[
    {
        "id": 204979,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1965",
        "page_number": 87,
        "title": "RAS-1965",
        "content_text": "78 \n\nA. D. BLUE \n\non board at the time. A similar, but even more murderous case had occurred in 1858, on a river steamer between Canton and Hong Kong. As this was during the Second China War, and the attackers were definitely established to be Chinese soldiers in disguise, this case might be charitably described as an act of war.\n\nMost China coasters carried deck passengers, in addition to a dozen or so saloon passengers. In the emigrant trades, however, hundreds and even thousands of deck passengers were carried, and the emigrant ships were the greatest temptations to the pirates. The strategy was to get control of such a ship, take her to Bias Bay or Mirs Bay, both conveniently just outside Hong Kong territorial waters, and then make off ashore in Chinese territory with the money and valuables of the passengers. A few wealthy passengers might also be taken for ransom. An operation of this nature required careful planning and organizing ability, some knowledge of the ship's geography and routine, and some knowledge of navigation and engineering. In many cases it became known afterwards that some members of the gang had travelled on the ship previously, so as to make themselves familiar with it.\n\nA piracy of this kind required at least two dozen men, who boarded the ship along with the other passengers, with weapons concealed in their baggage. At a prearranged time a simultaneous attack would be mounted on the ship's key points—bridge, engine room, radio cabin, and saloon; often a meal time being chosen when everyone not on duty would be congregated in the saloon. While the ship was being taken to her destination under the supervision of a few pirates on the bridge and in the engine room, the others were robbing the passengers and broaching the most valuable cargo. As the destination was invariably Bias Bay or Mirs Bay, the piracy would take place as near there as possible, so as to reduce the time the ship was under pirate control and out of communication with Hong Kong.\n\nThe average coaster never had more than seven or eight European officers, and if the attack were well-timed they could all be immobilized in the first few minutes of the attack. There was usually little resistance from the Chinese crew, and a few men in the engine room and on the bridge were able to take the ship to its destination. There always seemed to be some pirates",
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    {
        "id": 204981,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1965",
        "page_number": 89,
        "title": "RAS-1965",
        "content_text": "80\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nThe China Navigation Company's Sunning was pirated on 14th November 1926, on a passage from Shanghai to Hong Kong.3 The officers recaptured the ship shortly afterwards, and when they refused the pirates an armistice the latter set the ship on fire. By turning into the wind the pirates were smoked out, and forced to leave in one of the lifeboats. When the fire got out of control the officers and crew were forced to do the same, but were picked up by a Norwegian ship. When the destroyer H.M.S. Verity arrived, however, they returned to the Sunning and put out the fire with naval help. The Sunning was then towed to Hong Kong.\n\nThe Haiching piracy of 1929 was very reminiscent of the Sunning. The Haiching belonged to the Douglas Steamship Company of Hong Kong, and was pirated while on her way from Amoy to Hong Kong. There were two hundred and fifty deck passengers and four saloon passengers on board at the time, and the attack took place when passing Bias Bay, just a few hours before reaching Hong Kong. The third mate and a Sikh guard were killed in the first few minutes, but the wireless officer continued to send out messages for help. The pirates, unable to get control of the ship, set it on fire; and two lifeboats were burnt out before their resistance was broken. When British warships arrived, they helped to put the fire out, and then towed the Haiching to Hong Kong, where all the passengers were thoroughly screened. Three of them were charged with piracy and murder, but one was later freed through lack of evidence, while the other two suffered the death penalty. Captain Farrar of the Haiching was awarded the O.B.E. for his part in the case.\n\nFrom the pirates' point of view the Anking piracy of 1928 was much more successful than either that of the Sunning or the Haiching. It was probably the classic piracy of modern times on the coast. The Anking, also a China Navigation Company ship, with over 1,000 deck passengers aboard, was on her way from Singapore to Amoy and Swatow when the piracy took place. These passengers were either returning to China to retire, or for a holiday after working in Malaya for several years, and were likely therefore to be well supplied with money and valuables.\n\n3 The Sunning had also been pirated three years earlier, on 23rd October, 1923.",
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    {
        "id": 205068,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1966",
        "page_number": 24,
        "title": "RAS-1966",
        "content_text": "REGIONAL APPROACH TO CHINESE HISTORY\n\n19\n\nBetween 1842 and 1849, Canton and its environs seemed to have been rocked by a series of violent anti-foreign disturbances. Three of these were full-scale riots in which the foreign factories were either directly attacked or seriously threatened. In one case six young Englishmen were murdered while strolling in the countryside. Throughout the period foreigners, either singly or in groups, were subjected to attacks and insults. In 1849 a massive demonstration succeeded in forcing Great Britain to abandon its demand that British subjects be permitted direct access to the city.27\n\nThe 1849 demonstrations were particularly impressive. Organized by members of the upper levels of the gentry class and aided and abetted, if not actually inspired by, the local authorities, they served to convince Sir George Bonham, then Governor of Hong Kong, that should he seek to force an entrance into the city, which Britain had always claimed as her right according to the terms of the Treaty of Nanking, his troops would be met by massive resistance on the part of the populace.\n\nNow, no one would deny that all this reflected a certain degree of anti-foreign spirit on the part of the people of Canton and its environs. After all, foreigners were attacked and their property was stolen or destroyed.\n\nBut what happens when these incidents are examined more closely?\n\nIn the cases of attacks upon the foreign factories, each episode was provoked by an ill-considered act of the foreigners themselves. In perhaps half, or more, of the attacks on individuals or groups of foreigners, robbery was the primary motive. Some \"attacks\" were not really \"attacks\" at all. One involved some small boys who threw stones at a group of passing barbarians (and were severely reprimanded by their parents for doing so).28 Yet Sir John Davis made this an occasion for a formal protest to the Chinese high authorities. Another \"incident\" concerned the looting of the house of the Reverend I. J. Roberts by a \"ruthless gang of Chinese\". Investigation shows that the ruthless gang was really Roberts' own congregation, who fell to fighting among themselves over the distribution of coins which the Reverend used to reward them for attending his services.29 As to the murder",
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    {
        "id": 205418,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1967",
        "page_number": 180,
        "title": "RAS-1967",
        "content_text": "BOOK REVIEWS \n\n173 \n\nand its raison d'être: why we find rows of burial urns placed on the hill-sides of the \"Territories, and why more permanent omega-shaped graves are scattered rather than in neat burial grounds. \n\nThe individualism and competition of geomancy in relation to the ancestors is to some extent balanced in another aspect of ancestral care with which the author deals: ancestor worship itself. But even so, at every level of a complex lineage, it seems, segments may be in competition with each other in ancestor worship. Differences in social status and ambition are shown in the way the very ancestors are admitted to the ancestral halls (through their tablets) and in the performance of the grand rites for such lineage forbears. \n\nTwo other sections, again well illustrated by New Territories material, should be of particular interest to people here. One is on social status, power and government, and the other on relationships between lineages. We are told of the rivalries between powerful higher-order groups, with illustrations taken from the Tang and the Man groups which have a history of mastery of large parts of the county from which the New Territories were cut out. Most of us know of the Tang lineage in Hong Kong; if not by name, at least by one of its villages in Kam Tin — the walled village often visited by tourists to the Colony. The large Man community at San Tin, near the border, is also becoming popular with visitors. \n\nThe strength of such lineages was not only in their man and fire power, as the author says, but in the command also of economic resources and call on political influence through scholarly ties with the traditional bureaucracy. But smaller communities might also combine with other weaker groups to form more powerful organizations to stand up to high-order lineages. These groups are what the author calls \"yeuk combinations\". In Cantonese yeuk (*) popularly means a pact, but it appears the term might have deeper political associations — a question Freedman goes into. Several yeuk combinations existed here: one at Taipo, and others at Tsuen Wan, Sai Kung and Sha Tin. Some of the armed resistance to the British when they first arrived in the 'Territories was bound up with such complexes. \n\nThe author warns us that this book does not represent the end of the story. I would say, however, that his skill in drawing on \n\nPage 180\n\nPage 181",
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    {
        "id": 205699,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 5,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "# CONTENTS\n\n## PRESIDENT'S REPORT FOR 1968\n\n## HON. TREASURER'S REPORT FOR 1968\n\n## TRANSACTIONS OF THE BRANCH 1968\n\n## Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils in Hong Kong up to 1941\n\n### T. C. CHENG\n\n## ARTICLES CONTRIBUTED:\n\n### Y\n\n### Militia, Market and Lineage: Chinese Resistance to the Occupation of Hong Kong's New Territories in 1899\n\n#### R. G. GROVES\n\n### Tung Kwu Island; the Type Site of Hong Kong's Older Prehistoric Culture\n\n#### W. SCHOFIELD\n\nPage 1\n\nPage 5\n\nPage 7\n\nPage 31\n\nPage 65\n\n### King Mongkut and the Kingdom of Siam\n\n#### R. BRUCE\n\n### The Linguistic and Literary Value of Ming Dynasty 'Mountain Songs'\n\n#### JOHN MCCOY\n\n### The Chinese Descent System and the Occupancy Level of Village Houses\n\n#### H. G. H. NELSON\n\n### Some Notes on Ethno-botany in the New Territories of Hong Kong\n\n#### ARMANDO DA SILVA\n\n### The Mapping of Hong Kong\n\n#### J. T. COOPER\n\nPage 82\n\nPage 101\n\nPage 113\n\nPage 124\n\nPage 131\n\n## ARTICLE REPRINTED:\n\n### The San On Map of Mgr. Volontieri\n\n#### RONALD C. Y. NG\n\nPage 141\n\n## NOTES AND QUERIES:\n\n### Bethesda and the Berliner Frauenverein Für China\n\n#### ALBRECHT PLAG\n\n### The Comet of 1532 —\n\n#### L. Carrington GOODRICH\n\n### What Inspired Sir John Bowring's Hymn?\n\n#### L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH\n\n### Books from the Victoria Library —\n\n#### H. A. RYDINGS\n\n### Early Hong Kong Libraries\n\n#### J. R. JONES\n\nPage 149\n\nPage 150\n\nPage 151\n\nPage 152\n\nPage 154\n\nPage 154\n\n### Defence Wall at Pass between Kowloon City and Kowloon Tsai —\n\n#### W. SCHOFIELD\n\n### Removal of Villages for Fung Shui Reasons. Another Example from Lantau Island, Hong Kong\n\n#### JAMES HAYES\n\n### The Occupancy Level of Village Houses in the Hong Kong Region\n\n#### JAMES HAYES\n\n### A Pair of Pottery Covered Jars found at Shek Pik, Lantau Island\n\n#### JAMES C. Y. WATT\n\n## BOOK REVIEWS\n\n### Kelly and Walsh\n\n## THE LIBRARY, 1968-69\n\n## LIST OF MEMBERS\n\n### HON. EDITOR\n\nPage 156\n\nPage 158\n\nPage 161\n\nPage 163\n\nPage 165\n\nPage 179\n\nPage 183",
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    {
        "id": 205718,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 24,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "18\n\nT. C. CHENG\n\nwatchmen being paid for with subscriptions from the Chinese community.* In 1893 a District Watch Force Committee was formed with the Registrar General (Protector of Chinese) as Chairman, and from that time onwards up to 1941 many prominent Chinese leaders served on that Committee. Indeed, for many years, it was more or less a tradition for prominent Chinese who wished to render public service to the Colony to begin their public career with this Committee and then, in the case of those who had a knowledge of English, to proceed to the Sanitary Board (which was replaced by the Urban Council in 1935) and thence to the Legislative Council.\n\nFor some years Wei Yuk was more or less an unofficial liaison officer between Hong Kong and the Manchu Government, and the latter was indebted to him in no small degree for the assistance he rendered in bringing to justice Chinese criminals who had fled from Chinese territory to Hong Kong. He was so respected by the Chinese in South China that, following the successful revolution in 1911, when Admiral Li Tsun, Commander of the Chinese Imperial Naval Detachments of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces, declared his surrender to the revolutionary forces directed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen's deputy, Hu Han-min from Hong Kong, Mr. Wei Yuk was asked to act as the guarantor of good faith on both sides!\n\nIn 1894, a fierce bubonic plague broke out in Hong Kong which accounted for over 2,000 deaths mainly in the oldest Chinese section of Hong Kong, viz., Tai Ping Shan (the present Po Hing Fong). In 1896 and subsequent years the plague recurred to a greater or less degree every spring. As there was little scientific knowledge of the plague and as there was no western treatment for this, Government decided to take drastic measures including the cleansing and disinfecting of infected areas, compulsory removal of the sick and house-to-house visitation carried out generally by the military. As it was very un-Chinese to allow sick parents or relatives to be removed from their homes to die in strange hospital rooms, and as the Chinese looked upon house visitation as interference and intrusion upon their privacy and personal liberty, they adopted an attitude of passive resistance and often hid away the dead and the sick. Wei Yuk was able to do\n\nSee chapter 4, \"District Watchmen\" of Regulation of Chinese Ordinance, No. 13 of 1888.",
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    {
        "id": 205731,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 37,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "31\n\nMILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE:\n\nCHINESE RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION OF HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES IN 18991\n\nR. G. GROVES*\n\nIntroduction\n\nViolence, or the very real possibility of violence, was endemic in southeastern China during the nineteenth century. The provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien were notorious to imperial official and foreign observer alike for their varieties of armed conflict. Brine, a British naval officer with contemporary experience of the coastal provinces, described the mid-nineteenth century situation as follows: \"the whole history of the period is little else than a continual series of local insurrections, bursting out in all directions. The coast was infested with pirates, who not only caused great injury to the coasting trade, but frequently landed and sacked the villages lying adjacent to the sea. In the two Kwang provinces armed bodies of men moved from town to town, and committed large robberies in open day... the Pekin Gazettes were full of reports from the provincial governors acquainting the emperor with the disorganized state of the country, and complaining of the inadequacy of their troops to quell the interminable revolts.\" To this catalogue of ills may be added the Opium and Arrow Wars, inter-lineage and clan warfare, ethnic conflict, and major and minor rebellions.\n\nThe prevalence of violence was by no means new. Writing of the Hsin-an District of Kwangtung Province, just over a century ago, the German missionary Krone noted: \"Hung-mo the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1399 A.D.), found it necessary... to appoint an officer with the title ‘Shou-yu-sho'... Protector of the region, in order to protect the population, which was rapidly increasing, against the bands of robbers and vagabonds which infested the district.\"3 More recently Professor Maurice Freedman, surveying a mass of evidence and arguing that organized violence\n\n* Mr. Groves is a Lecturer in Sociology at the University of East Anglia. He conducted field research in the New Territories between 1963-65. His article \"The Origins of Two Market Towns in the New Territories\" appeared in Aspects of Social Organization in the New Territories (ed. M. Topley) published by the Hong Kong Branch, R.A.S. in 1965.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205733,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n33\n\nBritish at Canton, and second, the Taiping Rebellion. Imperial resources were now strained to the limit and the paramilitary associations of the Kwangtung hinterland became an essential if volatile and unpredictable adjunct to government strategy. Contingents of gentry-organized militia contributed, with government encouragement and varying degrees of success, to the defence of Canton on several occasions and were largely responsible for the suppression of the mid-century Red Turban revolt.?\n\nThe existence of such composite militia forces raises many interesting problems. For the moment they may be subsumed under two general questions. How were these militia forces organized? Can they be related to what is known of other, enduring aspects of social organization in rural Kwangtung? These questions are central to this article, as they are to Wakeman's study of the militia movement in Kwangtung province between 1839–1861. His analysis will be discussed in conjunction with the smaller, but in some respects similar, resistance movement which sought to prevent the British occupation of Hong Kong's New Territories in 1899. However, before turning to these events, it is necessary to consider two other recent contributions to the study of Chinese society.\n\nTheoretical Considerations\n\nSkinner has suggested that \"anthropological work on Chinese society, by focussing attention almost exclusively on the village, has with few exceptions distorted the reality of the rural social structure. Insofar as the Chinese peasant can be said to live in a self-contained world, that world is not the village but the standard marketing community. The effective social field of the peasant... is delimited not by the narrow horizons of his village but rather by the boundaries of his standard marketing area.”\n\nFor present purposes the central elements of Skinner's thesis are: (i) that the patterned economic activities of a predominantly peasant and agrarian society are discernible in the spatial distribution of its markets; (ii) that the markets, in terms of their different functions, can be conceptually ordered in a hierarchy; and (iii) that the overall system of differentiated marketing activities is integrated by a series of co-ordinated periodic market schedules. The resulting typology is: minor market, standard market, intermediate",
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    {
        "id": 205736,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 42,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "36\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nzation, the other with the implications of marketing systems for social structure. Both are relevant to an understanding of the mid-nineteenth century militia movement and the resistance to British forces entering Hong Kong's New Territories at the end of the century.25 The remainder of this article will be devoted to a consideration of the two subjects.\n\nThe Mid-Nineteenth Century Militia Movement.\n\nWakeman, in his analysis of this subject, distinguishes three types of militia. The first comprised yung (勇), or braves, Yung were hired mercenaries who, when officially employed, were commanded by regular officers and tended to fight as closely supervised auxiliaries to the regular forces. Tung-kwan Hsien, Kwang-tung, had a particular reputation for producing such 'bare-sticks' and sent recruits to fight the British in both 1840 and 1899. The second type of militia were gentry-sponsored t'uan-lien (團練). They were raised at Government's request or by its authority and tended to be under close official supervision, although frequently retaining considerable independence of action in the field. The third type of militia, described by Wakeman as \"genuine t'uan-lien”, might be more appropriately termed ‘local corps'26. Although their existence may have been sanctioned or countenanced by Imperial officials, they were frequently formed on local initiative and particularly during the later years of the nineteenth century were largely independent of government control. Subsequent discussion will be principally concerned with the second and third types of militia.\n\nThe t'uan-lien which assembled at Canton in 1840 were composite organizations. They came from the counties of Nan-hai, P'an-yü, Hsiang-shan, and Hsin-an and, in theory, were created by the implementation of the hu-ch'ou-ting (戶抽丁) system. This seems unlikely as the entire force was assembled within ten days. In fact, the hu-ch'ou-ting system had been \"superimposed on preexisting local militia\"27 An example is provided by the t'uan-lien (local corps) of San-yuan-li, which were “organized under 'banners' (旗), usually inscribed with the characters 'righteous people' (義民) and the name of the particular village\n\neach of the t'uan-lien represented someone's own village. The irregulars tended to retreat or advance behind the banner of their particular town.... \"28\n\n1",
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    {
        "id": 205738,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 44,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "38\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nMany of the points mentioned above can be further developed. What interaction was there between gentry leadership, she-hsüeh, and kinship? How were the 'catchment areas' of she-hsüeh established? Is there a relationship between these elements and marketing communities? What was the pattern of consultation which preceded the mobilization of militia? What sorts of relationships were invoked and in what order? How effective were militia as fighting units? How was logistic support provided? Such questions are relevant, not only to moments of opposition to the British, but also to a more complete understanding of social structure and organization in rural Kwangtung at this time. The resistance to the occupation of the New Territories constitutes a 'case-study' which, in conjunction with Wakeman's analysis, provides a further opportunity to attempt at least partial answers to these questions.\n\nDescription of the New Territory.\n\nThe New Territory, it was originally styled in the singular, though currently used in the plural, is an irregularly shaped peninsula jutting down from the coast of Kwangtung toward Hong Kong Island.37 The extremity of the peninsula had been ceded to Britain by the Convention of Peking, 1860. In 1898 an additional 356 square miles were added to the Colony's land (see map at rear of volume).* The territory is surrounded by water on all but its northern boundary and 33 islands account for about one-quarter of its area. Rugged hills and mountains range across the peninsula from northeast to southwest. The eastern section is, therefore, an area of hills and small valleys, while the western and northern sections comprise a large and fertile plain which extends across the Sham Chun river to the mountains in the north of the district.38\n\nJ. H. Stewart Lockhart, Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong at the time of the lease, estimated the population of the territory to be 100,000, living in 423 villages.39 This population was not evenly distributed. For instance, the western plain supported 23,020 people, living in 59 villages. The much larger eastern section of the territory is said to have had a population of only 20,870 living in 182 villages.40\n\n* Plate 21.",
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        "id": 205742,
