[
    {
        "id": 204502,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1962",
        "page_number": 134,
        "title": "RAS-1962",
        "content_text": "BRITAIN AND CHINA\n\n119\n\nBut only once, in September 1950, has Britain voted for a resolution in the General Assembly calling for the admission of Communist China. From June 1951 the British representative has continued to vote in favour of postponement of discussion of the question, even when, on conclusion of the Korean war, the argument that China was participating in aggression against United Nations forces no longer held good. Mr. Luard well brings out, though unfortunately he does not try to explain, the expediency which guided western policies; how one argument was produced after another when the old ones went out of date; how the British government allowed itself to be swayed in this matter by the wishes of the Americans. He does not go into the intricacies of American internal politics, which are at the root of this matter—obviously he could not in a book about Britain and China—but without some understanding of them, Britain's behaviour, somewhat unfairly, seems feeble and misguided. Britain could have done more than she has to influence American public opinion, but to have brought China into the UN against the wishes of numerous Americans would only have devalued the institution in their eyes, and might even have resulted in earlier days in an American withdrawal of funds (upon which the U.N. is very dependent) or even, disastrously, of membership.\n\nSuch a criticism does not affect the discussion of Hong Kong, which is a matter purely for the British and the Chinese. As in the rest of the book, the historical background is only sketched in; the interest is all concentrated on wartime and post-war developments. Hong Kong is unique among British colonies in that since the war it has made no progress towards independence; having narrowly escaped being \"liberated\" by Kuomintang armies at the end of the war, the prospect of a more democratic constitution was shelved when the Communists overran neighbouring Kwangtung. As Mr. Luard points out, the constitution of the Colony remains, in all essentials, exactly what it was in 1843.\n\nAnd this is where the British government's devotion to commercial interests in its relations with China again becomes apparent. Now that Hong Kong has found a new lease of economic life in manufacturing, neither the British nor the Hong Kong government are prepared to do anything which may upset the present favourable climate for investors. It is generally",
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    {
        "id": 204614,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1963",
        "page_number": 95,
        "title": "RAS-1963",
        "content_text": "82\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG\n\nexpansion. Thus a new student-interpreters' mess was built and also a new house for the Counsellor in a pleasant garden. A barrack was also built for the Legation guard on the site of the former Chinese Board of Works, Board of War, and Court of State Ceremonies, an area with historic associations. The barracks were large enough to house 500 men though normally not more than 100 were stationed there at any one time. As a result of this enlargement the British Legation now covered about thirty-five acres, and was the largest foreign Legation in Peking. While this reconstruction was going forward the opportunity was taken to make the Legation more self-contained so that if ever it were again besieged it would be in a better state to resist. With this object in view the Ministry of Works built a thoroughly ugly electricity power-plant and a water tower. A large coal dump was also formed so that now the Legation had its own supply of water, coal and electricity.\n\nGradually memories of the siege became less vivid and life settled down into a routine which was much the same as before the siege. Perhaps the only difference was that by 1908 there were signs of some modernization in Peking itself such as macadam roads, handsome cabs and electric light. Meanwhile visitors to Peking continued to enjoy the hospitality of those living in the British Legation, and no clear change can be seen until 1928 when the Kuomintang was victorious over the Northern warlords and the capital was established at Nanking. As a result the British Ambassador moved south of the Yangtze and resided mainly at the British Consulate in Shanghai while the majority of his staff moved to Nanking, though the student-interpreters continued to study at the Legation in Peking which now became a Consulate. When war broke out between England and Japan in December 1941 some British nationals and American nationals, who were sick or elderly, were interned in the Legation. The Swiss Consul looked after the buildings, aided by Chinese employed by Her Majesty's Ministry of Works. The buildings were reoccupied as a Consulate at the end of the war, but in 1948 the Chinese Communists captured Peking, and at first the government of the Chinese Peoples' Republic refused to recognize the status of the British Consulate there. However, in January",
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    {
        "id": 204986,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1965",
        "page_number": 94,
        "title": "RAS-1965",
