[ { "id": 212180, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 122, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "99\n\nresidents in 1932, under conditions quite similar, the efforts of which they were capable. It was thought that at the best the Chinese government would be compelled to sue for terms within three or four months: nor did the foreign residents of Shanghai appear to feel much concern at the prospect of such an issue; the years of pin-pricking told. Despite the precedents recently set in Manchuria, where the Japanese had driven out foreign enterprise, there were many who really believed that the Japanese would “clean up the Chinese mess”, as they called it, and usher in a beautiful era when all obstructions would be removed to a profitable trade untrammelled by notions about \"unequal treatment\".\n\nOn my return I found Nanking settling down to war. Most of the foreign ladies had left by steamer for ports upriver, the International Club band was dispersed, the cinemas were closed, the leak in our swimming pool got worse, coupons were required for petrol, and the irreplenishable stock of liquid refreshment at the Bungalow Club diminished at an alarming rate.\n\nThere were particularly heavy air raids on the 19th and 20th of September, and so it was with some astonishment on the evening of the 20th that we heard over the wireless Admiral Hasegawa's warning to foreign residents of Nanking to move out because,\n\n\"the Japanese Naval Air Force may after noon on September 21st have to resort to such offensive measures as bombing and otherwise upon the Chinese forces, as well as all the establishments pertaining to their military operations and otherwise around Nanking.\"\n\nHe spoke after a month of bombing as though the bombing had not yet commenced. Japan waved the big stick with singular effect. During the night of the 20th there was a frenzy of packing and on the morning of the 21st the remaining foreign ladies left by steamer, and several offices closed down and transferred themselves to Wuhu. The men who were staying behind made arrangements to \"cruise\" for the day. The various embassy staffs boarded their respective gunboats; and many civilians hoarded the S.S. \"Whangpoo\" which promptly at 11 a.m. took the Butterfield hulk in tow and steamed away, while our small party had the use of a launch on which we crossed over to the far side of the Yangtze to anchor a couple of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214744, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 159, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "123\n\nThe performance of a military force is always a relative term in many senses. Authors writing about the Battle of Hong Kong have not rigorously compared the performance of the Hong Kong garrison with that of the Japanese invaders, save statistics of casualties and strength. Nor have they compared the performance of the garrison with British garrisons in other theatres of war.\n\nIt is true that the performance of the Hong Kong garrison did not prevent the fall of Hong Kong. Yet, it should be recognised by the military historian that the Hong Kong garrison, notwithstanding its inferior strength, did not only (a) manage to hold out for a much longer period of time; but also (b) sustain a much lower loss rate, as weighed by relative strength, than its adversary relative to the latter's strength. The former was probably the true mission of the garrison as contemplated by Churchill and both (a) and (b) testified to the battle worthiness of the garrison.\n\nEvidence of these two points is adduced in Table 1, which compares several dimensions of the Battles of Crete, Hong Kong and Singapore. These battles all involved British forces repulsing invading well-prepared Axis forces which had either absolute or relative local air superiority and which succeeded eventually in overrunning the defended territories, taking a large number of prisoners. Each battle has attracted much post-war criticism of the failure of Churchill's strategy or tactics about defence of the island concerned. In all cases, the battles were mainly fought on land, though the German invaders of Crete were air-borne. In the cases of both Hong Kong and Singapore, the conflict was largely between infantries supported by artillery and there was no naval support during the hostility as the navy either was absent or had been wiped out. Evacuation by sea was only possible for a part of the Crete garrison.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215831, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 130, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "63\n\n45 USAAF, p.178.