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 48,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "42\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\ncoterminous with the standard marketing areas mentioned above, each taking its name from the appropriate market town. The fourth tung, Sheung U, was larger. It included much of the eastern section of the territory, from San Tin and Sheung Shui in the north to Sai Kung in the southeast. Within it were the markets of Shek Wu Hui, Tai Po, and Sai Kung. The extent to which these divisions were the units of organization for the resistance movement will be discussed in the conclusion.\n\nThe Occupation of the New Territory in 1899.\n\nThe resistance to the occupation of the New Territory is one of the forgotten episodes in the Colony's history. Present-day government publications dismiss it with a line: \"the British take-over in April 1899 met with some initial ill-organized armed opposition...\"5 Major-General W. J. Gascoigne, who commanded the British forces in Hong Kong at the time, took a different view: \"I am confident that if this rising had not been so promptly met from all sides as it was, it would have assumed very formidable proportions, as it is now discovered that it had been most carefully planned beforehand.\"52 In the paragraphs below an attempt is made to reconstruct the development of the resistance movement, the sequences of events being divided, for purposes of exposition, into three phases: Prelude to Resistance; the Resistance Movement; and the Occupation of Sham Chun and its Aftermath.\n\nPrelude to Resistance — August 1898 to 27th March, 1899,53\n\nAlthough the Convention of Peking was concluded in June 1898, the take-over of the New Territory did not occur until April of the following year. In the interval there were various portents of impending British rule which can have done little to reassure the inhabitants of the territory. In August of 1898 Stewart Lockhart toured the territory and made enquiries about many aspects of social life. At about the same time agents of a Hong Kong land syndicate began to operate in the area. Their object was to acquire land which might appreciate in value as a result of either government purchase, or, the expansion of commercial activities. Unscrupulous methods were used to persuade reluctant owners to sell their land. For example, the syndicate's agents were the authors of a rumour that the Hong Kong government intended to expropriate all privately owned land. It was believed that the syndicate",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205743,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 49,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n43\n\nbad informal connections with Hong Kong's officialdom and that its activities were a foretaste of the future.\n\nBy March of 1899, British officials began to appear in the territory. A party was busy near the Sham Chun river, marking out the frontier with China. Meanwhile, the officer in charge of the Hong Kong police was touring the territory, considering alternative locations for police stations. This official—Captain Superintendent F. H. May arrived at Ping Shan on 27th March. His first action was to post a proclamation saying that the Hong Kong government would not interfere with the land, buildings, or customs of the people. He then designated a hill behind Ping Shan as the site for a police station. A crowd gathered and the argument began. “It says that land, buildings, and customs will not be interfered with but will remain the same as before. Why should they, therefore, when they first come into the leased area, wish to erect a police station on the hill behind our village? When has China ever erected a police station just where people live? The proclamation says that things will be as before. Are not these words untrue?”\n\n54\n\nThe Resistance Movement -- 28th March to 18th April, 1899.\n\nThe day after May's visit to Ping Shan, discussions were held in the ancestral halls of Ping Shan and Kam Tin. In both instances, agreement was reached that resistance should be offered to the British. Following the two meetings, a third took place in an ancestral hall at Ha Tsuen. Representatives of all three Tang lineages were present and previous decisions to offer resistance were ratified. Messages were sent to leaders throughout the marketing area, asking them to attend a meeting at Yuen Long market the next day.\n\nSteward Lockhart later argued that the resistance leaders feared for their positions of power and privilege. At the Ha Tsuen meeting, a wider range of anxieties were expressed: “... that under English law a poll tax would be collected; that houses would be numbered and a charge made therefor; that fishing and wood-cutting would be prohibited; that women and girls would be outraged; that births and deaths would be registered; that cattle and pigs would be destroyed; that police stations would be erected, which would ruin the Fung Shui [Mandarin: Feng Shui] of the place. In short, that the evils that would arise would be so great",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205744,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 50,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "44\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nthat one could not bear to think of them.\"55 These apprehensions represent the core of arguments which were developed and embellished as the campaign to mount the resistance movement continued. They reached their highest point in a petition sent to the San On Magistrate some two weeks later. This alleged that, in an effort to control cholera, the Hong Kong Sanitary Board murdered Chinese who were ill by poisoning them with arsenic and then burned their houses down. The inflammatory potentialities of these charges — which appear to have been widely believed — are obvious. They were used frequently by leaders of the resistance in subsequent weeks.\n\nAs requested, leaders of the various districts within the Yuen Long marketing area assembled the next day at Yuen Long market. Pat Heung, Shap Pat Heung, and Kam Tin were each represented by four people. Ping Shan sent six representatives, Ha Tsuen three, and Tun Mun (Castle Peak), one. Of the twenty-two people who attended the meeting, thirteen were members of one or another of the three Tang lineages. Once again, a decision was taken in favour of resistance, although not without disagreement. Two days later, on 31st March, leaders from throughout the area convened again at Yuen Long. The previous decision to resist was reaffirmed and letters were sent to leaders within the Sheung U Division, asking them to attend a general meeting at Yuen Long the next day.56\n\nOn 1st April leaders from the northern part of the Sheung U Division made their way to Yuen Long. In addition to the Yuen Long leaders, representatives of the following Sheung U lineages were present: Liu (Sheung Shui), Pang (Mandarin: P’eng, Fan Leng), Tang (Tai Po Tau), and Man (San Tin). The ensuing meeting was characterised by long and heated debate. It ended with a decision to offer resistance on an inter-divisional basis. Whatever the others did, the Tangs were clearly determined that the occupation would be opposed. While the Yuen Long meeting was in progress a copy of a placard issued by the Yuk-on Hin (\"wish for peace\" library) of Ping Shan reached the Governor in Hong Kong. Its message was direct and to the point:\n\nWe hate the English barbarians, who are about to enter our boundaries and take our land, and will cause us endless evil. Day and night we fear the approaching",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205746,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 52,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "46\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nYee Yuen and donated sums to its resistance fund. The two lineages also comprised two yeuk within the Ts'at Yeuk and, as such, were represented in the fighting at Tai Po.\n\nAt some point after 1st April, leaders from the Yuen Long and Sheung U Divisions went together to the Tung P'ing Kuk at Sham Chun and attempted with little success to enlist wider support for their activities. An agent was sent to Tung-kuan Hsien, where a number of 'bare-sticks' were recruited. In addition, the help of the Tang lineage of Pan T'in, in the northern part of Hsin-an Hsien, was solicited. This lineage appears to have stood in a clan relationship with the Tang higher order lineage within the New Territory. Members of the Pan T'in lineage participated in the fighting within the territory and subsequently felt themselves threatened by the British occupation of Sham Chun.\n\nThe first confrontation between the Ts'at Yeuk and the vanguard of the occupying force occurred at Tai Po. Since late March, contractors had been erecting matsheds for the Hong Kong authorities on a hill near the market. Work had been obstructed by local villagers who claimed that the hill was private land and that the matsheds would disturb the feng shui of the area. On 3rd April Captain-Superintendent May set off for Tai Po, with a mixed party of Sikh policemen from Hong Kong and a detachment of Chinese soldiers, which had been temporarily assigned to him by the Commander of the Chinese military garrison stationed at Kowloon City. He hoped to get work on the matsheds started again and intended to leave the soldiers as a guard for the construction materials, pending assumption of British authority in the Territory.\n\nMay arrived at Tai Po early in the afternoon and went to a nearby temple, almost certainly the Man Mo Miu, where he knew he would meet local leaders. A large crowd gathered, both within the temple and in the narrow street outside. His efforts at persuasion failed and the bystanders \"became very offensive in their language and demeanour.\"59 May thought it wise to leave, but hope of a dignified withdrawal ended as soon as the British party reached the street. They were set upon by an angry crowd, wielding brooms, buckets, and other improvised weapons. An escape was made after the soldiers had threatened the crowd with their rifles and the Sikhs had made a bayonet charge to clear a path.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205747,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 53,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n47\n\nWhen the party regained their boat May sent the civilians back to Hong Kong. He took the remainder of his men to the matshed hill, where he intended to spend the night. As May deployed his men on the hillside, men from Fan Leng took the card of Man Cham-tsun—leader of the Man lineage of Tai Hang—to villages throughout the area, asking for help in an assault on his position.\n\nWhen darkness fell, May could see lights in the five villages nearest the hill and more lights moving along the footpaths to the rear of his position. Bombs were exploded in the adjacent valley and parties whistled and signalled as they moved forward. Realising that he could not hold the hill, May withdrew to an adjacent one and from there watched the attack. A signal drum sounded and there was a concerted rush from all sides to the crest of the hill. The matsheds were fired and a search begun for the British party. May and his men hid in a thicket of rushes and cactus until early the next morning, when they were able to escape unobserved.\n\n+\n\n-\n\n+\n\nEnquiries made the next day, by Stewart Lockhart and General Gascoigne, showed that the assault had been made by villages from within the Ts'at Yeuk. Of the seven yeuk, only one—Ting Kok Yeuk—appears not to have participated. In retrospect, May estimated that between 100 and 200 men had been involved. He concluded: \"what struck me most was the evidently organized manner in which members from the surrounding villages concentrated to take part in the attack... This is no doubt a method... adopted both for offence and defence.\"60 The Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Henry Blake, took a detached view of the affair. “I am not disposed to attach much importance to this attack upon Mr. May and his party. Such a sudden access of militant irritability is not uncommon in Ireland, and subsides as rapidly as it rises.\"61\n\nThe next ten days were busy ones for the resistance leaders, particularly those of Ha Tsuen and Kam Tin. They visited villages throughout the area and exhorted people to oppose the occupation. Ammunition was purchased in bulk. Captured account books, associated with an ancestral hall at Ha Tsuen, show that gunpowder, ball, and percussion caps were being ordered throughout the earlier part of April. For example, the section for",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205748,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 54,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "48\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\n7th April includes entries for approximately 999 catties (about 1,332 lbs.), of gunpowder.\n\nMeanwhile, the Governor of Hong Kong again asked the Viceroy to take whatever steps necessary to maintain order prior to the take-over. A reassuring proclamation was jointly issued by the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and the Governor of Kwangtung, and Chinese troops were ordered into the area. The Governor of Hong Kong had already issued his own proclamation to the people of the New Territory. Whatever its intention, his message cannot have appeased the resistance leaders:\n\nthe most respected of your elders will be chosen to assist in the management of your village affairs, to secure peace and good order and the punishment of evil doers. I expect you to obey the laws that are made for your benefit, and all persons who break the law will be punished severely. It will be necessary for you to register without delay your titles for the land occupied by you, that the true owners may be known.\"62\n\nIn other words, control over both land and political institutions appeared to be at risk.\n\nBy 10th April plans for resistance were sufficiently advanced to allow the establishment of the T'ai Ping Kung Kuk (Great Peace Public Council), at Yuen Long market. The inaugural meeting promulgated several policies: (i) a levy of 100 taels of silver was to be made upon each village and, where necessary, force was to be used to secure payment; (ii) the wealthy, and those who appeared to be associated with the British, were forbidden to leave the area. Those attempting to do so were to be killed,63\n\nThe date and place of the formal British take-over — Tai Po, on Monday, 17th April — had been announced in a variety of contexts and must have been widely known. However, the first major clash involved provincial Chinese troops, rather than the British. As part of his undertaking to maintain order the Viceroy had directed a Major Fong, in command of a gunboat and troops, to the territory. The Major sent letters ahead, saying that his intentions were pacific. The implication was that he would not interfere with plans for resistance. These assurances were unacceptable and his landing at Castle Peak Bay, on 12th April, was successfully opposed by militia of the Yuen Long Division,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205749,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 55,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "# MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n49\n\nThe resistance movement had now reached a state of readiness. Further subscriptions of silver were obtained and responsibility for provision of rations allocated. On 13th April Ping Shan supplied pigs as food for the militia. By 14th April an advance force was in position on the hills overlooking Tai Po. It was composed of units from Fan Leng, Kam Tin, the Lam Tsuen valley, and Pat Heung. A British party making preparations for the flag raising saw about 150 men on the hills to the northwest. Four or five standards were seen, and the Chinese \"kept up an incessant yelling, beating of gongs, and firing of crackers, or guns, probably jingals ...\" 64\n\nWhen the Governor heard of these events at Tai Po he decided to station a force there immediately. On the morning of 15th April, two units were dispatched from Hong Kong. Captain Superintendent May, in charge of 22 policemen, left by launch for Tai Po. A company of the Hong Kong Regiment* — comprising 125 officers and men — set off overland from Kowloon, with orders to rendezvous with the police that afternoon.\n\nWhen the police landed near the matshed hill they were fired upon by forces from the Lam Tsuen valley, Tai Hang, Pat Heung, and Kam Tin. The militia of Ha Tsuen and Ping Shan had not been committed, although Ha Tsuen was, on this day, responsible for rations. By this time the infantry company was only a short march from Tai Po. Its commanding officer, Captain E. L. C. Berger, could see that the hills were crowded with several thousand militia, displaying six or seven different banners. As they approached the market he noted that the Chinese were uniformed and that the units nearest him occupied good tactical positions.\n\nThe soldiers joined the police on the matshed hill and found their situation difficult. The hills to the west and northwest were occupied by militia. To the east was Tolo Harbour. Twelve pieces of light artillery — probably jingals and mortars — kept up a steady fire on them from two positions. There was also continuous musketry fire. If the aim of the militia had been better, the casualties would have been heavy. Shortly thereafter the militia began an advance but were driven back by volley fire. This was the situation when H.M.S. \"Fame\" arrived late that afternoon.\n\n* A regiment of the Indian Army, with British officers and Indian (Pathan) other ranks, not to be confused with the volunteer unit of this name in present day Hong Kong.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205752,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 58,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "52\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nthe configuration of the country favoured cover and our casualties were few.\" But, \"had this advance not been conducted with great care the loss to our troops must have been heavy.\"69 After fierce fighting the militia withdrew from the valley, leaving it by way of the saddle which gives access to the Pat Heung district. The soldiers followed and, having lost touch with the Chinese, bivouacked for the night at Sheung Tsuen, on the foothills overlooking the Pat Heung valley.\n\nThe next afternoon a large force (subsequently estimated at 2,600 men), was seen approaching from a distance. It consisted of men from Ping Shan, Ha Tsuen, and Castle Peak and from four villages in adjacent Chinese territory, including Pan Tin. The British force took up positions and stood watching the militia, deployed in three lines, \"advance across the open in excellent skirmishing order.70 The British Officer Commanding later conceded that it was \"distinctly a determined advance for Chinamen.”71 The militia began firing at long range and their rifle and jingal fire shortly became almost continuous. When the distance had been reduced to 500 yards the British tried a few ranging shots, moved forward under cover of a dry water course, and advanced into the open toward the on-coming militia. In the face of such a determined response, which now became a general advance accompanied by heavy fire, the militia broke and ran.\n\nThis battle marked the end of organized resistance within the New Territory. The next weeks were spent in establishing the civil administration and in persuading villagers to return to their normal occupations. The Governor, in attempting to explain what had happened to a remote Colonial Office, drew upon another Celtic parallel. The resistance, he said, revealed \"a state of clan feeling and power of combination not unlike that of the Scottish Highlands two centuries ago . . .\"72\n\nThe Occupation of Sham Chun and its Aftermath-- May to September, 1899.\n\nThus far, operations had been confined to the newly leased territory. Early in May, however, reports reached the Hong Kong Government of an impending attack from across the Sham Chun river. Police informers said that 140 ‘bare-sticks' from Tung-kuan Hsien had assembled in secrecy at Sha Tau, on Deep Bay. They were to form the nucleus of a force which was to be augmented by",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
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    {
        "id": 205757,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 63,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n57\n\nas leaders during the fighting. Ten of the 63 leaders are identi-fiable as members of the gentry, in the sense that they are men-tioned in the documents as having degrees obtained either by purchase or by examination.\n\nexamination. Most of the remainder could be termed 'local notables'. Some were substantial owners of agricul-tural land and village houses. Other owned shops in their local markets. It is probable that they were often --as was Man Cham-tsun managers of corporately-owned lineage property. The available information about these men is summarized below.\n\n—\n\nTable II\n\nLEADERS IN THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT\n\n(By Marketing area, District & Village, Surname)*\n\n  \n    Marketing area\n    District, or other Association of sharing gradu-ates\n    Village, or Surnames\n    No.\n    No. of leaders\n  \n  \n    Yuen Long\n    5+\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Ha Tsuen\n    \n    Tang\n    12\n    2\n  \n  \n    Ping Shan\n    \n    Tang\n    11\n    1\n  \n  \n    Kam Tin\n    \n    Tang\n    10\n    2\n  \n  \n    Pat Heung\n    \n    Tang\n    2\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Li\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Lai\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Tse\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    1.\n    \n    +3\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    15\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Shap Pat Heung\n    \n    Chu\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Ng\n    2\n    2\n  \n  \n    \n    15\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Tai Po\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Tun Mun Ts'at Yeuk\n    \n    Tang\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Lo\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    Tai Hang\n    \n    Man\n    3\n    1\n  \n  \n    \n    71\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Pan Chung\n    \n    Chan\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Mak\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    -\n    \n    *\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    +3\n    \n    +\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    ++\n    \n    7\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    \n    **\n    \n  \n  \n    Fan Leng\n    \n    Pang\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    Sha Lo Tung\n    \n    Li\n    2\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    \"\n    **\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    *\n    *\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    2\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Cheung Shue Tan\n    \n    Chan\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    7:\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    \n    *\n    \n    H\n    \n  \n  \n    3.\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Hang Ha Po\n    \n    Lam\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    Tai Po Tau\n    \n    Tang\n    *\n    \n  \n  \n    Shek Wu Hui\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Lung Yeuk Tau\n    \n    Tang\n    I\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    ++\n    \n    +1\n    \n  \n  \n    Sheung Shui\n    \n    Liu\n    1\n    \n  \n  \n    Ping Kong\n    \n    Hau\n    2\n    1\n  \n  \n    \n    **\n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Sha Tau Kok\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Sham Chun\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    Wo Hang\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n  \n    San Tin\n    \n    Li\n    4\n    \n  \n  \n    \n    \n    Man\n    1\n    \n  \n\n* All romanisations are in Cantonese.",
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        "id": 205762,
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        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 68,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "62\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\n44 Skinner, op. cit., Part 1, p. 27. The markets of the northern district of the New Territory seem to have been dependent primarily upon Sham Chun, rather than upon several intermediate markets. This may be an example of what Skinner terms a marketing system in a \"topographic cul-de-sac\". Ibid., p. 21.\n\n45 Baker, Hugh D. R. \"The Five Great Clans of the New Territories”, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. VI, 1966, p. 31.\n\n46 Freedman, op. cit., pp. 82ff., gives an account of the origins of the Ts'at Yeuk. The character yeuk may be translated as 'covenant', or 'agreement'. The seven covenants' were a confederation of seven groups of villages within the Tai Po marketing area.\n\n47 Papers Extracts, op. cit., p. 192.\n\n48 Hayes, \"The Pattern of Life.\", op. cit., p. 9.\n\n49 Freedman, op. cit., p. 81.\n\n50 Papers Extracts, op. cit., pp. 201ff.\n\n51 Hong Kong 1963, Hong Kong, 1964, pp. 363ff.\n\n52 Papers Extracts, op. cit., pp. 587-8.\n\n53 The following account has been assembled, somewhat in the manner of a jigsaw puzzle, from two sources: Hong Kong. Correspondence (June 20, 1898 to August 20, 1900) Respecting the Extension of the Boundaries of the Colony, Eastern No. 66, Colonial Office, London, 1900; Papers Laid Before the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, 1899. Despatches and Other Papers Relating to the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1900. Specific references will be given only for quotations.\n\n54 Correspondence, op. cit., p. 261. A brief discussion of the activities of the land syndicate mentioned in the preceding paragraph is to be found in Endacott, G.B., A History of Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, London and Hong Kong, and Paperback Edition, 1964, p. 265, who says: \"The main problem of the take-over was not military but administrative. A land syndicate of Chinese among whom it was suspected Ho Kai [Dr. Ho Kai, a Chinese unofficial member of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong] was one, had bought land at a fraction of its value by spreading the rumour that the British would seize all land. Blake threatened to restore this property, but the land problem proved too baffling for him to carry out his threat.\"\n\n55 Correspondence, op. cit., p. 261. Wakeman, op. cit., Chap. V, discusses similar charges made against the British at Canton almost sixty years earlier.\n\n56 One recipient was Liu Wan-kuk, of Sheung Shui. His support for the resistance appears to have been half-hearted throughout. On at least two occasions he protested: \"the villages in our Division have no plans. Moreover, our commissariat and arms being insufficient, how can we offer effective resistance? We request your Division [Yuen Long] to decide on the plan of campaign and we will follow your instruction\". The dominance of the Yuen Long Division—and of the Tang lineages within it—was to become increasingly obvious as the resistance movement developed. Papers Despatches, op. cit., p. 72.\n\n57 Translated in Correspondence, op. cit., pp. 138ff.\n\n58 Baker, op. cit., pp. 35ff.\n\n59 Correspondence, op. cit., p. 147.\n\n60 Ibid., p. 148.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 205763,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 69,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "MILITIA. MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n63\n\n61 Ibid., p. 154.\n\n62 Ibid., p. 159.\n\n63 Liu Wan-kuk, of Sheung Shui, later described the inaugural meeting and its consequences in the following terms. \"On the 1st of the 3rd moon (10th April), the Un Long Division made a great show of force, and stated in a most peremptory manner that if we refused to join in the resistance of the British, thousands of men from the Un Long Division with arms would proceed to level to the ground the villages belonging to the Liu, Tang and Pang families. The Sheung U Division was therefore compelled on the 3rd day (12th April) to request the Hau, Liu, Pang, Tang, Man clans to meet in the temple dedicated to a former Governor of Kwang Tung province. There it was decided to raise a small public subscription.... It was also decided that the various villages in our Division should have their trainbands (or militia) in readiness so that we should not be....powerless to check disorder. Our Division was the victim of circumstances.... Our trainband (or militia) was intended solely for the protection of the old and young in our Division.\" Translation of a statement made to the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong, 26th April 1899, Papers. Despatches..., op. cit., p. 74. Here and subsequently, the spelling of place names and parenthetical remarks are those of the original translator. Remarks in brackets are my own.\n\n64 Correspondence ..., op. cit., p. 226. Jingals are \"long tapering guns, six to fourteen feet in length, borne on the shoulders of two men and fired by a third. They have a stand, or tripod, reminding one of a telescope being less liable to burst than cannon, they form the most effective gun the Chinese possess.\" J. Dyer Ball, Things Chinese, London, 1904 edition, p. 44.\n\nPage 13\n\nCorrespondence\n\n65 Stewart Lockhart described the flag as follows: \"the flag has a red border and a white centre, on which are seven Chinese characters meaning: Train band sanctioned by the Government: -Tai Kai (village), surname Man.' The village referred to.... is also known by the name of Tai Hang\n\n, op. cit., p. 180. The militia were so martial in appearance and conduct that the British at first thought they were regulars. The Viceroy commented: \"the Governor of Hong Kong suspected that they were regular troops from the fact that they had guns, cannon, and uniforms. He was not aware that the villagers of Kwangtung, in their constant fights with each other, are always erecting forts, and use guns and cannon, and wear uniforms. This is a matter of common notoriety.\" Ibid., p. 304.\n\n66 Ibid., pp. 188ff. These and similar letters were found in the T'ai Ping Kung Kuk at Yuen Long. A proclamation issued by the Council of the Yuen Long Division was also discovered. It supports Liu Wan-kuk's claim that coercion was a feature of the resistance movement:\n\n\"The English barbarians are about to enter our territory, and ruin will come upon our villages and hamlets, All we villagers must enthusiastically come forward to offer armed resistance and act in unison. When the drum sounds to the fight, we must all respond to the call for assistance. Should anyone hesitate to take part or hinder or obstruct our military plans he will most certainly be severely punished, and no leniency will be shown. This is issued as a forewarning.\" Ibid.\n\n67 Ibid., p. 171.\n\n68 Papers\n\n69 Ibid.\n\nDespatches\n\n, op. cit., p. 66.\n\nop. cit., p. 166.\n\n70 Correspondence",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206090,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1970",