        "content_text": "PIRACY ON THE CHINA COAST\n\n85\n\ncase had serious political repercussions. China considered L4's actions as flagrant aggression, and disregard for international law. Two years later they brought a suit against the commander of the L4 which was unsuccessful. This was one of the few cases in which the Navy came into actual contact with pirates, and it had several unsavoury features,\n\nPiracy was on the decline in South China at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. As for the previous few years, the Kuomintang Government had been gaining more effective control of the southern coastal provinces. Isolated cases, however, still continued right down to the fall of Canton to the Japanese in October 1938. After that Japanese control over the coast of Mainland China curtailed the deck passenger and emigrant trade, as well as the coast trade in general. The pirates turned to smuggling arms through the Japanese blockade, assuming the guise of patriots as they had done so often in the past. When they resumed their normal profession after the war, their activities had a very short lease on life.\n\nThe last piracy involving a foreign ship on the China coast was in 1952. The victim, appropriately enough, was the Hupeh of the China Navigation Company, the company which had suffered so much from piracy in the past. The piracy followed the traditional pattern, with the Hupeh being taken to Bias Bay, where the pirates went ashore with their ill-gotten gains and some wealthy Chinese passengers to be held for ransom. Soon after this, the Communists secured complete control over the coast of Mainland China, and for the first time for centuries it became free of pirates. Unfortunately, there are now no British ships trading on the coast to enjoy this unusual immunity.",
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    {
        "id": 205132,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1966",
        "page_number": 88,
        "title": "RAS-1966",
        "content_text": "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF BUDDHISM\n\nL\n\n83\n\nTibet so that he could learn the language and some day return to translate Tibetan books. In 1933 he was given a scholarship at the Chinese Tibetan Language School, which moved in January 1934 to Chungking. There he became the disciple of a lama on the faculty. After completing the two-year course, he entered the Central Political University, which had been set up by the Kuomintang to train cadres. After a year and a half the government selected him to go to Tibet for further training.28 He lived for eight years at the Drebung Monastery outside Lhasa—the largest monastery in Tibet and probably in the world—and received a high ecclesiastical degree. His final years in Lhasa were spent running a school for Tibetan children and working in the Tibetan office of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, so that he kept his dual role of monk and political agent. This is not to imply that there was anything sinister in what he was doing. It was simply that the Chinese Government had enabled him to pursue his interest in Buddhism for their own purposes, which he naturally expected to serve.\n\nThe presence in China of an increasing number of Tibetan lamas2 and monks returned from Lhasa further stimulated interest in Tantrism among the Chinese laity. In November 1935 a group of devotees set up the Bodhi Society in Shanghai to promote the translation and study of Tantric texts. The Panchen Lama was president and the members included some high-ranking ex-officials.30 This society was one of the regular stops on the lecture tours of the lamas and Lhasa-trained monks.\n\nAmong the most active of the latter was Neng-hai (see p. 11) who had been a Nationalist general before he had taken the robe. About 1938 he became the abbot of the Chin-tz'u Ssu in Chen-tu, which until then had been a typically Chinese monastery. Neng-hai changed the daily ritual and routine to incorporate Tibetan elements. He also started a scriptural translation institute that published Tibetan books in Chinese. Since some 250 monks were usually in residence, this monastery might have exerted a wide influence towards the \"Tantrification\" of Chinese Buddhism if it had been able to carry on after 1950.\n\nRelations with Theravada Buddhists\n\nThe Japanese and Tibetans were Mahayana Buddhists with whom it would be natural for Buddhists in China, who were",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/bz60k0811",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205198,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1966",
        "page_number": 154,
        "title": "RAS-1966",
        "content_text": "148\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\nAs he very aptly writes in the 'Author's Note', the book describes the voyage which \"starts in Hong Kong and ends there; the ports visited are those colonies in which I served: Bermuda, Jamaica, Nigeria and Fiji and the Western Pacific, as well, of course, as Hong Kong\". Even more appropriate for this review, however, is his comment: \"I did not keep a diary and I made no notes. For my story I have relied mainly on my memory which, at times, may be at fault, but only, I believe, on points of detail. I have recounted, and commented on, those happenings that remain foremost in my mind.\" The memory of the author is indeed faultless: he can remember all the trivials, but in doing so, he has left out (very painstakingly, it seems) the really important events that happened during his various tours of duty. In this connection, the subdivision of the chapters into Pre-War Days 1922-41, War Years 1942-45 and Post-War Hong Kong 1947-57, becomes extremely misleading. To cite only two examples of exclusion: the reunification of China (1926-28) and Jamaican attempts at self-government prior to and during his term of office. Perhaps most disappointing is the chapter which is burdened with the heading of 'Communist China'. The chapter indeed starts off with pomposity: \"On 1st October 1949, the Chinese communists declared themselves to be the lawful government of China. Why did China go communist? This is a question to which different answers are given. Some say, because China was betrayed... betrayed by whom?... the United States, the Kuomintang.\" But then, this is all there is to it. After a brief account of the 'history' of China's struggles since the days of the treaty ports, we are treated to a narration of 'incidents' (for example, the exploits of the HMS Amethyst and the Kashmir Princess) in fact, well-known events, which unfortunately provide no new information. It is only in the last chapter titled 'Retrospect', that we glimpse the author's own political viewpoint. He only superficially analyses the political situation in Asia and we conclude that he is anti-communist.