[
    {
        "id": 204970,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1965",
        "page_number": 78,
        "title": "RAS-1965",
        "content_text": "69\n\nPIRACY ON THE CHINA COAST\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nFor most of recorded history piracy has been a menace to sea-borne trade, and there have been times when it has been difficult to distinguish between pirates and honest or should one say legitimate traders. Nationality has often been the only mark of distinction, as Spanish and English views of Drake, Hawkins, and the like illustrate.\n\nThe Chinese were pioneers in piracy, as in so many other things, and a history of piracy in China would begin many thousands of years ago. The Chinese were probably skilled practitioners of the art before history began to be recorded. The earliest accounts are in the records of the Chou Dynasty in the fourth century B.C., and piracy continued in China long after it had been suppressed in other parts of the world.\n\nWhen the first Europeans arrived in the China Seas in the sixteenth century, many of the pirates on the coast were Japanese. For three centuries after the defeat of Kublai Khan's invasion of Japan in 1281, Japanese pirates mainly from Kyushu were active along the whole coast, from the Liaotung Peninsula in the north to Hainan Island and the Straits of Malacca in the south. The famous Arctic explorer, John Davis, met his death at their hands in 1604. Davis was serving on an East India Company ship which was anchored off the island of Bintang, east of Singapore, when it was attacked by Japanese pirates.\n\nThis was at the end of the Japanese era, which came about as the result of several different factors. One was the establishment of a strong central government in Japan by Iyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns at the beginning of the seventeenth century; and another was the increasing superiority of Chinese over Japanese junks.\n\nThe depredations of these Japanese pirates often extended far inland, and they were accompanied by atrocities reminiscent of the Japanese Rape of Nanking in 1937. Because of this the Ming Emperors banned all intercourse between the two countries, and this afforded the Portuguese the opportunity to act as",
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    },
    {
        "id": 206016,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1970",
        "page_number": 96,
        "title": "RAS-1970",
        "content_text": "CHINESE EMIGRATION AND THE DECK PASSENGER TRADE\n\n91\n\ntrade for their own China Navigation Company. During most of the inter-war years a Norwegian company also operated a weekly service between Swatow and Bangkok in opposition to the China Navigation Company; but the latter's faster and more modern ships enjoyed the lion's share of this trade. The Singapore trade was an inheritance from the Blue Funnel Line, and came to the China Navigation through their close connection with the Holt family.\n\nFor several decades before the First World War much of the emigrant trade to Indonesia was in the hands of German companies, but when German overseas shipping was eliminated after the outbreak of war in 1914 this trade passed to Dutch companies, in particular the K.P.M. and the J.C.J.L. lines. Previous to 1890 a consortium of Dutch planters had employed coolie brokers in Singapore and Malaya for recruiting purposes, and Malaya was always something of a reservoir of Chinese labour for much of South-east Asia, especially for Indonesia and Siam. Entry into Malaya was easier than elsewhere, and there were more frequent and cheaper shipping services between south China and the Straits. It was always a comparatively simple matter for Chinese—authorised or unauthorised—to cross the short Malacca Straits into Indonesia or the ill-defined boundary between Malaya and Siam.\n\nThe Indo-China Steam Navigation Company was not nearly so deeply involved in the southern deck passenger trades as the China Navigation Company, but their Japan-Calcutta ships took part in the Straits trade on their way up and down the coast, and their Hong Kong-Sandakan ships had a near monopoly of the comparatively small trade to British North Borneo. Most coasters on the Hong Kong-Shanghai service called at Canton and carried deck passengers, but there was also a small fleet of specially designed river steamers employed between Hong Kong, Canton, and Macao, which provided daily and nightly services between the three ports, and thus an out and in connection for emigrants. The Canton river steamers were smaller editions of the Yangtse steamers, and their night departure from the Praya at Hong Kong, when they were a blaze of flamboyant and garish lights, was a spectacular sight before the Second World War. The six or seven hour passage between Hong Kong",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241",
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    },
    {