        "page_number": 170,
        "title": "RAS-1970",
        "content_text": "HONG KONG BEFORE THE BRITISH\n\n165\n\nsaved by their uncle, a man called Yang Liang-chieh, and made their way with their mother to Foochow which they reached at the beginning of 1276. Their position was by no means hopeless. Most of Southern China was still loyal to them and they had hopes of reaching Canton before the Mongol armies and forming a line of resistance along the whole coast. With them was a famous statesman and writer Wen T'ien-chiang whose influence was very great. They had a considerable army; according to some accounts, it consisted of 170,000 regulars and was increased by 300,000 volunteers, and their court and retinue included a chief minister, Ch'en I-chung, and the general Chang Shih-chieh who recognized the eldest son as Emperor and were prepared to fight for him.\n\nAt Foochow they left behind a force under Wen T'ien-chiang and went first by sea to Chuan Chow, the port which had been a centre of foreign trade during the Sung dynasty. But here they found the local authorities hostile to them and carried on to Chao Chow. There a Mongol force appeared and tried to cut them off but they escaped in their boats and reached K'ap Tze Mun where they landed and marched inland with the idea of getting to Canton, but again they found the local authorities lukewarm and not to be trusted. They took ship and reached a place called Mui Wai in Kwangtung province.\n\nMui Wai or Lam Wai, as it is sometimes called, was undoubtedly in our region. The Topography says that the ruins of the travelling court were still to be seen there. But it has been impossible to identify it. On a map contained in the Topography it is set in the sea just opposite the Kowloon peninsula and from descriptions in texts it appears to be very near Kowloon.* It was densely wooded at that time. From what evidence there is one might suppose it was a part of Hong Kong island, or else one of the peaks to the north of Fat Tong Mun which was mistaken for an island or possibly in the neighbourhood of Mui Wo on Lantau, since the two names are euphonious. Wherever it was, the Emperors and their court appear to have settled there for one or two months, crossing several times by boat to a place on the mainland where they settled in the fourth moon of the year 1277.\n\n18 梅蔚 or 监蔚\n\n* See plate 19.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206092,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1970",
        "page_number": 172,
        "title": "RAS-1970",
        "content_text": "HONG KONG BEFORE THE BRITISH\n\n167\n\nof Lantau as being the place where many loyal servants of Sung are buried.\n\nThe same scholar who identified the marquis Yang also states that the elder of the two kings died on Lantau. But this cannot be correct.22 The place of his death is Kong Chow and there is no reason to identify it, as he had done, with Tai Yü Shan or Lantau. After the defeat at Ts'ün Wan the movements of the fugitive court are not very clear and there are contradictions in the various accounts, but it seems that they fled as far as they could westwards from the battlefield. During their journey they met with a storm as a result of which the eldest Emperor, who was afterwards given the title of Tuan Tsung, fell sick. The texts on the subject often state that the storm they encountered was a typhoon, but commentators have been careful to point out that typhoons do not occur in winter and that it happened in the 12th moon. However, this is most unimportant.\n\nThe Mongol armies were bent on catching the Emperors since their death was to mean the end of all resistance in South China. The chief minister, Ch'en I-chung, who had accompanied the court so far, deserted them and fled to Annam, and many other desertions must have occurred at this time. Their army, which is said to have numbered 200,000, was concentrated mostly in boats and commanded by Chang Shih-chieh, somewhere west of the Canton estuary. A Mongol fleet equipped at Canton was searching for them in the estuary. Tuan Tsung died in the 4th moon of the year 1278. He was then eleven years old. His brother was declared Emperor by the chief minister Lu Hsiu-fu. He was eight years old.\n\nThe last Emperor Wei Wong or Ti Ping, to give him his posthumous title, still had a slender chance of regaining his kingdom if Wen Tien-chiang, the minister who was organising resistance on the Kiangsi-Fukienese border, had been able to gain a battle. In the 3rd moon, Wen Tien-chiang had advanced as far as Kan-chow and there was a chance of his being able to attack Canton and relieve the pressure on the Emperor's army. The new\n\n21 廣東新語\n\n22 Professor Hsu Ti-shan has, however, just published an article in which he reaffirms this theory. (See X).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206322,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 139,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "THE DISTRICT WATCH COMMITTEE\n\n133\n\nAffairs, and so recruitment for the force was suspended and vacancies caused by death or retirement were not filled.\n\nIn 1948 the Secretary for Chinese Affairs wrote that 'even before the outbreak of the Pacific War it was becoming evident that this system of raising money (i.e., by voluntary subscriptions) would have to be abandoned. Plans for the reorganisation of the Force were under consideration at the time when the Japanese invaded the Colony'. By the District Watch Ordinance, No. 15 of 1949, the force became the direct responsibility of government and the pay and terms of service were brought into line, rank for rank, with those of the Police Force. The Committee was not mentioned in the new Ordinance, and the names of its surviving members were no longer given in the Civil Service Lists.\n\nThe reasons for this change were never made clear by the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. But it seems reasonable to conclude that the utility of the force declined once the regular police became more professionalised. There was probably some resistance within government and the community to the idea of a few prominent Chinese controlling a private police force and, on occasions, putting it to their own use. It could also be argued that since the returned Governor, Sir Mark Young, had promised a far greater participation of the many rather than the few in public life, the need for a small body of rich Chinese to act as a key advisory body was seen as not quite 'democratic' in the new Hong Kong; moreover, a few prominent Chinese, members of the Committee, had been a little too prominent in the organisations set up by the Japanese. For these and other reasons, then, the District Watch Force and its Committee after eighty-three years of life and service to the public came to an end in 1949.\n\n—\n\nAn analysis of the District Watch Committee terminates in a number of broader sociological enquiries: the role of associations in Overseas Chinese communities and the nature of leadership in such societies. It is not my intention to pursue such comparative questions in this short and mainly descriptive paper; but of course some comparisons should be suggested. The system that evolved in Hong Kong was not imposed on the Chinese by a colonial government; there were no Congrégations or Kapitan Chinas in Hong Kong63 nor, for that matter, did secret societies supply leaders as they did in Malaya at one stage.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206326,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 143,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "The District Watch Committee\n\n137\n\nto be the richest man in Hong Kong. When Ho Tung retired as chief compradore to Jardine, Matheson's in 1900, Ho Fook succeeded him. Ho Fook's assistant was Ho Kom Tong, another of Ho Tung's brothers. The members of the District Watch Committee were members of a small circle of businessmen, often related through ties of blood or marriage. When the Tai Yau Bank was established in 1914 with a paid-up capital of $6,000,000, the proprietors were named as Lau Chu Pak, Ho Fook, Ho Kom Tong, Lo Chung Shiu and Chan Kai Ming. Lau Chu Pak was compradore to A. S. Watson and Co., chairman of the Po On Commercial Association and chairman of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce; Chan Kai Ming was manager of the Opium Farm; and Lo Chung Shiu, assistant compradore to Jardine, Matheson and Co., was Ho Fook's brother-in-law. All were or became members of the District Watch Committee.\n\n22 T. C. Cheng writes that Wei Yuk 'was very much concerned about law and order among the Chinese masses because in those early days riff-raff and political refugees from South China continued to come into Hong Kong. Thus it was at his suggestion that the District Watch Force was founded in 1888. Mr. Cheng appears to be mistaken about the date and is no doubt referring to the ordinance of that year, no. 13 of 1888 rather than to its proper date of origin. Wright and Cartright, Feldwick, and Professor Woo all state that the Committee was formed on Wei Yuk's suggestion. See: T. C. Cheng, 'Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils of Hong Kong up to 1941', Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 9, 1969, pp. 17-18; Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartright, Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai and other Treaty Ports, London, Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Co., 1908, p. 109; W. Feldwick, ed., Present Day Impressions of the Far East and Prominent Chinese at Home and Abroad, London Globe Encyclopedia Co., 1917, p. 576; Professor Woo Sing Lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Five Continents Book Company, 1939, p. 4.\n\n23 Unfortunately all the records in the Secretariat for Chinese Affairs were destroyed or lost during the Japanese occupation and hence anyone trying to reconstruct the history of the District Watch must work mostly from scraps of information found in government publications, newspapers, books.\n\n24 My guess is that a large number were traditional Chinese merchants from the Five Districts operating on a relatively small scale. The Committee after 1891 represented the views of a more westernised and modernised elite with a knowledge of modern business techniques and modern financial manipulations. Dr. Ho Kai, for example, played the stock exchange with great success and speculated in many fields, particularly land development. He was, properly speaking, a financier although his occupation is often given tout court as lawyer. He had also qualified in medicine at Edinburgh but gave up the practice of medicine soon after his return to Hong Kong in 1882 because of Chinese resistance to western medicine.\n\n25 In 1903, for example, the Committee opposed the re-introduction of the night-pass system but suggested other remedial measures (see Index to Correspondence (General Register) 1894-1904, Hong Kong, Noronha and Co., 1909, p. 100). In 1909 'at the request of the District Watchmen Committee, children who are hawking without a licence are on their first offence sent to the Registrar General who cautions their guardians. This procedure seems to have proved effective in each case' wrote the Registrar General in 1909. It is worth noting that both Registrar General and Committee wanted to end the night-pass system and were opposed by the Captain Superintendent of Police, who was unsuccessful. As for hawkers, very few Chinese regarded them as a serious menace although colonial administrators",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206521,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1972",
        "page_number": 69,
        "title": "RAS-1972",
        "content_text": "SIR JAMES HALDANE STEWART LOCKHART\n\n63\n\nOn 16 April Lockhart returned to Taipo and in the presence of the General Officer Commanding, Major-General W. J. Gascoigne, and about 500 men, he hoisted the British flag and then read the Order-in-Council and Convention. The territory was now formally occupied. There had been some resistance from the people and from those living in the Sham Chun area. Lockhart had been asked to return to Hong Kong to attend a meeting of the Legislative Council but in a minute to the Governor he stated: 'I have consulted the General Officer Commanding, who thinks it very desirable for many reasons that I should remain here. I am of the same opinion, so propose to remain.'22 Since the situation was still unsettled, the Governor concurred with Lockhart's proposal and Lockhart stayed behind with the troops, accompanying them on a long sweep through the New Territories to make the British presence known.\n\nLockhart and the troops led by Lieutenant-Colonel The O'Gorman pushed on from Taipo on 18 April to Shek Kong; from that village they passed through Kam Tin, Yuen Long, Ping Shan, Sheung Shui, Fanling, and arrived back in Taipo on 27 April. The O'Gorman reported: \"To the Honourable J.H. Stewart Lockhart, C.M.G., Colonial Secretary, is due the admirable results that have been attained in the Civil Administration of this Territory during this brief state of turmoil; his measures have been taken with great energy and ability and in a manner that, long experience has shown him, were suitable to the occasion. The result has been a most complete success. Only those on the spot can realise the amount of labour and care he has devoted from early morning to late at night to the discharge of these trying duties. A most hearty co-operation has existed throughout between us and no difference of opinion on any one point has arisen.'23 The Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, in a despatch to the Governor, commented: 'without wishing to undervalue in any way the services rendered by others, it is evident to me that much has been due to the energy of Mr. Lockhart, and to his local knowledge.\"24 Lockhart remained in the New Territories until July 1899 in order to start the civil administration. The headquarters of the new administration were fixed at Taipo. He was assisted in his task by C.M. Messer, a cadet officer, Ts'oi Yeuk-shan, First Chinese Clerk, and two Chinese assistants. The problems he had to face were at first formidable.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206551,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1972",
        "page_number": 99,
        "title": "RAS-1972",
        "content_text": "REVIEW OF HOUSING CONDITIONS IN HONG KONG\n\n93\n\nhealth and in his first annual report went so far as to predict the eventual outbreak of an epidemic of \"unenviable renown\".2 He found houses commonly occupied by three to eight families per room which were in a filthy state and were constructed without any regard to basic sanitary requirements. Such properties were owned both by Europeans and wealthy Chinese who exacted high rents secure in the knowledge that, because of the critical shortage of accommodation, the tenants were in no position to seek more equitable terms or improvements.\n\nEfforts by the government to improve standards of construction and health met with determined resistance from property owners. To take but one example, in early 1878 the Surveyor General, J. M. Price rejected some plans of Chinese tenement houses on the grounds that they would be unhealthy; to help improve the situation he made certain recommendations for better ventilation by widening the alley at the rear of the premises. This action met with a storm of protest and culminated in a petition to the Governor, Pope-Hennessy, to the effect that the buildings were designed in accordance with the requirements and habits of Chinese people. The petitioners further claimed that:\n\n• these habits, although condemned by the more recent rules of western science are, as a matter of fact, the outcome of a lengthened experience among the Chinese living in large and crowded cities, and are as deep rooted as most of their social customs, so it is quite certain that the tenants, as they would not understand the reason, would in no way avail themselves of the facilities for the free access of light and air. The windows looking out into the proposed alleys would be kept closed and the alleys themselves would be made receptacles for the deposit of refuse... Chinese tenants are, as a rule,... unable or unwilling to pay high rents, and it is only by so dividing the houses that many families can reside in each division that Chinese property is made profitable and at the same time the necessary lowness of rent attained\n\n2 \"Annual Report of the Colonial Surgeon\", The Hongkong Government Gazette, 4th April 1874, p. 157.\n\n3 \"Chinese Houses\", The Hongkong Government Gazette, 27th July, 1878, pp. 370-371.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206557,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1972",
        "page_number": 105,
        "title": "RAS-1972",
        "content_text": "REVIEW OF HOUSING CONDITIONS IN HONG KONG\n\n99\n\nby the reduction of available accommodation, that privies for common use were contrary to Chinese social habits and that no compensation was offered to property owners.7 The unofficial (appointed) members of the Legislative Council were most vociferous in their objections to the proposed measures and were successful in obtaining numerous amendments which made the Ordinance of very limited use. However, the restriction over the amount of internal living space was retained but only after heated debate and the use of the official majority vote.\n\nTwo years elapsed before the government again attempted to introduce new provisions in the form of a Building Ordinance. The matter of rear yards was included in the Bill but this was once more forced out by the unofficial Legislative Council members and had to be included in the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance. A clause was proposed whereby mezzanine floors could only be constructed if provision were made for a vertical clearance of 9 ft. above and below. This was modified at the insistence of the unofficial members so that it would apply only in cases where the mezzanine extended over more than two-thirds of a room; otherwise a clearance of 6 ft. was permitted. Another clause relating to the provision of sufficient windows was eliminated whilst the installation of privies was made optional.\n\nStiff resistance continued from property owners against further proposals put forward by the government to help improve the sanitary condition of the Colony which daily became the cause of greater concern. Nevertheless, the administration did achieve a number of major improvements recommended by Chadwick in 1882. Between 1883 and 1900, for example, over HK$2 million was spent on improving water supplies through the completion of a reservoir at Tytam; another HK$1 million was allocated for the reprovisioning of the sewerage system and the redraining of 9,957 houses; a further HK$660,000 was used for the construction of new markets, animal depots, slaughterhouses, latrines, laundries and other miscellaneous works.\n\n7Letter of 18th July 1901 to the Hon. J. Chamberlain, Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies from J. H. Stewart Lockhart, Colonial Secretary, Enclosure No. 2: Measures to Give Effect to Mr. Chadwick's Recommendations of 1882 Legislation, Blue Book Reports on Sanitation and Housing 1900-1907, Hong Kong, 1907.\n\nPage 105\n\nPage 106",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206771,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1973",
        "page_number": 48,
        "title": "RAS-1973",
        "content_text": "42\n\nPETER WESLEY SMITH\n\nLockhart, A contemporary newspaper, however, revealed the true nature of the explanation: 75 marines and two Maxim guns.7\n\nThe Special Commissioner was appalled by the discourtesy of the villagers. They were reported to the Viceroy at Canton, who was to \"deal with the matter in a proper manner\", and a deputation from Kam Tin was obliged to apologize in Hong Kong.\n\nSuch punishment failed to impress the inhabitants with the error of being disrespectful to British officials, for when occupation of the New Territories commenced in April 1899 the Tangs of Kam Tin were foremost in organization of the resistance movement. Again, therefore, stern reprimands were required, this time by the use of gunpowder. On April 18 a party of sappers from the Hong Kong Regiment blew down the walls flanking the gates of both Kat Hing Wai and Tai Hong Wai, and a few days later the villagers themselves, as an act of submission, carried the two pairs of gates to Flag Staff Hill (Tai Po).10 There they were admired by Governor Sir Henry Blake who, wrote Stewart Lockhart, “instructed me to forward to him a pair of gates from Kam Tin\". This was duly done in May, though the villagers had to be reminded to send in a socket.12\n\nThe two sets of handsome gates were both defective, one wing of each having suffered from the back-scratching of generations of itchy Kam Tin pigs.13 The remaining gates in good condition were combined to make a pair and were appropriated by Blake for \"Myrtle Grove\", his home in the Irish county of Youghal.\n\nIn 1924 the residents of Kam Tin petitioned for the return of the gates. They were supported by the District Officer (North), who referred to the gates as objects \"of pride to the inhabitants on account of their workmanship and antiquity”, and the Assistant Superintendent of Police (New Territories) recalled their whereabouts. His wife had formerly been maid and companion to Blake's daughters, and she remembered seeing the gates at Myrtle Grove in 1902. Stewart Lockhart, then retired after serving for many years at Wei Hai Wei, was asked to approach Lady Blake for their recovery.1 His mission was successful, but when the gates arrived back in Hong Kong the Tai Hong Wai villagers recognised their half and claimed possession. Long negotiations ensued between elders of the two villages, and eventually, reports O'Dwyer, \"the amount of face that would be gained for the whole clan by their erection as a",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt",
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    {
        "id": 206772,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1973",
        "page_number": 49,
        "title": "RAS-1973",
        "content_text": "The Kam Tin Gates\n\n43\n\ncomposite whole, was put forward so convincingly that it carried the vote. And so the work was completed just in time for the ceremony of re-opening.\n\nThus, on May 26, 1925, Governor Sir Reginald E. Stubbs and his entourage arrived at Kam Tin for the ceremonial return of the revered gates. They were greeted by a Chinese salute of small guns and firecrackers and were presented with an Address which stated: \"We shall always now remember, how when your royal chair did pass, children and women left all the lanes deserted to come to bid you welcome, and when your car of state did stop, the neighbourhood was filled with joy\"16 There were \"expressions of goodwill and loyalty heard on all hands\"17, and the Government congratulated itself on a fine public relations exercise.\n\nIs there anything in this episode which gives it more than a mere antiquarian interest? Perhaps it illustrates the increasing readiness of the Hong Kong Government to accommodate the wishes of the local population; certainly, Governor Stubbs intended to impress upon the Kam Tin villagers his Government's munificence. He had gone to a good deal of trouble to ensure the gates' return, and the whole operation was paid for out of public funds. The Hong Kong Telegraph commented that \"there has perhaps been no incident in the whole history of Hongkong and of the New Territories which has more eloquently and genuinely revealed the Government's friendly feeling and sympathy towards the Chinese of the New Territories\"18. Yet within a month the anti-British strike and boycott of 1925-26 had commenced, and relations with the local Chinese thence rapidly deteriorated. One can also detect in Stewart Lockhart's Papers the Special Commissioner's disapproval of Blake's appropriation of the gates. The Governor and his deputy were at odds on several matters relating to the early administration of the New Territories, and there is evidence that differences of opinion regarding policy occasioned some personal animosity. Perhaps the episode of the gates from Kam Tin was a contributing factor.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 And to correct them. According to a translation deposited in the Colonial Secretariat Library, Hong Kong, the Kam Tin villagers offered resistance to the British in 1899 because the Ch'ing Government had not previously proclaimed the fact of the New Territories lease. This is false, for a proclamation had been issued by the San On Magistrate.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 206773,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1973",
        "page_number": 50,
        "title": "RAS-1973",
        "content_text": "44\n\nPETER WESLEY-SMITH\n\n2 See Wong Chung Hong, \"Walled and Moated a Hong Kong Village\" Arts of Asia, Vol. 1, No. 4, July-August 1971. This article is accompanied by architectural drawings of Kat Hing Wai. See also Sun Hok-p'ang, \"Legends and Stories of the New Territories. III. Kam Tin” Hong Kong Naturalist, Vol. VIII, Nos. 3 and 4, December 1936, pp. 255-6.\n\n3 Stewart Lockhart's Report is relatively well known; it is published in Confidential Print, Eastern No. 66, Serial No. 51, p. 83: C.O.882/5,\n\n4 \"Journal of Inspection through the Newly Leased Territory”, and Stewart Lockhart to Acting Colonial Secretary (undated), Nos. 27 and 29 in \"Papers Regarding the New Territory, Hong Kong\", in Stewart Lockhart's Papers, Vol. 3. These papers are deposited in the National Library of Scotland, Acc. 4138, and are used here with permission.\n\n5 Hongkong Weekly Press. Vol. XLVIII, September 17, 1898, p. 239.\n\n6 See note 4 above.\n\n7 See note 5 above.\n\n8 Serial No. 172 (see note 3 above).\n\n9 See R. G. Groves, \"Militia, Market and Lineage: Chinese Resistance to the Occupation of Hong Kong's New Territories in 1899” JHKBRAS, Vol. 9 (1969), p. 31.\n\n10 Stubbs to Thomas, No. 246, June 7, 1924, enclosure 3: minute by W. G. Gerrard, Assistant Superintendent of Police (New Territories), dated June 2, 1924: Stewart Lockhart's Papers, Vol. 5. The Hon. Mr. Bird incorrectly recalled at the re-opening ceremony in 1925 that he saw the gates carried into the Tai Po camp on the day the Union Jack was hoisted there (that is, April 16, 1899). He also stated that it took ten coolies to carry each gate: Hong Kong Telegraph, May 27, 1925.\n\n11 Entry for May 4, 1899, in a diary kept by Stewart Lockhart and contained in Vol. 36 of his Papers.\n\n12 See entries for May 9 and May 29, 1899, in ibid.\n\n13 K. O'Dwyer, S. J., \"Kam T'in. Memories and Legends\" The Rock, April, 1940, pp. 157-62.\n\n14 A. E. Collins to Stewart Lockhart, August 19, 1924: Stewart Lockhart's Papers, Vol. 5.\n\n15 O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 162.\n\n16 A translation of this Address is in the Colonial Secretariat Library, bound together with the official programme for the ceremony and the Hong Kong Telegraph's report of the proceedings.\n\n17 Hong Kong Telegraph, May 27, 1925,\n\n18 Ibid.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207067,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1974",
        "page_number": 138,
        "title": "RAS-1974",
