[
    {
        "id": 208020,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "A JOURNEY TO YENAN, 1946\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS*\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to record some experiences of a truck journey in early 1946 from Chungking, the wartime capital of the Republic of China, to Yenan, the Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, the Chinese Communist Party and capital of the Kansu-Ninghsia-Shensi Border Region, and back. This three-truck convoy carrying medical supplies was the first delivery to take place for a period of about four years, and a very brief review of the political background is perhaps required to set the scene.\n\nFollowing the Sian incident of December 1936, there were moves towards a united anti-Japanese front between the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists (Kungchangtang). This was followed on July 7, 1937, by the Marco Polo Bridge fighting and the start of the Japanese invasion of the heartland of China. In this period, there was a nominal united command of Kuomintang and Kungchangtang with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander. The New Fourth Army, based in Anhwei, had been formed from the Communist guerilla groups left behind in Central China, but friction developed between this and the Kuomintang forces, and in January 1941, it was attacked in South Anhwei and partly destroyed. This marked the end of the united front, and the Kuomintang re-introduced the blockade of the Liberated Areas under 18th Group Army control. These Liberated Areas were basically the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Suiyuan, Honan, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Jehol. Much of these areas were also under Japanese occupation of the cities, railways, and roads, but the countryside was effectively under the control of the Liberated Areas Regional Councils.\n\nThe reintroduction of the blockade meant that a proportion of the Kuomintang troops were engaged in this exercise rather than\n\n* Paper delivered to a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch on 31st May, 1977. Mr. Reynolds is head of the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Hong Kong.",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208021,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 60,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "44\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nfacing the Japanese. Consequently it was part of American policy, especially from 1944 onwards, to re-create a united front against Japan and promote agreement on a form of Constitutional Government for China which would include the Communist Party. To this end Chairman Mao Tse Tung was escorted to Chungking in August 1945 by the US Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. No real agreement was reached in some 41 days of talks and Chairman Mao returned to Yenan in October. Hurley resigned and in November the United States appointed General George Marshall as special negotiator, a truce was signed on January 10, 1946 and all-party Peoples Consultative Conference began*.\n\nHaving set the scene we may consider what this meant on the ground; specifically in terms of medical supplies to the Liberated Areas. These contained between 80-100 million people and perhaps 350,000 men under arms. Apart from supplies purchased and smuggled in from the Japanese occupied areas or captured, no UNRRA, International Red Cross, or other supplies had been allowed through from Chungking since the beginning of 1941, and the medical services were dependent on traditional medicines and drugs derived from available herbs. The situation was therefore very serious.\n\nThe UNRRA charter required that supplies be distributed to those in need regardless of race, religion, and party and UNRRA therefore applied pressure to the Chinese Government, via CNRRA, to allow supplies to go to the Liberated Areas. This pressure finally succeeded in January 1946 at the time of signing the truce and a permit for a total quantity of about eight tons of medical supplies was granted.\n\nDuring the period from the end of 1941 to 1946, the Friends Ambulance Unit, China Convoy, had been responsible for the transport of most of the civilian medical and relief supplies in the\n\n* For those desiring more detail of this period the following give different approaches:\n\nKenneth S. Chern, \"Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia\". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 4 Winter 1976-7.\n\nJohn S. Service, Lost Chance in China. Random House, 1974. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50. 2 vols, Chicago, 1964.\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209099,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 2,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "211\n\nElsewhere, \"smuggling\" between Nationalist-held areas and Japanese-held areas was just as prevalent as that conducted across Mirs Bay, and it was not necessarily carried out without the knowledge or consent of the Japanese. See the political context of this particular form of trade discussed in Lloyd E. Eastman, \"Facets of an ambivalent relationship: smuggling, puppets, and atrocities during the War, 1937-1945\", in Akira Iriye ed., The Chinese and the Japanese, Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton, 1980).