[ { "id": 204958, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1965", "page_number": 66, "title": "RAS-1965", "content_text": "The Dialects of Hong Kong Boat People\n\nfong 'square',\n\nkong 'harbor'.\n\nfu ‘lake', & u ‘black', fu 'to transfer'.\n\nku ‘ancient',\n\n59\n\n-ui\n\nk sui 'water',\n\nkui 'sentence', hui 'sea', ui 'to love',\n\ncui ‘mouth'.\n\nlui 'long time', lui 'to come',\n\ncui 'crime', fi sui ‘tax',\n\n-ut\n\nut 'life'.\n\n-uk\n\nmuk 'wood', buk 'to cry', fuk 'wealthy', iuk 'meat', luk 'green', fè cuk ‘common',\n\n-un\n\nfun 'broad', thun 'to swallow',\n\nun 'to change',\n\npun 'native',\n\niun 'round', † chun 'inch'.\n\ntung ‘east',\n\niung ‘old man',\n\nchung 'insect',\n\nhung 'to bear',\n\n#chung 'to follow',\n\nhung 'breast',\n\niung ‘to use'.\n\n-ung\n\nsung 'to send',\n\nlung 'to farm',\n\n-o\n\nA ng 'five', m2 'not'.15\n\nIII. Conclusions\n\nAt this point it is possible to make some comment on the original question, 'How does the language of the Kau Sai Boat People compare with Standard Cantonese?' Obviously the two are not the same but equally obviously KS is well within the limits of phonological diversity found within the Cantonese sub-dialects of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Province. Although the criteria are not available for making precise objective statements on the differences between closely related speech groups, in impressionistic terms KS phonology is much closer to SC than are many other subdialects of the Cantonese group. Any naive speaker of SC, that is, one with no experience outside his own subdialect, might recognize KS as a distinct accent but he would probably have no great difficulty in carrying on a conversation. On the other hand, some of the Szeyap forms might frustrate communication altogether. Unfortunately it will take a good deal of cooperation between the linguist and the psychologist before we have the techniques for making quantitative statements about cross-dialect intelligibility; my comment on this score are at best educated guesses.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1965.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s752cj653", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205216, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1966", "page_number": 172, "title": "RAS-1966", "content_text": "166\n\nNOTES AND QUERIES\n\ncase at Compensation Board hearings, following upon such resumptions.\n\nRods, acres and chains are unknown measurements in Hong Kong insofar as the Chinese farmer is concerned. He uses such measurements as mau (mou), tau chung (tou chung) and tam shui (tan shui) which besides being different words are also very different in area. A mau = 4.8 of an acre. This measurement is still used in mainland China but has been out of general use in the Colony of Hong Kong since at least the early 1900's. Here in Hong Kong the tau chung and the tam shui are the local measures.1\n\nEach Chinese village in Hong Kong has its own tau. Usually it is a wooden tub or boat-shaped container which holds approximately ten catties of rice seed. A catty is a Chinese weight of 1¼ pounds. The tau is therefore about 13.333 lbs., but could be more or less as there is no standard tau in use among the villages. Turning from the tau to the tau chung, the latter measure is the area of land required to grow one tau of rice seed.\n\nAgricultural land in Hong Kong is rated as first class, second class or third class, dependent on its water supply. First class land is well-watered land that will grow two crops of rice and a catch-crop in the off season, generally sweet potato. Second class land relies generally on rainfall for its water supply and is rated as medium grade land. Third class land is generally located on hillsides, is usually dry, and is used as orchard land or for growing ground nuts, millet and upland rice.2\n\nJust prior to the rice growing season which coincides with the southeast monsoon, padi nurseries are prepared here and there in the fields and the seed is scattered in a small nursery plot which grows very green and very thick. At the same time, the farmer gets out his buffalo and ploughs the padi fields in preparation for the planting. Each padi field is constructed so that it is at a slightly higher level than the one below it, which accounts for the terracing effect one associates with padi fields. The size and location of a padi field is governed by its ability to receive a gravity feed of water from its source. Each padi is surrounded by an earth bund in which outlets are made so that water flowing in from the top level feeds directly to the lowest level. With sufficient water in the lowest field the farmer plugs the bund outlet and allows the next level to fill until all the padis have", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1966.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/bz60k0811", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205990, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 70, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "A HONG KONG BUTTERFLY\n\n65\n\nsides of the creature above the prolegs is yellow-ochre and there is a narrow border of the same colour around the head and the anal segment. The head is black. There are no processes as in the larva of Papilio agamemnon. By 9th July the smallest larva had grown from 9 mm to 15 mm retaining the same coloration. On 10th July it moulted on the surface of the leaf leaving the black skin. The length was constant at 15 mm. The larva was now apple green, darker on the back, with three narrow yellow stripes on the seventh to tenth segments, and a buff line just above the legs from head to tail. The head is celedon green with four circular black spots on the crown, and two more smaller ones at the angle of the jaws.