[
    {
        "id": 211262,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 323,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "298\n\nby the Chinese with great dread and by foreigners with apprehension. . . \n\n(Transferring Technology, p. 69)\n\nIn truth, Giquel must have been greatly valued by the Chinese in particular, though the books show that this was at the expense of being thought too pro-Chinese by the French authorities, and even by trusted subordinates.\n\nThe book is full of such interesting and illuminating passages, either from Giquel's own pen, those of contemporaries, or from Dr. Leibo's hand. Another useful observation, this time coming from the Imperial Commissioner charged with overseeing the Dockyard project, has for us today an oddly familiar ring to it. Commissioner Shen Baozhen was pessimistic about the continuing success of the dockyard under solely Chinese direction, and to Giquel's recital of favorable signs for continued progress answered, \"Certainly, but what if Li [Viceroy Li Hongzhang] disappears? What will become of all this?” (Transferring Technology, p. 125). In other words, personalities were apparently as crucial then as they are today, in China's modernization programmes.\n\nShen's faith in Giquel was absolute. Dr. Leibo quotes from a Chinese language source which indicates that he informed Li Hongzhang at this time that his confidence in him was such that he would stake his entire career on Giquel's loyalty to China. If Giquel ever did anything to harm China, Shen promised to terminate his own public career. (ibid. p. 126).\n\nOf the two works, I found the first to be the more satisfying. It is detailed and well-organised, and uses French sources hitherto unutilized by historians. The man and his times emerge clearly, and his difficulties and dilemmas shine through the text. Relationships with high Chinese officials, as well as with European colleagues and would-be rivals, and with the French and other higher authorities are happily covered in sufficient detail to make them both interesting and illuminating, thanks to the varied sources used by Dr. Leibo.\n\nThe other is just as absorbing, especially the diary itself, but I found Dr. Leibo's Introduction less satisfying than the fuller account.",
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    {
        "id": 212029,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 444,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "419\n\npessimistic about the continuing success of the dockyard under solely Chinese direction, and to Giquel's recital of favorable signs for continued progress answered, “Certainly, but what if Li [Viceroy Li Hongzhang] disappears? What will become of all this?” (Transferring Technology, p. 125). In other words, personalities were apparently as crucial then as they are today in China's modernization programmes.\n\nShen's faith in Giquel was absolute. Dr. Leibo quotes from a Chinese language source which indicates that he informed Li Hongzhang at this time that his confidence in him was such that he would stake his entire career on Giquel's loyalty to China. If Giquel ever did anything to harm China, Shen promised to terminate his own public career [ibid. p. 126].\n\nOf the two works, I found the first to be the more satisfying. It is detailed and well-organized, and uses French sources hitherto not utilized by historians. The man and his times emerge clearly, and his difficulties and dilemmas shine through the text. Relationships with high Chinese officials, as well as with European colleagues and would-be rivals, and with the French and other higher authorities, are happily covered in sufficient detail to make them both interesting and illuminating, thanks to the varied sources used by Dr. Leibo.\n\nThe other is just as absorbing, especially the diary itself, but I found Dr. Leibo's Introduction less satisfying than the fuller account given in the book-length study. Personally, being interested in military matters, I would have liked to have had more information on the recruitment, organization and officering of the \"Ever Triumphant Army\". If not in this account, where else? It is too shadowy a body for my liking. Nor is there enough about Giquel in the Introduction, and unlike me, many readers may not have the other book to hand for reference. This handicap sometimes applies in reverse, since there are no maps in Transferring Technology, and the useful section in the Diary giving biographical vignettes only appears in that work. Finally, in neither work are we told anything about Giquel's wife and children, and the Giquel family, although the 1864 Diary and other papers came from his grand-daughter's home.\n\nNotwithstanding these observations, readers will find much of interest in these fascinating works which relate to a man who clearly had much to offer, did his best, and assuredly deserves to be better known and",
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    {
