[
    {
        "id": 206350,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 167,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "A SHORT HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN HONG KONG\n\nJAMES HAYES*\n\nOn the occasion of the disbandment of the Hong Kong Volunteer Corps in May 1866, His Excellency, after expressing his thanks for time, exertions and money spent for objects so essentially Public, went on to express his belief that the spirit which originated the Volunteer movement would be found to exist fresher and stronger than before, if any real and urgent necessity were to arise for defending, by force of arms, the rights of the Crown, or maintaining the supremacy of the Law in this Colony. The Hong Kong Volunteers would doubtless in such emergency come to the front again more numerous and efficient than ever!\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThere have been military volunteers in Hong Kong for almost as long as there has been a Colony. Hong Kong was occupied in 1841 and the first volunteers were established thirteen years later, in 1854. However, the existence of a Volunteer force does not make Hong Kong unique. In this respect, as is shown below, it takes its place in the great movement which, in its modern re-incarnation, was created by patriotic fervour in the British Isles\n\n* Mr. Hayes is a member of the administrative branch of the Hong Kong Civil Service. He is a reserve officer of the Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers) and has been Hon. Editor of this Journal since 1966.\n\n1 The Hongkong Government Gazette, 26th May 1866, G.N. No. 81.\n\nThe footnotes to this article are given at the foot of each page. The following abbreviations are used:-\n\nVol — The Volunteer, the current journal of the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force published annually since 1950. Y.B. = Year Book of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps 1934-40.\n\nS.P. = Printed Sessional Papers of the Hong Kong Government, being papers presented to the Legislative Council of Hong Kong.\n\nHan. Hong Kong Hansard, being the published proceedings of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. These were printed in the Government Gazette and the Hong Kong Daily Press. There are bound annual volumes in the library of the Colonial Secretariat, Hong Kong.",
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    {
        "id": 206351,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 168,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "152\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nin 1859 and spread outwards through the self-governing and other territories of what became the Commonwealth and Empire. It extended to Britain's Eastern Colonies and to the foreign communities of the treaty ports of China and Japan where, from time to time, various alarms and excursions added self-preservation to the list of factors motivating the continuance or periodic resuscitation of volunteer corps.\n\nIn Hong Kong the Laws of the Colony early provided for their existence as a constitutional force. A succession of Ordinances established volunteers on a proper basis. The earliest of these was No. 2 of 1862, which was repeated with slight variation in No. 18 of 1882. An important re-modelling was carried out by No. 6 of 1893. This was followed by a Volunteer Reserve Ordinance No. 25 of 1910. Both these Ordinances were replaced by a further Volunteer Ordinance No. 2 of 1920, still modelled largely on the important 1893 Ordinance.\n\nVolunteer forces were the rule in the various foreign concessions in China, though save in the larger ones local volunteer forces tended to be formed and reformed whenever events seemed to warrant it. For example, the Shameen Defence Corps was formed after a serious riot in 1884 and was reformed from time to time, e.g. in May 1911 due to the unsettled state of affairs in Canton (see Diary of Events and the Progress on Shameen 1859-1938 compiled by H.S.S. and privately printed about 1938, pp. 19-26).\n\nThe largest of the China volunteer units was, in time, the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. This originated at two public meetings held in April 1853 and its early doings are described in Chapter XXXV of Lanning and Couling's The History of Shanghai, Part I (Shanghai, Kelly & Walsh, 1921).\n\nInteresting details of its development are given here and there in Brigadier J. V. Davidson-Houston's Yellow Creek, The Story of Shanghai (London, Putnam, 1962). As in Hong Kong, the passing of the first emergency resulted in the demise of the Corps. \"Enthusiasm for the Volunteer Corps sank to a low ebb, members neglected to turn up for training and it was soon practically defunct\" (p. 58). The Corps was again raised in August 1860 with the onset of the Taiping rebels, when 107 volunteers came forward for enrolment (p. 65). However, after the successful operations against the rebels the Corps \"wilted and died\" and was wound up in 1867 to \"pay for its debtor's balance by selling its rifles\" although the rifle club continued to function (p. 90). The Corps was again formed in 1870 following the Tientsin massacre and continued in being thereafter, its numbers fluctuating between 250-350 for the rest of the 19th century (pp. 92-93). It then continued to grow in size, like the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, to meet the difficulties of the troubled 1920s and the war with Japan.\n\nThe number of foreign residents in China is relevant to the size and location of Volunteer Corps. Some figures are given at pp. 292-295 of J. Dyer Ball's Things Chinese or Notes Connected with China, 4th edition, Hongkong, Kelly and Walsh 1903. There were, for instance, 4,424 foreigners in Shanghai (exclusive of those living in the French Settlement) in 1895 and 6774 in 1900. The Hong Kong Census of 1891 listed 10,446 British and foreign residents.",
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    {
        "id": 206352,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 169,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n153\n\nway to the Volunteer Ordinance No. 10 of 1933 which was replaced, in its turn, by Ordinance No. 63 of 1948. The present Force is constituted under the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance Chapter 199 of the Laws of Hong Kong, Ordinance No. 25 of 1951, modified by subsequent amendments.3 Besides being established by law, all volunteers have also been subject to rules and regulations provided for in the main Ordinances,\n\nBesides serving as a reminder to the present day volunteer that he and his predecessors have always operated within the laws of the Colony, these Ordinances and Regulations are a valuable source of information about volunteering over the past century and more. They are milestones in the growth and development of the Hong Kong Volunteers and provide the essential framework of accurate facts on to which information from other sources can be fitted.4 These include annual inspection reports for part of the period, personal reminiscences, newspaper reports, old photographs and memorials and the wide range of material included in the pages of the pre-war Year Book of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, 1934-40 and of the post-war Royal Hong Kong Defence Force magazine, The Volunteer. The latter has appeared every year since 1950, with a special edition in 1954 to commemorate the centenary of volunteering in Hong Kong. The war period 1941-45 has been covered in Major Evan Stewart's account which has been supplemented by other publications dealing with the fall of Hong Kong. Material from these different sources has been used in writing this brief\n\n3 Since this article was prepared the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force Ordinance has been repealed and replaced by the Royal Hong Kong Regiment Ordinance and Regulations. Legal Supplements No. 1 of 18th December, 1970 and No. 2 of 24th December, 1970 in the Hong Kong Government Gazette refer.\n\n4 They are to be found in the various editions of the Laws of Hong Kong and of the Government Gazette.\n\n5 Only those for the years 1893-1907 are available in Hong Kong, printed in Sessional Papers 1894-1908. None of the earlier or later reports are available in the Colony.\n\n6 A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle for Hong Kong, December 1941, Hong Kong, Ye Olde Printerie, Ltd. Other sources include the official History of the Second World War - The War against Japan, Volume I edited by Major-General S. Woodburn Kirby (London, H.M.S.O. 1957), John Luff's The Hidden Years (Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, Ltd., 1967) and Tim Carew's The Fall of Hong Kong (London, Anthony Blond, Ltd., 1961).",
