[ { "id": 209110, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 13, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nPRESIDENT'S REPORT ... 1\n\nHON. TREASURER'S REPORT 6\n\nHON. LIBRARIAN'S REPORT.\n\nTRANSACTIONS:\n\nFolk Medicine in Borneo: Diagnosis and Cure-Stephen Morris 10\n\nAnother Look at Land and Lineage in the New Territories, c. 1900-Edgar Wickberg 25\n\nARTICLES:\n\nReligious Response to Modernization in Taiwan: the Case of I-kuan Tao-Hubert Seiwert 43\n\nThe Public Records Office of Hong Kong-A.I. Diamond 71\n\nHong Kong and China in the village World-David Faure 75\n\nThe Chinese Church, Labour and Elites and the Mui Tsai Question in the 1920's-Carl T. Smith 91\n\nResidential Mobility and Kinship Ties among Urban Chinese Families in Hong Kong-Lee Ming-kwan 114\n\nEducation as a By-product of Fish Marketing-T.A. Acton 120\n\nJuan Yuan's Management of Sino-British Relations in Canton, 1817-1826-Wei Peh-t'i 144\n\nThe Hong Kong Origins of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Address to Li Hung-chang-Alice Ng Lun Ngai-ha 168\n\nREPRINT:\n\nBro. Tsung Lai Shun in Massachusetts 179\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES:\n\nThe Yung Muk Tong Factories in Macau-David Faure 185\n\nLetters from World War II-David Faure 187\n\nTraditional Funerals-Patrick Hase 192\n\nNotes on Rice Farming in Shatin-Patrick Hase 196\n\nFuneral pots from an Ancestral Grave-David Faure 206\n\nBOOK REVIEWS 207\n\nMEMBERSHIP AS AT 31ST DECEMBER, 1981 211", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209154, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 57, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "RELIGIOUS RESPONSE TO MODERNIZATION IN TAIWAN: THE CASE OF I-KUAN TAO†\n\nHUBERT SEIWERT*\n\nIntroduction: Modernization and religious change in Taiwan\n\nSince the middle of the last century China has been a theatre of far-reaching political, economic, social and cultural changes. The most obvious manifestation of these changes has been the revolution of 1911, sealing the end of a monarchy which had endured for more than two thousand years. But the defeat of the Manchu dynasty marked the closing of an epoch not only politically: the revolution of 1911 was also a decisive turning point in the cultural development of China. The traditional culture which so long was the pride of every Chinese scholar underwent an almost complete reevaluation. To the revolutionary intellectuals of the first decades of the twentieth century this traditional culture was the ideological expression of the overthrown feudal system. The construction of a new society should, therefore, not be a mere change of political institutions but had to comprise the formation of a new intellectual culture as well.\n\nThe central target of this cultural-revolutionary movement was Confucianism, which was regarded as the ideological foundation of the old social system. At the same time this movement also had distinct anti-religious tendencies aimed not only at the religious components of Confucianism but at all kinds of religion, traditional Chinese as well as foreign. Religion and superstition were inconsistent with the scientific worldview which had been imported to China from Europe and America.\n\nThe critical attitude of the Chinese intellectuals towards religion was certainly one of the factors which contributed to the decline of traditional Chinese religion in the twentieth century. But there were other reasons, too. On the popular level, the arguments of the intellectuals were probably of no great significance for the religious behaviour of the common people. More important were the changes\n\n*Universität Hannover\n\n† Parts of this article were read at the XIVth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions, August 1980 at Winnipeg, Manitoba.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209155, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 58, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "44\n\nHUBERT SEIWERT\n\nin the political and social structure which eroded the social base of many traditional forms of religion. This is true especially for those forms which C. K. Yang called “diffused religion”, i.e. cults intimately connected with traditional social institutions. The best-known examples are the ancestor-worship whose social base was the traditional Chinese family, and the state cult which had its raison d'être in the traditional monarchy.\n\nIt is convenient to name the complex process of social, economic, political and intellectual changes which took place since the last century modernization. “Modernization” could then be defined as that process which leads to the formation of a new social structure and new cultural values. “New” here only means “other than traditional”, it being assumed that it is sufficiently clear what “traditional social structure” and “traditional cultural values” in the case of China mean. This definition might appear too vague and, therefore, unsatisfactory but we have to leave it this way since any attempt to define it positively seems to be doomed to failure. For modernization is essentially an open-ended process which makes it impossible to determine what the “new” social structure and the “new” cultural values will be. We have to avoid the quasi-evolutionary assumption that the transformation into a modern society necessarily produces a Western-style industrial society.