        "id": 212479,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 33,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "13\n\nto succeed him as chief comprador to Butterfield & Swire. However, Yang went into bankruptcy after a Shanghai financial crisis and left a debt of a hundred thousand taels to Butterfield & Swire. As the guarantor, Zheng was accused by the company and as a result he was imprisoned in Hong Kong for a few months. Zheng's business activities were not only confined to Shanghai, he had also been active in Canton. He had been in charge of the branch of Kaiping Coal Mines in Canton from 1891 and also of the Canton-Hankow Railway Co. Moreover, the first Chamber of Commerce in Canton was organised by him in 1905.\n\nXu Run, Tang Tingshu and Zheng Guanying, all came from the same place, Zhongshan prefecture, and shared the same experience in compradorial life and took part in the guandu shangban enterprises under the patronage of Li Hongzhang. Needless to say, they had all chosen Shanghai as the place to develop their careers. They could be regarded as leaders of the Cantonese community in Shanghai. Amongst the three persons, Xu Run was the earliest and youngest in arriving in Shanghai, Tang was regarded as the oldest, he arrived in Shanghai in 1858 aged 27, he had probably been educated and started his career earlier in Hong Kong for a long period. However, though Tang started his compradorial life later, it did not hamper his contribution to modern economic development of China. Tang joined the Kaiping Coal Mines from its beginning and remained with it until the end of his life. After Tang had been engaged in guandu shangban enterprises, particularly in the Kaiping Coal Mines, he confined his business activities mainly to Tianjin, while Xu and Zheng were still active in Shanghai, Canton and Hong Kong.\n\nAn obvious example was the nationalization project of China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. advocated by Sheng's political rival Yuan Shikai in 1909. Considering Xu was from Yuan's clique and able to use his strong influence in Hong Kong and Macau, Zheng was sent by Sheng to compete with Xu in soliciting the support of Cantonese shareholders in Canton, Hong Kong and Macau in opposition to the nationalization project. Xu and Zheng at that time were backing their own patrons. Xu was pro-Yuan whereas Zheng was pro-Sheng. As a result, Zheng defeated Xu in gaining the support of Cantonese shareholders and successfully kept the company private. It was incorporated as a limited company in 1909.\n\n15\n\nConnection of Cantonese Merchants\n\nMerchants were among the first Cantonese to emigrate to Macau and",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212485,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "19\n\ndominance of Cantonese by the 1860s when a Ningbo native, Chen Xuyuan, replaced the Cantonese as the chief comprador in Russell & Co. By the turn of the century, the Zhejiang compradors had outnumbered their Cantonese counterparts in Shanghai. Wu Jianzhang acted as the Shanghai tantai less than two years and was not succeeded by a Cantonese until 1864 when Ding Richang was called to the office by Li Hongzhang. However Ding had not been wholly pro-Cantonese. In response to the challenge of the Ningbo people, Cantonese such as Xu Run, Tang Tingshu and Zheng Guanying attempted, with success, to secure patronage from Li Hongzhang by taking part in his guandu shangban project. The Ningbo clique, however, competed with every effort to seek equal political support from another bureaucrat Zuo Zongtang in the 1870s.24 Entering into the Republican period, Cantonese gradually realised they were a minor group when compared with Ningbo men. They not only competed with one another but also collaborated together. Famous Cantonese capitalists such as Guo Piao, Huang Huan'dan, and Jian Dongpu were active in the Shanghai business community.\n\nNetwork of Hong Kong and the Pacific Rim\n\nThe story of the Chinese in Hong Kong as settlers can be classified in the following way. First, the Chinese merchants or traders. They knew the region, they traded successfully and they made their homes wherever their trade led them. They remained the dominant group of settlers in nineteenth century and perhaps even into the twentieth century. Second, the labourers or coolies who arrived during the second half of the nineteenth century. Their main significance was that they came in large numbers, although for the main part they came for short periods and many failed, became destitute and were sent home. The more successful ones, however, returned with their savings to help their families back in China. Nevertheless, amongst them were a number who remained, having married locally or having lifted themselves above their labouring status and turned successfully to trade. Again, for most of them it was their ability to establish a trade, and therefore own property, which was the first step towards settling down. Included amongst them were many artisans who were able to use their skills to establish businesses. Amongst them also were partly literate or semi-literate people who used their writing skills either to work for Chinese businesses or to go into business for themselves. Sooner or later, the two main reasons for settling were success in business and the acquisition of a family. Third, the import-",