        "id": 206392,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 209,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "THE COLONY OF HONG KONG\n\n183\n\nthe Governor, and many members of the community, in what was long afterwards called, in commemoration of the affair, K'e-ying house. His visit, no doubt, had reference to the evacuation of Choosan by our troops, and the opening of Canton city, for at that time the Governor of Hongkong was also superintendent of trade in all China;—an unfortunate arrangement, which continued till provision was made for the residence of an ambassador in Peking by the treaty of Teen-tsin in June, 1858. The wily Manchoo was more than a match for Sir John Davis. Choosan was evacuated, but Canton was not opened. K'e-ying had promised that it should be opened on the 31st March, 1847, and that not being done, as well as to avenge other injuries, Sir John made his famous raid upon the city, and on the 5th April dictated a convention, stipulating among other things, that Canton should be opened: --not immediately, but in two years, on the 1st April, 1849. It was an unhappy concession; but Sir John Davis somehow wanted \"the stalk of carl-hemp.\" Speaking after the manner of men, the refusal to open Canton was a sufficient casus belli, and I could wish that our second war with China had been fought upon it, rather than on the affair of the lorcha Arrow, nearly ten years later. The Cantonese, from the Viceroy of the Kwang provinces downwards, were encouraged in their insolent contempt for foreigners, and various outrages were perpetrated in consequence.\n\nI may mention that in 1846 a little steamer called the Corsair began to run between Hongkong and Canton, people being doubtful whether the enterprise would pay. The foundation of the Cathedral, then a church merely, was laid in January, 1847. The old Union Church had been opened in 1845.\n\nI returned to Hongkong in the summer of 1848, and found that Sir John Davis had resigned the government of the Colony, and that his successor was Sir George Bonham, whom I had known as governor of the Straits' settlements, when I was in Malacca. I remember, as he was about to proceed in the spring of 1849 to an interview with the governor of Canton at the Bogue, asking him whether he was going to insist on the opening of the city on the 1st April. He replied, \"How can I? My instructions are to keep the peace, and by no means bring on another war with China.\" He did keep the peace,—kept it with China, and kept it among the members of the government of",
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    },
    {
        "id": 206776,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1973",
        "page_number": 53,
        "title": "RAS-1973",
        "content_text": "EARLY STEAMSHIPS IN CHINA\n\n47\n\nonly did she carry troops, but often had a gun brig and several small boats in tow. Diana seemed to produce an effect on the Burmese analogous to that produced on the Mexicans by Cortes' horses. She continued in government service until she was broken up at Calcutta in 1835, and her engines installed in a new ship of the same name. The second Diana was also built at Calcutta, and was employed by the government as a cruiser against pirates in the Straits of Malacca,\n\nAlthough her origin was so closely connected with China, the first Diana never operated in Chinese waters. The first steamship to be seen in China was the Forbes, also built at Calcutta and launched in 1829. The Forbes was much larger than the Diana and cost 300,000 rupees. After she had been running on the Hoogly for several months, the Forbes was chartered by Jardine, Matheson and Company to tow their Jamesina, a barque of 362 tons which had formerly been H. M. S. Curlew, to China. At this time great importance was attached to getting the opium from India to China as quickly as possible in order to command the highest price, and no satisfactory passages had been made from Singapore to China against the north-east monsoon. The opium ships normally waited at Singapore until the monsoon was over before tackling the passage up the South China Sea, so that only one India-China voyage was possible in a season.\n\nThe Forbes-Jamesina convoy left Calcutta on 14th March 1830; the Forbes having 134 tons of coal on board, two-thirds English and the remainder Indian, while the Jamesina had another 52 tons of Indian coal for the Forbes, besides her main cargo of 840 chests of opium. Good weather was experienced on the passage to Singapore, where they arrived on the 27th, steaming for most of the time at 5-4 knots, and at the most favourable times reaching 7 knots. Four days were spent at Singapore, during which time the boiler was cleaned and bunkering carried out. The monsoon was still strong when they left on 31st, and speed fell first to 3-4 and later to 2-1 knots. By 12th April Forbes had only 12 days' coal left with over 500 miles to go and no sign of the monsoon easing. The Jamesina, therefore, was cast off and Forbes proceeded alone, reaching Lintin on 19th April, the first steamship to be seen in China. The Jamesina arrived two days later.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8910rj06r",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207352,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 120,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "112\n\n10 Ibid., p. 31.\n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE\n\n11 Fifty Years of Progress: The Jubilee of Hongkong as a British Crown Colony, Hong Kong, Daily Press Office, 1891, p. 43.\n\n12 J. S. Thomson, op. cit., p. 8.\n\n13 Ibid., p. 54.\n\n14 Allister Macmillan, ed., Seaports of the Far East, London, 1923, p. 340.\n\n15 Information about Bridget Montague is to be found in contemporary Hong Kong newspapers and the Report on the Contagious Diseases Ordinance (see note 5).\n\n16 Alfred Weatherhead, Life in Hong Kong: 1856-1859. Typescript in the Library of the University of Hong Kong.\n\n17 W. A. Hornaday, Two Years in the Jungle, London, 1885, p. 185.