\n\nTaking the book as a publishable autobiography, however, it becomes more satisfactory. We can perceive, reading somewhat between the lines, the mentality of a British civil servant, struggling from the lowest offices to the highest one in the Colonial Service. It is a picture of loyalty to one's country, diligence in one's duties and opportunism in one's promotions. In other words, it is the",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205722,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 28,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "22 \n\nT. C. CHENG \n\nIn May 1915, Japan forced the Republic of China, then under the premiership of Yuan Shih-kai, to accept the \"Twenty-one Demands\". Four years later, in 1919, the Chinese delegation failed at the Peace Conference in Paris to prevent the \"transfer\" of Germany's \"rights and privileges\" in the Shantung Province to Japan. As a result of this complete disregard of China's sovereignty by the foreign powers, thousands of students took part in processions demonstrating against foreign militarism and oppression in China on 4 May 1919. In response, students, merchants, and workers throughout China also staged demonstrations and strikes, thereby sparking off in China the \"May 4 Movement\". Chinese national feelings were also stirred by the Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (or K.M.T.), who now pressed for the abolition of extra-territorial rights and unequal treaties and the retrocession of foreign concessions. All these had serious repercussions in Hong Kong, and in 1922 the first of a series of seamen's strikes began. On 30th May 1925, certain Chinese demonstrators were shot and killed by British policemen in the International Settlements in Shanghai. This led to more serious strikes and demonstrations in Shanghai, Canton, and Hong Kong, culminating in an economic boycott which paralysed Hong Kong.\n\nDuring this period, the Chinese unofficials, viz., Chow Shou-son, Ng Hon-tsz (who died in May 1923) and Robert Kotewall (who succeeded Ng Hon-tsz), and other prominent Chinese leaders, including Sir Robert Hotung and the directors of Tung Wah Hospital, stood solidly by the Government. Some of them actually acted as unofficial middlemen in negotiations between Hong Kong and the seamen's representatives in Canton. The services rendered by Chow Shou-son and Robert Kotewall during this crisis were so valuable and outstanding that speedy recognition was accorded to them. In 1926, Chow was created a knight. Kotewall was given the honorary degree of LL.D. by the University of Hong Kong, and the following year was awarded the C.M.G.\n\nIt may be of interest to quote here the Governor Sir Cecil Clementi's remarks made in early 1926 at a Legislative Council meeting about the big strike of 1925 and the boycott that followed: \"We are determined to give full protection to the people of Hong Kong, and to put down with a firm hand any conspiracy to intimidate or otherwise to cause trouble among labourers and",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207800,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 188,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "LAND AND RIVER ROUTES TO WEST CHINA \n\n173 \n\nlords then fighting for power in Szechuan. Before the 'Incident' closed nearly a month later, another two China Navigation Company ships had been seized by Yung Lin. All available ships of the Yangtze Squadron were involved, and H.M. ships Dispatch, a light cruiser, and Hawkins, the flagship of the China Station, had been sent to Hankow. In addition the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company's Kiawo had been requisitioned by the Navy to carry reinforcements to Wanhsien. During the sometimes severe fighting which occurred at times, the chief engineer of the Wanliu and seven servicemen lost their lives, and several others were wounded. It was nearly two years later, and after Chiang Kai-shek had expelled the left wing elements of the Kuomintang and his Russian advisers, before the situation on the Yangtze returned to something approaching normal.\n\nAfter the Royal Navy took over the Pioneer, Captain Plant built a junk and traded between Ichang and Chungking, and made a thorough study of the Upper Yangtze. In 1908 he persuaded a group of Chinese business men and government officials to form the Szechwan Steam Navigation Company, forty per cent of the capital coming from official sources, and the balance from private Chinese merchants. The Company's first ship, the Shutung, was built by Thorneycrofts in Southampton under Captain Plant's supervision. She cost £26,000 and arrived at Ichang in 1909. The Shutung was 115 feet long, sixteen feet beam, and six and a half feet depth, and was described as 'a mass of machinery.' She towed a float alongside in which her cargo and passengers were accommodated, and in spite of only being able to carry sixty tons dead-weight of cargo, twelve first and sixty-six steerage passengers, was a great success financially and comparatively trouble-free. The Shutung's success was largely due to Captain Plant's intimate knowledge of the Upper River, his ability to inspire confidence in Chinese official and commercial circles in Chungking, and in his Chinese crew. Until 1914 the Shutung was the only steamer on the Upper Yangtze; but in April of that year she was joined by the Shuhun, a larger and more powerful sister ship, also built in Britain, sent out in sections, and assembled in Shanghai. At the same time the Szechwan Railway Company, then planning a railway from Hankow to Chungking, put three smaller steamers on the Upper Yangtze. Two of these ran between Ichang and Chungking, and the third between Chungking and Suifu. By 1914, therefore, the technical",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207802,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 190,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "LAND AND RIVER ROUTES TO WEST CHINA\n\n175\n\nthe Upper Yangtze-eight British, seven American, three Chinese, six French, five Italian, and three Japanese.