\n\nFor observation the larvae were kept in a large glass container which, if covered, keeps the food plant fresher than the ordinary breeding cage. On opening this one morning the pungent scent emitted by the Papilionidae when disturbed was very noticeable, but no amount of interference would induce the larvae to extrude the osmeterium so that the colour could be ascertained.\n\nThe green stage of the larva only lasted four days, during which the faint yellow horizontal lines above the prolegs gradually faded out, and the apple green colour rather deepened. The full length attained was 26 mm on the eve of pupation. In all instances but one pupation took place on the underside of the leaf, and not the upperside as recorded by Corbet for L. meges. The pupa is attached by a white cremastral pad, and a very fine silk girdle which is almost invisible, holding the abdomen in contact with the leaf. The shape is very similar to the pupae of P. doson or P. sarpedon, being beaked, but the length is only 22 mm. The colour varied with the background, from yellow-green on young growth, to emerald on mature leaves. The exceptional larva spun up on the glass of the container in a vertical position, head up producing a lilac grey chrysalis. From the beak a seam runs diagonally to the base of the thorax, and another finer line marks the centre of the back for 5 mm when it bifurcates making a roughly elliptical figure to the tail. All pupation was during the hours of darkness. Emergence took place exactly seven days after pupation, but this is the hottest time of the year, the mean temperature being around 85°F. All imagines appeared between the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 a.m, standard time. Just before emergence the pupal case is", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206346, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 163, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "SUNG-TYPE POTTERY FINDS IN HONG KONG\n\n147\n\nApart from general similarities in shape and style of potting, the bowls display a marked divergence in colour and quality of the glazes which range from a clear and very pale greyish green to an almost matt dark olive green. Crazing occurs with some of the glazes, usually the clear light coloured ones. Perhaps the most attractive of these glazes is one which is thick, unctuous and pale greyish green in colour and is found usually on bowls with flat unglazed bottoms and in one instance of a \"turned-down\" mouth rim of a vase. The styles of potting and decoration suggest similarities with certain wares of Chekiang.\n\nGENERAL PROBLEMS OF DATING\n\nIn connection with the dating of these pieces, it must be pointed out that none of the finds have been recovered as a result of systematic and controlled excavation, and all attempts at dating have been made by the criteria of traditional classifications or by comparison with finds reported from kiln sites in China. The accuracy of the latter method is largely determined by the standard of the reports and the correctness of the dating of the kilns by the excavators. If the judgment of the excavators of the kilns is influenced by traditional concepts and classification, which is not only possible but likely in some cases, then the value of their reports is greatly reduced as references for dating pieces found away from the place of manufacture. There is as yet very little evidence to prove conclusively that pieces regarded as \"Southern Sung\" could not have been produced in the later decades of the 13th century and, conversely, that \"Yuan\" pieces were not in production before the 14th century.\n\nThe discovery of coins with pottery finds is very much of a mixed blessing. While coins do provide an upper limit for dating they are of comparatively little use in precise dating. The extensive and continued circulation of Sung coins into later periods of Chinese history, especially in Kwangtung, is the source of much argument in the archaeology of Kwangtung in the later historical periods. To quote a notorious example, in 1955 there appeared a report14 of a \"Sung tomb\" in Canton which produced several blue-and-white jars. The strongest evidence adduced by the excavators for giving the tomb a Sung date was that all the numerous coins found in the tomb were Northern Sung. It took nearly two years and a great deal of...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207490, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 258, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "250\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\ned out of bounds. One Volunteer died at 11.15 a.m. on 27 April and having no acceptable mortuary we conducted the funeral at once to a site near Argyle Street, a short distance from the hospital.\n\nThe Japanese celebrated 29 April as a holiday in honour of the Emperor's birthday, and we received two issues of cigarettes for staff from the Japanese. Early in May we got plants including tomato and pakchoi, from a Chinese garden and had already planted onions. On 2 May Saito told me to try the main switch and true enough on the following day the mains electricity supply was restored. More mail came in and on 4 May parcels arrived from our visitor friends, two being for the Hong Kong Volunteer who had died on 27 April.