\n\n18 Capt. Gordon Casserly, The Land of the Boxers, London, 1903, p. 193.\n\n19 John Thomson, F.R.G.S., The Straits of Malacca, Indo-China and China, London, 1875, pp. 192-3.\n\n20 J. A. Turner, Kwang Tung or Five Years in South China, London (1894), pp. 108-9.\n\n21 See China Station 1859-1864: The Reminiscences of Walter White, London, National Maritime Museum, Maritime Monographs and Reports, No. 3, 1972.\n\n22 Ibid., p. 27.\n\n23 Major Henry Knollys, English Life in China, London, 1885, pp. 56-7.\n\n24 'Report of the Commission on Alcoholic Liquors', Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1898, p. 1.\n\n25 E. J. Eitel, \"Treatment of Paupers in Hong Kong', Hong Kong Government Gazette, 1880, p. 470.\n\n26 Ibid., p. 469.\n\n27 The Kowloon British School was opened in 1902; before that some girls were educated at convent schools in Macau.\n\n28 Marjorie Topley, 'The Role of Savings and Wealth among Hong Kong Chinese', in L. C. Jarvie, ed., Hong Kong: A Society in Transition, London, 1969, p. 193.\n\n29 J. Thomson, op. cit., pp. 203 and 208.\n\n30 L. N. Wheeler, The Foreigner in China, Chicago, 1881, p. 242.\n\n31 Rev. E. J. Hardy, John Chinaman at Home, London, n.d., p. 29.\n\n32 Leon Radzinowicz, Ideology and Crime, London, 1966, p. 38.\n\n33 Allister Macmillan, op. cit., p. 339.\n\n34 Op. cit., p. 151.\n\n35 Samuel Couling, The Encyclopaedia Sinica, Shanghai, 1917, p. 437.\n\n36 W. A. P. Martin, A Cycle of Cathay, New York, 1900, p. 24.\n\n37 L. C. Arlington, Through the Dragon's Eyes, London, 1931, p. 151.\n\n38 H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York, 1958, p. 186.\n\n39 Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartwright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Other Treaty Ports of China, London, 1908, p. 341.\n\nPage 120\n\nPage 121",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208937,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 99,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "SILK & SILVER: MACAU, MANILA TRADE\n\n67\n\naffairs clandestinely. This greatly encouraged them to develop autonomous merchant communities with what amounted to extra-territorial rights. The most important of these Chinese merchant communities at the end of the 15th century was in Malacca.\n\nShips went to and from Malacca as far as India and China, trading in a wide variety of Indian and Chinese goods which were exchanged for the products of the Indonesian islands. Malacca, the \"city made for merchandise\", was essentially an entrepôt the very existence of which depended upon its carrying trade. It had an excellent and easily defensible harbour, protected on either side by the narrow straits between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and strategically placed, as Pires put it, at the end of one monsoon and the beginning of others. When Afonso de Albuquerque captured Goa in 1510 he was quick to see that Malacca's unrivalled position as an emporium and as a centre for the dissemination of Islam in South East Asia made it essential that he gain control of it also. He could thus fulfil Portuguese obligations to the Holy See and acquire a base for their commercial activities in the archipelago, in particular the carrying trade in spices and other precious goods from Indonesia to Goa and Lisbon in which the Portuguese sought to gain a share, if not a monopoly.\n\nAt the other end of the maritime area with which we are here concerned was another important trading centre. This was the Ryukyu Islands. The inhabitants of these islands, known to the Europeans as Lequeos or Loochoos, were actively engaged in the carrying trade between the northern and southern parts of the area from the 13th to the mid 16th century. The islanders carried to the south Chinese porcelain, silks and other textiles, metal goods and drugs, Japanese weapons and armour, lacquer and gold, all of which they exchanged for spices, aromatic woods, dyewoods and exotic beasts and birds from the Indonesian archipelago — goods that they could sell in China for several hundred times the buying price.2\n\nTechnically this trade with China remained an imperial monopoly and was carried out under the pretence of tribute. As Ming seapower dwindled and piracy in the China Seas accordingly grew, and as the Portuguese extended their trading activities in the years following their conquest of Malacca in 1511 into the Indonesian archipelago and beyond to the spice islands, to Timor and the Solor Islands, to Makassar and eventually to Macau—so the Ryukyu trade became increasingly circumscribed until it was con-",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208947,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 109,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "SILK & SILVER: MACAU, MANILA TRADE\n\n77\n\nIn 1629 the Viceroy Conde de Linhares ordered that both the Macau-Nagasaki and Macau-Manila voyages should henceforth be made under the supervision and control of the Crown and the profits from them used for the upkeep of the royal dockyard at Goa and the maintenance of the Portuguese fleet in Asian waters, but it was not until 1635 that an administrator for the voyages was sent from Goa to Macau to enforce the new system.32 In the same year the Viceroy finally agreed to allow one pinnace to make the Macau-Manila voyage each year, laden with munitions for the Manila garrison and enough silk for local consumption in the Philippines without any surplus for export to Mexico, where it would compete with silks from Seville.