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        "id": 206353,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 170,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "154\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\naccount which is intended to provide a factual background to, and trace the major influences on, local volunteering over this long period.\n\nDEVELOPMENT AND ORGANISATION\n\n(a) 1854-1914\n\nThe different motivations, needs and attitudes of changing times provide some of the most interesting aspects of the history of the Hong Kong Volunteer Force. Danger is always a stimulus to volunteer efforts and the first Volunteers owed their origin to a foreign 'scare' occurring at a time of war with Russia and imagined insecurity in Hong Kong. This led the colonial authorities in June 1854 to take the initiative in calling for a corps of Volunteers for the defence of the lives and properties of themselves and their families in the temporary absence of a naval force sufficient to deal with an emergency. (It is interesting that Government called for an Auxiliary Police Force at the same time.) This call lost its magic when the emergency did not materialise and naval protection was restored, and for a few years there were no Volunteers in being.7\n\nAttempts to form a new Corps in 1857 proved an utter failure, the subject was mooted in the press in 1860 without result, and the eventual establishment of a new body of Volunteers on 7 April 1862 can be traced to an enthusiast, Captain Frederick Brine, Royal Engineers, a regular officer who had formed the Shanghai Volunteers in 1861 and went on to form other corps at Hankow and Yokohama. This second Hong Kong corps was disbanded in May 1866.\n\nA third Volunteer Corps was formed in May 1878, arising out of the danger of war with Russia the previous year. It was entitled the Hong Kong Artillery and Rifle Volunteer Corps. Endacott gives a succinct account of this body:\n\nIt numbered 150 by the end of the year, but when the crisis passed interest waned; there were quarrels, and all\n\n7 See Vol, 1954, pp. 17-23 and Endacott, A History of Hong Kong, (Oxford University Press, 1958) pp. 90, 119.\n\n8 Endacott, pp. 119-120. The Hong Kong Volunteers were organised as a battery of artillery with a band and rifle company added within a year see Major Arthur Chapman's article in Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong, Shanghai, etc. (1908) p. 274.",
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    {
        "id": 206354,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 171,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "# HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n155\n\nequipment borrowed from the military had to be returned. Numbers fell, and by 1881 it practically ceased to exist. After Hennessy left, an appeal was made for government assistance, and Marsh, the administrator, agreed. The Volunteer Corps was disbanded, and a new Volunteer Corps consisting of two companies of Artillery was formed in November 1882, on a new basis which gave the volunteers more official standing.9\n\nThe Volunteer Ordinance No. 18 of 1882 regulated the reorganised body.\n\nThe second and third Hong Kong Volunteer Corps spanned the period in which a renewed interest was taken in the volunteer movement in Britain. There had always been volunteer forces in Britain, especially during the Great War with France 1793-1814, but these then fell almost entirely into abeyance until 1859 when, because of a national panic arising from the hostile tone of the French Army and Government, and what was considered by many to be the defenceless state of the country, they were revived chiefly as rifle volunteers but partly as light horse, artillery and engineers.10 The large Volunteer Force that was formed at that time continued in being, gave valuable help to\n\n9 Endacott, p. 179.\n\n10 Sir J. W. Fortescue's County Lieutenancies and the Army gives a full account of the various forces raised at this period. More recently, an excellent account of one county's volunteer units is given in C. T. Atkinson's The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume 1, up to 1914, (the University Press, Glasgow, 1950, at pp. 375-377 and 430-435). Mr. Atkinson's account provides interesting background and comparison for the present article. He states that \"like the original Volunteers of 1793-1814 the new corps provided their own arms and equipment and served at their own cost, except if called out for actual service. Volunteers were therefore normally of some substance, well-paid artisans, shopkeepers, clerks or even small professional men or manufacturers; people who normally stood aloof from national defence, they did not join the Militia and were equally unlikely to enlist in the Regulars or to aspire to a commission.\" Originally formed in many independent single-company corps, the volunteers were gradually converted into definite battalions and, later (1888) into volunteer infantry brigades. As with volunteer corps everywhere, opinions differed as to their need and usefulness, particularly in time of peace and, as Atkinson says, \"it wanted enthusiasm, determination and devotion to carry on with the volunteer movement in those discouraging days, (in the 1870s and 1880s) and the country owes much to the officers and men who persevered.\" In Britain, the volunteers were converted into the Territorial Force on 1st April, 1908 and organised on the pattern of the Regulars into divisions and yeomanry brigades. Like the volunteers, the Territorial Force was specifically designed for home defence.",
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    {
        "id": 206355,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 172,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "156\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nthe regular army and militia during the South African War 1899-1902 and was reorganised as the Territorial Force (TA) in the Army Reforms of 1908. This movement influenced events in many colonies, and in the future Dominions of Canada and Australia. Hong Kong was thus no exception to the rule, particularly as, in her case, there were recurrent times of insecurity and uncertainty in the years to come.\n\n—\n\nAnother factor in the emergence of Hong Kong Volunteers at various times, and especially in its continuous manifestation from 1893 onwards, was the concern shown for Imperial Defence. Besides being an important port for the trade of and with China, Hong Kong was a naval base for coaling and refitting warships and was considered to be a vital link in the defence and maintenance of communications with the eastern parts of Britain's far-flung empire. In the 1880s there was much talk of its security which led first to the construction and arming of new batteries for coast defence at much cost—the Lei Yue Mun Fort dates from this time—and in the late 1890s the demand for the lease of the New Territories was made partly on defence grounds. This concern is reflected in the 1893 Volunteer Ordinance which made provision for two different bodies, the ordinary Volunteers—already well known to Hong Kong—and the Coast Defence Volunteers, who are here mentioned for the first time. (This Act also made the Hong Kong Volunteers subject to the Army Act whilst on active service in the same way as the Volunteers in England, and placed the Corps under the supervision of the Military Authorities).12 Imperial Defence was also later responsible, in 1902, for the conversion of the Corps, then comprising a field battery, machine gun and infantry companies, into garrison artillery which led to dissatisfaction among members and some resignations.13\n\nThe final stimulus at the end of the century was the enthusiasm and inspiration derived from being part of the British Empire which reached its emotional and material zenith in the decade between Queen Victoria's Silver and Diamond Jubilees in 1887 and 1897. An echo of this time remains in the Great Queen's\n\n11 S.P., 1884-85, p. 83.\n\n12 Section 18 of No. 6 of 1893 and Han., 1893, p. 70,\n\n13 Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 277.",
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    {
        "id": 206357,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 174,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "158\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nundoubtedly due to the Volunteer Movement and to the succession of small imperial wars in the last 25 years of the 19th century which popularised the Army, and fed the emotional needs of imperial Britain in the Victorian age. Between 1902 and 1914 it was due to the sobering effect of the Boer War and the growing realisation by many of the need to reform and rearm against a possible European enemy. Soldiers, in short, were in the public eye, and Hong Kong was no exception to the general rule.\n\nHere, and in the treaty ports, another factor in the popularity of, and support given to, the volunteer corps was the pool of potential recruits provided by the employees of the major European firms, many of whom had attended public schools in Britain and were well suited by their education and sentiment to play a leading part in the volunteer movement.\n\n(b) 1914-41\n\nThe 1914-18 War saw many Volunteers go off to the War in Europe, and led to increased duties for the Corps due to the need to employ regular forces on active service elsewhere. Numbers dropped and compulsory service was introduced in 1917.18\n\nIn 1920, shortly after the War, a new Volunteer Ordinance was introduced to replace those of 1893 and 1910 which regulated the existing Volunteer Corps and Volunteer Reserve. When introduced into the Legislative Council, it was stated to closely follow the old Ordinance, but with a few changes to meet altered times. The Volunteer Force was now \"considered desirable for two reasons for defence against foreign enemies, and also in order to assist the Police and regular forces in case of any serious local disturbances'19 (my italics). We are coming nearer our own times in which the present Regiment was called upon in 1966 and again in 1967 to assist with “duties in aid of the civil power” i.e., internal security. The obligation to serve was also to become more serious. Every Volunteer was to be deemed to have engaged himself to serve for a period of three years and if he left before this without showing good cause he would henceforth have to\n\n18 For the war period see Vol, 1954, pp. 58-67 and Endacott, pp. 284-285. See also the Military Service Ordinance, No. 19 of 1917,\n\n19 Han., 1920, p. 15.",