\n\nOn 5 May Saito put on the lights on the platform of the Assembly Hall and there was a concert which my diary shows to have included items in Japanese and English, though my memory does not recall details. On 7 May we ran a lottery for a consignment of Red Cross pullovers, blankets, underpants, vests, gloves, wool hats, green hats, mosquito nets, towels, jackets, and cardigans. There were two towels and eighteen jackets, but in all other cases the numbers were between thirty and thirty-five. By 10 May engineers were wiring up the room used as the operating theatre and X-ray room and were arranging to run our generator two days later to allow examination of our tuberculous patients and to allow a couple of minor operations to be performed. By now we had an additional supper meal including at times sweet meatless rissoles, cake, buns, and soup. For a time we had no ration beans and the vegetables were poor. The absence of beans was serious for us since we had been issuing 28 grammes daily after fish ceased to be provided. About this time pay for staff and officers came in and I asked that those who were attending the blind might also be paid. We had another concert on 12 May and by the middle of the month I estimated that we had 42 patients who on their expected recovery would be eligible for turn-over with patients from Sham Shui Po. Some of these were already being employed by us on the one-month temporary basis. On 19 May we had a concert for the third Saturday running though I record that the turns were of mixed interest but that the standard was poor.\n\nSmall quantities of mail continued to come every week or two and I received a card dated July 1944. We were carrying out anti-mosquito measures both inside and outside our wire and we received", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208063, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1977", "page_number": 102, "title": "RAS-1977", "content_text": "86 \n\nK. G. STEVENS \n\nIt is generally understood that the \"spirits who counter or cope with misfortunes”, and whose names appear on the green sheet of paper, are the main occupants of the Under Altar and others who share occupancy are there on sufferance. Only two of the five or seven spirits of the Under Altar appear in image form, the Local Wealth God and the Five Demons. The remainder are represented only as titles listed in columns. \n\nThe green sheet of paper on which the Under Altar spirits are listed is either pasted, or framed and hung, on the rear wall of the Under Altar. The titles, apart from the two outside ones which are standard, can be in any order. The local Wealth God, however, seems most frequently to be the title in the centre column. The lists which are very similar on both sides of the Pearl River estuary, are as follows: \n\nRight hand column: \n\nLeft hand column: \n\nCentre column: \n\n\"The Boy who averts calamities (or suffering) on the right\" (右使化難童郎) or (右使化難童郎) \n\n\"The Boy who averts misfortune on the left\"(左便消災童郎) \n\nThe Local Wealth God who distinguishes right from wrong both in the Human and Under Worlds (He has the title of \"Cheng Chen\") (正真財君) \n\nThe other columns are as follows: \n\nThe Two Great Spirit Generals who avert misfortune(冰消瓦解二大神將) The Five Demons who bring fortune (五鬼郎君運財童子) \n\nThe Two Gods of Mourning (二位客星君) \n\nThe White Ape (Monkey), Star God, the Prince of the Palace of the East (東宮太子白猿(猴)星君) \n\nMarshal Yin, The King of Thunder who averts the hundred sufferings/calamities (百解雷王殷大元帥)", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208309, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 33, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n17\n\nspecial kind of society of its own, and men who had not experienced from the outset the hardships of military life were unable to handle the common soldiers.\n\nThe question remains: What kind of training was available to military men in traditional Chinese armies? All the evidence suggests that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in fact well before, military education in China was woefully inadequate by almost any standard. Officers were unacquainted with even the rudiments of warfare, and the rank and file received only the most perfunctory drill. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, an investigation ordered by the Ch'ien-lung emperor revealed the lack of basic training in Banner forces everywhere in China Proper. The situation was no better for the degenerate Army of the Green Standard. Yet prior to the twin challenges of internal rebellion and external aggression in the mid-nineteenth century, there was comparatively little incentive for military men to engage in serious professional study, and even less incentive for most Ch'ing scholars to concern themselves with military affairs. As the redoubtable scholar-general Hu Lin-i remarked in the Hsien-feng period: \"Under the established system of the dynasty, the military is controlled by the civil, but the civil often disesteems the military.