\n\nBy the end of the 16th century Macau's trade was already being threatened from several quarters. On the one hand, the development of the Manila-Japan trade, the increasing power and cohesion of the Japanese state under the Tokugawa and the encouragement of a Japanese merchant navy by Tokugawa Ieyasu — the famous Red Seal ships33 — and, above all, the growing hostility of the shoguns towards Christianity and the missionary activities of Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish friars undermined Macau's trade with Japan. On the other hand, competition from the Dutch, whose control of the Straits of Malacca made trade and communications between Macau and Goa difficult and dangerous and whose establishment in Taiwan after 1624 extended this danger into the China Seas, had a deleterious effect on Macau's trade with Indonesia. The extortions of the Chinese merchants, who also of course carried on direct trade in competition with the Portuguese, licitly or illicitly, both with Japan and Manila, weakened Macau's position still further. Between 1613 and 1640, an average of 60 to 80 Chinese junks visited Japan yearly, though from 1634 they were, like the Portuguese, confined to Nagasaki. These difficulties culminated in the summary expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639 by the Shogun Iemitsu and in the fall of Malacca to the Dutch in 1641. The embassy sent from Macau in 1640 in a last attempt to get Iemitsu to revoke his edict of expulsion met a terrible fate. 61 of the 74 members of the delegation were beheaded by 61 executioners sent specially from Yedo to Nagasaki for the purpose. A contemporary Portuguese account of how the citizens of Macau reacted to the news of the calamity sums up well the peculiar quality of the whole Portuguese adventure in the East, its mixture of missionary zeal and ...",
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    {
        "id": 210833,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1986",
        "page_number": 184,
        "title": "RAS-1986",
        "content_text": "167\n\nDr. Legge was not happy about this and was somewhat bitter toward Miss Grant for stealing one of his ministerial candidates.\n\nSeveral years after his marriage Song Hoot-kiam entered the Singapore office of the Peninsula and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. In this position he is described as \"honest, punctual, sober, industrious and conscientious.” As an ideal employee he worked for the company for forty-two years, retiring in 1895. He died five years later. After the death of his first wife, there were two subsequent marriages. He left fourteen surviving children.\n\nThough he departed from his youthful intention of becoming a minister, a notice of his death appearing in the Straits Chinese Magazine suggests he took seriously the moral foundation laid by Dr. Legge's instructions: “Song Hoot-kiam was neither rich nor great, but he was a specimen of the best type of Chinese character. Sober, persevering and conservative, he was a mighty rock to his large family. Half a century of honest, steady and successful work for others is a sufficient commentary on the man's character. As a friend Mr. Hoot-kiam is loved wherever he is known, but he is known only to a small circle. Being of a shy and retiring disposition, he spent most of his time among his family, and those of us who can realise the happiness of this simple domesticity may well envy the coolness, the contentment and the goodness of our friend who has just departed.”\n\nOne of his sons, Song Ong-siang, became a prominent lawyer and in 1923 published, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore. Though Hoot-kiam never became an ordained minister, he served as a lay preacher, singing precentor and treasurer of the Prinsep Street Chapel in Singapore.\n\nThe next student Dr. Legge lost was Lee Kim-leen. He had accompanied Song to Singapore but went on from there to visit his family in Malacca. Unlike Song, he returned to Hongkong though somewhat belatedly in June.\n\nDr. Legge expressed the opinion that the visit had not been of much benefit to him as it led to his friends constantly urging him to return. His excellent knowledge of English made a great impression...",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt",
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    {
        "id": 211657,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 72,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "47\n\nfourteen years. The spirit boat was first carried in procession before being set alight as it drifted out into the Straits of Malacca.\n\nModel junks, both wooden and paper ones, tend only to come into their own during the three, five or twelve yearly major sacrificial ceremonies (Wang Chiao) held when propitious or requested by the deities. The demonic spirits which are the cause of disease are lured aboard the paper-covered bamboo frame junk and either sent out to sea or burnt, a rite called \"The Despatch of Disease\", an exorcism which protects devotees from diseases.\n\nWang Yeh spirit boats, Wang Ch'uan, seen in temples in Taiwan are, in some places, the original boat which had drifted into the vicinity, or are new models placed into temples for the various ceremonies which involve moving the Pestilence Wang Yeh images (see Plate 10). The plague boats of paper which are pushed out to sea are a far cry from the large wooden model Wang Ch'uan one sees in temples, and it should be noted that not all Pestilence Wang Yeh temples have large model boats, in some cases as large as quarter life-size, whilst still fewer contain representative images of the soldiers (and sailors) of the Pestilence Wang Yeh's armies (see Plate 11).