\n\nWhile we cannot say to which end-result the process of modernization in China will eventually lead, it is possible to name some of the elements of this process. I would like to mention only three which seem to have rather obvious consequences for traditional forms of religion: industrialization, urbanization and cultural contact. This characterization applies to Taiwan as well as to Communist China even though the degree of industrialization, urbanization and cultural contact differs widely in these two societies. It goes without saying that there are many additional elements of modernization in China, some of which are more or less confined to one of these two societies.\n\nIn what follows I deal only with the Taiwanese case, primarily because I had the opportunity to do field research there. We should observe, however, that the extent of industrialization, urbanization and cultural contact since 1949 has been much greater in Taiwan than in the People's Republic. The impact of these factors on religious life has therefore been stronger, too.\n\nIt is not surprising that the thoroughgoing changes in social and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209159, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 62, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "48\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nreligion. The Taoism of the elite, lacking the Buddhist idea of the sangha, was much more a private affair of the individual, while the Buddhist conception of meritorious deeds stimulated the propagation of the faith.\n\nThese might be some of the reasons for the poor state which Taoism was in at the end of the imperial era, and which did not improve much during the first half of this century. Although the starting position was rather poor, today there are signs of a renaissance of religious Taoism in Taiwan8, even if it is much less obvious than in the case of Buddhism. Significantly, the recovery of religious Taoism is promoted not only by the Taoist clergy, whose intellectual standard in general is still rather low, but also by laymen. It is not easy to assess exactly the scope of this Taoist renaissance, but we can say that the position of Taoism as an institutional religion is probably not weaker than in the last century. That means that here, too, no secularizing influence of modernization can be ascertained.\n\nApart from Buddhism and Taoism there is a third major form of institutional religion which played an important though less recognized role in traditional China: popular lay-communities of a more or less syncretic character. Most of these communities call themselves Buddhist or, less often, Taoist and indeed can be regarded as popular forms of these religions. From the observer's point of view, however, many of them are clearly distinguishable from the \"orthodox\" forms of Buddhism and Taoism. Not only do we make this distinction, the Chinese authorities also regarded some of these societies as heterodox and proscribed them. The best-known examples of this are the communities related to the White Lotus tradition. It would, however, probably be a mistake to believe that the majority of popular lay-communities belonged to this class of secret sects.\n\nIn contrast to orthodox Buddhism and Taoism these communities do not seem to have suffered from a significant decline during the last phase of traditional China. Quite the contrary, one gets the impression that in a certain way their strength corresponded to the weakness of the orthodox religions during the final years of the empire. Many people found relief from political and economic pressures by turning to the various popular forms of religion, ranging from consulting witch-doctors and spirit-mediums to joining one of the many smaller or larger sects which offered the hope of deliverance of the faithful or even an impending end to the present misery and the coming of a new era10.\n\n10", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209163, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 66, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "52 \n\nHUBERT SEIWERT \n\nof fu-luan cults in Taiwan in recent years?\". \n\nThere are many links between fu-luan cults and practices and the I-kuan Tao sect. Most of the texts which expose the teachings of this sect have been revealed by \"spirit-writing\" since the beginning of the sect in the nineteenth century28. Fu-luan sessions are held regularly, normally four times a year?, during which new revelations and instructions are received. Furthermore, the content of the teachings which are propagated by I-kuan Tao show strong similarities to those of many of the common fu-luan cults10. This is the case especially where the religious interpretation of the present time, the assessment of the historical role of the Chinese tradition and the confrontation with Western influence is concerned. It is these elements of the beliefs which show most clearly the popular religious responses