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    {
        "id": 212492,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 46,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "26\n\nRun, it is difficult to assess Tang's personal wealth accumulated during his compradorial years due to the absence of sources. However, it is not impossible to have an idea of his business activities through his connections with other Cantonese merchants and compradors.\n\nTang Tingshu left Jardines in 1873 when he was appointed General Manager (Zongban) of the recently organised China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. The reason why he was appointed to the post was first his political patronage from Li Hongzhang; and second, his experience in organising steamship business. Tang put capital in Jardine's associate companies such as the Canton Insurance Office in 1868 and China Coast Steam Navigation Co. in which he had 40% of shares at 40,000 taels. Tang was mostly interested in this modern steamship business; he invested in and became one of the directors of the Union Steam Navigation Co. and also North China Steamer Co. established in 1867 and 1868 respectively. In 1870, Tang with his friends, purchased the steamer Nanzing and sold it to Jardines in which he had a personal investment of not more than fifteen thousand taels. At that time, Tang also put his capital into the steamer Suwonada of Augustine Heard & Co. and ships of two small steamship companies, Morris Lewis & Co. and H. Muller & Co. Although no evidence shows why the foreign owners of these companies invited Tang to join in partnership other than the motive of raising capital, it is certain that Tang was not inexperienced, for he was, as expressed by Liu Kwang-ching, \"in some cases actually performing full managerial functions\" in the modern steamship enterprises. More interesting is that Tang brought with him Cantonese capital as well as managerial staff to the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. Tang and Xu had entered with many management officers. Starting from Shanghai, these Cantonese spread to other treaty-ports such as Tianjin or Hankou.\n\nTang frequently joined with Xu Run and another Cantonese comprador at Shanghai, Zheng Guanying, in coordinating business investment. For example, with Xu Run, he invested in Anhui Guichi mines in 1877; Pingchuan Copper Mines in 1887 and Qian'an Iron Works in 1888. With Zheng Guanying, he invested sixty-five thousand taels in Tianjin Tanggu Cultivation Co. in 1881, and ten years later, they planned to build a paper manufactory. Tang and Zheng united to open two wharf companies, one at Foshan in 1882 and one at Canton in 1890. And last but not least, Tang and Xu as well as Xu's uncle, contributed a thousand taels each in founding, in 1872, the first Cantonese Chamber of Commerce in",
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    {
        "id": 212494,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 48,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "28\n\nmissionary named John Fryer. Though he studied only in evening class, he learned to speak English as well as his uncle. In 1859, through his personal ties with Xu Run, he was introduced to Dent & Co. to work as an assistant in freighting and warehousing until 1868 when the firm was dissolved. Zheng then turned to a foreign tea company Heshengxiang as a comprador and later became a manager, and eventually the owner. In 1874, Zheng joined the Butterfield & Swire Co. as a comprador to its affiliate China Navigation Co. until 1881. He then turned to assist Sheng Xuanhuai in managing the China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co. thus terminating his compradorial career.\n\n34\n\nFrom Table 6 we can see Zheng was interested in a lot of modern enterprises. In absence of sources, we are unable to know the exact amount of his investment. A preliminary estimate as shown in the table was about thirty thousand taels. This is near Yenping Hao's assessment of forty thousand taels. Modern enterprises in which Zheng invested varied from commercial and financial to industrial and mining; they were scattered over Shanghai, Tianjin, Canton and other Chinese cities as well as Southeast Asia. As previously discussed, Zheng favoured joint-stock companies. He thought it was a powerful business organization and he considered it reasonable to have opened company accounts as a way to solicit support of shareholders. Zheng was quite conservative in starting a new undertaking. He had objected to Tang Tingshu's plan to establishing the Hongyuan Co. in London in 1881.35 Instead he had shown his genius in