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    {
        "id": 206358,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "page_number": 175,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n159\n\npay certain sums into the Corps Funds. These variations to the old Ordinance are important as no fixed period under penalty had been enjoined in it, and no special duties other than active military service had been envisaged for the force.\n\nThe reasons for these changes must again be sought in the changing nature of the times. The educated youth and the industrial labour of China had entered into a period of unrest and discontent brought about by their country's weakness. China had entered the war as an ally of the Western powers in 1917 but despite this they refused to give up tariff privileges and treaty ports (the European concessions) or to make their other Eastern ally, Japan, relinquish her territorial encroachments on China. The 1920s were a time of growing internal strife in China coupled with increased resentment of the West. Hong Kong was not excluded from the impact of ideological struggle. The Seaman's Strike of 1922 and the General Strike of 1925-26 crippled the port and damaged the economy of the Colony. An emergency situation existed, and thus a fresh impetus was given to the Volunteer Corps whose services were again needed for humdrum but essential work. Colonel H. Owen Hughes recalls being called out for six weeks in 1925, and combining office work by day with duty by night patrolling the streets and guarding hospitals and vulnerable points.20 Whoever decided that a new Ordinance was needed in 1920 was a man of prescience and discernment. Other amendments were made to the Volunteer Ordinance in 1926 and 1927 (No. 15 of 1926 and No. 27 of 1927) in the light of contemporary requirements.\n\nBy the late thirties hostilities were again threatening in Western Europe and Japan's gradual encroachments in China led to actual war in 1937 and the occupation of Canton the following year. The danger which these events might bring to Hong Kong had already been anticipated. The Corps grew in size during this period and the Year Books between 1934 and 1940 make interesting reading. In the first issues we see that, following the Ordinance of 1933, the Volunteer Defence Corps consisted of one battery of artillery, a machine gun battalion that included three machine gun companies, corps infantry (largely Portuguese) and corps engineers and signals and armoured cars with a reserve company.\n\n20 Vol, 1964, p. 42.",
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        "id": 206359,
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        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "page_number": 176,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "160\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nBy 1940 this force had been considerably expanded to include four batteries of artillery and one anti-aircraft battery, seven machine gun or rifle companies, a mobile column consisting of two platoons of armoured cars and three of medium machine guns, a fortress signal company, corps signals and engineers, an Army Service Corps company and others. All these men were recruited as volunteers, although no doubt some of them felt that the pressure exerted upon them by events and by their fellow-men made it easier to fall in with the rest than stay away. At any rate, the Commandant was able to say in 1940 that \"the Corps is now as strong as it is ever likely to be\".21 The G.O.C., Lieutenant-General E. F. Norton clearly thought they were good in quality as well as in numbers, because in a message dated 30th October, 1940 he said that the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps was \"in an eminently satisfactory state of efficiency\".22\n\nThis was no doubt true despite rapid expansion, but only because, as the Year Books show, its leaders had long been aware of the growing danger from Japan in the east and Germany in the west. In his message for the Year Book of 1936 the then G.O.C. had made a particular point of urging on the drive for volunteers,23 and in the 1937 issue the Editorial emphasized that, however willing, young men were useless in an emergency without previous training.24 Of the drive for efficiency there can also be no doubt. The Commandant's annual report ended with the statement that the headquarters staff of the Corps \"had one object and interest..... to make the unit as efficient as possible to take its place beside the regular Army in the defence of the Colony.”25\n\nThe expansion of these last few pre-war years contains one feature of great significance: the inclusion of Hong Kong Chinese in the Corps in separate units. No. 4 (Chinese) Company was formed in October, 1937 \"with two platoons each of 30 machine gunners\"26 and No. 7 Company some time later. The Corps had been slow in this respect; although it is clear from the Com-\n\n21 Y.B., 1940, p. 7.\n\n22 Y.B., 1940, p. 4.\n\n23 Y.B., 1936, p. 6.\n\n24 Y.B., 1937, p. 3.\n\n25 Y.B., 1937, p. 7.\n\n26 Y.B., 1938, p. 47.",
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        "id": 206360,
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        "page_number": 177,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n161\n\nmandant's annual report in the 1937 Year Book that there had been numbers of Chinese members serving in different units in the Corps before 1937.27 Some stimulus was required, and No. 4 Company's contribution to the 1938 Year Book tells us what it was. \"Encouraged by the records of the Chinese units in the Shanghai and Malay Volunteers, Headquarters considered that the inclusion of a Chinese unit in the Hong Kong Defence Force was fully justified.\"28\n\nThis was a real innovation, even if it was partly brought about by the preparation for war and the search for more men. All through the 19th century and early 20th century, though it far outnumbered the European community, the Chinese element in the Colony, was considered to be the shifting sector of the population with the European element as the hard core. The fact that Chinese were willing to serve and were coming forward in numbers on a voluntary basis is a significant development, not only in the history of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps but of the Colony itself. These men were not coolies and street traders, but belonged to the settled middle-class that had developed in Hong Kong Chinese society over the years since 1841.\n\nWar came to Hong Kong in December 1941. Including auxiliary units, the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force had a mobilised strength of 2,200 at the Japanese Invasion.29 It played a memorable, and costly, part in the defence of the Colony and its members suffered along with their Regular comrades and civilian internees during three and a half years of imprisonment that included, for some, transfer to Japan to work in essential industry, like coalmines. The story of these years has been told elsewhere,30 but the fighting and the period as prisoners of war cost the H.K.V.D.F. the lives of 172 officers and men killed in action or died of wounds, 39 missing, believed killed, and 78 died as P.O.W. The Force was awarded 1 C.B.E., 1 D.S.O., 4 M.B.E.s, 3 M.C.s, 1 D.C.M., 6 M.M.s, 3 B.E.M.s and 18\n\n27 Y.B., 1937, p. 6.\n\n28 Y.B., 1938, p. 47. There is, however, a reference to 'all races' volunteering in 1914-18 for the forces and to serve with the Volunteers in Endacott, p. 284.\n\n29 Vol, 1954, p. 112.\n\n30 See note 6 above.\n\n31 Vol, 1954, p. 111.",
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        "page_number": 178,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "162\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nmentions in despatches.32 On 1st May 1951, H.M. The King was pleased to approve the change of title of the Hong Kong Defence Force to be, in future, the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force and, in 1957, it was accorded the right to carry the battle-honour 'Hong Kong' like those Regular Infantry units that had taken part in the defence of the Colony. The Honour is worn on the Queen's Colour at present carried by The Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers).34\n\n(c) The Post-War Period.\n\nThe Volunteer Ordinance was re-enacted in 1948, and again in 1951; only this time, for the first time in the history of volunteer soldiering in the Colony, the Corps, now under the new Ordinance styled the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force, had to absorb and train conscripts recruited under the Compulsory Service Ordinance of 1951, as well as volunteer members.\n\nThe new post-war Volunteer Ordinance of 1948 made a departure in that it created an infantry battalion to be known as \"The Hong Kong Regiment\", in addition to Force Head Quarters units. Whilst there had been a Machine Gun Battalion before the war it was more a collection of companies than a battalion organisation. As Colonel H. Owen Hughes who was the first C.O. of the new unit remarks, \"The essential difference from the former H.K.V.D.C. was our establishment as an Infantry Battalion as opposed to the local formations of pre-war day, when the Corps had no proper Establishment but consisted of a number of independent and mostly support units, developed on an ad hoc basis\". The 1951 Volunteer records that strength had crept up from 19 officers and 282 other ranks the previous year to 21 officers and 318 men, but was \"still woefully short\".36 It was at that juncture that the decision was taken by the Hong Kong Government to introduce a Compulsory Service Ordinance, since volunteers alone could not provide the numbers required.\n\n32 Vol, 1954, p. 111. For war service in Hong Kong and elsewhere.\n\n33 Vol, 1954, p. 111.\n\n34 Vol, 1957, pp. 3 and 11-12. And now on the guidon carried by the Royal Hong Kong Regiment following the reorganisation mentioned in note 3 above.\n\n35 Vol, 1964, pp. 42 and 45.\n\n36 Vol, 1951, p. 31.",