to the modernization process. \n\nReligious interpretation of the present time: traditionalism \n\nTo illustrate some basic elements of the world-view of these cults I quote a few passages from a revelation of the god Shang Ti which was given during a fu-luan session in 1977: \n\nFrom 1914 to 1939 two world wars broke out. As a result the correct truth was almost eradicated and the traditional culture went up in flames. Streams of blood were shed and millions of corpses covered the earth. Wives were separated from their husbands and their sons scattered to the four winds, unbearable was the misery. If this happens again, if a third world war breaks out, mankind will face destruction. For the military weapons which are developed by the modern sciences are being improved day by day, nuclear weapons are perfected day and night. In such a situation we must give up our hope for the Great Harmony and the peace in the world. Therefore, there is only one way, if we want to avoid the final catastrophe: the original orthodox tradition of the Tao which our Chinese nation possesses has to be restored. The four social relations (szu wei9) and the eight virtues (pa teλ) [must be put into practice again]. We must continue the past in order to save the future, that means to follow the orthodox tradition of the Tao which has been transmitted from Yao, Shun, Yü, T’ang, Wen Wang and Wu Wang, Confucius and Mencius. Only in this way can one escape this huge cosmic catastrophe.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209165, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 68, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "54\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nsuperiors and inferiors are without righteousness, there is no faithfulness between friends. What a talk of liberalism! People get married and they get divorced again; if such conditions are common everywhere, how then can the orthodox tradition of the Tao be restored? Look at the following examples: In the European and American nations it is such that, when people are old and approach the end of their life, one is only waiting until they close the eyes and die. This is called the New Culture! Continually new weapons are being developed to destroy the human race. This is called the New Morality! How terrible it is! And we Chinese, we are giving up our own culture and our own morality, which we have inherited from our ancestors, in order to adopt the so-called New Culture and New Morality of other people. If one continues in this way, then our Chinese nation will soon have perished!\n\nIn the first section the present time has been pictured as one of utmost danger, threatened by an impending catastrophe. The second passage exposes the roots of this crisis, i.e. the general moral decline which can be stopped only by reviving the traditional virtues. In the above section the explanation again goes one step further. The moral decay, i.e. the extinction of traditional Chinese morality, is seen in relation to the influence of Western civilization. The westernization of Chinese society is regarded as promoting licence and demoralization. By implication, westernization is a major obstacle to the restoration of the orthodox tradition and will finally result in the perishing of the Chinese nation.\n\nThis pessimistic and critical picture of the present forms the background to the final revelations of the deity, which show the way to deliverance leading to a bright future:\n\nIf my heavenly Tao can be spread all over the world, the multitudes will not know any more suffering caused by weapons nor will there be malefactors or criminals. This is called to regulate without acting purposely (wu wei). Even if one does not plan for peace, peace will occur without doubt; even if one does not plan for a renaissance, a renaissance will come by itself. Then, what need will there be for rules and regulations, what need for severe laws and heavy punishments? And yet the days of Yao and Shun can come again and there can be a perfect world for men to live in.\n\n31", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209167, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 70, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "56\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nand modern Chinese culture. They present, to a certain degree, a religious interpretation of modernization in Taiwan. But if we examine the above mentioned elements, we find that virtually none of them is really new. They are all patterns which are well known from Chinese intellectual history. I shall just give a few examples:\n\nThe devaluation of the present time as a period of moral decline can be traced back as far as Confucius. In the earliest Confucian writings we can also find the theme of the return of the Golden Age of Yao and Shun.\n\nThe concept of the Great Harmony, Ta T'ung, also originated in antiquity, it is elaborated in the Li Chi. Probably somewhat later, during the Han dynasty, the idea was formulated that the emergence of the new ideal world would be preceded by a period of destruction, as can be seen in the T'ai-p'ing Ching. Finally Buddhism added to these elements the theory of the declining dharma and the expectation of the future Buddha Maitreya. Maitreya is still of utmost importance in the eschatological teachings of I-kuan Tao.