solving technical problems occurring in some guandu shangban enterprises such as China Merchants' Steam Navigation Co., Kaiping Coal Mines, Imperial Telegraph Administration, Hanyang Iron Works, Shanghai Cotton Mill and Canton-Hankow Railway Co., for which he had won appreciation from his patrons including Li Hongzhang and Sheng Xuanhuai. He had helped Sheng Xuanhuai in reorganizing the Hanyang Iron Works, Daye Iron Mines with Pingxiang Coal Mines into one limited liability company under the name of Hanyeping. It was incorporated at the Ministry of Commerce in 1908. One year later, he also reorganized the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. into a public company. Moreover, he was a pioneer in introducing the latest methods in organising joint-stock companies, as he had translated the company laws of Hong Kong promulgated in 1865 from English to Chinese.\n\nAs a Cantonese comprador, merchant and so-called comprador-merchant as mentioned before, Xu, Tang and Zheng were all regarded as outstanding in performing entrepreneurial activities, particularly in",
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    {
        "id": 212497,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 51,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "31\n\nLo was suspected to have cheated an amount of 20,000 taels as bad debt from the Bank See Group Archives of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Comprador Files Law Pak Sheung\n\n|| Ibid. Lo Hok Pang was said to be involved in certain bankruptcy cases See Comprador Files Lo Hok Pang\n\n12\n\nFor an important article that explores the studies on early Chinese in Hong Kong, see Carl T Smith (1993), Hong Kong Chinese Wills 1850-1890\n\n13 See HKRS#144-98. Cheang Hoong (December 1856), 245 Wong Kong (August 1867), 254 Kwong A Hang (January 1872), 268 Ng A Cheong (October 1870), 349 Law Pak Sheung (February 1877), 368 Wei A Kwong (October 1866), 457 Law Sai Nam (December 1881), 470 Lau Cheong (June 1880), 661 Au Yeung Shing (December 1886); 733, Wong Shi Lai (June 1888), 734 Sung Chin Tseung (January 1888), 1161 Tong Mow Chee (December 1894), and 1465 Choa Chec Bec (June 1890)\n\nHKRS#134-144; Soong Ke (December 1864)\n\n15 See Zheng Guanying. Da Guangzhou shangwu zonghu yi bingting zhuamban zhangcheng ershisi tiao (To draft the twenty-four opening ordinances of the General Chamber of Commerce of Canton), in Xia Dongyuan (1988a), pp 593-6\n\n16 HKRS#144-273 O Kee Cheong (October 1872)\n\nHKRS#144-1504: Leung Kiu (April 1887)\n\n18 HKRS#144-394 La Hing (January 1879)\n\n19 See Carl T Smith (1993), p 11, 15-6\n\n20 For Western merchants who came with their Cantonese compradors to Shanghai, see Hao (1970), pp 51-3\n\n21 According to Leung Yuen-sang's study, Wu Jianzhang came to power because of the rise of mercantile power in post-1843 local politics when there was an absence of official-gentry leadership during the British invasion and capture of Shanghai in 1842 The vacuum was filled by Cantonese merchants and compradors They were sought because of their foreign language skill and foreign knowledge During Wu's office, nearly all the jobs in the government were filled by Cantonese See Leung (1990), pp. 53-6, 147-50, Toyama Gunji (1994), Shanghai dotai Go kensho (The Shanghai Taotai Wu Jianzhang), pp 45-54. and Zhang Wenqin (1989), Cong fenguan guanshang dao maiban guantiao, Wu Jianzhang shilun (From Feudal Official Merchant to Compradorial Bureaucrat), pp 31-54\n\n21 Leung Yuen-sang (1982), Regional Rivalry in Mid-Nineteenth Century Shanghai: Cantonese vs Ningpo Men, pp 34-6.\n\n21\n\nThough Li Hongzhang was a central bureaucrat, through the guandu shangban enterprises in Shanghai and Tianjin, he had successfully extended his influence in this region discussed through the \"Shanghai-Tianjin Connection\" See Leung Yuen-sang (1986), The Shanghai-Tientsin Connection: Li Hung-chang's Political Control over Shanghai during the Late Ch'ing Period, pp 315-30\n\n24 Ibid, pp. 45-6\n\n24\n\nWang Gungwu (1990). China and the Chinese Overseas, pp 175-6\n\nHKRS#144-1152 Li Chu (December 1896)\n\n27 HKRS#144-1087. Lee Chak (May 1894)\n\n8 HKRS#144-1093 Chan Kin Tong (April 1896)",
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        "page_number": 54,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "34\n\nChan Kin Tong 陳健堂 Cheang Hoong WA Chen Xuyuan 陳照元 Ding Richang TRS Guo Piao 郭標\n\nHo Kai 何啟\n\nHo Tung 何東\n\nHuang Huan'nan #\n\nJian Dongfu 簡東甫\n\nGlossary\n\nWu Jianzhang f Xu Rongcun 徐榮村 Xu Run 徐潤 Xu Yuting 徐鈺亭 Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 Zheng Guanying\n\nZheng Tingjiang\n\nBaoyuanxiang 寶源祥\n\nZuo Zongtang E\n\nLaw Pak Sheung\n\nA\n\nBendi 本地\n\nLaw Sai Nam 劉世南\n\nLee Chak 李澤\n\nguandu-shangban\n\nLeung Xiu 梁喬 Li Hing 李慶\n\nLi Hongzhang 李鴻章 Lo Hok Pang #09 Ng A Cheong AS\n\nO Kee Cheung 柯其祥 Sheng Xuanhuai 盛宣懷 Soong Xe 宋琪\n\nSung Chin Tseung\n\nTong Mow Chee #\n\nTong Ying Shu (Xing Sing)\n\n唐廷樞(景星)\n\nWei Kwong #*\n\nWei Yuk 韋玉\n\nDanjia 晉家 #\n\nGuang Yang Xing 廣陽興\n\nGuang Zhao Gongsuo 廣肇公所 Heshengxiang #\n\nhuashang fugu huodong HÆ!