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        "id": 206362,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 179,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n163\n\nfor defence and internal security purposes. This Ordinance was similar to that introduced in Britain in the early post-war years, and was equally unpopular. It was suspended in 1961, having outlasted the British one by two years. Thereafter the Force reverted to Volunteers. Apart from retaining one infantry company and a Home Guard Company, the former infantry organisation was discontinued and the Hong Kong Regiment was reorganised as a reconnaissance unit with internal security duties, companies converting to squadrons, one of them later equipped with armoured cars.\n\nVOLUNTEER PERSONNEL\n\nWho were the Volunteers during this hundred years and more of service? Generally speaking they were mostly Europeans up to the establishment of Chinese companies in 1937-38, since when Chinese have played an increasingly important part in the manning of the Volunteer Force. The names of the famous Ninety-Nine who signed the Colonial Secretary's circular on 30th May 1854 show a predominantly British group with some Portuguese, Germans and Scandinavians.\nBy 21st June following their number had risen to 127 comprising 92 British, 4 Danes and Swedes, 8 Germans, 16 Portuguese, 1 Italian, 1 Frenchman and individuals from 5 other countries. This mixture was representative of the polyglot foreign population of the time. It has been a feature of Volunteer life in the early and later periods, though not in the middle years from 1893. The Ordinance of 1862 made it easy for persons who were not British subjects to join. Volunteers needed only to be \"such and so many of the Inhabitants of Hongkong as shall volunteer and offer themselves, and as His Excellency the Governor shall approve of\" (Clause 1). Neither did the Rules and Regulations approved on 14th May 1862 make any stipulations about nationality. Christians and non-Christians alike were acceptable and could make either an oath or declaration of allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and of faithful service during the term of enrolment (Clause VIII). There then came a change. Whilst the 1893 Ordinance, though being more specific in many things, still said nothing to exclude\n\n37 Vol, 1954, p. 21\n\n38 Vol, 1954, p. 20.",
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    {
        "id": 207160,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1974",
        "page_number": 231,
        "title": "RAS-1974",
        "content_text": "NOTES AND QUERIES \n\n225 \n\nand half-caste parentage, and to board, clothe and instruct them with a view to industrial life and the Christian faith according to the Church of England'. (Resolutions of Jan. 18, 1870) \n\nAfter the reorganisation, the Committee came under male domination; local firms were liberal supporters. Some members of Jardine, Matheson and Company were on the Committee from 1869 to 1901, William Keswick serving the longest from 1869 to 1888, except for his absences from the Colony. Sir Catchick Paul Chater served from 1874 to 1925. \n\nThe school was particularly useful in meeting the educational needs of the increasing Eurasian element in Hong Kong and the China Coast. It educated many of the future leading members of these communities. In 1869, it was decided not to admit any more girls as boarders, though they could continue as day students. In 1892, the girls then in attendance were transferred to a Boarding School 'Fairlea' conducted by Miss Margaret Johnstone. \n\nBefore occupying a building especially erected for the school on a lot on Bonham Road at Eastern Street in 1863, the school had been at the Albany, a building loaned to them by the Government. The Bonham Road building was enlarged and improved over the years. In time, however, it became inadequate for the needs of the school, especially as a growing emphasis on the role of sports in the life of the school was frustrated by a lack of proper playing fields. In 1917, a definite decision was made that a new site be secured. The firm of Messrs. Little, Adams and Wood drew up plans for a new school in 1920, but negotiations with the Government for a site were not completed until 1923. Site formation began in 1924. The general strike of 1925 and the resulting financial recession slowed down the construction and necessitated the elimination of certain parts of the original plans. An imposing tower, a feature of the original plan, was never erected. \n\nThe buildings were occupied in 1926, but in 1927, the school somewhat reluctantly released the premises to the Army for a hospital for the Shanghai Defence Force. The school took up temporary quarters in a recently built block of buildings on Nathan Road near Prince Edward Road. In January 1928, the premises were returned to the school. The school faced another crisis in 1932 when suggestions were made that the Government resume the property in default of payments on the debt the School owed and",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207347,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 115,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS IN 19TH CENTURY\n\n107\n\nof the underdog Portuguese or Eurasian communities. The one social event that united—for one evening—all classes of European was that great Scots tribal festival, the St. Andrew's Day Ball. Celebrated on November 30, it ushered in the Hong Kong season, a season that closed with the Volunteer Ball.* The St. Andrew's Day Ball was open to any Scot or his friends who could afford the price of a ticket. Held in St. George's Hall, a spacious ball-room within the City Hall edifice, it was attended normally by over a thousand adults. Although an Army chaplain inquired plaintively: \"Why should pig-iron turn up its nose at ten-penny nails (in Hong Kong)?\" for one evening at least status distinctions between retailers and wholesalers were partially ignored, although the proceedings were always dominated by the chieftains of Jardine, Matheson and Co., the patriarchal Scottish hong,\n\nThe European lower orders were excluded not only from the more amusing social life of the colony, they also had little say in its government. In 1885, for example, the total number of ratepayers was eighty-two: from this small group the unofficial members of the Legislative Council normally were elected or chosen. The pong-paân were thus totally unrepresented in this, a British colony. Their names, moreover, are not found on the lists of Justices of the Peace, Special Jurors, and those of members of official and other important committees. They were of course sworn in on occasion as common jurors.\n\nWhy did the European lower orders experience such treatment from the well-to-do and influential? Partly, it was a consequence of social attitudes formed in the homeland: Victorian notions about the ordering of social classes and occupational groups, such as are analysed in Thackeray's The Book of Snobs. However, in early Hong Kong another notion was also prevalent: the view that there were 'dangerous classes', a term that connoted the lumpenproletariat, a class of persons spawned in the new industrial cities of Europe, 'those who had so miserable a share in the accumulating wealth of the industrial revolution that they might at any time break out in political revolt as in France'.32 Predictably enough, working-class Europeans were often viewed with some suspicion; there was fear that middle-class control over them would cease to prevail in certain\n\nFor the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force see James Hayes' article in this Journal Vol 11, 1971: 151-171.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207394,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 162,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "154\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nconflict. I came to regret my thoroughness, for there was never time to use the equipment thus accumulated and this must have been splendid booty for the Japanese. There was also a full social life; many British women had enrolled for nursing and other essential duties and had not been evacuated. The Hong Kong Hotel was a gay place indeed, particularly on a Saturday night.