\n\nThe Wang Ch'uan are kept either in the temple or beside it, and are objects of worship. In some temples, there are models of the boats actually on the altar for worshippers to touch, a special characteristic of Pestilence Wang Yeh reverence. When a new temple is built, the images are taken there in a Wang Yeh spirit boat, on wheels. Wang Ch'uan are expensive to build and therefore quite often they are constructed well before the temple is finished. There are no set rules for size and quality of such boats, and they, like images, depend upon the availability of money. There is, however, a strict series of rules governing the construction of both wooden and paper boats, and each key stage must be strictly adhered to. When the boat is completed, the craftsmen have to decorate it to the satisfaction of the Wang Yehs. And when the Wang Ch'uan are ready to depart, the boatmen who will tow the boat are all dressed in clothes of the same colour, money for these being collected by the temple committee who also order the uniforms. The large wooden models are colourfully painted, complete with sails and, mounted on trailers, they are towed through the streets during pestilence festivals with the images of the Wang Yeh carried in palanquins behind.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212398,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 340,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "317\n\nNowadays piracy is very much in the news again, in the Malacca Straits, the Sulu sea, and even in the waters outside Hong Kong. There is scope for a new pirate book. However, it would call for more political background and a deeper understanding of human nature than Lilius shows in this briskly moving but somewhat superficial narrative.\n\nANTHONY LAWRENCE\n\nBeatrice S. Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ching China, 1723-1820 Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991. xxi + 417 pp. Bibliography. Glossary. Index.\n\nThe Emperors of China were both person and institution. The Chinese bureaucracy was the most highly developed organization of its kind in the pre-modern world, with a complex array of rules and regulations which confined and defined government. The Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1723-35) is traditionally portrayed as the epitome of a ruthless despot, a cunning autocrat who developed a whole new secret police system to solidify his power. The Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736-95) based his rule of more than sixty years on political adeptness, not ceremonial presence. The traditional image of a Confucian official is of a man who served principle, not a ruler, and who dared to criticize those Emperors who strayed from the Middle Way (read \"bureaucratically defined acceptable behavior\").\n\nHow do we reconcile these contradictory views? Did the Emperor terrorize the literati-officials into submission, or was he merely the tool of an ageless bureaucracy? Is Chinese history during the Qing the record of strong or weak monarchs, or did institutions evolve which tempered the influence of the Son of Heaven?\n\nBeatrice Bartlett has provided us in Monarchs and Ministers with a ground-breaking work. Bartlett, delving deeper into Qing court documents than any previous foreign scholar, has provided us with crucial information on the evolution of the political structure of China's last dynasty. Where other scholars have given us glimpses of Emperors, have laid out initial hypotheses or focused on narrower political issues, Bartlett has unlocked the actual records and drawn together different strands of research on 18th century China.",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215769,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 68,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "1\n\nARTICLES\n\nTHE TRANSFER OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS: A REVISIONIST APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COLONIAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION\n\nANDREW ABRAHAM\n\n[Hon. Ed. - The Straits Settlements was a former British crown colony on the Strait of Malacca, comprising four trade centres, Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and Labuan, established or taken over by the British East India Company. The British settlement at Penang was founded in 1786, at Singapore in 1819; Malacca, occupied by the British during the Napoleonic Wars, was transferred to the East India Company in 1824. The three territories were established as a crown colony in 1867. Labuan, which became part of Singapore Settlement in 1907, was constituted a fourth separate settlement in 1912.\n\nThe Straits colony, occupied by the Japanese during World War II, was broken up in 1946, when Singapore became a separate crown colony. Singapore attained full internal self-government in 1959, became a part of Malaysia in 1963, and became an independent republic in 1965. Labuan was incorporated in North Borneo (later Sabah) in 1946, which in turn became a part of Malaysia in 1963. Penang and Malacca were included in the Malayan Union in 1945, the Federation of Malaya in 1948, and Malaysia in 1963.]