\n\nKejia 客家\n\nlianhao 聯號\n\nO Chin Sin Tong\n\nQing Xu Yuzhi Xiansheng Run\n\nZixu Nianpu\n\n清徐雨之先生潤自序年譜\n\nSanyi 三邑\n\nShiyi 四邑\n\ntongxiang hui 同鄉會\n\nZongban 總辦\n\nWong Kong 黄亞廣\n\nReferences\n\nCheng, T C. 1969 Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils\n\nin Hong Kong In Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 9: 1-30\n\nChoi, Chi-cheung 1991 Cong difangzhi kan Xiangshan xian difang shili de zhuanbian (The influence of migration in Xiangshan county as viewed from local gazetteers) In Zhongguo Shehui Jingjishi Yanjiu 1991/1: 60-8\n\n1993. Competition among Brothers: the Kun Tye Lung Company and its Associate Companies, Unpublished paper presented at the Workshop on Chinese Business Houses in Southeast Asia since 1870 School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 121,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "101\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nBai Hua. \"Kulian.\" (\"Bitter Love.'') Shiyue (October), September 1979.\n\nBarnet, A. Doak and Ralph N. Clough, eds. Modernizing China. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.\n\nDietrich, Craig. People's China, a Brief History. Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1986.\n\nDong, Mei, ed. Zhongmei guanxi ziliao xuanbian: 1971, 7-1981, 7 (Selected Documents Regarding Sino-American Relations: 1971, 7-1981, 7). Beijing: Shishi Press, 1982.\n\nFairbank, John K. Chinabound. New York: Harper and Row, 1982.\n\nGoldstein, Martin E. American Foreign Policy: Drift or Decision. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1984.\n\nGuangming ribao (Guangming Daily).\n\nGuan, L. “Zai menghuan gongchang li\" (\"In the Mill of Nightmares\"), Renmin ribao (Renmin Daily). 13 January 1980, p. 8.\n\nHinton, Harold C., ed. The People's Republic of China, 1979-1984: A Documentary Survey. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986.\n\nHsiung, James C., ed. Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.\n\nHunt, Michael H. The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.\n\nImplementing Accord for Cultural Exchange in 1980 and 1981 under the Cultural Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America and the three subsequent accords.\n\nIndex to Newspapers and Periodicals - Philosophy and Social Sciences.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    {
        "id": 213876,
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        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 228,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "202\n\nstate through the mandarinate and extended downward. Dependence on the favour of aristocratic protection found in Europe was represented in China by dependence on the favour of personified officialdom from the central extending all the way down to the localities. Accordingly, the rivalry within central officialdom would extend downward to their protégés in the local regions. The Cantonese experience can illustrate this point.\n\nAs such \"reform-minded\" officials such as Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong were competing for national influence, their protégés recruited in the provinces were also competing among themselves. After the opening of Shanghai and Tianjin, increasing numbers of men from Ningpo and Zhejiang were appointed compradores of western firms or advisors to the reform-minded officials. Even within the Cantonese group, some were more influential than others.\n\nIn terms of national influence, those Cantonese engaged in economic reforms always gained the upper hand from those engaged in legal reforms. As shall be seen, for those Cantonese engaged in economic reform (from Tang Jingxing to his nephew Tang Shaoyi, and through him to Liang Shiyi), they eventually advanced to positions in Beijing and monopolized the influential Board of Communications, which commanded huge economic resources in steamships, railways, mining and telegraph. This group of Cantonese was known as the Communications Clique. Their interests were vested in a China united under the central control of Beijing. This partly explains why Liang Shiyi and his clique were willing to finance Yuan Shikai's government after 1911, as well as his monarchical movement in 1916.\n\nThose Cantonese advisors such as Wu Tingfang and Ho Kai (He Qi) who were engaged in legal and diplomatic reforms, had not established their power base in Beijing and so eventually they based their influence in south China. After all, they were appointed Legislative Councillors in Hong Kong, the highest political posts that the Hong Kong Chinese could expect. They were sympathetic to the revolutionary activities in south China. As shall be seen, they sided with Guangdong in reform, in revolution, and in independence. Remarkably, both the Communications Clique and the \"legal-reform group\" turned out to be political patrons for competing groups of Cantonese merchants in Hong Kong.",