\n\nIn October 1938, 35,000 Japanese troops had landed in Bias Bay on the China coast 35 miles from Hong Kong, and had then occupied Canton and had cut all communications between Hong Kong and mainland China. Patrolling Japanese ships thereafter made sailing from the Colony outside a circumscribed area very hazardous. In February 1939 the Japanese occupied the island of Hainan, 300 miles to the south of Hong Kong thus controlling the sea communications with Singapore. Curiously, after my arrival I do not remember taking part in any serious discussions with my friends about the prospects of a successful defence of Hong Kong. There were however plenty of rumours to fill the air. It was generally known that the strategic plan required Hong Kong to resist an attack for 90 days before a relief could arrive, a decision taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1937. In February 1940 the home authorities decided that food reserves should be accumulated for 130 days, while in August 1940 the Chiefs of Staff reached a further decision that in case of war with Japan, Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost to be held as long as possible. After the war I learned from Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, that in February 1940 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the troops should be withdrawn from Hong Kong. Nothing was done to give effect to this decision. I have no doubt that the decision taken in February 1940 was the correct one which could with advantage have been taken much earlier. Ever since my arrival in Hong Kong in 1939 I believed that the Colony could not be defended successfully. The frontier, beyond which lay a strong Japanese army, was some 20 miles from Hong Kong harbour, the line to be defended, the so-called Gin Drinkers line was less than 5 miles from the harbour, the Japanese navy controlled the coast, our airport was tiny and the Air Force planes were few in number and no match in performance for their potential opponents. One and a half million Chinese civilians were crowded into Kowloon and Victoria. Roads suitable for wheeled traffic were few and open to close observation at many points. The whole picture left no doubt",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207514,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 282,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "274\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nand I doubted very seriously whether any prisoners would get out of Hong Kong. Having reached this conclusion it seems strange that one just carried on. I do not recall discussing the situation as I saw it with any other person in the hospital, for it was my job to try to keep people cheerful rather than inspire feelings of gloom. I suppose the truth of the matter is that with the blessing of work to be done it became possible to shut one's mind to the dark thoughts that crowded in.\n\nIn 1944 the effects of the blockade on the Japanese began to become evident to us, though after April 1945 when the hospital reopened in Kowloon our conditions were improved and my own depression and I believe that of others lifted very considerably.\n\nThe military situation was such that in April 1945 the Japanese expeditionary force in China which had recently been reinforced numbered about one million men, though by this time neither the training of the troops nor their equipment were good and their efficiency was not high. Responsibility for the Canton area was laid upon the Japanese 23rd Army which consisted of six divisions, two independent mixed brigades, two independent infantry brigades and the defence force allocated to Hong Kong. In May 1945 the 23rd Army was reduced from six to three divisions, but its task was still to hold Liuchow Peninsula, the Hong Kong-Canton area and Swatow in order to repel an American invasion.\n\nWhatever plans may have been made or even considered, our Official History contain no suggestion that an American or British attack on Hong Kong was contemplated in 1945. Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, the American Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek and commander of the American forces in China, hoped to have a force of 13 Chinese armies, each of three divisions for operations in the Hong Kong-Canton area. Wedemeyer's plan was to attack the Hong Kong-Canton area in the last quarter of 1945, and the assault on Canton was to be made on 1 November. Sixteen out of Wedemeyer's 39 divisions had American training and were fully equipped. None of the other 23 was either fully equipped or trained. At the time of the Japanese surrender 20,000 troops and civilians laid down their arms in Hong Kong. It would seem therefore that the battle for the relief of Hong Kong would have been fought between Japanese and Chinese troops. All operations of course were halted after the atom bombs were dropped.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207530,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 298,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "290\n\nEditor's Footnotes\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\n1. Dr. Bowie's own career and achievements, before and after the historic events of which he writes, will be of interest to readers of this Journal. They are as follows:\n\nM.B. 1918. University of Glasgow.\n\nF.R.C.S. Royal College of Surgeons, Edinburgh 1929.\n\nHonorary F.R.C.G.P. (Royal College of General Practitioners) 1969.\n\nSir Arthur Keith Medallist, Royal College of Surgeons, England, 1969.\n\nMain Appointments, Army.\n\nCommissioned R.A.M.C. 1918.\n\nServed in U.K., France, Germany, Turkey.\n\nSeconded to Egyptian Army 1923-25.\n\nShanghai Defence Force 1927.\n\nTerritorial Adjutant, 54th East Anglian Division T.A. 1928-30,\n\nSurgical Specialist, British Troops in Egypt 1930-35.\n\nSurgical Specialist, Queen Alexandra Military Hospital, London 1936-39,\n\nSurgical Specialist, British Troops in China, Hong Kong, 1939.\n\nPrisoner of War, 1941-45.\n\nReader in Military Surgery, Royal Army Medical College, London 1946-48. Consulting Surgeon, Middle East Land Forces 1948-50.\n\nRetired 1950. (voluntarily)\n\nCivil.\n\nRegional Postgraduate Dean, British Postgraduate Medical Federation, University of London in North West, South West Metropolitan and Wessex Hospital Regions, 1950-70.\n\nNow Retired.\n\nDr. Bowie was awarded the O.B.E. (Military) in 1946.\n\n2. Dr. Bowie's account of Japanese attitudes and behaviour can usefully be set beside the comments of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke and Dr. Li Shu-fan, the eminent Hong Kong surgeon, who both experienced them at first hand. Sir Selwyn writes (pp. 71-72 of his autobiography referred to at p. 178 above):\n\nNobody can deny that man's potential for cruelty was exhibited on an appalling scale by the Japanese in the stress of war. It was predictable in the circumstances that I should suffer my share of ill-treatment at their hands, and this is what presently came about. Yet the feature of their character that stood out from that whole experience was in fact their unpredictability. They would be acquiescent, even humane, when least expected, vicious with sudden fury after a phase almost of apathy. They could respect, sometimes, a principled stand or an unflinching argument, and yet visit a meaningless rage upon the helpless. To attempt to understand them was the plain duty of anyone seeking to protect a community that was at their mercy, and the first lesson to be learned was that surrender violated their military code, making a prisoner a non-person. But this too was a generalization, and as such to be guarded against as one guarded against racial prejudice. For men are not cast in one mould, even by war, even by a code or an ideology.\n\nDr. Li's account of Hong Kong under Japanese rule is given in chapters 6-9 of his autobiography, Hong Kong Surgeon (London, Victor Gollancz, 1964) in which his comments at pp. 159-160 are relevant here.",
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    {
        "id": 207552,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 320,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "312\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\nThe Deputy Commander at Taipang was the highest ranking officer in the locality of Kowloon during the Ch'ing Dynasty. At that time, the headquarters was set up within the Kowloon Walled City. This office, which also served as a garrison, still existed before the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, but had been converted into a Home for the Aged run by a Catholic Mission. In accordance with the [Kwangtung] military system adopted in Ch'ing Dynasty, there were altogether 6 battalions of armed forces under the Kowloon garrison commander. The reason why the Kowloon headquarters was named the Taipang Garrison is that the geographical name of Kowloon was once alternatively called Taipang Shan (⚟) and was politically under the sovereignty of Po On (then San On) District Magistracy.* Besides, there is also a very good harbour by the name of Taipang Bay located at the southeastern part of Po On District and east of Kowloon. In Taipang harbour the water runs to 5-10 fathoms deep where large warships can cast anchor. It was partly due to the importance of local coastal defence and partly due to the necessity of civil administration that such a garrison was established at Taipang Bay. The post of Deputy Commander was normally held in a 3 years' term; and among all the previous commanders, General Cheung was the most important in terms of historical significance.\n\nCheung Yuk-tong, alias Hon-sang,† was born in Wei Yeung District, Kwangtung, and for many generations the Cheung's family lived in the Peach Garden in the capital town of the Wai Yeung District. In the 4th year of Hsien Feng (A.D.) (1853) he was appointed as Deputy Commander at Taipang, being promoted from staff officer at the Chin Shan Checkpoint [near Macao]. For four successive tours of service, in all a total of 13 years Gen. Cheung had been holding this post, and in those days the local inhabitants enjoyed a very peaceful time.\n\nIt was not until the 5th year of Tung-chih reign (1866) that General Cheung retired from the military service at the age of 72. When the southern part of the Kowloon Peninsula was ceded to Britain as a consequence of the signing of the Peking Treaty he was still in office. As the Treaty was signed by the Imperial Court,\n\n*This is not so, but the Taipang garrison force served in and controlled Kowloon and district. Except where stated footnotes are supplied by James Hayes.\n\n†",