        "content_text": "132\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nIn English\n\nAlabaster, Chaloner Grenville, The Laws of Hong Kong, 3 vols., Hong Kong, Noronha and Co., Government Printers, 1913.\n\nArlington, L. C., Through the Dragon's Eyes, Fifty Years' Experiences of a Foreigner in the Chinese Government Service, London, Constable, 1931.\n\nBaker, H. D. R., 'The Five Great Clans of the New Territories', in JHKBRAS, 5, 1965: 25-47.\n\nA Chinese Lineage Village, Sheung Shui, London, Frank Cass, 1968.\n\nBalfour, S. F., 'Hong Kong before the British being a local history before the British occupation', Shanghai, T'ien Hsia Monthly, Vols. 11-12, 1940-41; 330-352, 440-464. Reprinted in JHKBRAS, 10, 1970: 134-179.\n\nBarnett, K. M. A., 'The Peoples of the New Territories' in J. M. Braga (compiler), Hong Kong Business Symposium, Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, Ltd., 1957, pp. 261-265.\n\n'Hong Kong before the Chinese', 'Technical Revolution in 900 AD' and 'The Riddle of the Hakka', Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 24-26th April, 1967.\n\nCollingwood, Cuthbert, Rambles of a Naturalist on the Shores and Waters of the China Sea, London, John Murray, 1868.\n\nCooper, J. T., 'The Mapping of Hong Kong' in JHKBRAS 9, 1969: 131-140.\n\nDes Voeux, Sir G. William, My Colonial Service in British Guiana, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Fiji, Australia, Newfoundland and Hong Kong, London, John Murray, 1903, 2 vols.\n\nEitel, E. J., (revised and enlarged by Immanuel Gottlieb Genähr), A Dictionary of the Chinese Language, 2 vols., Hong Kong, Kelly and Walsh, 1910-1911.\n\nFox, Grace, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates 1832-1869, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1940.\n\nFranke, Wolfgang, An Introduction to the Sources of Ming History, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaysia Press, Singapore 1968.\n\nFu, Lo-shu (Compiler), A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820), 2 vols., Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1966.\n\nGiles, H. A., A Chinese English Dictionary, Second Edition, revised and Enlarged. Shanghai, Hong Kong, etc., Kelly and Walsh, 1912.\n\nGroves, R. G., 'Militia, Market and Lineage: Chinese Resistance to the Occupation of Hong Kong's New Territories in 1899', JHKBRAS, 9, 1969: 31-64.\n\nHay, Sir John C. Dalrymple, The Suppression of Piracy in the China Sea, 1849, London, Edward Stanford, 1889.\n\nHayes, J. W., 'Cheung Chau 1850-1898: Information from Commemorative Tablets', JHKBRAS 3, 1963: 88-99.\n\n'The San On Map of Mgr. Volontieri' in JHKBRAS 10, 1970: 193-196.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1974.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/x633mp077",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207401,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 169,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n161\n\ntroops, in my opinion, put up an excellent resistance from the static strong points which were the mainstay of the defence plan. They were pitted against a numerically superior and much more mobile enemy and no blame should be placed on them for the fact that our resistance was broken in under three weeks, nowhere near the ninety days originally judged to be desirable. These views imply no criticism of the defence plan for the circumstances of the Colony decided the plan. The defence was further prejudiced by the huge population of non-combatants in Kowloon and Victoria. Given the conditions under which our troops had to fight, I believe that our defeat could never have been avoided except by avoiding hostilities altogether. I believe we could have accepted any loss of face which a pre-war withdrawal, leaving only internal security forces, would have entailed. Having said that, however, the troops thereby released from Hong Kong would probably have been used in Singapore and almost certainly would not have changed the outcome there. One can only sympathise with the Governor and the G.O.C. and their staffs in their task of defending a Colony whose fate was sealed long before the fighting and they and the troops did their jobs well. The story unfolded slowly but inexorably after the style of a Greek tragedy.\n\n26 DECEMBER 1941–7 AUGUST 1942\n\nThe Japanese were slow to move in to take control of the hospital though they did concentrate our fighting troops at once and moved them to prisoner of war camps. For years I wondered why the hospital and indeed the whole of Hong Kong was spared the large scale rape, murder and looting which seemed to be the reward for Japanese troops upon the capture of large cities in China. The case of Nanking in December 1937 was the best known of these, when the city was given over to the victorious Japanese troops and for some weeks suffered on a huge scale.\n\nIt was not until I read the Official History of the War Against Japan that the probable explanation appeared in Volume 1. The Japanese attack on Hong Kong was made by the 38 Division reinforced by additional troops. The division had three regiments, the 228, 229 and 230 Infantry Regiments. The 228 regiment was transferred from Hong Kong to Davao on 18 January 1942 and thence to Amboina and Timor. The 229 regiment and one battalion",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207516,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 284,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "276\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nordered to do so, unwounded. However this may be, there we were, available to relieve them of the responsibility of caring for our casualties.\n\nThe next point of importance is the Japanese decision to behave like other belligerents and abide by the terms of the Geneva Convention though they had not been signatories. As a result, they recognised and accepted representation in Hong Kong and some, at least of the activities of the International Red Cross Society.\n\nAs a possible third consequence they allowed the hospital to remain in its buildings and concentrated there all allied wounded from other hospitals in the Colony. They used it also to receive some, but not all sick from the P.O.W. camps.\n\nAll of these actions conferred clear benefits on the Japanese, as well as upon us.\n\nAny drugs or dressings removed by them from the hospital were in such small quantities as to be unimportant to us. Even when an electricity generator was taken, we still had another left. Except when some unacceptable decisions to admit too late, or discharge too early, sick prisoners were made by the Japanese the clinical freedom of our doctors was not challenged.\n\nThe hospital was given staple food and fuel rations and clothing and boot repair materials on a scale which may have been based on a standard used for Japanese troops who of course were known to live in part off the country in which they were operating. International agreements of course required only this scale to be observed. I think that our guards fared rather better than we did on their basic rations, especially in fish, but I have recorded earlier the anxiety shown by guards when their rations, like ours were late in arriving. I recall here the public statement to us in 1944 by a supplies officer that there were shortages on the Japanese side but that they would try to keep the hospital properly supplied. This was an appeal to us to understand their position, an appeal which fitted ill with much of the Japanese bearing towards prisoners. Their plight then, in Japan itself as well as in Hong Kong and no doubt elsewhere was extremely grave and their desperate resistance for another year is surprising. It was however hard, even impossible for prisoners to take then the detached view that we can today.\n\nWhile the Japanese haul of booty in the form of drugs and medical supplies in Hong Kong must have been enormous the quantities that reached the hospital were negligible and we were",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207834,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 222,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE N.T. OF HONG KONG, 1963 207\n\npromote among themselves morality, education, social solidarity, and mutual aid. The plan seems to have enjoyed some vogue in the Ming dynasty, but the early Ch'ing rulers took over the term to give it a new meaning: 'hsiang-yüeh' became a public lecture system by means of which the masses were to be indoctrinated with the political ethics of Confucianism. Yet by the nineteenth century 'hsiang-yüeh' had once again undergone a transformation, a lecture system developing into a framework of state control to the point where 'hsiang-yüeh' was sometimes taken to be synonymous with 'pao-chia' and 'li-chia', the state organisations for security and taxation. On the other hand, a contrary process of evolution was also at work moving ‘hsiang-yüeh' back towards the kind of self-government which had been originally conceived under its name. It is on record that in places in Kwangtung the heads of 'hsiang-yüeh' assumed roles of local leadership in such a way as to take command of local affairs. In addition, 'hsiang-yüeh' were used as a setting for organising ‘regiment and drill corps' ('t'uan-lien') for local defence, and it is an interesting speculation that just as the 'ke yüeh hsiang-yung', the village braves of the several yeuk, rallied to the defence of Canton against the British in 1842, so we might find on closer inspection that some of the armed resistance to the first British in the New Territories was bound up with the Ts'at Yeuk and other yeuk-complexes. (There are of course many sources, both Western and Chinese, for the history of 'hsiang-yüeh'. The best and most convenient is Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, Seattle, 1960, pp. 184, 205).\n\n28. My tentative view of the matter is that, while early Ch'ing policy may have popularised the term heung yeuk in the course of spreading the public lecture system, at the time we are concerned with, at least in our part of Kwangtung, yeuk were looked upon by the people who engaged in them as instruments of local control independent of state supervision. They might be used for treating with the state, as seems to have been the case especially with the three yeuk-complexes oriented to Kowloon City, and might have allied themselves with officialdom in the face of banditry or attack by outsiders, but they were far removed from being mere instruments of state control. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose home was in an area of Kwangtung which may be regarded as being in many ways comparable to San On, laid stress on the heung yeuk as a basis for a high degree of local independence and self-government in his",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207860,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 248,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE N.T. OF HONG KONG, 1963\n\n233\n\nor resisting them (and running the risk of being accused of denying the original undertaking by the British Government to respect local beliefs and customs). It is not to be wondered at that present-day administrators sometimes appear to be reluctant protectors of popular faith. They probably feel themselves caught in a situation where they are being exploited by the unscrupulous for the respect they show for their religion.\n\n67. Cynical and selfish exploiters there no doubt are, but the problem cannot be dismissed so simply. For if these men are able to put forward strong cases it is because they have behind them a public opinion firmly rooted in geomantic faith. There is every indication that the fung shui objections are now being raised on an unusually large scale. It was to be expected. In the full flood of rural development traditional rights are bound to be increasingly affected. The system of geomancy is so complex, the alternatives in interpretation so numerous, that a fung shui case can be brought against anything at all that meets with the disapproval of the country people. Any work undertaken by the Administration can be said to be harmful in geomancy. But it can also be judged to be geomantically beneficial if local opinion is in favour of its practical worth. (I know a community where a proposed new road is being urged precisely on the grounds that it will help remedy a natural defect in the geomantic conformation of the front aspect of the village). But it is not to be assumed that people are making a coldly rational translation of their practical wishes into the language of geomancy. They may be rationalising, as the psychologist might put it, but they are not hypocrites.\n\n68. Faced by its dilemma the Administration must fall back on what it considers to be a practical formula: fung shui objections will be heeded if they are 'reasonable'. What is 'reasonable'? It would be interesting to know. As far as I can see, 'reasonable' is taken to be assessable by the sincerity of the objectors. If they seem to believe what they assert, and there is no evidence that they are misrepresenting facts (as, for example, about the ownership of graves), then a case has been made and the Administration must in some measure yield. Of course, it is not necessary to yield; a 'tough' policy would almost certainly work, in the sense that objections would become fewer and people accustomed to the fact that they are no longer in a position to get their way. (There must have been times in the history of the New Territories when a firm resistance...",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208059,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 98,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "82\n\nJ. T. KAMM\n\nlawsuits. In some instances the smaller villages pay their land tax through the influential clans.\" (p. 20).\n\n18. Tung-Kuan Hsien-chih (1921), 3:4a.\n\n19 For details on Hakka migration into the area, see Lo Hsiang-lin's K'o chia shih liao hui p'ien (***** Historical Sources for the Study of the Hakkas). See also Essay I.\n\n20 Krone, op. cit., p. 125.\n\n21 Sung Hok-p'ang, \"Legends and Tales of the New Territories” in The Hong Kong Naturalist, VII: 3 and 4. For the tale of the \"Hungry Bug\" see pp. 249-250 in number 3.\n\n22 CSO6269 in 1909,\n\n23 Extension Papers, p. 227.\n\n24 See statements by Tang Kok-lam in the Extension Papers (pp. 216 and 293-294): \"... the reason for the resistance is that there were rumours that there would be an increase in taxation, numbering of houses, and taxes on fruits and houses.\" See similar reasons put forth in the petition from the Tung Wo Kuk of Sha Tau Kok Tung, p. 319.\n\n25 CSO130 in 1902.\n\n26 Pat Heung and Shap Pat Heung are districts whose natural boundaries are made up of two major valleys of Un Long to the southeast and northwest of Kam Tin, respectively. These hsiang consist largely of small, multi-lineage settlements with substantial Hakka populations. In some of the documents in the Extension Papers, tung is appended to these districts, a usage still heard among the older elders in the area. The hypothesis which I develop later in this paper refers specifically to the large-order tung; however, it applies equally to the smaller-order tung insofar as they constitute districts treated as a whole for the purposes of revenue collection.\n\n28 CSO6269 in 1909.\n\n29 The only mention of this decision which I have seen is Tratman's account of the opening of a new market at Un Long in CSO3172 of 1915. \"Of the existence of this feud there can be no doubt. It began in the endeavors of Pat Heung to free their land from the ground-rent claimed by Kam Tin as first settlers and so overlords of the whole district. The actual bone of contention fell to the Pat Heung when the Land Court disallowed all the \"taxlord claims\" in that district; but the bad blood still remains. Its fast manifestation was in the form of an organized assault by the people of Un Long on certain Kam Tin cultivators in 1911.”\n\n30 Hugh Baker, \"The Five Great Clans of the New Territories,\" Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume 6. pp. 25-48.\n\n31 “If a person is arrested by a village constable, he is taken before the gentry and elders of the village, who assemble in a place specially appointed for the purpose. The gentry and the elders, who are the representatives of the clans inhabiting the villages, are selected by the inhabitants to deal with cases in the village council, The usual cases are those of theft, disputes about land, domestic squabbles, and cases of debt. Most of these cases are summarily dealt with by the village council, and as a rule, the decision of that council is accepted as final. But if either of the parties to a case is dissatisfied, he can appeal to a council of the Tung, or to a general council, made up of representatives of the different Tung. A reference to Map VI will show how the newly leased territory is divided",
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    {
        "id": 208177,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 216,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "200\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\nvided useful suggestions concerning possible lines of enquiry; their assistance promised to complement the substantial resources Government placed at our disposal. Most significant of all was the enthusiasm displayed by the village representatives and elders of Kam Tin. The Kam Tin area, populated chiefly by members of the Tang clan, has a long and rich history; we decided, therefore, to concentrate our efforts in this area. On 25 June, Government hired Chan Sin-wai, a fourth-year history student at Chinese University and longtime resident of Kam Tin, to assist in carrying out the project. Another unpaid co-worker, Chen Ka-won, a graduate of C.U.H.K. and a resident of Ping Shan, joined the project in late July.\n\nAn examination of available knowledge and questions of methodology absorbed the next few days. A field headquarters was established in Ng Ka Tsuen, and the long process of “introduction” was begun. On 11 July, Mr. Paul Wong, liaison officer attached to your Office, arranged a meeting of interested elders from the Tang villages of Kam Tin. During the meeting, we explained the goals of the project, and their warm reception assured us of every cooperation.\n\nThe success of this \"mass meeting\" prompted a series of formal interviews which have been taking place over the last six weeks and will continue into September. We have interviewed nearly twenty-five elders possessing knowledge of Kam Tin's history and traditions. Several have proved to be exceptionally valuable informants, and closer, more \"informal\" relationships have developed.\n\nWe have made a number of tape recordings of important tales ranging over a variety of topics. One collection of stories centers around the resistance by the Tangs to British occupation. We are especially hopeful that these tales and personal remembrances will shed light on the events of 1898-99 and subsequent land disputes, and will lead to the solution of certain perplexing questions regarding land tenure and rural class structure (the 'Sai Man' question).\n\nWe have been granted access to clan and fong genealogies, and have received permission to make photo-copies. Documents, paintings, and plaques dating from Ming and Ch'ing have also come to light. Field trips were undertaken to every village in the Kam Tin area, and we have been guided through the major temples, tsz tong, and graves of historical interest.",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208191,
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        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 230,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "214\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\n[This is perhaps the feud Lockhart mentions on page 51 of his Report.] There is also the case of the Ha Tsuen Tang who sold the Cheung Sha Wan clan land [see appendices]. The first murder case heard in the New Territories is thought to have some connection with this dispute. Tang Cheung, a Ha Tsuen Tang, was captured during the resistance and \"executed\" for posting British petitions. This event, in turn, is cited by Kam Tin Tangs as further evidence of treason on the part of their clan brothers.\n\n32. One question that came up was the relationship between the local Tangs and the Tung Kwun Tangs. We have assembled a great deal of documentary evidence which illustrates the broad range of defense activities performed by braves from Tung Kwun (Intelligence reports at the time of the resistance estimate over 1000 braves from Tung Kwun were stationed in Yuen Long). Behind a nunnery near Sha Po (9), a well-kept grave bears witness to the memory of those troops killed in the fighting who were buried secretly by the Kam Tin Tangs. The nuns still perform ta chiu ceremonies for their spirits, at intervals of 10 years.\n\n33. A biography of Ng Ki-Cheung, or Ng Sing-chi ({✯✯) would illuminate the transitional period 1898-1930. On the one hand he is considered, by the Sha Po villagers, as being \"The Hero of the New Territories,” a literatus (Sau Tsoi) who led the revolt of 1898 against the British and, in later years, against Tang efforts to reassert land rights. His name figures prominently in the Extension Papers, in which he is implicated in the Tang Cheung murders and other related resistance events. His confession is particularly interesting, as it implicates many Tangs in the crime. He received a sentence of life-imprisonment, which was later commuted \"to still the hearts of the loyal natives.\"\n\n34. The 1930's were particularly eventful years in and around Kam Tin. The Chengs (i) moved in, after being relocated due to the building of the Shing Mun Reservoir at Tsuen Wan by the Hong Kong Government. The villas (1) built in Pat Heung with Overseas Chinese and Warlord support, became nuclei for non-Tang settlements unbound by the traditional system.* The last tax-revolt against the Tangs was successfully carried out by Sha Po villagers, an event which coincided with the disappearance of sai-man and mui-chai.\n\ne.g. Ng Ka Tsuen immediately south of Kam Tin which is populated by descendants and relatives of a wealthy Overseas Chinese.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208393,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 117,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "SHIWAN POTTERY EXPLORED\n\nFREDRIKKE SKINSNES SCOLLARD*\n\nIn April of 1977 I had the opportunity to visit the pottery-producing town of Shiwan for the first time with the Oriental Ceramic Society tour. At that time for foreigners, group travel to China from Hong Kong still involved months of waiting for approval, and the individual trip needed for my own research of Shiwan pottery was an impossibility. The day spent in Shiwan however, was sufficient to establish a few acquaintances and to discover that fundamental archaeological research was in progress.\n\nIn May of the same year I gave a talk to the Oriental Ceramic Society titled \"Shiwan Reverberatory\". The reason for the choice of that title was that in ten years' experience studying Shiwan pottery, I have met with a great deal of resistance to the study of these wares. Art historians feel they are a coarse and unimportant local product with little esthetic merit, and even most non-specialists more often than not react with \"I just don't like it.\" In a first lecture on Shiwan pottery, I therefore did not expect to gain immediate converts to this art with a very different and unfamiliar esthetic. Rather, the choice of the title indicated that I felt the subject was worthy of much more attention, and that I hoped, over the next few years, my audience would have repeated opportunity to see and study Shiwan pottery, thereby slowly gaining familiarity with its esthetic.\n\nIndeed, over the last two years, more attention has been paid to these wares. In October of 1977, the Hong Kong Museum of Art in cooperation with the Leal Senado of Macau, staged an exhibition of 139 pieces and published a full colour catalogue. Mr. Lawrence Tam delivered an excellent talk to this Society on the subject, and Mr. Nigel Cameron critiqued the exhibition with his \"Second Thoughts on Shekwan\" in the South China Morning Post.1 At present, the Fung Ping Shan Museum of the University of Hong Kong, in cooperation with Guangzhou museums, is preparing a joint exhibition on Shiwan pottery for the fall of 1979.\n\n* Ms. Scollard holds Masters' degrees in the History of Art (Hawaii) and Chinese Literature (Chicago). She is Associate-in-Research, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208573,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 30,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\nFar Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944, terms “the most difficult supply operation of the entire war\" over the towering hump of the Himalayas. The second difficulty was connected with the priority given to the European theatre. The result was that much of the promised materials to China was often diverted, much to the distress of Hornbeck and others, from its original destination for the European fronts.? Speaking in more specific terms, by late September 1942, US$3.1 billion worth of lend-lease materials were sent to the British Empire, $750 million to Russia, and only $112 million to China. The disparity became even more remarkable by early June: $7,030,000,000 to the British Empire, $1,899,000,000 to Russia, and only $133,000,000 to China.8\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is understandable that the United States should entertain grave anxiety regarding China, especially over a possible collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. This concern, which the Chinese did everything to keep alive, was universally shared by senior men in the Washington government, including the president himself, H. L. Stimson, then secretary of war, Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the Treasury, Leahy, and many involved in Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, principally Hornbeck.9 While some doubt was expressed as to how much China could and was willing to contribute to the war effort in the east, the consensus was that her collapse would be a fatal blow to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the Pacific theatre. This event, therefore, must be prevented at all cost.