\n\nThe rejection of foreign influence is also a familiar topic. As we know, Buddhism has long been the target of anti-foreign propaganda. During the Six Dynasties Buddhism was held responsible for all the deficiencies of the time.\n\nFinally, we should observe that I-kuan Tao as well as most of the other popular cults combine elements of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, and promote the idea of san chiao he i, \"the three teachings form a unity\". This explicit syncretism goes back at least to the Sung dynasty.\n\nThese remarks suffice to show that the reactions of these popular religious movements to the social changes resulting from modernization are by no means new. The symbolization of the tensions caused by cultural contact and modernization draws heavily upon the traditional symbol repository. Not only are the traditional symbols relied on, but also their content: The values by which modern society is measured derive mainly from the traditional moral teachings. It would therefore not be untrue to say that the religious responses to modernization as we have analyzed them so far can be characterized as traditionalism and conservatism.\n\nNevertheless, it would be misleading to regard movements like I-kuan Tao as mere survivals of a past historical period. For, as we shall see presently, besides the traditional elements there are also", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209173, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 76, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "62\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nthe prospects of an ideal new world for the faithful are dealt with. For deliverance is not confined to the Chinese followers of the Tao; who cultivates his spiritual life and follows the true Tao can be saved. As has been noted above, this means that the spiritual tradition of the Tao, which originated in China and today still exists in Taiwan, contains the key to salvation for all mankind. Since the spiritual renewal of the world has to start from China, this universalism is in harmony with the traditionalism which asserts the superiority of the Chinese cultural tradition.\n\nModernization and the problem of cultural identity\n\nIn the last part of this paper I would like to make a few remarks which may contribute something to a better understanding of the intricate relationship between modernization and religious change. To formulate this as a question: can the renaissance of institutional religions in Taiwan be explained, taking into account the secularizing tendencies normally connected with modernization?\n\nLet us first recall that secularization and religious renaissance obviously do not exclude each other. Many forms of diffused religion are continuously disappearing along with the decline of traditional social institutions they were related to. At the same time the symbol system by which the social and natural world is conceptualized in many cases loses its religious coloration. In this process religious legitimations of reality are replaced by more “rational\" or \"scientific\" ones.\n\nAnother development which has to be taken into account is the differentiation of the cultural system into more or less distinct spheres, such as politics, economics, science, philosophy, religion, which traditionally were intimately interwoven and integrated into a single legitimation system. The growing importance of institutional religions — as compared with diffused religion — is partly a result of this general process of differentiation, as religion becomes more and more distinct from other social institutions.\n\nAs a matter of fact, in the West institutional differentiation of religion went hand in hand with secularization. The relative importance of Christianity as an institutional religion has diminished. The assertion that in Taiwan there has been a decline in traditional institutional religions cannot be accepted without reserve, however, since we are witness to a renaissance of Buddhism, Taoism and popular forms of institutional religions. We may ask, therefore, whether reasons", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209175, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 78, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "64\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nwesternization then thorough modernization means thorough westernization. This amounts to giving up one's own cultural identity. There are many reasons to suppose that no society would go that far, unless it is forced to from the outside.\n\nThis is not the place to look into the mechanisms of what might be called \"cultural resistance\". Let it suffice here to note that the present situation in Taiwan is characterized by two opposite trends. On the one hand we have the fact of modernization with its need for innovation. Innovation, of course, means discontinuation of traditional patterns and in many cases westernization. On the other hand we have the need for cultural identity, which means symbolization of continuity, distinctness and self-assertion. These two trends are mutually opposed because more modernization as a rule implies more westernization and thus less distinctness. Less distinctness, however, increases the need for cultural identity.