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    {
        "id": 210965,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 27,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "2\n\nserved under him for the next nine months until he was replaced by the late (Sir) Ronald Holmes. It was my first posting after language study, and I was inexperienced and ignorant. Ken was formidable by reason of bulk and intellect, and I was instinctively wary of him. He was, too, one of those rather \"larger than life\" personalities around whom legends and stories had already accumulated. However, he turned out to be both kindly and helpful. More, he was informative; and for a new District Officer anxious to know more about his charges it was fortunate that he had written about local history, something that had attracted insufficient attention from the Civil Service, or anyone else for that matter. I probably saw more of him than the other DOS, because of our joint preoccupation with the Shek Pik Reservoir investigations and the fact that his town office was in the District Office (South) building on Gascoigne Road, Kowloon.\n\nHe used to come in once a week, on set days, and I remember once being indignant upon hearing his booming voice on another day. “Oh well” I thought resignedly, for I was still very new, “he'll come in shortly”, and dismissed him from my mind. Some time later I heard his voice again, and realized it was a tape recording on which his secretary must have been working, a draft speech or something of the kind.\n\nAfter he left the N.T., our association was mostly personal. Through joint interests, including membership of the Royal Hong Kong Defence Force, we met from time to time. The Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch, to which he lectured occasionally, was another shared interest. After he left Hong Kong on retirement we exchanged letters periodically. I also saw him on his visits to his family here, and particularly remember the last occasion (1986) when, together with the then District Officer, Yuen Long, we arranged a visit to the border area including the Mai Po marshes. We began with a picnic lunch at Island House which had been his home when he was District Commissioner, New Territories. This was a particularly happy and relaxed family occasion, with his grandchildren, on which I look back with great pleasure.\n\nOne always got a lot out of Ken. Our mutual interest in local people and their history led me to send him copies of any draft",
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    {
        "id": 213314,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1994",
        "page_number": 136,
        "title": "RAS-1994",
        "content_text": "116\n\nPoon, Clement and May Fung, 'Plenty More Fish to Fill the Tanks of Mong Kok', Hong Kong Standard, 26 November 1994,\n\n'Race-Day Rites to Exorcise Sha Tin Jinx', South China Morning Post, 3 May 1987\n\nRam, Jane, 'Asia Conjures Wind and Water to Boost Business', International Management, July/August 1987\n\nSaw Puay Lim, \"The Force is With Them', Sunday Morning Post Magazine, August 1990\n\nStewart, Rob, 'Can Your Business do Without the Feng Shui Edge?', Executive, November 1995\n\n'Superstitions Rife. Survey Reveals', South China Morning Post, 11 December 1989\n\nTatlow, Dermot, 'Safe and Sound in Domain of the Yellow Emperor', Sunday Morning Post, 7 March 1993\n\nTse, Patricia, 'Banking on a Grand Design and Good Luck', South China Morning Post, 28 May 1990\n\nWan, Melanie, 'Fungshui Experts not what They Used to Be', Hong Kong Standard, 19 August 1985\n\nWesley-Smith, Peter, Identity, Land, Feng Shui and the Law in Traditional Hong Kong, Law working paper series no 5, University of Hong Kong, 1992\n\n'What Pyramids and the River Thames have in Common', International Property Review, undated\n\nWoo, Anthony, 'The Tao of Technology', Asia Magazine, c. 1995\n\nLetters to the Editor of the South China Morning Post\n\nChan, C.W., 'Safety Concern', 24 June 1990\n\nHo, Eugene, 'Fung Shui and a Lesson from Science', 25 May 1987\n\nWebb, Richard, 'In Defence of Fung Shui', 10 July 1991\n\n'Unlucky Bank', 21 September 1991",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213605,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1995",
        "page_number": 201,
        "title": "RAS-1995",
        "content_text": "173\n\nwith a strong visible presence along the colony's first line of defence.\n\nA very comprehensive description of the new observation posts was given in an article by Sub-Inspector M.E. Davis* which appeared in the HK Police Magazine in December 1953:\n\n\"The land frontier of the Colony of Hong Kong extends from Mirs Bay in the East, to Deep Bay in the West, following for the most part the tortuous course of the Shum Chun river. The country is intensely varied. The arable plain at Sha Tau Kok soon gives place to rugged mountains and deep gorges, which gradually fall away until the extensive marshy tracts near Mai Po are reached. Along the border for 16 miles of the length runs the frontier fence. It is, without any overstatement, difficult territory. The frontier area forms part of the New Territories Division of the Hong Kong Police Force, and is commanded by Mr. N.B. Fraser, M.B.E., Senior Superintendent of Police. One of the most important of the several methods of border control in effect in this area is the operation of a chain of Observation Posts\n\nThere are seven of these posts in the chain, covering the whole of the land frontier. Each is within sight of one or more of its neighbouring posts. All are accessible from the frontier road, or by means of jeep track from the roads. Most are located on prominent hill features which gives them an excellent field of observation. The elevation of the highest is over 700' above sea level. The frontier is divided into three sections, each with its complement of observation posts, which are controlled by a parent station in each section. From East to West the stations are Sha Tau Kok, Ta Ku Ling and Lok Ma Chau. The first has only one post, Pak Kung Au, under its control. Ta Ku Ling, the central and largest area has four, Kong Shan, Pak Fa Shan, Nga Yiu and Nam Hang. On the Western flank Ma Cho Lung and Pak Hok Chau posts are controlled by Lok Ma Chau\n\nThe posts are all almost identical in construction. Centrally there is a round, two storied, tower, and jutting from its sides are two long, one storied arms. The plan of the whole is roughly in the shape of a chevron. The upper storey of the tower is the Control Room, equipped\n\n* Deceased-Editor",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1995.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/95941j25g",
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    },
    {
        "id": 213607,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1995",
        "page_number": 203,
        "title": "RAS-1995",
        "content_text": "175\n\nthere are rainwater catchments discharging into underground water storage tanks.\n\nOuter defences consist of a dannert or barbed wire topped chain link fence, slit trenches, barbed wire entanglements, and at some locations concrete bunkers sunk into the hillside. Dense thickets and tangled undergrowth form a natural defence outside the perimeter. A later Police Commissioner, Charles Sutcliffe, who came to Hong Kong from Tanganyika, had the idea of improving the natural defences by planting the Mauritius or Cape Thorn. His idea was to cultivate the thorn all along the border fences and around the observation posts as a general security measure. The plan was not successful as the plant did not grow very well and in most areas never really developed as expected.\n\nThe man who gave his name to the new observation posts and whose idea it was to build them, was Duncan William MacIntosh, C.M.G., O.B.E., who assumed command of the Hongkong Police Force on Nov. 22, 1946. At the age of sixteen he joined the Royal Irish Constabulary in 1920 and served with that force until 1922 when he joined the Airdrie Burgh Police. In 1929 he was appointed an Inspector of Police in the Straits Settlements and was interned in Singapore during the occupation. After the war he became Acting Commissioner of Singapore Police, from where he was posted as Commissioner to Hong Kong in 1946.\n\nCommissioner Macintosh was responsible for reorganising the Hong Kong Police Force after the liberation, and to him goes the credit for laying the foundations on which so much of the present efficiency of the force depends. One of his most important tasks was to improve the low morale among the men under his charge. He set about this by beginning a long battle to upgrade police pay, conditions of service, and above all living accommodation. He also concentrated on improving professional standards, and reorganised the Police Training School. He succeeded in his efforts in boosting morale, improving recruitment, and established an esprit-de-corps essential to the running of an efficient police force.