\n\nIt was only natural that the United States, torn by anxiety, should be obsessed with the desire to compensate China as best she could. Consequently, the American government announced at the beginning of 1942 a loan of 500 million dollars to China, with next to no strings attached.10 Meanwhile, the move to push for the allies' recognition of China as one of the great powers, of which Hornbeck claimed himself to be the originator, became increasingly prominent in the American government.11 The outcome was the American insistence that China be included as a signatory, together with Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on 30 December 1943, and that Chiang Kai-shek, together with Roosevelt and Churchill, be a party to the Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943.12 The American eagerness to compensate naturally did not allow Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States,\n\nPage 30\nPage 31",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209097,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 259,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "p.61\n\nlast line\n\np.62\n\nline 17\n\n+\n\np.63\n\nline 16\n\nFor \"contrtdiction” read “contradiction\"\n\n\"resistence\" read \"resistance'\n\n**\n\n\"late\"\n\nP.64\n\nline 7\n\n**\n\n\"Histoy\"\n\np.65\n\n**\n\nline t\n\np.65\n\nline 3\n\nP.65\n\nline 10\n\np.72\n\nsixteenth line from foot For\n\np.77\n\nline 11\n\np.79\n\nfootnote 14\n\np.83\n\nline 1\n\n**\n\np.86\n\nline 16\n\nHong Kong Daily Press in italics Delete second note 13\n\nInsert Daily after Hong Kong\n\n\"ae\" read\n\nDelete the second “any”\n\n\"are\"\n\nFor \"centur\" read \"century\"\n\n\"Kai\" supersitious\" read\n\n\"later\"\n\n\"History\"\n\n\"Kat\"\n\np.88\n\nthird line from foot\n\n++\n\n**beieve\" read \"believe\"\n\np.88\n\n\"superstitious\"\n\nsecond line from foot\n\n\"weis\"\n\np.89\n\n**\n\nline 14\n\n**\n\n“wais”\n\n**\n\n“determinded” read “determined\"\n\n44\n\np.90\n\n“determined\"\n\nline 10\n\n**\n\np.91\n\nfootnotes 2 and 3\n\np.93\n\n‘scienfitic” read \"scientific*\n\n\"Rubos\"\n\n\"Dubos\"\n\nline 3\n\n14\n\np.94\n\nline 3\n\nDelete \"to\"\n\n\"anthropilogical\" read “anthropological”\n\np.101 fourteenth line from foot Delete second comma after\n\np.107 line 1\n\np.107 line 3\n\np.112 note 10 line 1 p.113 note 20 line 2 p.114 note 41 line 3\n\np.116 eighth line from foot\n\np.117 fourteenth line from foot p.118 third line from foot p.119 line 2\n\n\"changed\"\n\nFor \"he\" read “Exsultet” to be in italics\n\n\"the\"\n\nFor \"occasion\" read \"occasions\" Insert bracket before \"London\"\n\nFor \"Uterageri” read “Unter Ageri\"\n\n\"granduate\"\n\n\"graduate\"\n\n\"crucial\"\n\n\"curcial\"\n\n++\n\nInsert \"on\" after “study”\n\nInsert \"study\" after “careful” For \"Territiries\" read\n\np.119 line 7\n\n\"Territories\"\n\np.119 line 10\n\np.119 line 13\n\n\"if\"\n\n\"and\"\n\n\"of\"\n\n\"and\"\n\n**\n\n++\n\np.120 line 20\n\n**\n\n\"Vitually\"\n\n+\n\np.120 fifth line from foot\n\n**\n\n\"palced\"\n\n17\n\n\"Virtually\"\n\n\"placed\"\n\np.121 line 10\n\np.122 line 5\n\np.166 line 7\n\np.212 line 1\n\n++\n\n++\n\n\"extint custom” read “extinct custom of\"\n\n\"new\" read “now”\n\n\"publir\"\n\n**\n\n\"public\"\n\n\"in\"\n\n\"is\"\n\n**\n\n1+\n\nI regret these errors which I am bound to ascribe to defective eyesight and looking at the text too often, or both, and wish to thank Mr. H. A. Rydings for his help.-J.W.H.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209099,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 2,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "211\n\nElsewhere, \"smuggling\" between Nationalist-held areas and Japanese-held areas was just as prevalent as that conducted across Mirs Bay, and it was not necessarily carried out without the knowledge or consent of the Japanese. See the political context of this particular form of trade discussed in Lloyd E. Eastman, \"Facets of an ambivalent relationship: smuggling, puppets, and atrocities during the War, 1937-1945\", in Akira Iriye ed., The Chinese and the Japanese, Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions (Princeton, 1980).\n\nMr. Shing 10.7.81.\n\n100 Mr. Chan T'in Po 12.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n101 Mr. Ip Wan 2.7.81.\n\n102 Mr. Lei Yun Shau 14.11.80.\n\n103 Mr. Tse Koon K'au 9.6.81.\n\n104 Other members of the East River Guerrillas included Wong Koon Fong, Kong Shui, and Lo Fung; see ints. Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80, Mr. Chiu Lin Shing 11.5.81, Mr. Sham Kin K'eung 23.6.81, 1.7.81. For the background history of the East River Guerrillas see Feng Pai-chu, Tseng Sheng, et. al. Kuang-tung jen-min k'ang-Jih chan-cheng hui-i (Canton, 1951), and \"The general conditions of the liberated areas behind enemy lines in South China (East River and Hainan Island)”, in K’ang-Jih chan-cheng shih-chi chieh-fang-ch'ü kai-k'uang (Peking, 1st ed. 1953, rep. 1981) pp. 123-132. Dr. (later Sir) Lindsay Ride contacted Ts'oi Kwok Leung immediately upon his escape from Hong Kong and after the British Army Aid Group was formed, Ts'oi co-operated with the B.A.A.G. to assist prisoners-of-war escaping from Hong Kong. See Edwin Ride, BAAG, Hong Kong Resistance, 1942-1945 (Hong Kong, 1981).\n\n105 Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80.\n\n100 Mr. Hoh Shang 24.6.81, Mr. Wong Ts'ing 23.6.81.\n\n107 Mr. Lau 17.7.81, Mr. Chan Shing 21.11.80.\n\n108 Mr. Lau Wan Hei 25.6.81, Mr. Sham Kin K'eung 23.6.81, Madam Chiu I Mooi 7.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n100 Mr. Cheung Hing 28.11.80, Mr. Wong Ts'ing 23.6.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81.\n\n110 Mr. Chan Shing 21.11.80.\n\n111 Mr. Chiu Lin Shing 11.5.81, Mr. Lau Lui Faat 23.6.81, Mr. Lei Yun Shau 14.11.80.\n\n119 Mr. Lok Kau Kei 26.6.81, Mr. Yau Koon K'au 27.7.81, Mr. Lei Yau 13.11.80, Mr. Tse Kw'an 16.11.80.\n\n113 Mr. K.M.A. Barnett 13.2.82, Mr. Wan Yau 14.7.81.\n\n114 Father Lau Wing Yiu 18.5.81.\n\n115 Mr. Chung Poon 13.11.80, Mr. Sham Kin K’eung 23.6.81, 1.7.81.\n\n116 Mr. Lei Shiu Yam 8.5.81, Mr. Lei Yau 13.11.80, Mr. Tse Kw'an 16.11.80. See also \"The story of the American pilot Kerr's escape\", in the Wen-hui pao 7.1.80, and Edwin Ride, op. cit. pp. 219-220.\n\n117 Mr. Wan Ts'eung 31.11.80.\n\n118 Mr. Yau T'aam Shang 8.5.81.\n\n110 Mr. Chung P'oon 13.11.80, Mr. Lau Wan Hei and Mr. Kong Sai P'ing 25.6.81.\n\n120 J. Barrow, \"Annual Report of the D.C.N.T. 1947-48”, p. 2.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209250,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 153,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "EDUCATION AS A BYPRODUCT OF FISH MARKETING\n\n139\n\nEducation and Science, though it has taken an interest, has so far postponed for ten years the fulfilment of promises to give written encouragement to local education authorities.**\n\n49\n\nThere are some obvious reasons for these differences. The F.M.O. schools started some twenty years before the first projects for Gypsies, and the faintly remembered problems of their early years, of continuity, over-age pupils in inappropriate classes, all-age literacy teaching and so forth, were probably more similar to the problems of Gypsy education today than their present problems. There is a much greater drive to social assimilation of the Shui-sheung-yan than of the Gypsies, both in the community itself as well as from the government side. There is a greater availability of government resources in Hong Kong.\n\nTo understand these differences, however, we have to set the education policies in a more general policy context, to look at the overall policy problem that each pariah community seemed originally to present.\n\nIn the case of the Shui-sheung-yan in Hong Kong, it was an economic problem, the necessity, first of regenerating the fishing industry, then in the '50s and '60s of mechanising it, and finally in the '70s, of slimming it down. To carry this out a technologically literate workforce was needed, with appropriate social standing and honour in the community. So the start of an educational policy came swiftly on the heels of an economic policy: fish markets in 1945, schools in 1947. Finally in the 1950s, with the loans to the \"Better Living Societies\", came the beginnings of a housing policy to enable the Shui-sheung-yan to have the domestic culture consonant with their new economic and educational status.\n\nIn Britain a quite different chronology applied to the development of policy concerns. Once Gypsies were no longer being conscripted for military service or agricultural labour, as happened in the Second World War (and was promptly forgotten afterwards!) the initial policy concern was precisely with Gypsies' domestic culture. Gypsy caravan parked on rapidly diminishing amount of open land, giving rise to continuous protests by house-holders, increasingly brutal evictions by British police and council workers, and finally political resistance by Gypsies themselves, demanding places to camp. In 1968 the Caravan Sites Act was passed to try to produce an accommodation between Gypsies and house-dwellers, and on the heels of that came increasing concern for the education of Gypsy children, to further that accommodation (“so they\n\n49",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209266,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 169,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "JUAN YUAN'S MANAGEMENT 01 SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS IN CANTON, 1817-1826 155\n\nhead was a cut of 1 ts'un and 4 fen in length, and 3 fen deep. The cut had gone all the way to the bone. The captain and the owner of the American ship both inspected the wound of the dead woman,\n\nand pronounced that \"the woman in reality died from head injury and from drowning\".\n\nThe Americans agreed to submit Terranova to an investigation by Chinese officials, provided that the hearings were conducted on the American ship with Americans present. As a compromise, the \"ceremony\" of charging the prisoner was to be conducted on a Chinese war vessel that was to carry the Chinese official to the American ship. On 6 October, Captain Cowpland cleared all firearms from the deck of the Emily, stationed all hands at the forecastle, had Terranova without handcuffs on deck, and waited for the arrival of Chinese authorities. The Chinese officials were led by the magistrate of P'an-yù who was concurrently serving as prefect of Canton. Eight hong merchants were in attendance. The service of Dr. Morrison, who was then attached to the British factory, as a translator, was refused because Juan Yuan did not want to involve a third nation. After a lengthy debate during which Captain Cowpland argued successfully that no American prisoner was ever in irons during a trial, Terranova was \"surrendered\" to the Chinese with Puiqua pledging his safe return for trial on the Emily. Captain Cowpland accompanied Terranova and the hong merchants to the Chinese war vessel and back to the Emily.\n\nTestimonies of witnesses at the trial were somewhat different from the facts Juan Yüan had ascertained earlier. The Americans objected to the magistrate's allowing the presence of two children who were prompting the witness Ch'en-Li shih, and demanded that she speak in English, as her command of the language was superior to that of the translator or even Puiqua himself. When the woman's testimony deviated from what she had said before, an instrument of torture was brought aboard. The instrument was not used, although the woman insisted upon the later version of her testimony. Altogether, there were one thousand Chinese at the trial on board the Emily, and forty Americans. At the end of the session, the Chinese wanted to take Terranova with them. Captain Cowpland said: \"Come and take him,\" but the Chinese wanted the Americans to \"surrender\" the prisoner officially. While the Americans prepared for armed resistance, the magistrate proceeded to put Exchin, the ship's security merchant, and the Chinese linguist, Cowqua, in chains. Together with the overwhelming number of Chinese on board and other considerations such as opium in the hold, Captain Cowpland changed his mind",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209918,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1983",
        "page_number": 177,
        "title": "RAS-1983",
        "content_text": "155\n\ngovernment in Taiwan. In the textile industry, there were the left-wing Spinning, Weaving and Dyeing Trade Workers General Union and the right-wing Cotton Industry Workers General Union. Together they had unionized just 18 percent of the textile workers in 1971 (England and Rear 1975: 89-90). The numerical weakness and political affiliations of the unions permitted the spinners to dismiss them as a nuisance. A12 did not hide his annoyance:\n\n'Unions are not bad. There should be real unions so that workers' opinions can be expressed. But they should be separated from politics. In Hong Kong, it is difficult. Unions are not fighting for the welfare of their members. Some years ago, several union representatives came to talk to me. They were not making any demands, but just stating principles. They made several suggestions about welfare provisions. I told them these were already instituted in the mill. They said this was not proper and that the suggestions should come from the unions. At present, there are two unions in our mill, and I absolutely refuse to talk to them.'\n\nThe second rationalization was that the workers were uneducated, with the implication that they could not look after their own interests. Thus A19 asserted:\n\n'There are unions in Hong Kong, but workers' educational levels are not high enough. There should be consultations, but the workers cannot come before management, because they do not have sufficient education.'\n\nBy this the spinners seemed to be maintaining that their authority was legitimized by superior knowledge and cultivation, an age-old Chinese assumption traceable to Mencius' dictum that those who worked with their mind ruled others while those who worked with their hands were to be ruled by others.\n\nFrom the actual practice of joint consultation in the mills, it is clear that there is a more fundamental albeit unstated reason for their resistance to the idea of trade unionism. This is that they did not welcome the idea of workers' representatives. This might provide the clue to understand their rejection of organizational conflict in favour of harmony. Richard Solomon has suggested",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210366,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1984",
        "page_number": 337,
        "title": "RAS-1984",
        "content_text": "316\n\nHUGH WITT\n\nSverre Holth, a leading authority on Reichelt, wrote: “His vision of the cosmic Christ had opened his eyes to the need for a special type of missionary work in the Far East, namely to reach with the gospel those religious people whose hearts had already been prepared by God's logos. His experience had convinced him that Christ had been there before him and that his footprints were to be seen even in the non-Christian religious systems, or even specially there. He also believed that it had been one of the gravest blunders of modern missionary endeavour that these divinely prepared points of contact had been neglected.”\n\nDid this belief in \"preaching to the converted\" conflict with the traditional approach of missionaries to preach to the Godless?\n\nDr. Lee commented: \"Chinese are not really secular people. In Hong Kong today religion is there much more than it appears on the surface. Most Chinese people have some kind of religious influence. Reichelt's approach was not a denial of the truth of other religions but an affirmative statement that Christianity fulfils other religions.\"\n\nAfter Reichelt's death his followers did not have the same outlook and there were inevitable changes of course. The Christian Mission to Buddhists became the Tao Fong Shan Christian Institute.\n\n\"That Reichelt's followers did not have the same outlook was partly due to his unique personality. There was also a gradual growth in resistance to Western influences during the years after his death,\" said Dr. Lee. Buddhists coming from China in the late 1940s found hospitality here but by the mid-1950s not so many people were coming out.\"\n\nA transitional period followed, when in 1957 the institute became the Tao Fong Shan Christian Study Centre on Chinese Religion and Culture. Reichelt's son became its first director and the Right Reverend R. O. Hall, then Bishop of Hong Kong, who lived at Shatin and had been a friend of Reichelt, became its first chairman.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1984.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210387,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1984",
        "page_number": 358,
        "title": "RAS-1984",
        "content_text": "337\n\nperiod — which lasted from the bronze age Dongson period of the third century B.C. to the end of the T'ang dominance in the early tenth century A.D. He has divided this long period into six distinct phases, constructing the main characteristics of each one as the centre-piece of a chapter.\n\nThe first (Chapter 1, \"Lac Lords\") covers the emergence of organized society in the plains of the Hong and Ma rivers (near present Hanoi) under feudal lords. Sources for this bronze age period are largely archeological and linguistic, with a heavy reliance upon the interpretation of myths and legends.\n\nThe second chapter or phase (\"The Han-Viet era”) charts the invasion of Chinese forces and particularly the southern expedition of Ma Yuan, the great Han general, and the emergence of a mixed Sino-Viet ruling class.\n\nThe third phase (Chapter 3, \"Regionalism and the six dynasties\") covers the consolidation of Chinese political and cultural domination.\n\nChapter 4, \"Local rule in the sixth century\" is the fourth phase, which Taylor calls a \"time of self-discovery” for the Vietnamese. It was a time when Chinese control weakened slightly before the consolidation of Sui-T'ang control of the south. And in this weakening the Vietnamese, according to Taylor, began looking to their pre-Chinese roots.\n\nThe Sui-T'ang period of rule is covered in Chapter 5, \"The protectorate of An-nam\". In this phase he chronicles the \"intensity\" of pressure upon Vietnam to conform to the Chinese model of civilized society, as well as the growing resistance to Chinese domination. That resistance bore success of sorts when in the tenth century the T'ang dynasty collapsed and Vietnamese rebellions succeeded in throwing off direct Chinese rule. This is Taylor's Chapter 6, \"The T'ang-Viet confrontation\", and Chapter 7, \"Independence\".\n\nWhile critical of Chinese and French historians as treating the Vietnamese past as a “branch of Chinese history\" Taylor uses",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1984.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210932,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1986",
        "page_number": 282,
        "title": "RAS-1986",
        "content_text": "265\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\nMORE ABOUT THE KOWLOON WALLED CITY\n\nThe Kowloon Walled City, situated to the north of the present Kai Tak Airport, was the most important military base in the Hong Kong region during the later Ch'ing Dynasty. It was built in the 27th year of Tao Kuang (1847) to strengthen the fortification of Kowloon.1\n\nThe first invasion that it faced was not of British troops but of Chinese bandits. On the 26th day of the Seventh Moon in the 4th year of Hsien Feng (1854), bandits under Lo Ah-tim2 took possession of the Walled City. Seven days later, on the 4th day of the leap Seventh Moon of the same year, imperial forces under Cheung Yu-tang recaptured the Walled City. The fighting lasted for only one day, over thirty bandits were killed, and only two soldiers, Liu Tat-bong and Lam Yu-ping*T, died. Since then, the Walled City remained under the rule of the Ch'ing Government.\n\n3\n\nThen in the 24th year of Kuang Hsu (1898), the New Territories was leased to the British. The following terms were stipulated by treaty: \"The Chinese officials stationed there (i.e. the Kowloon City) shall continue to exercise jurisdiction, except so far as may be inconsistent with the military requirements for the defence of Hong Kong. Within the remainder of the newly-leased territory, Great Britain shall have sole jurisdiction. Chinese officials and people shall be allowed as heretofore to use the road from Kowloon to Hsinan. It is further agreed that the existing landing place near Kowloon City shall be reserved for the convenience of Chinese men-of-war, merchant and passenger vessels, which may come and go and lie there at their pleasure; and for the convenience of movement of the officials and people within the city.”\n\nHowever, in the 25th year of Kuang Hsu (1899), when the British encountered strong resistance to the occupation of the New Territories,\" according to Chinese sources, they asked for the help of the Ch'ing Government. Six hundred soldiers were then sent to assist the Brigadier of the Tai Pang Battalion to suppress the upris-",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211000,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 62,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "37\n\nment, when attempting in April to occupy the New Territory (as the New Territories were then called), encountered much more ferocious resistance than anticipated. At this juncture, 600 men were sent into the Kowloon Walled City by the Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the British authorities, convinced that they were there to support the resistance, demanded their withdrawal. The Colonial Office went so far as to threaten starving out the garrison at the City until troops were removed.41 The Chinese, however, claimed that the troops had been sent by special request of the Hong Kong government to preserve order, and though some of the men were withdrawn, by 4th May, 200 were still stationed in the City.42\n\nThis prompted the British to take action to attack Shumchun and Kowloon City as punishment for the Governor-General's duplicity in abetting the local resistance. On 16th May, at 3:00 p.m., a force of 300 men consisting of Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 100 Hong Kong Volunteers proceeded to Kowloon and occupied it, apparently meeting little resistance.43 All Chinese civil and military officials were ordered to depart as the British claimed that their continued presence and the retention of Kowloon Walled City in Chinese hands had proven inconsistent to British military requirement. To “legalize” the situation, an Order-in-Council was issued in December, announcing British jurisdiction over the Walled City which was to be administered in the same manner as the rest of the Colony.44 Yet this remained a unilateral revision of the Convention which the Chinese government never recognized.\n\n44\n\n45\n\n46\n\nThe Chinese naturally responded bitterly to the development. T'an Chung-lin, the Governor-General, protested vehemently to the court of the undignified manner in which the military officers and soldiers were cast out.45 At Peking, the Tsungli Yamen complained to the British Minister.46 Chinese eagerness to recover jurisdiction at Kowloon is best revealed in the letters from Lo Feng-lu****, Chinese Minister at St. James, to the Foreign Office.Yet, paradoxically, this eagerness was not accompanied by action; no attempt was made by the Chinese to reinstate an administration in the Walled City.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 211003,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 65,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "40\n\nare the ones to be found remounted in the City today. Inscriptions on them indicate that they had been cast in 1802 and apparently transferred to Kowloon from the Tung-lung Forts in 1811. We do not know the origins of the other cannon, and since the War, there has been no trace of them.\n\nAnd so the City languished. Although squatters had filtered in after 1899, in the 1930s, the population was still less than 500. Conditions there were insanitary but at least it escaped the horrific over-crowding of some other parts of the Colony. In 1933, however, the government announced plans to demolish the houses, ostensibly for sanitary reasons, sparing only those used for public purposes, and to make the area into “a place of popular resort and antiquarian interest\". There was some resistance from the residents; the Chinese authorities protested on their behalf while objecting to British disregard for the Convention. After several years' hesitation, the Hong Kong government finally took steps, despite Chinese objections, to evict all residents. By 1940, all buildings, except the old people's home, the former Lung-chin Communal School and the private home of a native resident, had been demolished. The dismantling continued under the Japanese: the wall was completely torn down to provide material to extend Kai Tak Airport.\n\nThe \"Walled City\" was no more.\n\nAfter the War, as refugees fled to Hong Kong, a number of them settled in the \"Walled City”; by 1947, its population had risen to about 2,000. Once more, the Hong Kong government's attempt to expel them provoked diplomatic conflict. But this time, no eviction took place. Instead, the City was left to its own devices, and to develop, as Governor Sir Alexander Grantham described it, into “a cesspool of iniquity, with heroin divans, brothels and everything unsavoury. From the early '60s, squatter huts gave way to high-rise buildings, which seem designed to break every conceivable construction regulation. Built with no open space between them, but with passages connecting each other like rabbit warrens, they are fire and health hazards and perfect criminal hide-outs. The old people's centre, formerly the Kuang-yin yuan, provides the only open area, and the mass of concrete around this\n\n+65",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213037,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 105,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "85\n\nenquiring what funds were in hand and when building would commence, was attached a letter from Mr Chau Siu K1. That letter indicated that as a result of the previous day's chat with Ho Kat, his friends were very pleased with the idea and willing to subscribe. By 27 March, he had collected close to $2,000. A Mr. Fung had promised to raise a further $2,000, and by 5 April, Mr. A. Ramjahn's $500 and the $1,500 promised by his friends gave the proposal, with money already collected, $8,500, enough to begin building.\" Having raised the money, Dr. Ho Kai pressured Dr. Gibson, in letters of 16 April and 16 May, to indicate when building would commence.\n\nFrom Dr. Gibson's account,\" the impetus for Chinese subscriptions was that 'they are appalled at the great loss of mothers and children' and Dr. Ho was anxious to take the opportunity of cheap building material prices in 1902 to begin building. 12. Building was delayed for many months, however, by the discussions of the LMS local committee on its ability to meet the conditions on which the Chinese subscribers made their donation. On the one hand, Dr. Gibson noted that, with Dr. Ho Kai as prime mover, his wishes should be acceded to as far as possible,\" and on the other hand, resistance of the committee to a change in policy was evident. The issue was over the appointment of a lady doctor to take charge of the maternity hospital and who was to pay for her.\n\nBy this time, the LMS had lady doctors in several cities in China, including Amoy, Peking and Hankow. These doctors were either self-supporting or privately funded, although not, it appears, as a result of any discriminatory policy. Goodall notes that there had always been some men and women who offered their services without stipend, sometimes subsidising others. However, women missionaries were not appointed in their own right as the equal partners of men until late in the nineteenth century. Lovett indicates that from 1875 the LMS was in the vanguard in using women missionaries to reach the women of India and China who were inaccessible to male missionaries, with LMS lady doctors being introduced to China before other places, the first being Dr Tribe of Amoy, in 1895.\n\nIt appears, from the correspondence between Hong Kong and Mr. Cousins, the Joint Foreign Secretary of the LMS, that the payment of a salary split 50:50 between LMS and locally raised funds, as suggested by Dr. Gibson, was not acceptable to the LMS.\n\nPage 105\n\nPage 106",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213041,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 109,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "89 \n\n+ \n\nThe reason given was the LMS financial position. Yet the fares, salary and expenses of the lady doctor had been guaranteed by the Chinese subscribers at a rate of $2,000 per annum on a five or six year contract basis. \"If there is the slightest prospect of a Lady who would be either self-supporting or supported privately I would prefer to wait a year even\" Dr. wrote to Mr. Cousins and, in a postscript added: 'Mr. Pearce has suggested a code of answer by telegram and I strongly recommend the Society's answer to be \"wait\". While saying that he saw a lady doctor as important for the credibility of the maternity hospital and claiming that she would be equal, his resistance to the type of appointment which was eventually made is clear. Dr. Gibson's position is consistent with his medical training and the social mores of his day. Edinburgh had been the site of strong resistance to female medical students, and the admission of women doctors to the British Medical Association was recent. As well as the 'nature' perception of women, the organisation of medical work itself was modelled on patriarchal family roles and relationships, wherein male doctors were dominant.