\n\nPolitical troubles, however, had forced the pioneering Szechwan Steamship Company out of business in 1920. During the previous few years its Shutung and Shuhun had so often been forced to carry troops for the different war lords as to make their operations uneconomic. After 1920 the Chinese flag was flown by the China Merchants Steam Navigation and the Ming Steamship Company, both of whom seemed more able to accommodate themselves to the political changes. Captain Plant, however, was still active on the Upper Yangtze, but in a different capacity. He had left the Szechwan Steam Navigation Company in 1913 to become River Inspector in the Chinese Maritime Customs, and his work was one of the factors contributing to the development of steam navigation on the Upper Yangtze in the early 1920s.\n\nThere was a period during the brief heyday of the Kuomintang government between 1927 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when shipping on the Upper Yangtze almost settled into a regular pattern. Probably 1928 was the peak year, when there were seventy small steamers in regular service between Ichang and Chungking; the smallest about thirty tons and the largest just over 1,000 tons. The average time between Ichang and Chungking was three days, as against an average of a month by junk. Britain had fifteen ships of 5,357 tons; China twenty-six of 3,672 tons; and America eleven of 2,934 tons.\n\nLosses, however, were heavy. Several of the smaller companies were forced out of business, some selling their ships to the China Navigation Company. In this manner, the latter acquired the famous Loong Mow in 1923, which was renamed Wanliu I, and the Alice Dollar in 1926, which was renamed Wantung. This company also built six ships at Yarrows on the Clyde between 1922 and 1926. These included the Wanhsien, 210 feet long with a loaded draft of eight feet and reciprocating engines of 3,000 indicated horsepower, the most powerful ship on the Upper Yangtze; two turbine steamers of less than half this tonnage, the Kiating and the Kintang, for the low water season; and two small motor ships, the Siushan and Suiting, of 296 gross tons for the Top River above Chungking. British shipping was supreme on the Upper Yangtze for the last few years of the treaty port era, since political troubles hampered",
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    {
        "id": 208020,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "A JOURNEY TO YENAN, 1946\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS*\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to record some experiences of a truck journey in early 1946 from Chungking, the wartime capital of the Republic of China, to Yenan, the Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, the Chinese Communist Party and capital of the Kansu-Ninghsia-Shensi Border Region, and back. This three-truck convoy carrying medical supplies was the first delivery to take place for a period of about four years, and a very brief review of the political background is perhaps required to set the scene.\n\nFollowing the Sian incident of December 1936, there were moves towards a united anti-Japanese front between the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists (Kungchangtang). This was followed on July 7, 1937, by the Marco Polo Bridge fighting and the start of the Japanese invasion of the heartland of China. In this period, there was a nominal united command of Kuomintang and Kungchangtang with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander. The New Fourth Army, based in Anhwei, had been formed from the Communist guerilla groups left behind in Central China, but friction developed between this and the Kuomintang forces, and in January 1941, it was attacked in South Anhwei and partly destroyed. This marked the end of the united front, and the Kuomintang re-introduced the blockade of the Liberated Areas under 18th Group Army control. These Liberated Areas were basically the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Suiyuan, Honan, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Jehol. Much of these areas were also under Japanese occupation of the cities, railways, and roads, but the countryside was effectively under the control of the Liberated Areas Regional Councils.\n\nThe reintroduction of the blockade meant that a proportion of the Kuomintang troops were engaged in this exercise rather than\n\n* Paper delivered to a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch on 31st May, 1977. Mr. Reynolds is head of the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Hong Kong.",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208429,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 153,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1933\n\n137\n\ntraditional authority. They form a new and disruptive element in village political life. But their importance seems to be growing.\n\nThe emergence of this group is significant as indicating a slow but certain shift in rural group values. The traditional values such as custom and precedent, age, family status and scholarship of the old sort are losing ground, under the impact of new ideas, to the values of practical success, individual prowess, youth and new education. It is Kulp's opinion that in the new complex of social values, although learning will remain as a criterion for leadership, age is sure to disappear. How quickly and how thoroughly the familist value of status will be overridden it is difficult to guess.\n\nThese new leaders gain importance from a connection they are often able to make outside the village with the Kuomintang party and with the National Government. The new government of China is eager to introduce a modern republican form of politics in rural districts. Often it is these natural leaders who most eagerly accept the new idea. When they are able to get the support of the party and organize a local unit they can exert a great deal of power to the severe detriment of traditional polity. This subject will be discussed more completely below; at present only the traditional village leader will be considered.