\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe Straits Settlements were transferred in 18671 to the Colonial Office's administration due to the dissatisfaction of the European merchants with the Indian government's rule. Their grievances were cited in a petition in 1857, the most contentious of which cover complaints of the East India Company's (EIC) attempts to introduce measures damaging to trade, problems with piracy and convicts, and failure of the Indian government to build up an influence in the Malay peninsula.\n\nHowever, a study of the history of the Straits Settlements shows evidence of a booming economy, many cases of intervention by the EIC in the affairs of the Malay states, and issues such as those concerning piracy, convicts and currency more or less resolved. Furthermore,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215770,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 69,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "Turnbull, an established historian, equivocally suggests that the transfer was based on an inaccurate and unbalanced feedback of the community's feelings:\n\nNo dissenting voice was raised in London and Calcutta, and the colonial office naturally had the impression that the demand for transfer was based on general dissatisfaction with rule from India, with the entire merchant body clamouring for change. In fact, it had required years of agitation on the part of Read, Woods and a small minority of enthusiasts in Singapore to arouse interest in the transfer, and apart from the brief period of panic in 1857 in when the petition was framed, the majority even of European merchants in Singapore were not actively in favour of the change, while the Asian merchants showed almost no interest in the movement.2\n\nIn spite of these conflicting points, I hold that the transfer was needed as the problems raised in the Straits merchants' petition were material and bona fide enough to necessitate the transfer of the administration from Calcutta to London. However, my essay attempts a revisionist's approach to the transfer controversy, questioning its necessity and examining its legal significance through an orchestration of the pot-pourri of relevant issues, in the hope that this methodology may help to provide a clearer awareness and legal understanding into this much taken for granted transfer, thus according it the new angle of attention it deserves.\n\nBackground history of the Straits Settlements3\n\nSingapore, Malacca and Penang were combined to form the Straits Settlements in 1826. The Straits Settlements became the fourth presidency of India, and remained an Indian dependency until 1867. The EIC obtained possession of Penang in 1786, as a base to protect the company's expanding China trade and a centre for the collection of Straits produce from the Malay peninsula and the eastern archipelago for shipment to China. When Singapore was founded in 1819, it was placed under the administration of Bencoolen (in Sumatra) where Raffles was lieutenant-governor. When he resigned and returned to England in 1823, Singapore was placed under the control of the Supreme Government of India. Singapore was ceded to the EIC in 1824 and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215771,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 70,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "3\n\nbecame British territory. Malacca was administered by the Dutch until the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824, whereby it was ceded to the British among other terms. Two years later, Singapore and Malacca came under the Penang Presidency.\n\nAccording to Turnbull, the Straits Settlements were the East India Company's most incongruous offspring….The Straits Settlements formed a scattered unit, which was difficult to administer efficiently.” In legal terms, it included Western laws at constitutional level, and local legal systems under the control of sultans.\n\nPhysical/geographical problems\n\nPenang Island lay opposite Province Wellesley (a strip of land about 30 miles long and three miles wide) which the EIC acquired from the Sultan of Kedah in 1800. Malacca was about 260 miles to the south of Penang. Singapore Island was a further 120 miles south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula.\n\nThere were problems of communication between these settlements, being only by means of sea. Until 1861, the Straits government possessed only two antiquated sailing gunboats and one steamer, used mainly to ferry the governor, recorders and senior officials between the three stations. Communications with the EIC's headquarters in Calcutta were also poor, and until 1864, a monthly steamer service between Calcutta and the Straits Settlements remained the only link with the seat of government.