\n\n10 \n\n申 \n\nDr. Sibree was warmly welcomed, however, began her language classes and was introduced to the Chinese subscribers and visited their wives. Dr. Gibson noted that she seemed ‘eminently fitted for the task which lies before her.'\" In June, 1904, the new six-bed hospital was opened.\n\nAlthough, as Paterson notes, Dr. Sibree's Annual Reports show the growth of the maternity work and midwifery training, her correspondence with the Joint Foreign Secretary of the LMS paints a different picture. Dr. Sibree, within six months of the hospital's opening, complained of lack of work and the LMS District Committee General Meeting of 1904 recorded support for her opening of a dispensary for women and children at Sham Shui Po to provide more work.\n\nThe problem appears to have been two-pronged. With respect to Chinese people, their knowledge of and therefore use of the maternity facilities was low, at an average of 1.5 patients per week in the early years. The wives of the Chinese subscribers also did not use her services, either because they were not in Hong Kong, were ignorant of the service, or were already patients of private doctors.\n\nThose we did see were in perfect ignorance of the whole scheme. Mr. Wells took a great deal of time and trouble in trying to explain",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213050,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 118,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "98\n\nwere well pleased with her qualifications. From 1 January, 1911, Dr. Perkins took over the supervision of government midwives. One can only assume that, although the position had been more or less promised to Dr. Sibree by the government's Medical Officer of Health, Dr. Gibson was able to gain the reinstatement of the AMMH. This was probably supported by the Legislative Councillor and Chairman of the Alice Hospitals, Dr. Ho Kai. Thus, the AMMH was again the provider, through its Lady Doctor, of the supervision of government midwives. That decision was clearly linked with the designation of the Medical Superintendent and Lady Doctor of the AMMH as members of the Midwives Board in the 'Midwives Ordinance', proclaimed in September, 1910.\n\nThe resistance of the District Committee and Dr. Gibson to the inclusion of extra Chinese subscribers on the maternity hospital's management subcommittee was overcome shortly after, when a proposal to add two subscribers was linked with a proposal to build a Training Institute for Nurses and Midwives. As well, the right of subscribers to nominate students for training was agreed. Finance was subsequently raised in the Chinese community for the project, which was opened in March, 1914.\n\nOutcomes and Implications of This Development Process.\n\nBetween 1903 and 1911, then, the first maternity hospital for Chinese women was built and training for Chinese midwives set up. That it happened at all was due to the convergence of interests of the LMS, the Chinese elite and the Hong Kong Government. The struggle for control in pursuit of sectional interests, Dr. Gibson versus the LMS District Committee, Dr. Gibson and the District Committee versus the Chinese subscribers, and the position of the LMS in relation to medical education, placed difficulties seen to be insuperable in the way of the Lady Doctor and the development of her service, as she was excluded from general medical work.\n\nIt is hard to reconcile the picture of Dr. Sibree as portrayed in the correspondence of her detractors as unable to adapt; lacking initiative; reluctant to state her case to the District Committee directly, rather going behind their backs to the LMS; and publicly denying any problem in her relationship with Dr. Gibson, with the strong figure she later appears. Dr. Sibree married Mr. C.C. Hickling, son of the Rev. C.H. Hickling, pastor\n\nI",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213093,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 161,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "142\n\nimportance of an unexampled calamity. However in spite of difficulties in balancing the budget, many public works projects were completed during his term. He governed with a liberal-mind for he increased the number of unofficial seats in both the Legislative and the Executive Councils in response to a demand for reforming the government. He also agreed to have an unofficial majority on the Sanitary Board. Generally regarded as an able administrator he stayed for fully six years as Governor, the longest tenure held by any governor thus far. In the history of modern China, he would be remembered as the Governor of Hong Kong who imposed a five-year ban on Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who then went to London and was kidnapped but rescued by Sir James Cantlie but that is another story.\n\nSir James Stewart Lockhart, the main target of Lowson's attack, was Registrar General and acting Colonial Secretary in 1894. There is a biography of him written by Shiona Airlie entitled 'The Thistle and the Bamboo.' He emerged from it as a capable but ambitious man who was eager to seek promotion ahead of his time, and in spite of what Lowson said of him, he got on well with the Chinese. The function of a Registrar General in the early years was to deal with Chinese affairs, not legal matters as at present, in fact, the initial title was Protector of the Chinese. In this office, Lockhart maintained good relations with the directors of Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk and the District Watch Committee, the three main representative bodies of the Chinese community. As to his character, he was said to possess 'humoured geniality which endeared him to his contemporaries' but 'occasionally his patience snapped and from a man considered in the main to be warm-hearted and genial, he became angry and stubborn.' He made at least one important contribution in connection with the Epidemic. After the Resumption of Tai Ping Shan Ordinance was passed, action had to be taken to demolish the old houses. Both landlords and tenants put up a spirited resistance as they both had to suffer financial loss, no rent to be collected by the landlords for sometime and no cheap lodgings for the tenants who were mostly coolies. The coolies threatened to go on strike which would paralyse the city in already very difficult circumstances. Lockhart, who was fluent in Chinese, having been a cadet in the Hong Kong Civil Service, was instrumental in solving the dispute which ended amicably. In 1895, at the age of thirty seven, he became Colonial Secretary when his acting appointment was substantiated. In addition, he was appointed as Special Commissioner for the New Territories in 1897 after the lease was settled. In 1902, he went to Weihaiwei as its first Civil Commissioner. On his departure the",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213365,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1994",
        "page_number": 187,
        "title": "RAS-1994",
        "content_text": "171\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\nNOTES ON CHEUNG PAO TSAI\n\nANTHONY SIU KWOK-KIN\n\nCheung Pao Tsai, also known as Cheung Pao Tsai, was the son of a fisherman living along the coast of San Hui county in the Kwantung province. He was kidnapped by Chang Yat, leader of the pirates of the Red Flag Squadron, at the age of fifteen. Because he was young and clever, he was forced to be a pirate. He managed all business very well, and was soon promoted to be headman. In 1807, Chang Yat died at sea in a great storm. His wife, Shek Yeung (also known as Chang Yat Sao by the pirates), and his nephew Chang On Bong led the Red Flag pirates. Chang On Bong was very timid. Thus, Cheung Pao became a good assistant to Chang Yat Sao. She appointed Cheung Pao to be the chief headman, and placed the whole crew under his sway, while she commanded all the squadron.\n\nCheung Pao was a good assistant of Chang Yat Sao. He was very faithful and obedient to her. He did everything only with her permission. She trusted him well, and his suggestions were generally approved. He could command the Red Flag Squadron with her consent. Thus, people at that time only knew the name Cheung Pao, and all the piratical disasters in the South China Sea were said to be done by him.\n\nCheung and his gang plundered along the coast of the Canton Delta from 1808 to 1810, concentrating on the Heung Shan, San Hui, San Ning, Pan Yu, and Tung Kwun counties. Of these, Heung Shan faced the greatest disaster. At first, they only robbed the merchant ships at sea. Later, being encountered by the Ching navy, they turned inland and robbed the villages they could reach by boats. Then, because of the strong resistance made by the villagers, and being defeated by the Imperial force for many times, Cheung was forced to surrender in 1810. He was given the title of a Shoubei or captain in the navy, and he helped to pacify the rest of the pirates in the South China Sea. He married Chang Yat Sao. Because of his bravery in the navy, he was promoted to be a Fujiang or major-general. He died in 1822.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213504,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1995",
        "page_number": 100,
        "title": "RAS-1995",
        "content_text": "68\n\nsubdivided into a number of cubicles and sublet to a number of households or families. In the district, examples of over 25 people clustered into a living space of 600 square feet could be found easily. The great density and the serious overcrowding had become a matter of great concern. In 1890, an exhaustive report on the subject was submitted to the Government. However, no strong action was taken after that. In that report, an enumeration of the people of the district by the method of verbal inquiry, which could only be assumed as fairly accurate, had been made by the Chinese District Watchmen. A table (Table 2) has been drawn up to show the difference between the figures of the Overcrowding Report and that of the Census.\n\nThe question of insanitary conditions in Sai Ying Pun had also excited attention for a long time. The houses in the district were usually built back to back. The rooms were dark, damp, and badly ventilated. Very few houses had been cleaned or whitewashed inside since they were built. Latrines and dustbins seldom existed in those houses. A large proportion of the houses in the district had the old-fashioned drains which were built of bricks. As the old bricks rotted away, the sewers collapsed and blocked the pipes. Furthermore, a number of houses were converted or used as storage for grains and other goods. These contained an enormous number of rats and cockroaches. In 1881, the Government had decided to seek the service of a sanitary engineer, Osbert Chadwick, to advise as to the sanitary conditions of Hong Kong. A year later, he made a special report and proposed a number of sweeping changes, which included the provision of open spaces at the rear of buildings, of a window in every habitable room, and of 600 cu. ft. of unobstructed space for each adult in rooms divided into cabins, and the layout of roads and drains before the building lots were offered for sale. A Sanitary Board was set up in 1883, but it had only limited powers because of the stiff resistance from the Chinese as well as European property owners and the laissez-faire attitude of the government. The Public Health Ordinance of 1887, which, among other things, provided for the reservation of open spaces at the rear of buildings and the fixing of a minimum standard of 300 cu. ft. of internal living space per adult, and a clause in 1889 whereby mezzanine floors could only be constructed if provision were made for a vertical clearance of 5 ft. above and below, were also met with great opposition from the Chinese.\n\nThe insanitary conditions and the inevitable direct human contacts",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1995.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/95941j25g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213880,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 232,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "206\n\npolicy of railway nationalization that sparked off very strong provincial\n\nresistance.\n\nNumerous Railway Protection Societies were formed in different provinces, and one by one, they declared the provinces independent from Beijing.\n\nThe 1911 Revolution and its Aftermath\n\nIn Guangdong, the Railway Protection Society was formed in Hong Kong and chaired by Li Yutang, the chairman of the Siyi Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. In a dispatch to the Colonial Office, the Governor noted that since the revolution, the Siyi Chamber had \"principally ruled Canton.” It is recorded that in a meeting in the Siyi Chamber of Commerce of Hong Kong, Wu Hanmin was elected as the new Governor-General for Guangdong. Li Yutang, chairman of the Siyi Chamber, as well as that of the Railway Protection society, was appointed as the Provincial Treasurer of Guangdong. His son, his two brothers and his son-in-law also held posts in the Canton Government. They formed themselves into a bank of Canton, but registered it in Hong Kong. Aside from this, the Siyi men formed themselves into a \"Thirty-Men Subscription Team”. With certificates granted by the Canton Revolutionary Government, they set up a Subscription Bureau in Hong Kong. One member of this group, a Yang Xian recalled years later that:\n\nthe uprising was a success without any single help of a soldier or army... because of the assistance of the Hong Kong merchants... we subscribed, within half a day, an amount of 40,000 and had it transported to Canton immediately. Originally, the Canton government promised to return $2 for any $1 subscribed... but we [with patriotism] adjusted it to $1.50 for $1 only.\n\nTo back up the unsecured currency issued through the Bank of Canton by the Canton Revolutionary Government, the Siyi Chamber established a \"Canton and Hong Kong Financial Company\" to redeem the unsecured currency in August 1912.\n\nThrough the Registrar-General of Companies, the Governor warned the Hong Kong merchants of the \"financial unsoundness of the scheme\"",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214134,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1997",
        "page_number": 202,
        "title": "RAS-1997",
        "content_text": "173\n\n7\n\n(Nie Dragons) Hills, Hunting (Watung County, Guangdong) (November 1997), handout\n\nEdwin Ride, Brush Army Aid Group BAAG Hong Kong Resistance 1942-1945, OUP (1981) Edwin Ride was the son of Colonel (Lt Lindsay) Ride\n\n*Peter Rull, A Report on a Recce to Historic Military Sites in the Wat Chow Area. 15 and 16 November 1997 (19 November 1997)\n\n4\n\n0\n\nAnthony Hewitt, Children of the Empire, Kangaroo Press (1993), passim\n\nRosemary Lee, “Tang Tai Uk' Beyond the Metropolis Villages in Hong Kong, RASHKB/Joint Publishing (1995), pp 159-172\n\nS Y Lam, 'Salt Manufacture in Hong Kong', RASHKB Journal, v 7, (1967), pp. 138-151",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214192,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 50,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "13\n\nvariety of humour and just talking mo lei tau (nonsense, f). It all adds up to people coming out of a show and feeling good about themselves.\n\nChinese humour\n\nWhereas Westerners have been described as being seriously humorous, Chinese have been said to be 'humorously serious' (Kao, 1946; XVIII). Chinese humour is, by and large, down to earth, with a surfeit of action, with the hero's mother breaking a leg or the bully being beaten up. Much of it may, nevertheless, be, so called, mo lei tau, and include a certain amount of Western style slapstick.\n\nIt was not until the beginning of the 20th century (unlike the West where they became popular two or three centuries earlier) that cartoons became popular in China (Xu, 1989; preface). The reason was largely because China was a semi-feudal society and people did not have freedom to create works of humour and sarcasm. Today, under socialism, works considered 'in poor taste' are often still not accepted for publication. Often cartoons tend to be used as resistance to oppression and, like a dagger or javelin, aimed to do 'battle.' Having said all that, however, many Westerners (as well as many Hong Kong Chinese) believe humour in China is not subtle enough and it does not demand rapid thought. In the main it is straightforward, then there is a pause followed by the punchline.\n\n'Laugh talk' (slapstick), as it is sometimes dubbed, generally goes down well with Chinese, and, between the two World Wars, it is understood that on the first night of a show put on by the family of Sir Run Run Shaw, in Shanghai, an actor, purely by accident, fell through the floorboards. Because this was considered hilarious by the audience, the Shaw showbiz family made it a permanent part of the act.\n\nThe author recalls when he visited Hainan Island, in China in 1987, in an off-the-beaten-track village, a Chinese infant was placed on his shoulder. The child wore standard Chinese shorts, with a longish vertical split in the seat. This conveniently opened automatically when it squatted to do its business. As it sat on the author's shoulder its bare bottom rubbed against his face. What a joke! All the Chinese, espe-",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214298,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 156,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "119\n\nmust have been dreadful. For whenever they were wounded and fell, the match-lock set fire to their cotton clothes, and I saw several instances of their being literally burnt alive.\n\n33 C.Worswick & J.Spence. Imperial China, Photographs 1850-1912. London, 1979,\n\np.36 shows a photograph by Felix Beato.\n\nMackenzie, op. cit., p. 144 reports that \"The Tartars and Chinese troops use bows of different sizes and strengths, the Tartars use a peculiar kind of cross-bow, throwing three arrows..\"\n\n35 John Henry Gray. Walks in the City of Canton. Hong Kong, 1875, p.527.\n\n36 Ouchterlony, op. cit., p. 98 reporting the taking of the fort of Tycocktow says \"More resistance, however, was offered here than at Chuenpee, for the Chinese were not forced from their ramparts until the boats' crews had gained the summit, and the bayonet and cutlass had clashed with the spear and the broadsword. Several of the assailants received wounds from the cold steel, a rare occurrence in the Chinese war.\"\n\n37 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 151.\n\n38 Lt. Colonel Fisher, C.B. Personal Narrative of Three Years' Service in China. London 1863. p.383.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214542,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 400,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "369\n\nANOTHER DILEMMA FOR TODAY'S YOUTH IN\n\nCHINA\n\nKeith Stevens and Jennifer Welch\n\nDuring a recent RAS [HK BR] tour of the Museum of the Humen People's Resistance against the British in the Opium War [1840-1842] at Humen [Bocca Tigris], a small town about sixty miles south-east of Canton on the east coast of the Pearl River, we entered the old temple dedicated to the Northern Emperor [Bei Di] in the grounds of the Museum.\n\nThe main altars of the temple were not in any way unusual in that it had the central altar with the image of the Northern Emperor, Bei Di, and two flanking side altars, one dedicated to Lü Dongbin, the doctor in the group of the Eight Immortals and the second dedicated to Guan Yin, the Goddess of Mercy. However, there were two further glass cabinets, identical with the form of the main altar, one on either side wall. Against the wall, stage left, was an image of Lin Zexu,\n\nthe Imperial Commissioner despatched by the Emperor to Guangdong province in 1839 with instructions to stamp out the opium trade. His destruction of the stocks of opium held by British, American and other foreign traders led to the so-called Opium War [in British parlance, the First China War].\n\nThe cabinet against the temple wall, stage right, contained three images of Chinese officials involved in the War. They were Admiral Guan; The Governor of the Two Guangs and a General Chen who, captured by the British, is now remembered as the prisoner taken by his captives, together with his loyal horse, to Hong Kong where he died. Before both side cabinets, which had baldachin and silken hangings in front of the altar tables bearing honorifics as do temple altars virtually everywhere, were altar tables with red spirit tablets bearing their honorific titles, as well as offerings of fruit, bottles of wine and incense pots.\n\nWhat proved so interesting was the indecision manifest amongst Chinese visitors who, having not hesitated to bow and offer incense before the images of the three main deities, Bei Di, Lü Dongbin and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214743,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 158,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "122\n\nThose who are resting in peace in the military cemeteries in Sai Wan and Stanley and those not buried there have not just earned for themselves a reputation for obedience and courage, but also won a way of life for the future generations of Hong Kong. Above all, they served their home countries and mankind by making a contribution to a war that was a crime against humanity.\n\nThe Performance of the Hong Kong Garrison\n\nWhile politics and good will may be controversial, an objective assessment of the actual performance of the defenders vis-à-vis the invaders is not impossible.\n\nAll authors referred to in the literature above pointed out that the Hong Kong garrison was, militarily, facing a hopeless situation on 8 December 1941. The Colony was isolated, with virtually no air cover or naval support, outnumbered three to one by the Japanese, and largely without combat experience, adequate training, sufficient ammunition or even winter uniform. Furthermore, it was an assortment of nationals who spoke different native languages; English, Cantonese and several Indian dialects. It was thrown into a battle against well-prepared and veterans of the Japanese Imperial Army, which had at least five years of combat history in China and was well supplied with detailed intelligence and mapping information about the Colony. During the Battle, Japanese agents and Chinese collaborators living in the Colony also assisted the invaders. The British forces also laboured under the impression that the offer of assistance by the Chinese forces and other Chinese groups was reliable. The final collapse of the resistance happened not only earlier than the London authorities had expected - 17 days instead of 9012 - but also far ahead of schedule for the Japanese, who contemplated that half a year13 would be required to conquer the Colony. Thus, many commentators argue that the defence of Hong Kong was a shambles. However, no author has actually attempted to measure the \"fighting power\" or effectiveness of the Hong Kong garrison or made a comparative study of the tactics of the defender vis-à-vis the invaders.\n\nI argue that it is unfair to pass judgement on the performance of the garrison by solely comparing the actual and planned duration of the battle or any other military dimension of the fall of Hong Kong.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214747,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 162,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "126\n\nindicated in Table 1, the Japanese outnumbered the Hong Kong garrison by 3.09 (X). However, they could only inflict a casualty rate of 2.11 (Y). The Singapore garrison, by comparison, fared better than its counterpart in Crete.\n\nSome Speculative Thoughts Regarding the Merits of the Defence\n\nConstrained by the statistics available to the author, the above analysis is crude indeed. However, it raises the point that the Hong Kong garrison, however unprepared and poorly equipped, had fought quite well. There are indeed sources that suggest a much higher casualty rate for the Japanese. Why was this the case?\n\nAny answer to this question surely requires a much more rigorous study. A number of speculative points and observations worthy of attention are raised below. Firstly, the geography of Hong Kong rendered defence more effective than that of Singapore. It is a cliché that the Japanese forces were well trained and prepared. Yet, they did suffer great losses. Most such losses were incurred when they made attempts to cross the harbour and in fighting for control of the hills and gaps on Hong Kong Island. In both the Battle of Singapore and the Battle of Hong Kong, the Japanese forces aimed at capturing reservoirs as their tactical targets, as they had anticipated long resistance and the loss of water supply would erode the morale of the defending forces and their ability to continue fighting. Unlike the Island of Singapore, Hong Kong Island is much larger in size, and is highly rugged in relief with several reservoirs in different parts of the upland areas.\n\nSecondly, the size of the garrison was also a factor. Comparing again Hong Kong and Singapore, a smaller garrison operating in a more defensible topography proved to be more battle worthy than a large number of troops congested in a much smaller flat island devoid of air cover and was running out of fresh water.\n\nThirdly, notwithstanding criticism of the design weakness of the Gin Drinkers Line, the Hong Kong garrison fought in an orderly manner according to a pre-conceived plan with defence structures well in place. As soon as the under-powered Shing Mun Redoubt was lost, the garrison evacuated the New Territories and Kowloon to prepare for",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214748,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 163,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "127\n\nfighting pitched battles in fence works on the upland and coastal low-land of the Island of Hong Kong. The defence works in the uplands did pose for some time death barriers for the advancing Japanese infantry, though these works were often only defended with small infantry arms. It is well reported that the Japanese had good maps as to the locations of these defence positions. It is also correct to say that the best post-war documentation of the routes of invasions and battles is that produced by Japanese authors rather than the British. Nevertheless, there are reports that the Japanese Army had to make several pointless raids on unmanned defence positions, such as those in Sai Kung, and that it had to force civilians to be guides when approaching lines of resistance. It is interesting to know just how well informed the Japanese were about these defence works at the time of hostilities.\n\nFourthly, while the British might have made a tactical mistake by abandoning the defence works in the Devil's Peak area on the Kowloon side, the Japanese also appeared to have committed a number of tactical mistakes that delayed their victory. The withdrawal of the defending forces and equipment to the Island from the mainland was unhindered by much Japanese interference. As commented on by Tse (Tse, 1996), the Japanese apparently missed an opportunity to pursue the retreating British forces. Besides, the Japanese infantry suffered huge losses on the Island until it had obtained artillery support.