\n\nCalled by many different names,2 performing different functions in different areas of the country, and enjoying varied degrees of influence and authority, yet these village elders are a thoroughly Chinese phenomenon with a long history and a fairly constant set of rights and duties. They form the core of village government in China, and it is due to their generally high standard of character that the system of self-government has so long been in effect and effective. Under all sorts of political disruption, in the midst of civil wars they have carried on the government of rural districts, oblivious to changes of dynasties, invasions of \"barbarians\" and national disasters.\n\nThe Ti-pao (*) is a semi-official government officer who is usually to be found in large villages or in those near administrative\n\nKulp; op. cit., p. 116.\n\n2 Among the more common names listed by Giles as referring to the village elder are Hsiang lao (**), Hsiang ch'i (**), Hsiang chang (**), Hsiang hsien-sheng (£), Li chang (LA), and Hsiang cheng (RE). There are also many others which refer more definitely to semi-official government positions but are used interchangeably, Giles, Herbert A.; Chinese English Dictionary, passim., especially, p. 530.",
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    {
        "id": 208449,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 173,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1933\n\n157\n\nof approximately 2437 inhabitants. It differs from typical rural villages in at least three respects: it is very young, having a history of only about fifty years; it is rather a grain market town with many stores than an agricultural community; and it is really a suburb of Peiping, lying just north of the former capital, and its whole economic, political and social life is highly colored by this fact.\n\nAt present there exist in the town two sets of political organizations: the old type established by the people themselves, and a more recent type set up by provincial or Kuomintang authorities. The two sets of organizations function simultaneously, and each seems to be weakened by the presence of the other. Of the first type is the village self-government of the traditional kind, a Chamber of Commerce composed of the leading merchants, and an Association of Farmers for the Protection of Crops.\n\nIn 1915 a district self-government movement was started. The term is not exactly accurate, however, since all the officers were appointed from among the various heads of villages by the county government or by the governor of the capital district of Peking direct. This organization worked with the cooperation of the traditional village governments, and seems both to have supplemented and coordinated them.\n\nIn 1919 the provincial authorities decided to remodel the system of self-government after the Shansi plan. According to this system, which is almost identical with the plan adopted later by the Central Government, five and twenty-five families were to be gathered into groups each with a chief. One hundred families or more were to constitute a village with a village head. Above the village there was to be a district office under a leader who would serve as a link between the self-government of the villages and the officials of the county government. This district head was also to serve as chief of the local police.\n\nThis theoretic plan was not so democratically carried out. In Ching Ho the selection of the village head was not made by popular vote in a mass meeting, as was supposed to have been done. Only the leaders of the village were present, no vote was taken, and the office was assumed by the associate of the former village head. Nor was the district head elected, his office being taken temporarily\n\n1 Ibid: chapters seven and eight, p. 96-121. The following description is taken from this section of the book.",
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    {
        "id": 208450,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 174,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "158 \n\nC. MARTIN WILBUR \n\nby the police head, who was a government officer under direct control of the county police office. Thus very little self-government is apparent in this new system. \n\nAnother phase of activity where external pressure was brought to bear upon the traditional forms of organization in Ching Ho was in the establishment of a local branch of the Kuomintang party. In 1928 the county party organization appointed three men to organize a local party in the district. But because enough members could not be found to form a proper district party the organization was given the rank of branch association. In the meantime the directors attempted to form two organizations in competition with already established semi-political bodies. \n\nThe first of these was to be a Merchants' Union to displace the influential Chamber of Commerce composed of the leading shopkeepers of Ching Ho. The attempt to form a competitive Merchants' Union was not very successful. Although, the Chamber of Commerce suffered a setback, it followed a policy of passive resistance and its leaders are only waiting for a favorable opportunity to revive their own organization. \n\nThe second body which the local Kuomintang party tried to crowd out was the Farmers' Association for the Protection of Crops. This organization has a history of several hundred years in China, and in Ching Ho it was quite powerful. Its main purpose is to protect green crops in spring and autumn, but it enters into other activities for the benefit of the farmers. The local Kuomintang attempted to organize a Farmers' Union on the pattern of the successful organizations in South China. Although the party authorities worked quite hard to form such a union in the district, they were only successful in smaller villages, and could not get a foothold in Ching Ho itself, where the association was too powerful to be destroyed. \n\nAt the time the survey was made the fortunes of the party were under a cloud due to internal dissensions. All the party members had left town including the organizer and his associates. The organizations they had established continued to function in an uncertain way. \n\nIf Ching Ho were a typical rural village one might be able to infer what the results will be when the National Government",