\"\n\nAdministration problems\n\nAccording to Turnbull, '[d]ivision of interest between the East India Company and its eastern dependencies was even more formidable than the geographical and physical problems of administration. The sole value of the Straits Settlements to the East India Company was to protect and stimulate the China trade. When [the EIC] lost its monopoly of this trade in 1833 Calcutta was left with an unrewarding and expensive burden. She could not abandon the Straits Settlements but constantly begrudged the drain they made upon India's financial resources and upon the time and attention of senior officials over the next thirty years.'",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215782,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 81,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "14\n\n8 ref. to the map of the Malay Peninsula\n\n9 under the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Alliance of 1800\n\n10 (Malacca's land area included the town and hinterland about 40 miles long, 25 miles wide)\n\n\"Turnbull, Ibid, p 3 cf. SSR, S 32, Items 105, 204; SSR, R 45, pp 246-7\n\n12 under the Charter Act of 1833; cf. Hansard Parliamentary Debates 3rd series vol. cxlix p 988\n\n13 Turnbull, Ibid, p 3\n\n14 Turnbull, Ibid, p 4\n\n15 Turnbull, Ibid, p 4\n\n16 Turnbull, Ibid, p 4\n\n17 Turnbull, Ibid, p 4\n\n18 Turnbull, Ibid, p 4; Thio Eunice British Policy in the Malay Peninsula 1880-1910 Vol. 1 Introduction pp xvi–xvii\n\n19 Parliamentary Papers, 1862, xl (House of Commons) 259, pp 585-8; Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce, 13 Oct 1857; Buckley C, An Anecdotal History of Old Time in Singapore\n\n20 cf. Hansard Parliamentary Debates 3rd ser. cxlix, 986-90\n\n21 Buckley C, Ibid p 755\n\n22 Turnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Chap 2 p 59\n\n23 Mills LA, British Malaya 1824-1867 Chap 5 p 96-97; Jones W, Public Administration in Malaya, Chap 1 p 13; Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons No 259 of 1862, 13 (Vol. xl)\n\nI\n\n24 Ibid, Chap 5 p 89",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215785,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 84,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "in the Straits, for example in negotiation for the settlement of Penang Island in 1786 where the Supreme Government remained steadfast in refusing to promise military aid to the Sultan of Kedah. Thus, in a Siamese invasion in 1821, the Penang Government did not offer military aid to the Sultan, but only political asylum and mediation. Indeed the whole history of Anglo-Siamese relations in the Malay Peninsular shows evidence that the non-intervention policy was adhered to as much as possible, (cf. Mills, supra, Chap 8 (Anglo-Siamese relations)) For the obvious political and economic reasons the British did not want to antagonise the Siamese (cf. Tarling, Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1760-1824) by interfering in the affairs of the Malay States (such as Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu) which were within the Siamese sphere of influence.\n\nSevere censures were passed upon Captain Low for his treaty with Perak in 1826; and the treaty between James Low and Perak and Selangor in 1826, received strong criticism from the Supreme Government and resulted in Low's being suspended from his duties. (Tan DE, Supra, p 119) The Indian Government only relented when Governor Fullerton managed to convince it of the necessity of protecting British interests, a clear instance of the Indian Government's unwillingness to intervene in any of the Malay States. This was further proven when appeals of Perak and Trengannu for defensive purposes were likewise rejected. In the Naning War of 1831-2, Governor Ibbetson was told that the extension of territory was not desired. (Ibid. p 119)\n\nAn even more striking instance occurred in 1833, when the boundary between the Malacca Territory and the tiny state of Johol was debated over. Between the two lay a debatable piece of land which had formerly been claimed by both states, containing rich mines of tin and gold. Governor Ibbetson regarded the frontier delimitation as an excellent opportunity for showing that accessions of territory and encroachments upon their rights is the furthest from our views and intentions' (Mills, supra, p 177), thus resigning any claims that the British might have to it, and even included it within the area of Johol.\n\nThrough the above examples, I would say that the British were pursuing a policy of non-intervention in the Malay States between 1824-73. They upheld this policy whenever possible, though in some cases intervention was unavoidable. And it is significant that sometimes even in instances where British merchants' interests were threatened (for example in Negri Sembilan), the policy of non-intervention was still observed.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215787,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 86,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "19\n\nfrom Pitt's India Act. The EIC accordingly found itself guaranteeing some states protection from attacks, or pledging to uphold boundary settlements. (Thio, supra, p xvi-xvii)\n\nThere were cases of intervention for example, in Kedah, Perak and Selangor, brought about by Robert Fullerton, Burney, Anderson and James Low:\n\nWhen Robert Fullerton was governor of the Straits Settlements in 1824, he completely reversed the earlier British attitude of giving in to the claims of Siam, thus embarking on protection and expansion of British interests in the Malay Peninsula by checking Siamese attempts at extending their influence over the northern Malay states. Thus, when Ligor prepared to invade Perak and Selangor in 1825, he sent a Penang squadron to patrol the river mouths to prevent any attacks. (Mills L A, British Malaya 1824-1867, Chap 8 p 141; other examples of intervention included the following: Burney's Preliminary Treaty with Ligor in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8 p 143-146); the Anderson Treaty (involving Selangor and Perak) in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8, p 145-146; Purcell, supra, Chap 6, p 70)\n\nThe Burney Treaty of 1826 saw British attempts to secure independence for Selangor and