[ { "id": 207394, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 162, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "154\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nconflict. I came to regret my thoroughness, for there was never time to use the equipment thus accumulated and this must have been splendid booty for the Japanese. There was also a full social life; many British women had enrolled for nursing and other essential duties and had not been evacuated. The Hong Kong Hotel was a gay place indeed, particularly on a Saturday night.\n\nIn October 1938, 35,000 Japanese troops had landed in Bias Bay on the China coast 35 miles from Hong Kong, and had then occupied Canton and had cut all communications between Hong Kong and mainland China. Patrolling Japanese ships thereafter made sailing from the Colony outside a circumscribed area very hazardous. In February 1939 the Japanese occupied the island of Hainan, 300 miles to the south of Hong Kong thus controlling the sea communications with Singapore. Curiously, after my arrival I do not remember taking part in any serious discussions with my friends about the prospects of a successful defence of Hong Kong. There were however plenty of rumours to fill the air. It was generally known that the strategic plan required Hong Kong to resist an attack for 90 days before a relief could arrive, a decision taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1937. In February 1940 the home authorities decided that food reserves should be accumulated for 130 days, while in August 1940 the Chiefs of Staff reached a further decision that in case of war with Japan, Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost to be held as long as possible. After the war I learned from Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, that in February 1940 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the troops should be withdrawn from Hong Kong. Nothing was done to give effect to this decision. I have no doubt that the decision taken in February 1940 was the correct one which could with advantage have been taken much earlier. Ever since my arrival in Hong Kong in 1939 I believed that the Colony could not be defended successfully. The frontier, beyond which lay a strong Japanese army, was some 20 miles from Hong Kong harbour, the line to be defended, the so-called Gin Drinkers line was less than 5 miles from the harbour, the Japanese navy controlled the coast, our airport was tiny and the Air Force planes were few in number and no match in performance for their potential opponents. One and a half million Chinese civilians were crowded into Kowloon and Victoria. Roads suitable for wheeled traffic were few and open to close observation at many points. The whole picture left no doubt", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207769, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 157, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "142\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nand canvas tops added in Rangoon. Other similar trucks were obtained during the fall of Burma, but in the event a total of 12 trucks were left behind there. As has been mentioned earlier, the Unit took over the existing IRC fleet which was a very mixed bag. It also purchased eight Dodge 3 tonners in Chungking from Liddell and Co., a merchant house. Another addition was five 1938 Ford chassis into which replacement Hercules 4 cylinder diesel engines were fitted.\n\nBy May 1942, the Unit had a fleet of 30 trucks, and those held in Feb. 1943 are listed in Table VI. Some of these were obtained by an ingenious arrangement. Some mission organizations had purchased trucks, brought them to Rangoon and taken them up the Burma Road loaded with supplies and people. It was, however, uneconomic and difficult for the organization to run the trucks once their destination had been reached. The Unit, therefore, offered to take them over in return for 16,000 km. tons of haulage of their organizations' goods.4\n\nWith the fall of Burma, importation of fuel oil, lubricating oil, and petrol became impossible except by air. Low octane petrol and diesel fuel were available at the Yumen oilfield in Kansu, some 3,000 km. from the centre of operations. The alternative fuels were rape-seed or other vegetable oils for the diesel engines, alcohol produced from sugar cane, and 'petrol' distilled from tung (#) oil for the petrol engines. All these fuels suffer from serious shortcomings. The rape-seed oil had a high acid content which gave rapid wear on the fuel pumps, injectors, and cylinders of the diesel engines, and these were worn out after two years of hard service. The alcohol was not only expensive, it was also rationed and gave a fuel consumption double that of petrol with the engines and carburettors available. The water content of the alcohol also caused rusting in the fuel tanks. The tung oil petrol was better but cost (in October 1942) NC$130 a gallon when the exchange rate was NC$80 to 1 pound sterling.\n\nThe alternative was to convert trucks to run on gas produced from charcoal. The technical description of the system used is given later. Conversion sets were first purchased and later manufactured by the Kweiyang and Kutsing depots. Considerable skill and experience were required to operate the systems successfully, and the maximum power obtainable was perhaps 70% of that on petrol. The apparatus took up room and increased the tare of the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214738, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "117 \n\nA Review of the Literature? \n\nStrategy \n\nIn terms of the strategic and historical aspects of the Battle, the best known works from the British points of view are those of Winston Churchill (Churchill 1950), the Minister who led Britain to final victory, and Liddell Hart (Liddell Hart 1970), the strategist renowned for his theory on the use of tanks in modern warfare and \"indirect approach” (Liddell Hart 1991) as a general war strategy. There are few recent works in English that make reference to Hong Kong at this level of analysis. The common tenor of Churchill and Liddell Hart was that Hong Kong could not be defended. The former, however, held that Hong Kong should be nominally defended to deter the Japanese. In early 1941, Churchill told General Sir Hastings, his Chief of Staff: \n\n\"There is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of augmenting the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolic scale.... Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice.” \n\nIt was true that Churchill's Chiefs of Staff favoured reinforcing the Hong Kong garrison so that it could maintain a \"more worthy” defence or even a degree of deterrence, and Major-General A.E. Grasett, the former General Officer Commanding in Hong Kong, made a contribution to the strength of the defence by arranging for two Canadian battalions to arrive in the Colony in October 1941. Yet, under the dominant influence of Churchill's strategic concept, the Hong Kong garrison was outnumbered three to one by the Japanese when the invasion occurred. \n\nChurchill's position and decision apparently attracted universal criticism after the war. Liddell Hart thought that this was a patent mistake, which was exacerbated by Grasett's contribution, which cost many lives of the garrison. In other words, Liddell Hart considered that as Hong Kong could not be defended, it should not have been defended. In his History of the Second World War, Liddell Hart recalled what he said to General Dill in March 1935 about Hong Kong", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214739, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 154, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "118\n\n(Liddell Hart 1999);\n\n\"I suggested, and he appeared to agree, that it would be better to risk its loss by holding it too lightly than to strengthen it so much as to make it, morally, a \"Verdun\" or \"Port Arthur\" with great danger to our prestige if lost.\"\n\n9\n\nSome veterans complained about the lack of sympathy of London with colonial subjects, as evidenced in Colonel Anthony Hewitt's comments in his foreword to the work of Ko and Wordie (Ko and Wordie, 1996). Hewitt's passing comment is mild compared with the criticism of military historians of the allied countries. Vincent (1981) and Ferguson (1980), Cameron (1991) and most Chinese authors such as Yip (1982); Yuen (1988) and Tse (1995) criticised the British Government for being totally unprepared for the invasion of the Colony. The critical views expressed in English works in this period were pertinent to post-war claims for compensation by ex-servicemen in Commonwealth countries. The prevailing Chinese position is that Hong Kong should and could have been defended. An odd view is Tse (1995) who argued that Japan made a strategic mistake by taking the Colony, as it would serve no useful military purpose.\n\nBell's archive research (Bell, 1996) established that Hong Kong was not treated as an outpost but \"an integral component of an offensive strategy” based on faith in the superiority of the Royal Navy and the certainty of Hong Kong's relief. However, Bell's offensive strategy view is hardly consistent with the absence of fighters or bombers in the Colony before the outbreak of the Battle.\n\n\"Britain did not have enough men, or enough guns, tanks, ships and aeroplanes for the war against Germany. So it was impossible to send sufficient men and supplies for the defence of Hong Kong. These included the men of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. These men - English, Chinese, Eurasians, Portuguese and others - whose homes were in Hong Kong, prepared to defend the Colony from attack.” (Stokes, 1965, p.89)\n\nThough it is highly questionable whether the Scottish, Canadian and Indian soldiers in the \"others category\" mentioned by Stokes would regard Hong Kong as their permanent homes, Stokes' description is", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214749, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 164, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "128\n\nclaim that the defenders faced shortages in ammunition, notably for mortars. However, the movement of the defenders' guns within the defence perimeter throughout the Battle was rather hectic, aided by at least 20 armoured cars and more than 3,000 motor cars and 600 trucks. This indicated that the artillery arm of the garrison was playing a key role in prolonging the duration of the defence. Therefore, the effective firepower of the defenders did not appear to be as weak as frequently represented in publications up to now on the Battle of Hong Kong. The story of the defence of Hong Kong apparently could well have been distorted in favour of the winner.\n\nConclusion: a Plea for Further Research\n\nThe above points are just informed speculation and the Battle of Hong Kong is certainly an under-researched military episode in the Second World War. This being the case, it should be just a matter of interest not only to those directly involved.\n\n...\n\nIn broad historical terms, the significance of the Battle of Hong Kong should not be limited to a matter of war relics or past history. It has implications for the post-war political development of Hong Kong, a living issue that affects the present both physically and socially. We have mentioned the credibility of the defence of Hong Kong as a matter of responsible government and a matter of fact but not as an apology for British colonialism. There are still unknown numbers of unexploded bombs, both Japanese and Allied, yet to be unearthed in highly congested urban sites. There are also quite a number of old people in Hong Kong (and elsewhere in Asia) who still hold Japanese military currency, forced upon them when their convertible currencies were expropriated during the occupation, in the vain hope of obtaining compensation by the Japanese government (Keniti; Kobayasi Hideo and Isida Jimtarou, 1995).