\n\nFifthly, the frequent argument that the Hong Kong garrison was significantly less well equipped in weaponry than the invading forces must be carefully interpreted. While it is true that the Japanese had absolute control of the air, the Battle of Hong Kong was mainly fought on the ground. A close analysis of the weapons and transport equipment possessed by the Hong Kong garrison shows that the defenders had at their disposal quite a high percentage of machine guns, field guns and conveyances. The garrison had over 2,042 machines (a very high ratio of one per six defenders); 152 mobile guns (comprising 49 field guns; at least 27 anti-aircraft guns and 86 mortars) as well as 31 coastal defence guns in fixed locations. Ignoring the fixed guns, the defenders used 152 mobile guns to contest 203 guns and mortars, various calibres, of the invaders. The defenders were not overwhelmingly outnumbered in the number of mobile guns in absolute terms. In relative terms, the defenders had one gun per 85 persons and the Japanese one per 197. This observation should of course be qualified by the\n\nof",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214756,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 171,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "135\n\nSupplement, 29 January 1948; A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle of Hong Kong December, 1941 (1953). For the official Hong Kong account of the surrender, see Hong Kong Government (1948).\n\n3 The literature referred to in this section is not exhaustive and focuses on books and reports only. English and Chinese newspapers and periodicals from time to time carry articles on the Battle. Post-war annals of universities, university halls and secondary schools in Hong Kong are also a good source of materials about the Battle. There are also a number of novels on war events,\n\n+ The emphasis is placed on attacking the enemies' \"line of least resistance\" or \"line of least expectation\".\n\n5 As quoted in Ko and Wordie (1996), p.18.\n\n\"They were influenced by the views of Air Chief Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.\n\n7 During the initial stage of the Battle, BBC broadcasts (Orwell, 1987) placed high hopes on the availability of Chinese forces in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Such forces were never to come.\n\nLiddell Hart (1999): footnote at 219.\n\n\"Colonel Hewitt is the author of a number of books on the Battle and Japanese occupation of the Colony.\n\n10 The title of the book is a misnomer as the police force obtained the royal title only in the late 1960s.\n\nBlackburn gave an account of the anarchic situation of Hong Kong shortly before the surrender (Blackburn 1989).\n\n12 On 23 October 1937, the Joint Overseas and Home Defence Committee considered re-fortification or demilitarisation of Hong Kong, assuming that it took 90 days for the British fleet to relieve Hong Kong. Rollo (1992): 113. According to Aldrich, the British Chiefs of Staff considered the abandonment of Shanghai and demilitarisation of Hong Kong to avoid confrontation with Japan. Aldrich (1993): 261.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214796,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 211,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "176\n\nimaginings of more global others. The imaginary China which is depicted in writings and videos made by overseas Hmong is of course quite different from the China of actuality which some of them may visit, and yet these imagined recreations of place and locality are in some cases supported and reproduced through the cultural productions of local artistes and performers within China, as Schein (2000) has recently shown.\n\nI should like to present these kinds of returns as importantly powered by a nostalgia born in general from separation (a kind of metaphysics of place, rather than a metaphysics of absence), and these reconstructions of an often idyllic past as part of an attempt to re-appropriate, to forge new identities in the face of globalising dislocations from place; a kind of resistance, if you like. And, as communities have dispersed, and become transnational and cosmopolitan, so anthropology has had to change, from the older near-exclusive focus on local communities, to a discipline concerned with the wide-reaching effects of global capitalism, international tourism, and the production of media images which travel far and fast across cultural boundaries.\n\nMy own very first work on the Hmong was concerned with the rapid adoption by Hmong resettled as refugees in the United States of long-distance telephone calls to keep in touch with lineage relatives, and the recourse to telephone directories to find lineage members of the same surname with whom they could stay and from whom traditional lineage hospitality could be expected when they visited other cities. I saw this very rapid adoption of modern communications technology by a people who were still largely without writing skills (although they could read surnames in telephone directories!) as a striking instance of the power of a lineage society to reconstitute itself in a new global setting (a little like the Man lineage of Hong Kong did), and of the capacity of the still largely oral traditions of the Hmong to leapfrog entirely the stage of literacy which Marshall McLuhan had seen as the inevitable precursor to a new age of oral and visual communications (Tapp 1982).\n\nAnthropologists, and social scientists in general, can perhaps be criticised for being totally unable to provide any simple or easy answers to questions about whether the use of modern telecommunications is necessarily liberating and empowering for the individual, or",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214894,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 309,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "283\n\nTHE HKBRAS TRIP TO VIETNAM BETWEEN 30 SEPTEMBER AND 6 OCTOBER 2000\n\nCRYSTAL TANG\n\nTo take advantage of the two holidays, the Royal Asiatic Society's all overseas visit took place from September 30 to October 6, 2000 to Central Vietnam. Under the leadership of Dr. Patrick Hase, there were 20 of us in total; we started off our trip in the cosmopolitan south - Ho Chi Minh City. Saigon, the former capital of South Vietnam until 1975, when it collapsed along with the anti-communist resistance struggle, now bears the name of Ho Chi Minh City,\n\nWe stayed overnight at the Renaissance Riverside Hotel facing the beautiful Saigon River. Everyone in the group had a superb view from their rooms. Ho Chi Minh City is definitely a city on the move with its throngs of scooters, cycles, bicycles and cars running endlessly on the streets even at midnight. What an experience to cross the street there - you take your life into your own hands, it's entirely up to the pedestrian to avoid the traffic, not the other way round. According to the vice chairman of the Road Transport Administration of Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Manh Hung, \"traffic accidents are a bigger threat in Vietnam than the AIDS virus\". I'm glad I came back to Hong Kong alive.\n\nAfter dinner, I strolled along the streets near our Hotel. In a sense the French presence remains, lingering not only in the minds of the older generation but physically in the legacy of the colonial architecture and the long tree-lined avenues, streets and highways they left behind.\n\nThe next day we arrived in Hue. Hue is one of the few ancient capital cities of the world that maintains today a cultural heritage of national and international importance. On making Hue the capital of Vietnam early in the 19th century, the Nguyen dynasty (1802-1945) constructed here a complete urban complex in which the Perfume River played a vital role. Fortifications and palaces, where the Court held office and the Royal family lived, are built on the north bank of the river. Here exist three walled enclosures and hundreds of palaces and buildings. UNESCO declared these monuments in Hue World Cultural Heritage sites in 1993.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215559,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 336,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "286\n\nof gravity of the tower low and to afford the minimum resistance to wind and wave. This lighthouse became superfluous and stopped operating in 1896 after Waglan lighthouse came into operation in 1893.\n\nSeveral considerations\n\nIn building Hong Kong's first lighthouse many factors were considered, such as need, finance, location, the apparatus to be installed and the staff.\n\nIn the beginning of the 1870s the need to erect lighthouses was envisaged by the Western mercantile community. In fact, in 1872, the combined tonnage, outwards and inwards, amounted to about six million. The need to provide navigational aids for the heavy sea traffic was thus obvious. The revenue raised by levying vessels entering Victoria Harbour would be able to support the running costs of lighthouses.12\n\nSurveys were conducted to look for suitable sites on which to erect lighthouses to light the approaches to Hong Kong harbour. The three best sites were considered to be,\n\n• Waglan, an island off the south-eastern extremity of Hong Kong,\n\n• The North East head of Lema Island, and\n\n• Gap Rock, 26 miles southward of Hong Kong.\n\nHowever, all these three were then under Chinese jurisdiction. Negotiations with the Chinese Government did not reach satisfactory conclusions for both parties. This was because the Chinese Government would not cede or lease any island for such purposes and the British Government did not wish to spend money on projects not under its direct control.\n\nThe second-best sites, all within the jurisdiction of Hong Kong, were considered to be Cape D'Aguilar, Green Island and Cape Collinson, as reported by the Harbour Master, H.G. Thomsett in March 1873. Lighthouses in these places would cover the eastern entrance and the western entrance to Hong Kong harbour. Eventually, this is",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215567,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 344,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "294\n\nwere smashed by the mass of water being blown against them.\n\nThe Royal Observatory reported:\n\nGap Rock is lying very near the track of the worst typhoons that have been felt in the Colony, in an exposed position, and the conformation of the sea bottom, as well as the shape of the rocks causes the sea to be much worse than in other places (Bruce; 1990, 3).\n\nIt was reported in 1984, that the Royal Observatory and the Guangdong Meteorological Bureau had signed an agreement to set up a joint venture automatic weather station on Huang Mao Zhou, about two kilometres from Gap Rock so, presumably, the weather is as interesting today as it was in the 1890s (Bruce; 1990; 3).\n\nIt is obvious that lighthouses have to withstand immense force during bad typhoons. Consequently, they are designed circular on plan so as to offer the least resistance to both wind and sea. Lighthouses are expensive to construct. Nevertheless, like the cast-iron tower at Waglan, they can be reasonably pleasing in appearance.\n\nBefore December 1952, and from 1964 onwards, weather observations on Waglan were taken by Marine Department lighthouse keepers and transmitted by radio (Hong Kong Observatory; 1999). 33 The Observatory staff started taking weather observations on Waglan in 1952 and withdrew from the Island to the meteorological station at Cape Collinson Lighthouse in 1964.\n\nAs Waglan was no longer manned after 1989, the observatory constructed an automated weather station on the Island. The old weather recording station and a small store where equipment was housed were still there when the author visited in 1999, although the latter is no longer used. But the typhoon mast, where signals used to be hoisted, has been taken down.\n\nWater supply\n\nWaglan has no wells or springs. Keepers depended on rainfall for their water supply. Catchment areas consisted of roofs of a clutch",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215610,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 387,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "337\n\nThe paper began as a collection of notes squirreled from all sorts of sources, and as other information arose it grew almost on its own. For example, when I was in New Zealand for some months teaching at the University of Canterbury in 2001, a postgraduate student popped a just-published newspaper article on my desk about a shipload of Chinese coffins that had foundered on its way to China in 1902. Maori villagers had buried some beached remains with due respect.\n\nThe house where I'd lived in Dunedin for ten years had been close to a big cemetery, but I'd lived there in ignorance of the fact that there were Chinese graves there. By 2001 I had met Les Wong, a Kiwi Chinese who has made it his business to restore those graves and other Chinese graves in cemeteries close to the old gold-mining centres of Central Otago. Dunedin's Dr James Ng, who came to Otago as a child from Guangdong Province, sent me in late 2001 a copy of an autobiographical article which vividly brought to life the familial links (and breaks in links between 1949 and 1979) between Chinese family members in New Zealand and their home villages in Guangdong. I have appreciated the encouragement of both Les and James.\n\nTeather, E.K. (2001). The case of the disorderly graves: contemporary deathscapes in Guangzhou, Journal of Social and Cultural Geography 2(2): 185-202.\n\nThis paper describes three agendas that are shaping contemporary deathscapes in Guangzhou: the modernist planning agenda, the market economy, and the Chinese Communist Party ideology and resistance to it. It develops the concept of deathscapes into deathspace, \"a symbolic system that represents a stage in the ongoing process of conflict and compromise involving the traditional and the modern, the personal and political, and the sacred and the secular'.\n\nPreparing for this research was quite a challenge and I can't imagine how I ever thought I'd find out what I wanted to know. An introduction from James Hayes led to my meeting Dr. May Bo Chan, from the Department of History at Zhongshan University. This department generously hosted my second week in Guangzhou and invited me to give a seminar. Existing links between Hong Kong Baptist University and Zhongshan University were invaluable.\n\nAn enormous stroke of luck was finding a superb and energetic",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215713,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 12,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "FROM THE HON. EDITOR\n\nI have been receiving a relatively large amount of material over the last couple of years and Council has therefore authorised me to continue producing Journals which significantly exceed the '200 page' rule, in order that publication of accepted submissions is not overly delayed. At 532 pages, therefore, this Volume, No. 42 is another bumper effort.\n\nThere are 11 contributions in the ARTICLES section, which must be something of a record.\n\nAndrew Abraham has provided a most scholarly paper on the pros and cons of the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the jurisdiction of the Indian Government to the Colonial Office in 1867.\n\nContinuing our review of the Battle of Hong Kong during World War II, there are contributions from Chohong Choi and Anne Ozorio. The former rehearses Allied thinking on an invasion of Japanese-occupied Hong Kong and possibly the Chinese hinterland behind it, which area might then have been used as a base from which to bomb Japan. Chohong then discusses, somewhat novelly, the challenges to such an invasion from the weather. Anne Ozorio's paper shows that, contrary to popular belief, the British military were very much prepared for an attack on Hong Kong by the Japanese - in terms of continuing intelligence gathering and covert resistance during the occupation - and that they were very active in China until the end of hostilities.\n\nOur man in Bondi, former President, James Hayes, shares with us his experiences of Chinese ceremonial occasions and the considerable etiquette and pomp that go with them.\n\nLawrence Lai et al. reports on a survey of the World War II military installations on Devil's Peak, Hong Kong.\n\nI have reproduced a very pleasant piece from Eve Lam of TVB On HKBRAS which centres on the 40th Anniversary Celebration Conference held in December, 2000 at the University of Hong Kong.\n\nLauren Pfister's account of the life of Ch'ëa Kam-kwong (1800-\n\niii",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215723,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 22,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "CONTENTS\n\nPRESIDENT'S REPORT....................................xix\n\nFRIENDS OF THE HKBRAS (UK) REPORT.................................xxxiii\n\nFINANCIAL STATEMENTS.........................................xxxix\n\nHON. LIBRARIAN'S REPORT.......................................xlix\n\nARTICLES\n\nAndrew Abraham - The transfer of the Straits Settlements: A revisionist approach to the study of colonial law and administration..........1\n\nChohong Choi - Between the nine dragons and a divine wind: How Hong Kong's weather might have affected an allied invasion to retake the territory.........................................33\n\nJames Hayes - Hong Kong's Chinese associations: Their ceremonial occasions and their helpers..........................................67\n\nLawrence Lai, Daniel Ho and Leung Hing Fung - Survey of the Devil's Peak redoubt and Gough Battery...............................101\n\nEve Lam - The Royal Asiatic Society (Hong Kong Branch): The faces, the stories and the memories..................................139\n\nAnne Ozorio - The myth of unpreparedness: The origins of anti-Japanese resistance in prewar Hong Kong...........................161\n\nLauren Pfister - The proto-martyr of Chinese protestants: Reconstructing the story of Ch'ea Kam-kwong............................187\n\nStephen Selby - Chinese archery: An unbroken tradition?...........245\n\nKeith Stevens - The Yangzi port of Zhenjiang down the centuries...255\n\nDan Waters - Hong Kong in the 1950s and '60s: Reminiscences.......323\n\nxiii",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215822,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 121,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "54\n\nremained an integral part of Allied strategy to defeat Japan. Even if her expected contribution to Allied victory over Japan had been downgraded and a squadron of B-29s based on the mainland was not as promising as a combat-ready Chinese Army, the politics of basing such a new and promising weapon on Chinese soil were thought to be enough to boost Chinese morale.53\n\nThe issue is in doubt\n\nBy the end of 1943, Allied planners had not settled on a decision to drop Hong Kong from the list of future objectives, nor did they elevate its status to that of a territory whose possession was beyond debate. In short, if a campaign in China was likely, a port on the China Coast would need to be opened up, and Hong Kong was a leading candidate for such a port. The development of the war in 1944-1945 would determine Hong Kong's importance.\n\nAs the USN's Central Pacific offensive gathered momentum in early 1944, the adjacent Southwest Pacific offensive under General Douglas MacArthur also stepped up its pace so as not to be left behind. The competing dual advances sped up the Allied timetable, and brought the Allies to within striking distance of Japan by summer 1944.\n\nIn China, it was a different story. Chinese forces here had not faced a major Japanese attack since 1938. When the Japanese attempted to link their possessions in the south (including Hong Kong) with the large portion of China they held north of the Yangtze River with a major offensive in the summer, the Chinese forces standing in the way largely disintegrated without offering much resistance. By early 1945, the Hong Kong beachhead had linked up with the rest of Japanese-held China. By now, the prospect of recapturing Hong Kong from the sea, while still not entirely infeasible, was made harder due to the potential ease with which the Japanese could reinforce Hong Kong from the interior of China. Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese probably intended to wage a last-ditch defence of Hong Kong like they were already doing in the Pacific.54\n\nJ\n\nThe Japanese eventually overextended themselves in China, while China belatedly began to receive supplies in some quantity once the road link from Burma was reopened and the air link over the Hump",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215928,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 227,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "161\n\nTHE MYTH OF UNPREPAREDNESS: THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-JAPANESE RESISTANCE IN PREWAR HONG KONG\n\nANNE OZORIO\n\n[Hon. Ed. - I was initially hesitant to sanction this article because it seemed to me to be significantly under-referenced, even to the extent of \"personal communications.\" It draws significantly upon Hong Kong Eclipse (Endacott and Birch, 1978), which is not acknowledged. Ms Ozorio contends that the referencing is adequate and assures me that, to the best of her knowledge and belief, the article is an accurate resumé of events. In accordance with the general principles of free expression I have left untouched Ms Ozorio's editorial comments on 'colonials,' 'the British,' colonial administration and society, and (Sir) Lindsay Ride.]\n\nHong Kong fell to the Japanese in eighteen days: the wonder was that it took so long. [Hon. Ed. - The doggedness of the resistance and the bravery of the defenders, perhaps? See Lawrence Lai's article in Vol. 39 of the Journal, pp.115-136.] In the cosy, cocooned world of colonial society, the invincibility of Empire was taken for granted. Despite all that was happening in China, many Europeans in Hong Kong just couldn't conceive that any Asiatic might challenge their superiority. There were anecdotes that the Japanese planes bombing China were secretly manned by Germans, since Japanese were night blind. As the colonials sat comfortably mocking them, Japanese waiters, barbers, and menials were listening. Many would appear later, no longer servile, in full dress uniform, revealing their true status as high-ranking intelligence agents. The overwhelming Japanese victory was a shock to those who believed that Empire was unassailable. They assumed automatically, that if they had been caught off balance, then the authorities too must have been unprepared. This, however, is a myth.\n\ni\n\nIn January, 1941, General Ismay declared that there was 'not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of augmenting the garrison it should be reduced to a symbolic scale.' Defending a city crowded with a million civilians, little air cover, long supply lines and nowhere to retreat but the sea was a logistics nightmare. What may have been unimaginable for the average colonial civilian was clear",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215929,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 228,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "162\n\nquite early on to professional military strategists. War, when it came to Hong Kong, would have to be waged by means other than conventional warfare. Realistically, occupation would be a foregone conclusion: the challenge was to struggle on by covert means and to develop some resistance mechanism. In short, a new concept of waging war, based on intelligence and action behind enemy lines.\n\nMilitary intelligence\n\nThree years after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, [Hon. Ed. - I find it difficult to see how Japan's unprovoked occupation of large parts of China and the atrocities committed by its army can be termed a 'war.'] the British Army, Navy and Air Force created a 'Far East Combined Bureau.' It operated openly, employed no agents and depended on information volunteered by customs officials, commercial travellers and the like. Its offices, based within the Naval Dockyard compound, discouraged visits from casual informants, and much of its work involved monitoring personal reports from China sent by courier, rather than proactive intelligence gathering. Naval Intelligence provided support and maintained a signals station on Stonecutters Island for transmitting information to Singapore. GE Grimsdale, later to become Major General, joined the FECB in its early days. One of his earliest recommendations on curbing Japanese espionage in Hong Kong was to suggest that tourists be banned from using cameras! Later he was to acknowledge that espionage was harmless in a place like Hong Kong where defences were open and unsophisticated - one snatched photo of a ship leaving the naval dockyard revealed less than its official description in Jane's Fighting Ships.\" In any case, Japanese had been known to go to Kelly and Walsh, the booksellers in Central District, to find maps better than their standard issue 1:20,000 series.\n\nIn January 1937, Capt. Charles Ralph Boxer, of the Lincolnshire Regiment arrived in Hong Kong. Everything about Boxer contrasted strongly with the stereotype of a colonial in the Far East. Although he came from a family of military men, he was an unconventional individualist. Moreover, he was a scholar, who spoke fluent, literary Japanese, studying Japanese history and culture to the extent that he was welcomed in some of the most influential Japanese social circles. After the war, these values would pit him against bigots for whom any sympathy for the Japanese was anathema. But pre-war, he represented",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215934,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 233,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "167\n\nsocieties in the Japanese Army, though in his memoirs he downplayed this role. When Mrs Bush, a Japanese, was later forced to work as a Kempeitai interpreter, she talked to a prisoner who was in American Naval Intelligence about their mutual friend Charles Boxer. Bill Kendall, of whom more below, was told by Boxer that the Japanese were on the move: when he saw the zeros flying overhead, and knew that the attack had finally started.\n\nBeyond military intelligence\n\nFW Kendall was a Canadian from Vancouver who had lived in Hong Kong since childhood, and spoke not only fluent Cantonese but other dialects as well. He had had a mining business in China, but after the Japanese occupied east Guangdong and Chekiang his business was cut off. He then moved back to Hong Kong and worked for the Government organising refugee relief, building and running the main large camp at Kam Tin. Early in 1940 Kendall was approached by Col LA Newnham, in his capacity in charge of Military Intelligence, and asked to set up a small unit of civilians and volunteers. Being non-military personnel, they could undertake training in the use of sabotage and \"ungentlemanly warfare,\" which the official armed services could not legitimately carry out. The unit was given the cover name Z Force. Allocating £1,500 for this 'unit for independent action behind enemy lines' had to be done outside normal accounting channels, GOC Hong Kong told the War Office in September 1941, because of the need for absolute secrecy in a small place like Hong Kong.\n\nThe Special Operations Executive, under the Ministry for Economic Warfare, had been established in Europe for some years to assist resistance. They trained agents for the specific purpose of operating behind enemy lines using espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare. Specialist SOE units created miniature code machines, wireless facilities and concealed weapons, known by the cheerful name of 'toys.' Where strategically useful, SOE created facilities for specialised sabotage. The whole point of SOE was to facilitate war in situations such as in occupied countries where traditional warfare was impractical. Its methods were ideally suited to the situation in China, where the front was so large and diverse that Japanese supply lines were stretched to vulnerability. The populace was strongly motivated for resistance, and the Japanese, whose control was weak beyond urban areas, were",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215936,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 235,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "169\n\nindependently of each other, with little communication. History is written about those who create documents, not by those whose duty was to leave no trail. Nonetheless, it does appear that there were several groups quietly focussing on different aspects of resistance, not all military, should the day come when the Japanese took over.