[
    {
        "id": 212776,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 85,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "70\n\nOne of the problems faced by the Szechuan Force commander was the distance between his headquarters and the Viceroy's Yamen in the Szechuanese capital at Ch'eng-tu and the time it took for orders and reports to be carried between them. The length of time between reporting back to Ch'eng-tu and receiving instructions either encouraged the Force commander to take too much upon himself or to sit and wait for further intelligence or instructions. When the Hunanese Force was defeated on its way to take part in a joint operation with the Szechuan force, communications were such that the first the Szechuanese general knew that the plan had gone wrong was from stragglers from the defeated Hunanese Force and from captured Miao. Considering the terrain the commanders had no real choice as communications relied upon runners who had to cross enemy country where the Miao who knew the country well were in full control.\n\nWhilst Mesny did not provide any evidence of the consultative procedure, if indeed there was one, between the Viceroy of Szechuan and the Szechuan Force commander, we do know from Mesny that the military commander in Ch’eng-tu, the Tartar General Chung-shih, was visited by the Szechuan Force commander when the Szechuan Force commander returned to the provincial capital to pay his respects to the visiting Li Hung-chang.\n\nAn Outline Description of The First Campaign against the Miao: 1868-1871\n\nThe first campaign by the Chinese Imperial Forces in Kueichou to suppress the rebellious Miao tribesmen, as seen through Mesny's eyes, began with a thrust by the major element of the Szechuan Force into the heartland of Miao territory during the late summer of 1868. The Kueichou provincial Force and the Hunan Force, two other separate armies under their own commanders, paid and supported by their own provinces, flanked the Szechuan Force though, as we hear little about them and their activities from Mesny, we are led to believe that they were relatively inactive. The interesting point about the forces used to suppress this local rebellion of Miao tribesmen [which was minor on the scale of events], was that each of the Chinese Imperial forces was controlled unilaterally and led by Chinese officers from the contiguous provinces of Kueichou, Hunan and Szechuan without any senior general empowered to command all three forces. Until relatively recently senior military commanders in the Chinese Imperial Army had in the main been Manchus and not native Chinese.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212779,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 88,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "73\n\nmany Miao, a number of whom wished to live in peace and had offered allegiance to the Imperial Force. Meanwhile the Miao rebels who were constructing stockades on the mountain sides above Chung-an prior to attempting to destroy the Imperial Force, were able to observe the C-in-C's headquarters together with Imperial reinforcements and supplies arrive from Ma-ping-bah.\n\nThe Szechuan Force's next objective was the city of Ch'ing-p'ing Hsien some 20 miles away, on the far side of the river. Despite having been in rebel hands for the previous eighteen years it was captured without too much difficulty though the Imperial Force had had a tough time for a day or so repelling Miao counter-attacks.\n\nThe C-in-C of the Szechuan Force sent a proposal to the C-in-C of the Hunan Force suggesting that the Szechuanese should advance on one side of the river Chung-an with the Hunan Force advancing up the other and, as the Hunanese had gunboats, they could also advance up the river itself.\n\nMeanwhile, and here Mesny's chronology is questionable, in early May 1869 the Ko-i Brigade advanced on Ch'ing-p'ing Hsien and prepared to storm the thirteen Miao stockades on the Tieh-chang Po heights above the town. Eventually after a fierce struggle and capture of the stockades, the Ko-i Brigade awaited the approach of the Hunan Force which should have been taking the next mountain range at the same time. Mid-afternoon on the day of the assault on the stockades, as the Hunanese had not appeared, the Ko-i Brigade withdrew to their camp in Chung-an, only to learn that the Hunan Force after initial successes had been badly defeated at Wu-ku Lung.\n\nThe Szechuan Force then remained comparatively inactive in Chung-an for the next seventeen months, until November 1870.\n\nMeanwhile, during the summer of 1869, Miao rebel forces had defeated the Kueichou provincial Force at Tu-yün Fu which left the Szechuan Force undefeated but out on a limb with both flanks exposed by the defeat of the Hunan Force on one side and the defeat of the Kueichou Force on the other. The emergence of a new Miao rebel chieftain threatened the Szechuan Force whilst at the same time the lines of communication between the Szechuan Force and the provincial capital at Kuei-yang and the rear base at Tsun-i were in danger of being cut.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    }
]