far Eastern society and the extent of its impact.\n\nThe nature of the Calcutta administration\n\nLackadaisical attitude\n\nOne of the most glaring problems in the Straits Settlements was the failure of the Indian authorities to establish an effective form of government. This was due to its distance and lack of accessibility which cultivated an indifferent or disinterested attitude on the part of the Indian officials.21 The Indian government was far more interested in its Indian territories than in its possessions in the Malay Peninsular.22 This led to the administrative problems in the Straits Settlements. Owing to this indifference, the men sent from India were young and inexperienced who knew nothing of the problems in the settlements but were only too eager to return to India to reap bigger rewards and promotion.23\n\nLack of representation in Legislative Council\n\nAs the administration of the Straits Settlements was highly centralised in India, the governor of the Straits Settlements had very little authority and merely supervised administration.24 All important matters had to be referred to India for a decision and the governor had no executive or legislative power.25 All the legislation for the Straits Settlements was planned by the Indian government. As the Straits Settlements had no official representation in India, it could not block any legislation that could prove detrimental to the Straits Settlements.26\n\nThus it can be established that the 'roots of the transfer movement lay in the constitutional rearrangement in the Straits Settlements of 1830 and the [Indian] Charter Act of 1833. The system of government was unsatisfactory both for the governor and the mercantile community.'27\n\nThe petition of 1857: A critical evaluation of the complaints raised\n\nThe Currency Act 185528\n\nThe Currency Act is an example cited by the Straits merchants in",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215785,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 84,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "in the Straits, for example in negotiation for the settlement of Penang Island in 1786 where the Supreme Government remained steadfast in refusing to promise military aid to the Sultan of Kedah. Thus, in a Siamese invasion in 1821, the Penang Government did not offer military aid to the Sultan, but only political asylum and mediation. Indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsular shows evidence that the non-intervention policy was adhered to as much as possible, (cf. Mills, supra, Chap 8 (Anglo-Siamese relations)) For the obvious political and economic reasons the British did not want to antagonise the Siamese (cf. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1760-1824) by interfering in the affairs of the Malay States (such as Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu) which were within the Siamese sphere of influence.\n\nSevere censures were passed upon Captain Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826; and the treaty between James Low and Perak and Selangor in 1826, received strong criticism from the Supreme Government and resulted in Low's being suspended from his duties. (Tan DE, Supra, p 119) The Indian Government only relented when Governor Fullerton managed to convince it of the necessity of protecting British interests, a clear instance of the Indian Government's unwillingness to intervene in any of the Malay States. This was further proven when appeals of Perak and Trengannu for defensive purposes were likewise rejected. In the Naning War of 1831-2, Governor Ibbetson was told that the extension of territory was not desired. (Ibid. p 119)\n\nAn even more striking instance occurred in 1833, when the boundary between the Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol was debated over. Between the two lay a debatable piece of land which had formerly been claimed by both states, containing rich mines of tin and gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions' (Mills, supra, p 177), thus resigning any claims that the British might have to it, and even included it within the area of Johol.\n\nThrough the above examples, I would say that the British were pursuing a policy of non-intervention in the Malay States between 1824-73. They upheld this policy whenever possible, though in some cases intervention was unavoidable. And it is significant that sometimes even in instances where British merchants' interests were threatened (for example in Negri Sembilan), the policy of non-intervention was still observed.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215786,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 85,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "18\n\nHowever, there were also cases where the British did intervene in the Malay states during the period 1824-73. It is evident that, to a certain extent, the British were inconsistent with their policy of non-intervention, but compared to the period after 1874, when the policy was reversed, these interventions were limited and they only occurred where unavoidable (Ibid. p 179). In this respect, I would argue that the merchants had valid grounds for their petition of complaint to the House of Commons.\n\nThe EIC's non-intervention policy reflected realism and flexibility. They took the stance of non-intervention wherever their commercial interests and political prestige were not threatened, but their policy changed according to the dictates of time, thus in reality, causing them to play dual roles of non-activity and intervention in accordance with the change of times. Whilst the period 1824-73 was not marked by any 'spectacular action or further territorial advances', it can neither be described as being inactive, because as Tan observes, '[c]ases of intervention were...more in evidence than cases of non-intervention' (Tan D E, supra, p 120), and I will highlight some of the more important and interesting ones. From its footholds in the Straits Settlements, the EIC gradually extended its influence over the independent Malay States chiefly through trade and treaties. (Thio E, British Policy in The Malay Peninsular 1880-1910 Vol 1 - Introduction pg xvi-xvii)\n\nThe following examples could be used as evidence to challenge the truth of the merchants' statement of complaint, although in the final analysis, their complaint was a bona fide one.\n\nCases of Intervention\n\nAfter 1826 the Malay states tended to look to the EIC as the arbiter of local politics to whom they reported the ascension of new rulers, and appealed for help in settling internal disputes and quarrels with their neighbours. (Thio, Ibid. p xvi-xvii) For example, the proximity of thriving Singapore to Johore led the British to intervene in the affairs of Johore. When Sultan Hussein died in 1835, Governor Murchison refused to acknowledge Hussein's son, Ali, as the Sultan. It was only in 1852 that Acting-Governor Blundell persuaded the Supreme Government to recognise Ali as the rightful Sultan. Later, compromise was reached when Ali accepted an empty title of Sultan and Temenggong Ibrahim retained control over Johore in 1855. Thus, a new royal dynasty was established in Johore, with British intervention. This case clearly illustrates a deviation",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]