Perak (Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca Vol. 2 p 26); and later, the Low Treaty of 1826 promised British assistance in maintaining Perak's independence. These two treaties had more effect on the Malay States than any other treaties, the greatest consequence being a marked ending of Siamese southward ambitions, and thus securing the British position in expanding further into the Malay States at a later stage. However, signing these treaties showed non-compliance with Pitt's India Act. Thus, where Low's Treaty was concerned, the Supreme Government continued for some time to condemn it as unauthorised and never really ratified it. In effect, the intervention in the Malay States was still somewhat restricted by the Government's policy. (Mills, Op Cit. Chap 8 p 162) Other examples include Fullerton's challenge of Ligor's claim to the Kurau District in 1826, and the Burney Treaty of 1826 after which the British ceased to intervene in Kedah. (Mills, Ibid. Chap 8 pp 160-161)\n\nOther examples of intervention included those in Naning and Sungei Ujong: The British fought the Naning War in 1831-2 to establish British right to collection of revenue in Naning. In Sungei Ujong, the British squadron was called in 1857 to destroy the village of Pengkalan Kempas, in order to punish the chiefs who had been extorting British subjects. And again in 1860, Governor Cavenagh",
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    {
        "id": 215790,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 89,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "22\n\n76 Gullick, Malaya, Chap 4 p 43\n\n77 the petition 1857 to House of Commons (cf. Buckley, supra, p 758); Hansard 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 988\n\nHansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 990 - 991;\n\n-\n\nTurnbull, 'Convicts in the Straits Settlements, 1826-67', JMBRAS, xliii, no 1 (1970) p 88\n\nP 98 - McNair, the Superintendent of convicts in Singapore, remarked in his report for 1858/59 how well the convicts worked at brickmaking and roadbuilding, which made them 'still a positive advantage to this colony'\n\n7\n\nBlundell, in his Annual Report for 1858/59, pointed out that Singapore owed all its roads, canals and public works to convict labour\n\n79 Turnbull, Ibid, p 89 - Indian convicts were allowed a freedom that astonished outside visitors (for example, Lord Elgin in 1857 cf. Walrond T, Letters and Journals of James 8th Earl of Elgin, p 189) They often worked on roads and buildings without guards, sometimes they were employed as domestic servants or in government offices, and they could earn and keep wages\n\n80 Turnbull, Ibid, p 90 - those who did abscond were invariably given up by Chinese and Malays to claim the rewards on their heads\n\n81 Turnbull, Ibid, p 91 - In 1833, a European overseer was murdered by a convict; in 1852, there were two clashes between police and convicts in Penang; in 1853, a group of Sikh prisoners attacked their peons in Singapore\n\n82 Hansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 991; for example a Ceylonese convict, Tickery Bandah, who was released in 1864, settled down in Malacca as a shopkeeper, writer and amateur lawyer. He even kept up a correspondence with the King of Siam (cf. Cameron, supra pg 376; Turnbull, supra (on convicts), p 91)\n\n83 Hansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 988\n\n84 Turnbull, supra (on convicts), p 91\n\n85 Their origins are obscure.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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        "id": 215796,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 95,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "28\n\nMisra, B B, 1959, The Central Administration of the East India Company, 1773 - 1834, Manchester\n\nMontgomery, Martin R, 1837, History of the British Possessions In the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, Whitaker, London\n\nMukherjee Ramkrishna, 1974, The Rise and Fall of the East India Company, A Sociological Appraisal, Monthly Review Press, London and New York\n\nNewbold, T J, (1839) 1971, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, Vol 2, Kuala Lumpur\n\nA\n\nOliver, A S B, 1956, Outline of British Policy In East and Southeast Asia, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London\n\nOnraet, Rene Henry de Solminihac, 1947, Singapore: A Police Background, Dorothy Crisp & Co, London\n\nParkin, CN, 1960, British Intervention in Malaya 1867 - 1877, University of Malaya Press\n\nPhang, Boon Leong Andrew, 1990, The Development of Singapore Law, Historical and Socio-legal Perspectives, Butterworths, Singapore\n\nPhilips, CH, 1940, The East India Company 1784 - 1834, Manchester University Press\n\nPridmore, F, (1955) 1975, Coins and Coinages of the Straits Settlements and British Malaya 1786 - 1951, National Museum of Singapore\n\nPurcell, Victor, 1946, Malaya, Outline of a Colony, Nelson and Sons Ltd, London, New York\n\nRose, Saul, 1962, Britain and Southeast Asia, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore\n\nSandu, K S, (1966) 1968, ‘Tamil and Other Indian Convicts in the Straits Settlements A D, 1790 - 1873', Proceedings of the First International Conference Seminar of Tamil Studies, Kuala Lumpur, I, 197 - 208\n\nSankaran, R, (Dec 1966), \"Prelude to the British Forward Movement of 1909”, Peninjau Sejarah, I No 2",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
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