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        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 229,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "203\n\nBy the 1890s, however, these patronage networks developed by the western affairs movement underwent very drastic changes. Many of the “reform-minded\" officials in China had passed away due to old age.\n\nThe most serious blow came in 1895 with China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. This destroyed the credibility of the western affairs movement. With the downfall of Li Hongzhang, the basis of political patronage began to diversify.\n\nAs for Li Hongzhang, after having been disgraced, he was assigned by Beijing to be the Viceroy of such peripheral provinces as Guangdong and Guangxi. It is where the first attempt to make south China independent came into play.\n\nIn 1900, the issue of the Boxer Uprising divided the viceroys into two factions. The viceroys of the northern provinces followed Beijing and declared war on the foreigners. The viceroys of the southern provinces, led by Li Hongzhang, declared themselves neutral.\n\nHo Kai, a former member of Li Hongzhang's think tank, and then the Legislative Councillor of Hong Kong, was the agent in a deal between Sun Yat-sen, the Hong Kong Governor, and Li Hongzhang to establish a proposed independent government in the South. He sought the Governor's assistance to persuade, even with military coercion, Li Hongzhang to declare Guangdong independent. The Governor, anticipating that China was about to be partitioned, was anxious to find ways to protect British interests in Southern China. Without committing himself, Li was said to have reacted favourably. In addition, it is recorded that Li Hongzhang wrote to Sun Yat-sen inviting him to Canton for a \"parley\".\n\nAt this juncture, Beijing offered Li Hongzhang attractive high-level posts in northern China. He was called to Beijing to tidy up the political chaos after the Boxers. The rumour that Li was about to leave for the North evoked great fear among the Chinese in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Telegraph reported that to stop Li from leaving, the merchants threatened to \"lie in front of the wheels of his carriage\".\n\nThe Governor of Hong Kong, through the Consul in Canton, urged Li to reconsider his decision. Politely refusing this advice, Li inquired whether he could be granted an interview when he passed through.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216066,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 365,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "299\n\nrecently disbanded Weihaiwei Regiment of the British Army, trained by British officers.\n\nDuring the Boxer troubles in 1900 a number of missionaries fleeing south from their threatened mission stations, having passed through Anhui, reached safety at Zhenjiang on the south side of the Yangzi.\n\nExtraordinary case of the Englishman who wanted to be King of China\n\nMesny wrote at length some ten years after the event about a case in 1891 into which he had been drawn and which, according to him, caused his name to be dragged through the mud by Li Hongzhang, the most powerful and senior Chinese imperial official in Peking, and to all intents and purposes ended any future credence he might have had as a business adviser to the Chinese. He began by writing that:\n\n*As I was turning over some old notes of mine I found the following [on Mason] almost begging to be printed so as not to be lost.\" He then described his version of his involvement with Mason and the outcome. Mesny claimed that it was believed by many that he [Mesny] had been involved with Mason [Charles Mason was a junior officer in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, stationed in Zhenjiang), as a member, if not the head, of an illegal secret society. This led to him being ostracised by Chinese officials, as well as the desire of the apprehensive and phobic wife of Mesny to separate herself from him and his apparent connection with rebels, even going as far as wishing to divorce him.\n\nThe story as described in Mesny's article is as follows:\n\n'In the early part of 1891 the Municipal Council at Hankou decided to buy a machine gun as a means of protecting the foreign concession and its inhabitants from periodical riots. I therefore wrote to the municipal councillors offering them a machine gun and 30,000 cartridges.\n\nBy some means or other, Mason got this letter and tried to get the gun too. He first wrote me a letter offering me all sorts of good things if I would engage 1000 foreigners, and raise a force wherewith to capture the best ships in the northern squadron also the Wusong, Jiangyin and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216068,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 367,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "301\n\ngaol on Amoy Road, at the end of the Kueichou Road, and he probably occupied a cell that had previously been prepared to receive me.