\n\nRenaissance of institutional religions as a response to the problem of cultural identity\n\nAs we have seen, one element of I-kuan Tao and other popular religious movements is traditionalism. It is obvious that the adherence to traditional religious beliefs and practices can be a means of symbolizing cultural continuity and thereby identity. But we can go one step further: it is above all religion which is used as a symbolization of cultural identity. The reasons for this are manifold and can only be hinted at here.\n\nFirst of all, religion is the most important symbol system in traditional societies, at least on the popular level. This applies also to China where the legitimation of most strategic positions of reality had a strong “religious\" coloration: the important institutions like the family, the norms of social interaction, the values guiding personal cultivation, “national” history and the cosmic order. To remove the religious elements from the symbol system which explains reality would cause a collapse of the system and result in anomy. If anomy is to be avoided the old religious-oriented symbol system would have to be replaced by an alternative one without religious elements. Since such a substitute is not available for large portions of the population who have been socialized in the traditional legitimation system, the interpretation of reality must continue to make use of religious symbols.\n\nSecond, modernization in China, as probably in most non-Western", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209177, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 80, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "66\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nto the traditional legitimation system results in increasing tensions. If the tensions are to be diminished or at least kept to a tolerable level, then either the modernization process has to be stopped or even reversed, or the legitimation system has to be changed in such a way that it is more compatible with the social reality. I would argue that such an adaptation of the legitimation system can be observed in the teachings of I-kuan Tao.\n\nOne typical innovation in the teachings of many popular religious societies, of which I-kuan Tao is just one example, is what has been described as universalism. Not only are Western religions, especially Christianity, not fought against anymore, but they are accepted as being equal to the Chinese tradition. Foreign religions should even be learned from as they may contain truth which has not been revealed in China. On the other hand, the Chinese spiritual heritage is valid not only for the Chinese nation but for all of mankind. There is only one truth, one Tao, in the world of which all religions partake.\n\nIn a certain way, this universalist view is not new in Chinese intellectual history. In historic times too, there was only one truth which was theoretically valid for the whole world. But this truth did belong to the Chinese tradition, and to the degree that other nations did not accept the Chinese way, they were barbarians. The Middle Kingdom was the centre of the world, unequalled by other civilizations. While, as we have seen, the claim of uniqueness is not completely abandoned, the new universalism still represents a decisive innovation. The pretension to Chinese superiority could not be reconciled with the events of history since the last century. In the first phase, the national consciousness refused to take cognizance of other nations as being equal or even superior. The result was a rigid rejection of and hostility towards everything foreign. But reality could not be disputed for long. In the second phase, the pendulum tended to swing to the other extreme. China was seen as backward and unenlightened, and the Chinese intellectual tradition, especially Confucianism and religious thinking, was held responsible for this backwardness. By contrast, the West was idealized as a model which had to be emulated.\n\nOn the popular level, the replacement of the traditional symbol system by Western science and philosophy, which might be possible for intellectuals, was never a realistic alternative. To be sure, the success of Christian missions during the last hundred years would probably be unthinkable had there not been the strong need for new world interpretations which promised to be more consistent with the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209179, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 82, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "68\n\n1968).\n\n \n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\nCf. Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China. (Cambridge, Mass.\n\nCf. Y. Raguin, \"Buddhismus auf Taiwan\", in Buddhismus der Gegenwart, ed. by H. Dumoulin (Freiburg 1970) pp 113 – 116.\n\na \"Taoism' (by A. K. Seidel), in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, p 1042.