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    {
        "id": 208451,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 175,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1933\n\n159\n\nattempts to force a new type of political organization in rural districts. As a matter of fact, Ching Ho was probably a more fertile ground for innovations than a typical rural area would be. How slow the process of change and development will be, therefore, is not hard to guess. The study of Ching Ho seems to indicate that when changes come they will be successful only when they are built upon the already established system, and that innovations will not succeed well when the changes are too radical, or when entirely new organizations are introduced in an attempt to displace traditional ones.\n\nThe most hopeful sign in the whole scheme of reform is the interest which the National Government, the Kuomintang and other organizations have taken in the training and education of the rural citizenry. Training schools for rural leaders, and lecture bureaus for the teaching of citizenship are part of the plan of both the government and the party. The Mass Education Movement likewise is strongly marked by the desire not only to give the common people the rudiments of education, especially in the written character, but also to make them effective citizens for a democratic state. The textbooks used by the movement emphasize good citizenship, and the leaders of the movement seem to realize, what the leaders of the Kuomintang party, at least, do not seem to have grasped, that in the system of village government of the traditional sort are to be found all the essentials for a successful form of democratic, representative government. As the leader of the movement reports,\n\n\"The main work of the Movement in the field of training citizens is the extension of the noble moral practices prevailing in the clan and the family unit, and of the political institutions operating for centuries in the 'village republic', to the larger units of the district community and the nation, so that there may be active and intelligent participation on the part of the people in national and international issues.\"\n\nThe task of training between three and four hundred millions of people in the duties of citizenship, which today faces the leaders of China, is a stupendous and appalling one. But without this foundation of an educated citizenry no truly representative demo-\n\n1 Yen, James Y. C.; New Citizens for China, p. 14.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 209466,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 123,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "101\n\nlawyers two months training in \"New Democracy\" and placing them under Communist cadres.\n\nWhen the People's Political Consultative Conference, organized by the victorious Chinese Communist Party, issued its \"Common Programme\" formally establishing the People's Republic in September 1949, it also adopted an Organic Law of the Central People's Government, Article 5 of this document provided for a Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, but no action was taken on the establishment of a system of lower courts until September 1951. In fact, during this period, civil and criminal courts left over from the Kuomintang period continued to function alongside military, revolutionary, and people's tribunals. Article 17 of the Common Programme had done away with the six codes of the Kuomintang, but new laws were published in rapid order, some 3,452 of them by September of 1954, including major laws dealing with land reform, marriage, the punishment of counter-revolutionaries and corruption. However, no systematic codes were issued and there were many gaps in areas which lawmakers in most societies would consider of prime importance, including such crimes as homicide. When appropriate laws and regulations were lacking, judges were supposed to use the general policies of Mao's \"New Democracy.\" Such ambiguity naturally led to great inconsistency in judgments, and judges were forced to make wide use of analogy even to the point of secretly basing their decisions on Kuomintang legal precedent.\n\nIn the autumn of 1952 a National Judicial Conference was called to launch a reform of the courts. By the time the movement came to an end in April 1953, many former Kuomintang officials had been removed from the judicial system, but the problem of judicial decision making continued to persist. A Chinese Political Science and Law Association was established in the spring of 1953 which in May of the following year began publishing its national legal journal, Zhengfa yanjiu [Researches in Political Science and Law]. At the same time, a special legal publishing house was established and began producing annual collections of laws. Several law schools or institutes for training judicial cadres were also opened. Finally a second National\n\n--",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
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    },
    {
        "id": 209845,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1983",
        "page_number": 104,
        "title": "RAS-1983",