\n\nMesny was commanded to appear before Her Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court for China and Japan in Shanghai on the 8th day of October 1891 to give material evidence and testify what he knew concerning the charge that Charles Henry Allen Welch Mason of Shanghai on or about the 13th inst. did have in his possession or under his control five pounds or thereabouts of an explosive substance under circumstances that gave reasonable suspicion that he did not have it in his possession for a lawful purpose. He attended as requested with the result that Mason got nine months imprisonment, at Shanghai and to be deported from China for ever thereafter or something like that. Thus it happened, added Mesny, 'that this biter was bitten.'\n\nMesny added that he had suffered ever since from the evil effects of this monstrous attempt to involve him in a treasonable plot. 'I have never been able to obtain employment from the Chinese Government since those days and many of my Chinese friends have cut me dead under the impression that I must have been guilty of some collusion with Mason in some inexplicable manner.\n\nThus in 1892 when I called on Earl Li Hongzhang at Tianjin he accused me of being the head centre of all the Gelao Hui men in China.\n\n'Last winter [noted as 1892 but printed a number years later] I was in Nanjing and in a fair way of getting a good command when Zai Jun, the Daotai of Shanghai, I believe, telegraphed to the Viceroy to beware of me as I was a dangerous character, the friend of Mason, the plotter. My own wife has told me hundreds of times that she is in dread of the awful fate that awaits me on this account and has begged me to grant her a letter of divorce and let her take the children away, she has worried the life out of me during the past few months with this clamour for a divorce and I believe that she is being incited thereto by designing people who take advantage of her weakness of mind to thus annoy me, and when they have got my wife away from me by divorce she ceases to be British [i.e. post-1898], then will they do to her what they do not dare to do now, and probably kill my children.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216069,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 368,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "302\n\nso that I may die childless, as I am now old and not likely to have any more children. I had never met or seen Mason before he presented himself to me as being the United States Consular Marshal at Hankou, which was a lie, he being actually a Custom House Officer at Zhenjiang.'\n\nLet us try to unravel the sorry story of Mason and Mesny. It is involved and still has aspects which are difficult to fathom. We have a number of versions or parts of it available to us but will confine ourselves to three: Mason's own story, briefly described below, written some 30 odd years later after he had roamed the world as a vagrant worker; the letters from the Inspector General of the Imperial Customs, Sir Robert Hart; and Mesny's bitter accusation. Mason, according to Mesny, practically ruined him and certainly caused Mesny great personal problems as he explained in great detail in his Miscellany. It is difficult to fit these three pieces of jigsaw together as there are few elements in common; however, the basic story is there. Mason bought a large quantity of foreign arms, ammunition, and explosives with which to arm a rising against the Imperial government, and having been arrested in Shanghai, was tried, sentenced, gaoled, and finally deported. Mesny was called as a witness but was accused to his face by the Chinese Premier, Li Hongzhang, of being the chief or very senior in the anti-Imperialist bandit body, the Elder Brother Society. This led to Mesny being ostracised by Chinese officialdom and, as his be-all and end-all as a business go-between was his contacts with Chinese officials, his life quietly slipped downhill thereafter.\n\nAccording to records — ‘Charles Welsh Mason, a young Englishman, had joined the Imperial Maritime Customs in December 1887 and was sent to Zhenjiang, an important post but a minor port on the Yangzi, as 4th assistant B, where he joined the Gelao Hui and became involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Chinese government. In July of 1891, he took two months' leave and went to Hong Kong, where he purchased a quantity of arms and ammunition for the Society and arranged for it to be shipped to Shanghai and from there on to Zhenjiang. He also recruited men for the Society and bought a quantity of dynamite, which he carried with him to Shanghai, where he requested Commissioner Bredon of the Imperial Maritime Customs to allow it to be shipped on to Zhenjiang so that he, Mason, could uncover more of the Chinese rebels' plans. Bredon refused the \"sting\" and instructed Mason to report to Hart in Beijing. Instead, Mason took a river steamer",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]