\n\nAfter leaving Hong Kong in 1953 on retirement, Mr. MacIntosh accepted appointment as Adviser to the Iraqi Police and spent some time in Baghdad. He died at his home in Surrey, England on September",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1995.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/95941j25g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213826,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 178,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "151\n\nTHE HOUWANG CULT AND\n\nTUNG CHUNG'S COMMUNAL CULTURE\n\nHON-MING YIP AND WAI-YEE HO'\n\nWhile the ancestral hall often serves as the socio-political centre of a single-surname village, a temple of folk religion always stands out as the focal point of local people's social and cultural life in such a multi-lineage rural community as Tung Chung. For the dozen or so villages in the Tung Chung valley, the Houwang has long been their principal deity and the Houwang Temple, their main local shrine. For years, the popular worship of the Houwang has functioned as a cultural and social binding force to hold this secluded community together. In what follows, the development of Tung Chung's Houwang cult is traced, and details of the area's religious and social activities and their cultural as well as political significance for the locality are expounded.\n\nTung Chung as a Secluded Community of Multi-Surname Villages\n\nSituated on the north shore of Lantau Island, Tung Chung used to be a strategic port for maritime defence and trade during the early Ch'ing period. The area's economic development was also facilitated by its favourable position in sea transportation at a time when the northwestern New Territories were Hong Kong's economic centre of gravity. With the British occupation after the Opium War, however, the north end of Lantau suffered gradual marginalization and isolation as the colony's economic core shifted eastward to Hong Kong Island. The decline of ocean transport to north Lantau and underdeveloped overland communication with the southern part of the Island, in effect, kept Tung Chung in a state of seclusion. Hills to the east, south, and west separated this valley from other parts of Lantau. Between Tung Chung and Bak Mong in the east, Mu Wo and Tong Fuk in the south, and Tai O in the west, there were only muddy paths over the mountain or along the shore. Before transportation improved in the 1960s, travel between Tung Chung and these districts on Lantau required two to three hours by foot, roundtrip. Communication was even more difficult with regions outside of Lantau. Beginning from the 1920s, a few ferries carrying goods sailed on\n\nPl",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214427,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 285,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "251\n\nThe Stanley Battery\n\nThe 9.2 inch three gun battery at Stanley Fort was probably one of the most modern of its kind in 1937 in spite of the fact that the guns were second-hand, having come from the batteries at Devil's Peak and Mount Davis. The Mark X 9.2 inch 28 ton Breech Loader was the premier coast defence gun at that time and was used extensively in all major defences. In the UK it was sometimes railway-mounted so that it could be moved about together with its ammunition wagon. Rail-mounted guns, before being fired, had to be secured with heavy iron guys known as chain pickets to stop them toppling over from the force of their recoil. In fixed guns like those at Stanley Fort, the recoil was absorbed by a spring accumulator mounted to the rear of the gun. The Mark X had been developed from the Mark IX in 1899. It had a single motion breech mechanism with an electrical or percussion firing mechanism. Its maximum range was 29,200 yards, which meant that the upper gun at Stanley, which was mounted on a traverser, could reach targets in Kowloon and also the Lema Islands to the south of Hong Kong.\n\nThe weight of the Mark X B.L. including breech assembly was 28 tons, and the weight of the cradle mounting nearly 130 tons. As previously explained, the guns were transported from their old batteries by sea, as the roads would not have supported such heavy axle loads. The transportation of the guns and the construction of their huge concrete bases would have been carried out by civilian contractors, but the actual installation of the guns would have been undertaken by the Royal Artillery using a special portal crane known as a gantry crane. The installed guns would have been disguised with huge camouflage nets draped over them, and protected from the weather when not in use by canvas tarpaulins. The concrete gunhouses built over the two lower guns by the Japanese were probably not bombproof casemates and would only have given the gunners protection from the weather and from strafing by enemy fighters. Judging by old photographs of the gunhouses, the arc of fire must have been severely restricted.\n\nThe Stanley Battery, situated at the south-east corner of the peninsula, was made up of three gun emplacements and a large number of magazines, bunkers, and other battery support buildings spread over a fairly wide area. Most of these structures are still in existence.\n\nPage 285\n\nPage 286",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214744,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 159,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "123\n\nThe performance of a military force is always a relative term in many senses. Authors writing about the Battle of Hong Kong have not rigorously compared the performance of the Hong Kong garrison with that of the Japanese invaders, save statistics of casualties and strength. Nor have they compared the performance of the garrison with British garrisons in other theatres of war.\n\nIt is true that the performance of the Hong Kong garrison did not prevent the fall of Hong Kong. Yet, it should be recognised by the military historian that the Hong Kong garrison, notwithstanding its inferior strength, did not only (a) manage to hold out for a much longer period of time; but also (b) sustain a much lower loss rate, as weighed by relative strength, than its adversary relative to the latter's strength. The former was probably the true mission of the garrison as contemplated by Churchill and both (a) and (b) testified to the battle worthiness of the garrison.\n\nEvidence of these two points is adduced in Table 1, which compares several dimensions of the Battles of Crete, Hong Kong and Singapore. These battles all involved British forces repulsing invading well-prepared Axis forces which had either absolute or relative local air superiority and which succeeded eventually in overrunning the defended territories, taking a large number of prisoners. Each battle has attracted much post-war criticism of the failure of Churchill's strategy or tactics about defence of the island concerned. In all cases, the battles were mainly fought on land, though the German invaders of Crete were air-borne. In the cases of both Hong Kong and Singapore, the conflict was largely between infantries supported by artillery and there was no naval support during the hostility as the navy either was absent or had been wiped out. Evacuation by sea was only possible for a part of the Crete garrison.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214748,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 163,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "127\n\nfighting pitched battles in fence works on the upland and coastal low-land of the Island of Hong Kong. The defence works in the uplands did pose for some time death barriers for the advancing Japanese infantry, though these works were often only defended with small infantry arms. It is well reported that the Japanese had good maps as to the locations of these defence positions. It is also correct to say that the best post-war documentation of the routes of invasions and battles is that produced by Japanese authors rather than the British. Nevertheless, there are reports that the Japanese Army had to make several pointless raids on unmanned defence positions, such as those in Sai Kung, and that it had to force civilians to be guides when approaching lines of resistance. It is interesting to know just how well informed the Japanese were about these defence works at the time of hostilities.\n\nFourthly, while the British might have made a tactical mistake by abandoning the defence works in the Devil's Peak area on the Kowloon side, the Japanese also appeared to have committed a number of tactical mistakes that delayed their victory. The withdrawal of the defending forces and equipment to the Island from the mainland was unhindered by much Japanese interference. As commented on by Tse (Tse, 1996), the Japanese apparently missed an opportunity to pursue the retreating British forces. Besides, the Japanese infantry suffered huge losses on the Island until it had obtained artillery support.