        "content_text": "82\n\nat least for some sections of the language community, when it occurs in puns and other examples of wordplay. During a popular television show in the U.S. a chow dog which bites people but is quite timid is described as 'chicken chow mein'. The term wok has become so familiar that it has become a favourite item for puns.\n\nA fast food Chinese restaurant in Boston is called 'Wok In'. In San Francisco audiences watching a cooking programme are told to 'get wokking'. When someone had returned from a trip to Bangkok with some Thai silk ties, an expatriate colleague of ours was heard to make the following remark: 'Did the Thai tai tai tie your Thai tie? The noun lap sap from Cantonese laap saap ‘rubbish' is known to almost every English-speaker who has lived in Hong Kong for some time. Some people objected to the use of the word 'rubbish' as a verb in a slogan for the Clean Hong Kong Campaign launched by the Government recently: 'Don't rubbish your city' was felt to be bad English. The following letter to the editor of The South China Morning Post may be taken as evidence that lap sap and 'rubbish' are taken to be synonyms in the same language: 'To whoever gave us \"Don't rubbish your city”, a piece of advice. Don't lap-sap your language.' (South China Morning Post, 7/12/82).\n\nNOTES\n\n1 See M. Chan and H. Kwok, A Study of Lexical Borrowing from English in Hong Kong Chinese, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1982.\n\n+\n\nThe study is in the form of a monograph entitled Chinese Loan Words in English with Special Reference to English in Hong Kong has been accepted for publication by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, and will appear by early 1985. The monograph will include an appendix giving a list of 105 loan words with notes on pronunciation, meaning and etymology.\n\n* Oxford, 1962, p. 143.\n\n* For example, A.J. Bliss, A Dictionary of Foreign Words and Phrases, London, 1980, includes chopsticks, chopsuey, kowtow, kuomintang, sampan, tycoon.\n\nD. Carroll, Dictionary of Foreign Terms in the English Language, New York, 1973, has kowtow and sampan.\n\nA.H. Halt, Phrase and Word Origins, New York, revised 1961, has fairly lengthy explanations of pidgin terms and prevalent false etymologies, and includes references to chop chop, chow, kumquat, chau min.\n\nБ\n\nA.J. Bliss, op. cit.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212158,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 100,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "77\n\nexalt the magical power of the tree god.'\n\nOn the 23rd day of the first lunar month in 1925 just west of Suifu in Szechuan province some Chinese saw a beggar lying on the ground. They returned very shortly after to find the beggar had disappeared completely, the ground where he had lain was bone dry and his imprint on the wet grass stood out. They realized that he must have been an Immortal and built a small shrine dedicated to him. Once a year thereafter, on the 23rd of the first month anniversary local people held a special festival to celebrate his disappearance.\n\nInnumerable stories are told of the creation of such new deities. These tend to have the following common factors:\n\na. a human dies under unusual circumstances and his spirit is 'found' to have special and supernatural characteristics.\n\nb. An image is carved and placed on an altar as a direct result of the god's behaviour or action. Usually the deity has appeared in a dream, or in a more tangible form as a piece of wood sometimes rough, at other times shaped (a gate or door) — floating in the sea, on a lake or a river, and manifesting supernatural characteristics.\n\nAlthough in theory the deification of a dead soul requires the joint authority of the supreme Taoist deity, the Jade Emperor and the terrestrial emperor of China, there have been a large number of minor deities in particular who owe their deification to the common people, voting with their feet, going to shrines to offer up incense and oil. And just as gods fade and disappear because of lack of support from devotees who have found other and apparently more potent deities, so the creation of new gods springs from a natural but unusual happening such as was the case of the small boy in Singapore, who, as we shall see later, was killed in 1963 by lightning.\n\nCults spring up whenever the spirit of a dead person responds to public devotions and offerings and grants devotees their requests. The deceased need not be from the distant past. An image of Chiang Kai-shek, who only died in 1976, has been seen on at least one major altar in Taiwan, against the wishes of the Kuomintang government, though they would appear to have turned a blind eye. Sun Yat-sen, one of the Republic's greatest worthies, has also been seen in both image and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212159,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 101,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "78\n\nicon form on minor altars in Taiwan. These icons are understandable as portraits of Sun the 'Father of the Nation' appear with those of Chiang Kai-shek in offices, schools, barracks etc. where they were bowed to each morning as a sign of respect. Among the less literate and more superstitious it is not difficult to see how this has led to such icons appearing on altars with incense burnt before them.\n\nIn the mid-1960s, the Kuomintang organised a political demonstration in Cambodia on the 15th day of the seventh lunar month, the middle of the month during which Hungry Spirits return to the human world for thirty days. During the demonstration public sacrifices to the spirits of the victims of the communists in China were performed. There was also talk of deification of one or two but this came to nothing.\n\nIt has not been unknown for outstanding living persons to have a sanctuary built in their honour. The magistrate of Ch'ing-ho district in Hopei was such a man. He brought about a substantial reduction in taxes and other government levies and thus lightened the financial burden on a hard pressed people. In 1886, two years after he had been transferred to administer another district, the grateful populace of Ch'ing-ho built a shrine in his honour.\n\nIn Singapore in 1970 a new cult was founded near Woodlands on the northern tip of the island when the deity, Wu T'ien Chu, appeared to a Singapore Fukienese man in a dream. The deity explained to the Fukienese that he, Wu T'ien-chu [The Military Master of Heaven], was a mighty deity who had chosen the Fukienese man to become the 'Master Warrior' of his cult. He required a new bungalow to be converted into accommodation for the founder with the lounge becoming the altar hall. He told the Fukienese man that he would protect his devotees, cure their illnesses and bring them good fortune. A statue of the deity was carved in the likeness of the spirit as he appeared in the founder's dream and placed on the altar. The founder, the Fukienese man, explained that with his wide knowledge of all religions he encourages devotees from every nation and creed to worship in his temple. He explained that the world's most powerful deity is the Jade Emperor, with Sakyamuni, The Buddha, as his deputy. Next in seniority is Kuan Yin followed by Wu T'ien-chu who has a great many assistants and warriors under his charge, none of whom is ever portrayed in image form. He continued that the four pillars of the cult are \"the four gods (shen) of other religions, Buddha, Christ, the Pope and Mohammed”.