\n\nThe military aspects of the fighting itself should be interesting case study materials for the military scientist. Many other questions remain unanswered. The size and role and size of the \"fifth columnists\", the tactics of the Japanese and the useful value of occupied Hong Kong to the Japanese are just a few examples. Though these questions for a minor theatre of war may not catch the attention of those who are only interested in the broad-brush views of Liddell Hart (1970), they should", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214753, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 168, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "132\n\nLai, S.S. The Surrender of Japan: Before and After, Hong Kong, Ming Pao Publishing, 1995. (Chinese publications)\n\nLeason, J. Singapore: the Battle that Changed the World, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1968.\n\nLiddell Hart, B.H. History of the Second World War, New York, Da Capo Press, 1999.\n\nLiddell Hart, B.H. Strategy, second revised edition, New York, Meridian, 1991.\n\nLindsay, O. The Lasting Honour: the Fall of Hong Kong 1941, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1978.\n\nLindsay, O. At The Going Down of the Sun: Hong Kong and South East Asia 1941-45, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1981.\n\nLondon Gazette: Supplement, 29 January 1948. “Operations in Hong Kong from 8th to 25th December, 1941”\n\nMorris, J. Hong Kong: Epilogue to an Empire, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997.\n\nMuir, A. The First of Foot: the History of the Royal Scots, the Royal Regiment, Edinburgh, Royal Scots Historical Society, 1961.\n\nNeillands, R. A Fighting Retreat: the British Empire 1947 - 1997, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1996.\n\nOrwell, G. The War Commentaries, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987.\n\nOxley, D.H. Victoria Barracks, 1842-1979, Hong Kong, British Forces Hong Kong, 1979,\n\nPonting, C. Armageddon: the Second World War, 1995, Chinese translation by Rye Field Publishing, Taipei, 1997. (Chinese publication)\n\nPriestwood, G. Through Japanese Barbed Wire, New York,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214756, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 171, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "135\n\nSupplement, 29 January 1948; A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle of Hong Kong December, 1941 (1953). For the official Hong Kong account of the surrender, see Hong Kong Government (1948).\n\n3 The literature referred to in this section is not exhaustive and focuses on books and reports only. English and Chinese newspapers and periodicals from time to time carry articles on the Battle. Post-war annals of universities, university halls and secondary schools in Hong Kong are also a good source of materials about the Battle. There are also a number of novels on war events,\n\n+ The emphasis is placed on attacking the enemies' \"line of least resistance\" or \"line of least expectation\".\n\n5 As quoted in Ko and Wordie (1996), p.18.\n\n\"They were influenced by the views of Air Chief Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.\n\n7 During the initial stage of the Battle, BBC broadcasts (Orwell, 1987) placed high hopes on the availability of Chinese forces in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Such forces were never to come.\n\nLiddell Hart (1999): footnote at 219.\n\n\"Colonel Hewitt is the author of a number of books on the Battle and Japanese occupation of the Colony.\n\n10 The title of the book is a misnomer as the police force obtained the royal title only in the late 1960s.\n\nBlackburn gave an account of the anarchic situation of Hong Kong shortly before the surrender (Blackburn 1989).\n\n12 On 23 October 1937, the Joint Overseas and Home Defence Committee considered re-fortification or demilitarisation of Hong Kong, assuming that it took 90 days for the British fleet to relieve Hong Kong. Rollo (1992): 113. According to Aldrich, the British Chiefs of Staff considered the abandonment of Shanghai and demilitarisation of Hong Kong to avoid confrontation with Japan. Aldrich (1993): 261.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214757, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 172, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "136\n\n13 Yip (1982): 94.\n\n15\n\nFigures on losses for the Battle of Crete include those of killed, wounded, captured and missing. Source: Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung (1994)\n\nFigures on losses for the Battle of Hong Kong are those on casualties only, i.e. those of killed and wounded. Source: Ko and Wordie (1996)\n\n16 Figures on British losses are estimated by deducing total casualties in the Malaya campaign as reckoned by Leasor minus those losses incurred on the Malay Peninsula loss recorded by Liddell Hart. Japanese losses for the Battle of Singapore are those on casualties only, i.e, those of killed and wounded. Source: Leasor (1968); Liddell Hart (1970)\n\nhttp://www.crete.tournet.gr/crete-intro-Location_and_Size-15-en.html\n\n* Annual Report, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1938.\n\n19 Singapore Year Book, Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1965,\n\n20 According to Rollo (1992), this figure includes six x 18 pdr; six Lewis guns; two Bofors; four x 2 pdrs; eight x 4.5 inch guns; 23 x 3.7 inch guns. The total figure is very close to the numbers of field guns claimed to be captured by the Japanese: 47 guns.\n\n21 According to Rollo (1992), this figure includes three x 9.2 inch Mark VII; five x 9.2 in March V; 12 x 6 inch CP II; two x 6 inch naval; two x 4.7 inch; four x 4 inch naval; two x 60 pdrs guns. Most of these guns were in active use in the defence.\n\n2 Except those with asterisks, the references are those available in the University of Hong Kong Main Library and those quoted in Birch and Cole (1979); Tse (1995); and Ko and Wordie (1996).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 } ]