\n\nMr. Shing 10.7.81.\n\n100 Mr. Chan T'in Po 12.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n101 Mr. Ip Wan 2.7.81.\n\n102 Mr. Lei Yun Shau 14.11.80.\n\n103 Mr. Tse Koon K'au 9.6.81.\n\n104 Other members of the East River Guerrillas included Wong Koon Fong, Kong Shui, and Lo Fung; see ints. Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80, Mr. Chiu Lin Shing 11.5.81, Mr. Sham Kin K'eung 23.6.81, 1.7.81. For the background history of the East River Guerrillas see Feng Pai-chu, Tseng Sheng, et. al. Kuang-tung jen-min k'ang-Jih chan-cheng hui-i (Canton, 1951), and \"The general conditions of the liberated areas behind enemy lines in South China (East River and Hainan Island)”, in K’ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-chi chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang (Peking, 1st ed. 1953, rep. 1981) pp. 123-132. Dr. (later Sir) Lindsay Ride contacted Ts'oi Kwok Leung immediately upon his escape from Hong Kong and after the British Army Aid Group was formed, Ts'oi co-operated with the B.A.A.G. to assist prisoners-of-war escaping from Hong Kong. See Edwin Ride, BAAG, Hong Kong Resistance, 1942-1945 (Hong Kong, 1981).\n\n105 Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80.\n\n100 Mr. Hoh Shang 24.6.81, Mr. Wong Ts'ing 23.6.81.\n\n107 Mr. Lau 17.7.81, Mr. Chan Shing 21.11.80.\n\n108 Mr. Lau Wan Hei 25.6.81, Mr. Sham Kin K'eung 23.6.81, Madam Chiu I Mooi 7.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n100 Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80, Mr. Wong Ts'ing 23.6.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n110 Mr. Chan Shing 21.11.80.\n\n111 Mr. Chiu Lin Shing 11.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81, Mr. Lei Yun Shau 14.11.80.\n\n119 Mr. Lok Kau Kei 26.6.81, Mr. Yau Koon K'au 27.7.81, Mr. Lei Yau 13.11.80, Mr. Tse Kw'an 16.11.80.\n\n113 Mr. K.M.A. Barnett 13.2.82, Mr. Wan Yau 14.7.81.\n\n114 Father Lau Wing Yiu 18.5.81.\n\n115 Mr. Chung Poon 13.11.80, Mr. Sham Kin K’eung 23.6.81, 1.7.81.\n\n116 Mr. Lei Shiu Yam 8.5.81, Mr. Lei Yau 13.11.80, Mr. Tse Kw'an 16.11.80. See also \"The story of the American pilot Kerr's escape\", in the Wen-hui pao 7.1.80, and Edwin Ride, op. cit. pp. 219-220.\n\n117 Mr. Wan Ts'eung 31.11.80.\n\n118 Mr. Yau T'aam Shang 8.5.81.\n\n110 Mr. Chung P'oon 13.11.80, Mr. Lau Wan Hei and Mr. Kong Sai P'ing 25.6.81.\n\n120 J. Barrow, \"Annual Report of the D.C.N.T. 1947-48”, p. 2.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210797,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1986",
        "page_number": 148,
        "title": "RAS-1986",
        "content_text": "131\n\npeople applied themselves enthusiastically to the task, insufficient capital, the rigid application of ultra-Left policies such as the lop-sided emphasis on developing grain production which did not best utilize Hainan's tropical conditions, and poor technical support are all blamed for the slow progress in Hainan. During the Cultural Revolution in particular, the establishment of new plantations was discontinued, while large areas of mature coconut, rubber and coffee trees were felled to release land for grain production. Forests did not escape indiscriminate clearing: when liberated, there were 863,000 ha of tropical forest on Hainan, but by 1979 only 245,000 ha remained (Smil, 1983). Besides roads, one of the few benefits remaining from the ten turbulent years are the reservoirs and canal networks constructed to provide water for irrigation and generation of electricity.\n\nSome of these problems were caused by inadequate communication between the central government and the grass-roots level, while others are a direct result of ignorance of the biological potential of the tropical environment. The latter was undoubtedly aggravated by debasement of intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution. Further, following the withdrawal of Soviet experts and technical aid to China in 1960, the fostering by Mao of an isolationist policy from both Eastern and Western blocs meant that technical and economic development had to rely exclusively on Chinese talents and expertise. Given the dearth of experience with tropical agriculture amongst the Hainanese, overseas Chinese who had worked on plantations in Malaya, Indonesia and Thailand, but returned to Hainan in the 1950's and 60's, brought a great number of skills with them and deserve credit for much of the achievement made in planting tropical crops. Returning farmers brought with them seeds of crops never before grown in Hainan, and after some nursery testing, pepper, oil palm, new coconut varieties and traditional medicines were sown commercially, initially on overseas Chinese state farms.\n\nThe \"open door\" policy\n\nWith the ousting of the \"Gang of Four\", a resolution on Hainan's development was passed by the State Council in 1980 which placed primary stress on tropical agriculture and associated",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063",
        "rank": 0
    }
]