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213109,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 177,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "159\n\nposted in the market by various warlords and factions had an extremely bad reputation. They were not locals (they were mostly Mandarin speakers), indulged in looting the shops in the market, and were generally believed to be behind some at least of the bandit raids. The District Officer, New Territories, specifically accused Chinese irregular soldiers of mounting eight cross-border armed bandit raids in 1924. The Kuomintang forces eventually secured the area in 1925-1926, but the irregulars were only replaced by regular soldiers in 1928, when the irregulars at Sha Tau Kok were punished for some of their misdeeds.\n\nThe period of post-Revolutionary chaos along the border came to a peak in 1925, when the Kuomintang finally secured Sha Tau Kok, but immediately used it as a base for the General Strike boycott against Hong Kong. The 1925 Boycott caused serious problems for the villagers in the Sha Tau Kok area. If they loathed the Customs for insisting that their daily marketing was dutiable, they were even less enamoured of the view that their every-day shopping constituted \"trading with the enemy\", which should be stopped by whatever terrorising tactics could be brought to bear. The strikers seem to have taken over the Customs Station in Sha Tau Kok, and it is clear that local trade, and with it the villagers of the area, suffered greatly.\n\n17\n\nA third period of disturbance on the frontier was 1928-1937, in every year of which, except one, smuggling was noted as being a greater problem than in the previous year. During this period, further rebellions (by Communist-inspired guerrillas) in the area east of Yim Tin caused problems, which were then exacerbated with the attacks on the area by the Japanese from 1938. The closure of the Mirs Bay Customs stations in 1938 marks the date when the Kuomintang Government finally took control of the area - the Customs reopened the Sha Yue Chung station in 1939, but only following an \"agreement\" with the guerrillas, who were by then the only effective government there. 40 Although the western, Yuen Long, area of the frontier was the worst smuggling centre, major battles with smugglers/pirates took place in waters close to Sha Tau Kok in 1928, 1932, 1935, and 1939, and a major battle with smugglers in the Ta Kwu Ling area in 1932. Kai Chung Customs post was sacked by bandits - presumably a smuggler gang - in 1932 as well. From about 1937 smuggling of strategic goods to Sha Yue Chung, for the guerrilla rebels, and later of goods to be slipped through the Japanese lines, became a major business at Sha Tau Kok - this trade was centred on the Sha Yue",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213110,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 178,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "160\n\nChung Ferry. Finally, the Japanese attacked Sha Tau Kok in 1938, 1939, and 1940, before taking it over late in 1940,\n\n41\n\nThese periods of disturbance caused serious problems to the Sha Tau Kok villagers. Their sole desire was to sell their vegetables and firewood, and buy their salt and household goods, but this was, year after year, interfered with by political problems. Sha Tau Kok was rarely - except during the Boycott - the centre of the disturbances, but it was almost always \"in the front line\", full of intrigue, nervous military, and difficulties. A market shop-owner in Sha Tau Kok was executed by the military in about 1935, in an event still a talking point in the villages, probably for being involved with the rebels to the east. An underground Communist cell was established in the 1930s in the market, centred on one of the teachers in the Tung Wo School, with the job of encouraging smuggling of strategic goods to Sha Yue Chung and the guerrillas, and of indoctrinating suitable youngsters, to prepare for an extension of rebel activity to the immediate Sha Tau Kok area.\n\n41\n\nThe elders of the Shap Yeuk continued to function throughout this troubled period as the managers of the market at Sha Tau Kok, but less effectively than before. The strong military presence in the town, the close Government interest in it, and the elders' inability to control the Customs, greatly weakened the Shap Yeuk as the effective local administration. The guns which had been placed by the Shap Yeuk in the gun-towers they had built to guard the bridge were confiscated very soon after the 1911 revolution, and the eastern gun-tower, at the front of the Tung Wo School, was taken over as the military barracks at about the same time. The warlord and Kuomintang administrations were usually unwilling to discuss problems with the local elders - noticeably so compared with the District Officer in the New Territories - and so the elders and their Council declined to having responsibility, effectively, only for those things the officials could not be bothered to interfere with, especially the running of the market night-watch and cleaning services.\n\nBy 1910, the elders were already talking of moving the market over the frontier into the New Territories, with its better security, better villager-administration relationships, and absence of Customs problems. Nothing, however, was done until 1925, when the chaos of the Boycott started to push the market across the frontier. Shops began to be built on the New Territories side of the border street in 1925, and this process",
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