\n\n46 (1) G.L.D. Alderson, History of Royal Air Force Kai Tak (Hong Kong: Royal Air Force Kai Tak, 1972), p.70-71. (2) SCMP, July 20, 1946 (Morning Edition), p.1. (3) Eather, p.54-56.\n\n47 For bomber production figures, see Adrian Gilbert (ed.), The Military Hardware of World War II: Tanks, Aircraft and Naval Vessels (New York: Random House Value Publishing, 1985).\n\n*CCS323, \"Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan,\" 20 Aug 43, p.3; CCS373.11 Japan (8-20-43), pt.1; RG218; NA, Washington, DC.\n\n\"The mission for B-29s flying their own supplies over the Hump was codenamed MATTERHORN (for the B-24s DRAKE). See (1) CPS86/2, \"The Defeat of Japan Within Twelve Months After the Defeat of Germany,\" 25 Oct 43, p.4; sec. 8; RG218; NA, Washington, DC. (2) CCS417/2, \"Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan,\" 23 Dec 43, p.10-15; sec.10; RG218; NA, Washington, DC,\n\nSo Wheeler, p.35, 59. The runways in China were 19 inches (almost half a metre) thick and made of hand-crushed rock.\n\n51 CPS86/2, Map II, \"B-29 Factor of Effectiveness at Various Ranges\". The exact ranges and maximum bomb load at each range are as follows:\n\n1,367 miles (2,200 km) 10 tons\n\n1,484 miles (2,390 km) 8 tons\n\n1,614 miles (2,600 km) 5 tons\n\n1,860 miles (3,000 km) 2 tons\n\nAs the figures show, an extra 500 miles (805 km) one way for a B-29 theoretically reduced its bomb load by 80 per cent!\n\n52 Waichow Intelligence Summary No.16, 14 Jan 43, p.9; Series 11/7; Chop Suey, WIS Sub-Division No.1; Prisoner of War Camps and Covering Letters: File Ref. 5668/A; Waichow Intelligence Summary Nos.29-34; May-June 1943; Ride Fapers. Allied planners believed that the Japanese could commit up to four battleships and three fleet carriers to harass Allied LoC to Hong Kong. See CPS107/1, p.37, 119.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215929, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 228, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "162\n\nquite early on to professional military strategists. War, when it came to Hong Kong, would have to be waged by means other than conventional warfare. Realistically, occupation would be a foregone conclusion: the challenge was to struggle on by covert means and to develop some resistance mechanism. In short, a new concept of waging war, based on intelligence and action behind enemy lines.\n\nMilitary intelligence\n\nThree years after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, [Hon. Ed. - I find it difficult to see how Japan's unprovoked occupation of large parts of China and the atrocities committed by its army can be termed a 'war.'] the British Army, Navy and Air Force created a 'Far East Combined Bureau.' It operated openly, employed no agents and depended on information volunteered by customs officials, commercial travellers and the like. Its offices, based within the Naval Dockyard compound, discouraged visits from casual informants, and much of its work involved monitoring personal reports from China sent by courier, rather than proactive intelligence gathering. Naval Intelligence provided support and maintained a signals station on Stonecutters Island for transmitting information to Singapore. GE Grimsdale, later to become Major General, joined the FECB in its early days. One of his earliest recommendations on curbing Japanese espionage in Hong Kong was to suggest that tourists be banned from using cameras! Later he was to acknowledge that espionage was harmless in a place like Hong Kong where defences were open and unsophisticated - one snatched photo of a ship leaving the naval dockyard revealed less than its official description in Jane's Fighting Ships.\" In any case, Japanese had been known to go to Kelly and Walsh, the booksellers in Central District, to find maps better than their standard issue 1:20,000 series.\n\nIn January 1937, Capt. Charles Ralph Boxer, of the Lincolnshire Regiment arrived in Hong Kong. Everything about Boxer contrasted strongly with the stereotype of a colonial in the Far East. Although he came from a family of military men, he was an unconventional individualist. Moreover, he was a scholar, who spoke fluent, literary Japanese, studying Japanese history and culture to the extent that he was welcomed in some of the most influential Japanese social circles. After the war, these values would pit him against bigots for whom any sympathy for the Japanese was anathema. But pre-war, he represented", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]