\n\nFifthly, the frequent argument that the Hong Kong garrison was significantly less well equipped in weaponry than the invading forces must be carefully interpreted. While it is true that the Japanese had absolute control of the air, the Battle of Hong Kong was mainly fought on the ground. A close analysis of the weapons and transport equipment possessed by the Hong Kong garrison shows that the defenders had at their disposal quite a high percentage of machine guns, field guns and conveyances. The garrison had over 2,042 machines (a very high ratio of one per six defenders); 152 mobile guns (comprising 49 field guns; at least 27 anti-aircraft guns and 86 mortars) as well as 31 coastal defence guns in fixed locations. Ignoring the fixed guns, the defenders used 152 mobile guns to contest 203 guns and mortars, various calibres, of the invaders. The defenders were not overwhelmingly outnumbered in the number of mobile guns in absolute terms. In relative terms, the defenders had one gun per 85 persons and the Japanese one per 197. This observation should of course be qualified by the\n\nof",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214752,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 167,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "131\n\nGandi. R.L. Season of Storms: The Siege of Hong Kong 1941, Hong Kong. South China Morning Post, 1982.\n\nGreenhous, B. \"C Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe. 1941-1945. Oxford, Dundurn Press. 1997.\n\n1956.\n\nGuest, F. Escape From the Bloodied Sun, London: Hutchinson, 1956.\n\nHahn, E. \"Preparing for War.\" Ch 48 in White, B.S. ed. Hong Kong: Somewhere Between Heaven and Earth, Hong Kong. Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 198-205.\n\n1943.\n\nHarrop, P. Hong Kong Incident, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943.\n\nHay, I. Singapore Repulsed, Edinburgh, Pentland Press, 1998.\n\nHong Kong Government. “Events in Hong Kong on 25th December 1941\", Hong Kong Government Gazette: Special Supplement, 2 July 1948.\n\nJapan Defence Office. The Hong Kong-Cheung Sha Operation, Tokyo, War History Division, 1971. (Japanese publication) [Honkon Chosa Sakusen, Boeichoikenshusho Senshishitzu, Asagumo Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1971]\n\n1952.\n\nKemp, P. The Middlesex Regiment, Aldershot, Gale and Polden, 1952.\n\nKennedy, Paul, Strategy and Diplomacy: 1870-1945, London, Fontana, 1989.\n\nKo, T.K. and Tong, C.M. Hong Kong: Japanese Occupation Period, Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co. Ltd., 1995. (Chinese publication)\n\nKo, T.K. and Wordie, J Ruins of War: a Guide to Hong Kong's Battlefields and Wartime Sites, Hong Kong, Joint Publishing (HK) Co. Ltd., 1996.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214756,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 171,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "135\n\nSupplement, 29 January 1948; A Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle of Hong Kong December, 1941 (1953). For the official Hong Kong account of the surrender, see Hong Kong Government (1948).\n\n3 The literature referred to in this section is not exhaustive and focuses on books and reports only. English and Chinese newspapers and periodicals from time to time carry articles on the Battle. Post-war annals of universities, university halls and secondary schools in Hong Kong are also a good source of materials about the Battle. There are also a number of novels on war events,\n\n+ The emphasis is placed on attacking the enemies' \"line of least resistance\" or \"line of least expectation\".\n\n5 As quoted in Ko and Wordie (1996), p.18.\n\n\"They were influenced by the views of Air Chief Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East.\n\n7 During the initial stage of the Battle, BBC broadcasts (Orwell, 1987) placed high hopes on the availability of Chinese forces in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Such forces were never to come.\n\nLiddell Hart (1999): footnote at 219.\n\n\"Colonel Hewitt is the author of a number of books on the Battle and Japanese occupation of the Colony.\n\n10 The title of the book is a misnomer as the police force obtained the royal title only in the late 1960s.\n\nBlackburn gave an account of the anarchic situation of Hong Kong shortly before the surrender (Blackburn 1989).\n\n12 On 23 October 1937, the Joint Overseas and Home Defence Committee considered re-fortification or demilitarisation of Hong Kong, assuming that it took 90 days for the British fleet to relieve Hong Kong. Rollo (1992): 113. According to Aldrich, the British Chiefs of Staff considered the abandonment of Shanghai and demilitarisation of Hong Kong to avoid confrontation with Japan. Aldrich (1993): 261.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214903,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 318,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "294\n\nI don't for one moment think they had. The Japanese invasion of Hong Kong was a \"natural extension\" of their campaign in China in the sense that they had already occupied southern China - across the border from Hong Kong - a considerable time before. Also, although there are innumerable examples to show that invasion from the sea can be a costly business if the beaches are in any way defended, in Hong Kong's case they weren't. A number of gun emplacements had been built on Hong Kong Island before the war but these would not have prevented an invasion at Deepwater Bay. And there certainly weren't any Allied troops around. The Japanese knew all this. I rather suspect that they invaded from the New Territories rather than assault Hong Kong Island at the outset because they believed that if and when they overran Hong Kong Island, the Allied forces would cross to Kowloon and thence to the New Territories and continue to wage guerrilla warfare for months, if not years. The Japanese had every reason to think that conquering the New Territories and Kowloon first would result in the Allied forces retreating to Hong Kong Island - which they did - where they could be \"bottled up\" - which they were.\n\nIn the round, however, this discussion is academic. The hard fact of the matter is that Hong Kong was simply not defendable with the forces available in December 1941. A successful defence would have required a force of enormous size and superbly equipped, supported by comprehensive fortifications. The \"protective buffer\" of the New Territories was never any more than an illusion. These arguments, incidentally, were as valid in 1897 as they were in 1941 and to that extent The Back Door was both disingenuous and unhelpful. September 1897 was evidently what the media refer to as a \"slow news\" month!\n\nHong Kong Invaded! A '97 Nightmare is a 'new, integrated and corrected' edition of The Back Door. Incidentally, although The Back Door was written in 1897, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Gillian is having a gentle swipe at the momentous event in Hong Kong's history that occurred exactly 100 years later.\n\nThe actual story occupies but 56 pages of Gillian's book, including illustrations by Arthur Hacker. These, incidentally, are a disappointment. They are supposed to be illustrating a serious account of a battle fought to the last, with heroism and heavy loss of life on both sides. One would have thought, therefore, that they would have been",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215936,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 235,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "169\n\nindependently of each other, with little communication. History is written about those who create documents, not by those whose duty was to leave no trail. Nonetheless, it does appear that there were several groups quietly focussing on different aspects of resistance, not all military, should the day come when the Japanese took over.\n\nUsing his cover as a businessman working for Butterfield and Swire, where his \"manager,\" Mike Turner, also seems to have had SOE connections, Kendall also travelled through China, setting up contacts and listening posts, including those installed by Chauvin and Chinese intelligence. Indeed, because SOE tapped into an existing Chinese network, the intelligence it was able to access was far more sophisticated and accurate. SOE continued to fund another Chinese organisation, the RII (Research and Information Institute) throughout the duration of the war. This was a Chinese operated service using British equipment and a small British staff, working for, not in charge of, the Chinese. Many of its reports still exist, showing just how detailed was the information they gathered: exact ammunition supplies and strengths of Japanese units, area by area, names of officers, postings and movements. When, later in the war, efforts were made to amalgamate various British agencies operating in China, SOE managed to insist that RII was to remain separate and unaffected because it was a Chinese force.\n\nDespite what seems to have been a working relationship between the SOE and various forms of KMT intelligence, it is evident that Kendall also cultivated strong links in the hinterland of Hong Kong where KMT influence was weak. These areas were relatively remote and fiercely resistant to central government influence. The villagers were clannish, and their communities closed, united internally by family and traditional ties. Many of these villagers had emigrated overseas to work in places like South America and Malaya. They also had traditional systems of defence and security, but piracy and banditry were endemic, almost part of the economy. These regions were alien territory to urban Hong Kong people, European or Chinese, who as outsiders would have been treated with suspicion. Political loyalties varied, and before Hong Kong was attacked, people had no automatic regard for the British who were not yet ‘Allies, and whose record in China was not edifying. In many ways, this work was much easier after the occupation when locals and British forces, though humiliated by defeat, shared common ground. Kendall went into these areas, often alone, meeting and talking\n\n+",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]