\n\nFor example, the Taoist Association of the Republic of China is run mostly by laymen who try to get rid of many of the more \"vulgar\" practices of religious Taoism and to restore the intellectual tradition of former times. These efforts seem not to be supported by many of the Taoist priests, possibly since they make their living by performing these practices.\n\n10\n\n \n\nSee for example G. G. H. Dunstheimer, “Religion et magie dans le mouvement des Boxeurs”, in T’oung Pao, 47 (1959) pp 323 - 367; G. Miles, \"Vegetarian Sects\", in The Chinese Recorder, 33 (1902) pp 110; D. H. Porter, \"Secret Sects in Shantung\", in The Chinese Recorder, 17 (1886) pp 1 – 10, 64 – 73; M. Topley, \"Chinese Religion and Rural Cohesion in the Nineteenth Century\", in JHKBRAS 8 (1968), pp 9 - 43.\n\n11\n\nCf. Wing-tsit Chan, Religioses Leben im heutigen China, (München, 1955) pp 109-156.\n\nT'ai-pei-shih\n\n12 Such a healing-cult is treated by Wang Chih-ming Chi-lung-lu ti i-ko min-su i-sheng he t'a-ti hsin-t'u-men (unpublished B.A. thesis, National Taiwan University, Dept. of Archaeology and Anthropology, 1971)\n\n13 An example of this is the Sheng-hsien-t’ang community in Taichung. The publications of the revelations of the mediums of this temple are distributed and read everywhere in Taiwan.\n\n14\n\nSome sects (e.g. Li-chiao), however, are copying Buddhist or Taoist ceremonies and dress so that it is difficult to decide whether the performers are priests or laymen.\n\n16 Some of the \"new religions” are treated in Hsiao Ching-fen, “The current situation of new religions in Taiwan\", Theology and the Church, 10:2 – 3 (Tainan, 1971) pp 1 -- 28;\n\n10 I-kuan is actually derived from a passage in the Confucian Analects (IV, 15).\n\n17\n\nThe popular name is Ya-tan chiao. Other names are Tien Tao chiao, K'ung-tzu chiao, Ta Tao chiao, Lao-mu chiao\n\n4. Cf. Tung Fang-yüan, Tai-wan min-chien tsung-chiao hsin-yang (Taipei 1976) p 123.\n\n18 Tung, op. cit., p 123f. According to Su Ming-tung, T'ien-tao kai-lun (Kaohsiung, 1979) p 197, there are more than 300,000 followers of I-kuan Tao in Taiwan today.\n\nLi Shih-yü, Hsien-tsai Hua-pei mi-mi-tsung-chiao (Chengtu, 1948, repr. Taipei, 1975) p 32.\n\n20 It seems certain, however, that the I-kuan Tao has followers outside Taiwan, esp. in Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. In contrast to Taiwan, in these places the sect is not forbidden by the government and can operate openly (cf. Su Ming-tung, op. cit., p 198f). For the propaganda of the Communist government", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209181, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 84, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "70\n\nHUBERT SEIWART\n\n39\n\nibid., p 20.\n\n40 A practical consequence of this universalism can be seen in the effort of I-kuan Tao to spread beyond the borders of China proper. Of course, most followers outside Taiwan are overseas Chinese, but it also tried to gain followers among foreigners. Up till now, these efforts have not been very successful, not least because of the language barrier.\n\n41 \"Differentiation\" is the key-concept in many neo-evolutionary theories. Bellah makes use of it in his theory of religious evolution which has implications also for the \"secularization\" of traditional forms of religion. Cf. R. Bellah: \"Religious Evolution”, in American Sociological Review, 29 (1964) pp 358–374.\n\n42 The decline of institutional Christianity does not necessarily imply a decline of religion generally. Cf. for example the considerations by Th. Luckmann, The Invisible Religion, New York 1967.\n\n43\n\nCf. similar considerations in the case of a 19th century Korean religious movement by Chai Sik Chung, \"Religion and Cultural Identity - The Case of 'Eastern Learning'\", in Internationales Jahrbuch fur Religionssoziologie 5 (1969) PP 118 - 132.\n\n** For other examples see Paul de Witt Twinem, \"Modern Syncretic Religious Societies in China”, in The Journal of Religion 5 (1925) pp 463–482, 595 – 606 and Hsiao, loc. cit.\n\n46\n\nWhether it is possible to substitute for the traditional symbol system Western science and philosophy depends on several parameters. Social and intellectual stratification is just one. Another important one is the degree of internalisation of the traditional symbol system. Older people - even intellectuals who acquired their primary and secondary socialisation in terms of the traditional symbol system are less likely to be able or willing to substitute for it a new symbol system than are younger people (cf. Paul de Witt Twinem, loc. cit. p 163). It is noteworthy that the attitude toward traditional and foreign religions may change during the life of a person in the sense that he is willing to join a foreign religion during his youth but later on turns back to traditional religions. In a paper entitled \"How I Happened to Join a Japanese New Religion': One Life History and its Significance for Interpreting Japanese New Religions” H. R. Earhart has analyzed an interesting example of such change. The paper was read at the XIVth Congress of the I.A.H.R., August 1980 at Winnipeg, Manitoba.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 } ]