\n\nUsing his cover as a businessman working for Butterfield and Swire, where his \"manager,\" Mike Turner, also seems to have had SOE connections, Kendall also travelled through China, setting up contacts and listening posts, including those installed by Chauvin and Chinese intelligence. Indeed, because SOE tapped into an existing Chinese network, the intelligence it was able to access was far more sophisticated and accurate. SOE continued to fund another Chinese organisation, the RII (Research and Information Institute) throughout the duration of the war. This was a Chinese operated service using British equipment and a small British staff, working for, not in charge of, the Chinese. Many of its reports still exist, showing just how detailed was the information they gathered: exact ammunition supplies and strengths of Japanese units, area by area, names of officers, postings and movements. When, later in the war, efforts were made to amalgamate various British agencies operating in China, SOE managed to insist that RII was to remain separate and unaffected because it was a Chinese force.\n\nDespite what seems to have been a working relationship between the SOE and various forms of KMT intelligence, it is evident that Kendall also cultivated strong links in the hinterland of Hong Kong where KMT influence was weak. These areas were relatively remote and fiercely resistant to central government influence. The villagers were clannish, and their communities closed, united internally by family and traditional ties. Many of these villagers had emigrated overseas to work in places like South America and Malaya. They also had traditional systems of defence and security, but piracy and banditry were endemic, almost part of the economy. These regions were alien territory to urban Hong Kong people, European or Chinese, who as outsiders would have been treated with suspicion. Political loyalties varied, and before Hong Kong was attacked, people had no automatic regard for the British who were not yet ‘Allies, and whose record in China was not edifying. In many ways, this work was much easier after the occupation when locals and British forces, though humiliated by defeat, shared common ground. Kendall went into these areas, often alone, meeting and talking\n\n+",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215937,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 236,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "170\n\nto villagers, making personal and individual contacts. He told Endacott how he met farmers and fishermen, Hoklo and Hakka speakers, and gradually won acceptance: at one stage, he had to undergo a “blood ceremony” with some pirate families in the Mirs Bay and Bias Bay area. Trained in SOE tactics, he realised that these close-knit communities, with their tradition of secret societies and their sometimes justified tradition of being outlaws, alienated from established government, were an ideal ready-made resistance underground. Strategically, the hinterland behind Hong Kong was a critical buffer zone in the event of Hong Kong being occupied. It would be the area through which information, personnel, and material would enter and exit. Hence the extreme importance placed on developing relationships with all the local people, whatever their politics, and channelling their interests in support of the British cause.\n\nShortly after the fall of Canton in 1938, a guerrilla unit was formed, nominally under national government influence, to assist in carrying out resistance against the Japanese in the East River Area, just north of Hong Kong, and along the lines of the Kowloon-Canton railway from Sumchun to Sheklung. This unit was commanded by the charismatic ex-seaman Tsang Sheng, whose vision of social change was far closer to communist values than to the increasingly right-wing KMT. Because his power base was the region behind Hong Kong, not especially loyal to the central government, he was able to break free and declare his communist sympathies. He consolidated his influence over the area by earning the support of the local populace and by controlling the worst excesses of bandits, many of whom at this period were KMT supporters. Tsang’s army of guerrillas, known as the Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese Resistance Unit, or the East River Column, formed the strongest, best-organised, and most aggressive Chinese military formation in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Kendall noted that these men were well-armed with Mausers and decent equipment, funded either by the Communist Party or by the relatively prosperous villagers who had overseas remittances from men working abroad. He knew that many in the KMT were as violently opposed to the Communists as they were to the Japanese, and that working with the Communists would be a high-risk strategy, but it was essential in a region so crucial to Hong Kong. It is known that Kendall was involved in negotiations with the Communists. Ronald Holmes, a SOE agent seconded to the BAAG, was to refer to this in July 1944 when he prepared a report of",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215942,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 241,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "175\n\nHong Kong shipyards to do marine engineering could also be used to make armour cladding for ships and vehicles. Hong Kong was also the base from which British aircraft manufacturers wanted to penetrate the Chinese market - the Far East Flying School wanted to train Chinese to fly so they would buy British rather than American or German planes. Hong Kong was also a centre for financial transactions both within and outside the banking system, a source for remittances and money transfers, more secure than Shanghai after the Japanese conquest. A large KMT community operated out of and lived in Hong Kong: almost a parallel government. While there was sympathy for the Nationalists, the colonial administration was uncertain how to maintain a balance between the Japanese and the Chinese Government. Riots against Japanese living in Hong Kong had been suppressed, and no protests made against Japanese attacks on the junk fleet. When the St Johns Ambulance wanted to send an ambulance to bombed Canton, the Colonial Office refused permission. Groups of Chinese 'terrorists' were arrested and deported from time to time. As late as May 1941 the colony's police force raided premises at 98 Robinson Road and destroyed a wireless transmitting station which had been operating for three years. The leader of this group was Chan So, an agent of General Wu Te Ching. When Governor Northcote sought guidance, the Colonial Office was advised by the Foreign Office that British policy had to vary according to circumstances, and support for China should be rendered 'compatible with the safety of Empire and avoidance of actual hostilities with the Japanese.'xix Nonetheless, there was a significant understanding between the Goumindang and the British when it came to matters of mutual benefit. When war officially broke out, their clandestine relationship could come out into the open. When Phyllis Harrop,\n\na civilian consultant working with the police reported for duty right after the outbreak of hostilities, she was assigned to work with the KMT who had already started to occupy offices with the police.\n\nThe Japanese were all too aware of the importance of Hong Kong to the KMT. The Japanese Foreign Minister had softly but firmly reminded the British Ambassador to keep the KMT under control. Even before their push to the south, the Japanese had identified KMT activists and targeted educated, articulate overseas Chinese as a threat and source of resistance. In Malaya and Singapore, they were to massacre thousands of Chinese in the wake of their advance, a fact obscured by the emphasis on the sufferings of Europeans interned in camps. In Hong Kong, on",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215945,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 244,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "178\n\nClarke resistance circle during the occupation. Another member of the group was Emily Hahn, later the wife of Charles Boxer. Relationships between this left-wing branch of the Guomindang, with their strong Communist connections, and key figures in the British establishment may shed more light on the relations between the British and the Communists.\n\nWhen the War Office authorised the creation of a Chinese Machine Gun Unit, it pondered where the men for this group would come from. Who did they call on for advice? None other than Rewi Alley, the journalist who had lived in Yenan and knew the Chinese Communists well.xxii He even went so far as to suggest that the War Office consult a Communist guerrilla leader from the north on setting up the unit, and recruiting men from China. This was tantamount to establishing, in Hong Kong, a unit of left-influenced fighters. Even more significantly, the unit was designed specifically to be a Chinese unit with minimal British input. The first batch of trainees were supposed to form an elite officer corps in what eventually might be an all-Chinese unit. The War Office was prepared to go along with this idea and detailed Chauvin, who had set up the wireless network, to organise the unit. This was in line with SOE's record of training and arming local men for a resistance and sabotage role, although the details of the training these men received is unknown, and officially they were a 'machine gun company.' By this stage, SOE had two separate guerrilla training units in China itself: the Danish Commando Company staffed by Danish businessmen under cover of Danish neutrality, and another force known as Mission 204, a much larger-scale and better-established organisation created to assist specifically in the Chinese war effort and operate in the hinterland of Shanghai. Chauvin was able to recruit and train fifty men for this Chinese battalion. Whether he used men with Communist leanings or men recruited through his contacts with KMT guerrillas is unknown. Photographs of the passing-out parade of the unit show that they were unusually tall men, possibly northerners. Unfortunately, they graduated from their training barely a week before the Japanese attacked.\n\nJust as war is an extension of politics, so is politics essential for the continuance of war. In a situation like Hong Kong, the political aspects of resistance were even more complex than in other places because of the proximity and the supremacy of China. No amount of intelligence gathering and sabotage skills would have counted without",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215946,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 245,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "179\n\npolitical understanding. Boxer's approaches to Chiang Kai Shek came at an opportune time, and might have developed into more, had circumstances so evolved. By spiriting Admiral Chan right from under the noses of the Japanese the British were making a political statement that they, too, could deliver. This was important as the Chinese had perfectly effective escape and intelligence systems of their own: General SK Yee, for example, was able to escape from Apleichau Island, even though the Japanese were almost certainly hot in pursuit and there appeared to be no means of escape for him when he was left behind, believed killed, as the two MTBs flotilla sailed away. Nonetheless to retain their credibility and their claim on Hong Kong, the British had to demonstrate their own ability to create a functional resistance and gain the respect of the Chinese.\n\nBeing realistic about defeat meant that British military strategists could plan pragmatically for occupation and resistance. It was those who clung to colonialist values who could not envisage that there might in fact be quite sophisticated planning behind the scenes. Quietly and unobtrusively, the British developed a comprehensive and effective network ready to activate as soon as the Japanese attacked. They were not \"caught on the hop\" by defeat by any means, nor unprepared. The groundwork was developed and networks in place and in some cases already operating. Support was brokered with the Chinese National Government and also with the Communists, and with the influential left wing faction of the KMT as well. The hinterland behind Hong Kong had been surveyed and alliances were in place to support any resistance in occupied Hong Kong. The British military may have surrendered Hong Kong on Christmas Day, but the next phase, war by other means, was poised and ready to unfold.\n\nChange of direction\n\nJust as refugees had poured into Hong Kong to escape the Japanese conquest of south and central China, refugees began pouring out of Hong Kong within days of the Japanese attack. Throughout January 1942, people were pouring out of Hong Kong by any form of transport they could find: some villagers reported 100 or more passing through each day. At first, the Japanese neither had the inclination to stop them, nor the apparatus in hand to organise an orderly evacuation. Even in POW camps it was easy enough even for men to discreetly remove",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215949,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 248,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "182\n\nstatus, since there were 'so many other senior officers working in the area,' and he saw it as ‘axiomatic that all branches of the service will cooperate and pool their information.' The new section was to have 'full authority to control the movements of all Europeans whether military or civil who had escaped.' Having left Hong Kong less than a month earlier, having by his own admission no knowledge of escape and evasion organisations, he was now to command, and to 'have authority to add to his strength such British or Chinese as are available.' The full story of the BAAG is too complex to tell here, but the transition was not seamless. By 16th May 1942, Ride was given the letter he wanted stating 'from the time of escape until they reach Chiyang all escapees of whatever rank and whatever service will come under your command.' This should be made clear to them at first responsibility. xxii This included the men who had spent so long setting up the groundwork, who had met the Ride group and brought them to safety.\n\nAnother even more fundamental change in direction was the change in emphasis from a general resistance function to an organisation primarily for the escape of Prisoners of War, and particularly of Europeans at that. Ride consistently thought in terms of mass escapes from camp, larger scale and more spectacular than the Chan Chak escape. In the summer of 1942, he planned the escape of 500 or more POWs by junk, and as late as September 1943 proposed paying millions to guerrillas to conquer Canton so an airborne assault of paratroopers could descend on Hong Kong to free the POWs.**** The gathering of intelligence and support of other forms of resistance were corollary to this basic function. An analysis of why the escape of POWs became the central focus of British activity in the Hong Kong region when it was not of paramount military strategic value in the overall conduct of war in the theatre is again beyond the scale of this piece. However, it illustrates that the plans British military strategists had developed to challenge Japanese occupation and to continue the struggle by alternative methods had to adapt to new conditions. SOE and SOE related agencies were by no means silenced in China but continued to play a very important role, even around Hong Kong. The chrysalis opened, but what emerged had to shape itself to a new situation.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215950,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 249,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "183.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Quoted in Endacott and Birch, Hong Kong Eclipse, Hong Kong 1978 p 56\n\nTM Grimsdale Thunder in the East MSS\n\nibid\n\niv FO 371/22153\n\n*FO 371/23573\n\nvi Urban warfare and underground resistance: Heroism in the Chinese secret service during the war of resistance. Wen Hsin Yeh, in Wartime Shanghai ed Wen Hsin Yeh, Routledge 1998\n\nvii WO 208/2049A\n\nviii ibid\n\nix private diary CO129/23\n\n* Endacott's notes, HKPRO.\n\n* WO 208/716\n\n* WO 208/457, 12th July 1944\n\nx ibid Bunny Hide's report, www.hamstat.demon.co.uk\n\nxi ADM 199/1287\n\nxii \"Police Files G56(4)\n\nxvi Although there are rumours of an incident in which some 400 fifth columnists were reported killed.\n\nxvii Letter to SS colonies 3/2/42 WO 208/733A\n\nxviii Alfred Peveril Guest who attached himself after hearing about the mission from an unknown source.\n\nxix FO 371/22160\n\n** WO 311/543\n\n*** CO129/591/23\n\nxxi WO 208/727\n\nxxii ADM 199/357\n\nxxiii ibid.\n\n***WO 208/3260 p 41, also Ride, British Army Aid Group, Hong Kong 1981 p 44\n\nxxiv CO129/590/23\n\n* WO 208/3260 appendix 1\n\nxxvi ibid, appendix 2\n\nxxvii ibid. appendix 4",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215985,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 284,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "218\n\nthe Zongli yámén, he cannot be faulted for missing this major tragic event among Chinese Protestants in southeast China, because it was apparently never reported or discussed by British and Qing officials.\n\nMaybe the \"oversight\" happened because the turn of events shifted attention to the military problems associated with the resistance of Tàiping forces during the next three years before they were destroyed. They had become the target of a common effort by the Qing armies as well as some foreign (and particularly British/Scottish) militia under General Gordon, probably causing a host of special problems demanding the \"immediate attention\" of the British Ambassador, Sir Frederick Bruce.4 Nevertheless, it was against the Ambassador that Legge expressed his most piercing salvo of Protestant Dissenter displeasure in 1863, nearly two years after the riots in Poklo and Ch'ëa's murder had taken place.\n\nIn a brief note leaked to the public a year after it had been written, Sir Bruce explained his opinion to Lord John Russell (1792-1878), then Secretary of State, that missionaries should not be permitted to enter into China because of the troubles they caused and the dangers they faced. His arguments stood in blatant opposition to the conditions codified by the 1860 treaty, but were nevertheless read with approval by Lord Russell. This occasioned an outburst of righteous anger from Legge, who took Bruce's letter apart piece by piece, and showed its insensitivity to missionary work as well as its incoherence in the face of the recent treaty conditions. In and of itself, this letter written by Legge, first published in the Patriot in London and soon afterward in the local China Mail in Hong Kong, was one of the most perceptive and articulate pieces of political analysis he ever wrote. But the coup de grâce came in the end, where the level of frustration Legge felt against British bureaucratic reticence and its discounting of missionary and Chinese Christians' rights had grown to a new height.\n\n95\n\nI will conclude this long letter by referring to a case in point,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215996,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 295,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "229\n\nrecollections, Jonathan Spence's depiction of Hong Xiùquan's madness in God's Chinese Son, and the argument of Robert P. Weller where he suggests the Taiping king's responses did maintain an appearance of sensibility to those in 19th century Guangxi and Guangdong (Resistance, Chaos, and Control in China: Taiping Rebels, Taiwanese Ghosts and Tiananmen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994)).\n\n38. No recognition of this kind of cultural logic is explained or addressed in any direct manner within any of the materials published about Ch'ea. Wherever Legge hints at this kind of problem in his 1861 \"Journal of a Missionary Tour,\" the new editors of the EMMC/MM in London (Legge's father-in-law having died in 1858) consistently deleted it from his original text.\n\n39. This rarely mentioned factor in late Qing political movements is hardly given the attention it rightly deserves, but has been recently readdressed in Frank Dikkötter's study, The Discourse of Race in Modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992), especially the section on \"Race As Type (1793-1895)\", pp. 31-60.\n\n40. Advocated in Paul A. Cohen's evaluation of historical writing about China as the appropriate new direction for academic studies. See his Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).\n\n41. Illustrations from the text are explained with translations and notes below each image, appearing in Paul A. Cohen, China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963, third printing, 1977), consisting of nine plates (seven with scenarios) between pages 140 and 141.\n\n42. The book title was also translated by Christian missionaries who exposed the content of the volume in a tamer manner as Death Blow to Corrupt Doctrines. See Paul Cohen, China and Christianity, pp. 277-281.\n\n43. Whether or not these exact images were being employed in the ideological opposition to Ch'ea's conversion is not certain. In fact, Legge himself possessed one copy of Bixie shilu only later in his life, possessing it only after 1884 when he received an \"LLD\" from Edinburgh University. The copy he received in Oxford originally was owned by Alexander Wylie, if the signatures on the cover portray the story. This same copy was later donated to the Bodleian Library by \"H. Corbett\", and is a text without pictures (Ms. chin. d. 23).\n\n44. This is the argument of An Pingqiu and Zhang Péihéng, editors of Zhōngguó jinshu dàguān (A Complete Introduction to [the History of] Chinese Censored Books) (Shanghai: Cultural Pub. Co., 1990), esp. pp. 102-144, and also illustrated with extensive detail in Okamoto Sae's new publication, Shindai kinsho no kenkyu (The Prohibited Books in the Qing Dynasty) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1996), where she discusses the kinds of books censored, the contents of these volumes, the authors and their fates.\n\n45. And so the Taiping in their own demonology cast the Manchurians into the role of demon devils in response to these intergenerational racist oppressions. Spence notes the presence of the demonology, but does not point out the connection with the previous imperial tactics oppressing intellectuals (God's",
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    },
    {
        "id": 216431,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 190,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "140\n\nthe Russian military with a major headache. Russian attempts to destroy brigandage inadvertently increased the dislike with which they were regarded by the local inhabitants. It was not long before Chinese peasants supported the bandits who also received secret encouragement from Chinese and Manchu officials. The native officials hated the foreign usurpation of their power, but were impotent to openly protest against it.\n\nThe Russians tried to avoid any interference with the Chinese provincial administration in Manchuria which remained intact, continuing in the hands of Chinese officials, though the Russians instituted their own police service. However, the Russian occupation was distasteful to the official class as a whole, as it diminished both their prestige and, consequently, their emoluments. So that from the official class the Russian met with a hostility which took the form chiefly of passive resistance.\n\nA number of snippets in the illustrated War in the East refer to the 'Chunchuses' operating alongside Russian troops on the road to Mukden. One such reads 'On 15th June 1905 took place the battle of Telissu while on the 12th General Kuoki reported the occupation of Huairen Xian by a detachment of his (Japanese) troops, who expelled a force of six hundred Russians and Chunchuses.'\n\nThe Red Beards were to all intents and purposes soldiers of fortune, and as such fought for whomsoever they wished but only for as long as it suited them. In view of their general attitude towards the Russians it was surprising that they ever co-operated with them in the field. However, the Red Beards resembled the Cossacks with their habits of free life and distrust of military discipline, a common love of their horses and a shared prowess at horsemanship.\n\nBandits serving with Japanese forces\n\nThe Japanese were quick to appreciate the potential of the Hong Huzi as guerrillas. The large contemporary two-volume Japan's Fight for Freedom, a contemporary illustrated popular history produced in Britain, included several references to the Hong Huzi, describing them in the text as 'Hunhuses, serving under Japanese command.'",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390",
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    },
    {
        "id": 216432,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 191,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "141\n\nOne such snippet dated 12 May, 1904, described how 'when the Russians withdrew from Wafangtien, contemporaneously with the Japanese advance, bands of Hunhuses throughout Manchuria began to show great activity, especially in the region of Yantai, a station between Mukden and Liaoyang, thus adding enormously to the dangers and preoccupations of the Russians. There were reports that these bands were led by Japanese, which were not improbable, since the Japanese had a perfect right to make use of their hostility to the Russians of the population of Manchuria. At the same time, in all directions, attacks on the railway began, under the direction of officers of the Japanese General Staff. Two such officers had been captured by General Kuropatkin in April and, as there was no doubt as to their mission since they had upon them a large quantity of dynamite, fuses and tools for destroying the line, they were promptly executed.' On the page facing this snippet is a photograph of the decapitation of several Hong Huzi with the caption 'How Russians deal with the Hunhuses who destroy the railway.'\n\nAlthough it does not in any way help clarify the employment of Chinese bandits as irregular troops by the Russians, a British observer writing on the horsemanship of the Cossacks, noted that ‘after a comparatively small force of Japanese cavalry at Sha-ho had acted as a sufficient counter-check to the larger masses of Russian horsemen, the Cossack was deficient in courage and staying power, but was well mounted. There was a long and exposed line of the Manchurian Railway for them to guard, and the Russian cavalry had the Hunhutses [sic] always with them, but these marauders on their diminutive horses should not have been able to ride round the horsemen of the steppes in the manner they seem persistently to have done.'\n\nAlthough captions on photographs of captured Chinese claim they were being executed for espionage, mainly spying for the Japanese, it tended to have been more a matter of individual banditry and any resultant monetary reward rather than prisoners having been 'resistance fighters.'\n\nThere is also a photograph of \"The Head Chief of the Hunhuses.' It shows four Chinese and one Japanese (said to have been an Intelligence Officer, who worked in Newchwang [Niuzhuang] during the Russian occupation as a shoemaker). The central figure is described as 'the chief named Chin, said to be in Japanese employ who is a well-",
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