\" The late Ch'ing period was perhaps the highwater mark of what Lei Hai-tsung describes as China's “a-military culture\" (wu-ping ti wen-hua),\n\nThe Opium War jolted at least some Ch'ing officials out of their complacency and ignorance. Unfortunately, however, many of those individuals who knew most about the Western military challenge and China's need to reform were least free to speak with complete candor. Lin Tse-hsü is, of course, the best-known example. One official who did speak his mind openly was Ch'i-shan's ill-fated and little-known successor as governor-general of Liang-kuang, Ch'i Kung. In 1842, Ch'i Kung memorialized the throne, suggesting that if China wanted the services of capable men in military affairs, it would be necessary to secure scholarly talent. The way to do this, he proposed, was to reform the traditional civil service examinations. Ch'i's plan was to test advanced candidates in five areas of military expertise: history, strategy and tactics, instrument-making and mathematics, meteorology, and geography as the final exercise (“discourses on policy,” ts'e-lun) in the three-part examination", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208311, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 35, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n19\n\naltogether. But fears over tampering with inherited institutions and respect for ancestral precedent (tsu-tsung ch'eng-fa) prevented the tests from being either transformed or abandoned. Subsequent attempts to reform or abolish the system of military examinations, such as Shen Pao-chen's famous memorial of 1878, came to nothing.19 As late as 1898, we still find the throne ordering officials to determine what the policy of the imperial ancestors had been regarding military reform before taking concrete steps.20 Small wonder the prestigious civil service examinations also remained essentially unaltered throughout the nineteenth century.\n\nThere was, however, room for the reform of military education outside the examination system - particularly during the Taiping period. Not only did the Rebellion allow for the emergence of new civil and military leadership in China; it also resulted in the establishment of new-style military forces which placed comparatively heavy emphasis on military education. The yung-ying armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and others, for example, employed the highly effective training methods of the famous Ming general Ch'i Chi-kuang - techniques that had long since fallen into disuse. In addition to Confucian moral instruction, yung-ying armies received daily drill, which was all but unheard of in Banner and Green Standard forces. They practiced regularly with firearms, swords, knives, spears and other weapons, and were taught tactical formations such as Ch'i Chi-kuang's \"mandarin duck\" (yuan-yang) and the \"three powers\" (san-ts'ai).\n\nIt is true, of course, that officers received very little, if any, formal military training, since it was deemed sufficient that they be upright gentlemen (chün-tzu) who led by moral example. Moreover, we know that active involvement by officers in troop training was generally considered demeaning. But at least some lower level personnel in yung-ying staff organizations (ying-wu ch'u), and perhaps some high-level officers as well, were more knowledgeable about key aspects of military affairs - planning, command, field maneuvers, discipline, supply, communication and so forth - than the vast majority of their Banner or Green Standard counterparts.25\n\nAfter 1860, Western influences began to penetrate Chinese military forces. In the latter stages of the Ch'ing-Taiping War, the British and French took an active role in supporting the introduction of foreign-training to Chinese troops. Foreign-officered con-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208312, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "20 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\ntingents such as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün) brought Western drill and tactics to literally thousands of Chinese soldiers. Officers from these forces not only instructed their own men, but also trained large numbers of troops for Chinese officials, most notably Li Hung-chang.23 At about the same time, foreign-training programs arose in several port areas, including Tientsin, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow and Canton. A number of Green Standard forces at the capital (and eventually elsewhere) were transformed into Western-armed \"retrained armies\" (lien-chün) on the yung-ying model, and several thousand Bannermen were molded into the famous Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), established by Wen-hsiang and others.24 \n\nThe Peking Field Force was an especially interesting experiment. Until the late 1860's, selected members of the force were drilled by foreign instructors using English words of command but thereafter, Western-trained Bannermen carried on instruction independently in Manchu. Nominally 20,000 strong throughout most of the late nineteenth century, the Peking Field Force usually numbered closer to half that amount. According to Major A. E. J. Cavendish, a British military attaché in China, the force as late as 1894 was considered to be an elite organization with \"higher pay and quicker promotion\" than in any other Banner units at the capital. Officers in the force were described as \"the pick of the Banners,\" and posts in it were \"eagerly sought after.\" Yet Cavendish formed a decidedly negative opinion of the force, which he described as poorly armed and superficially trained, with emphasis on form rather than content. One can imagine the shape of the rest of the traditional Ch'ing military establishment.25 \n\nA major deficiency in all of the early foreign-training efforts was lack of centralized direction and support. In the absence of adequate central government guidelines, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely from force to force and area to area. There was virtually no effort on the part of the Ch'ing government to co-ordinate its military programs, or to expand foreign-training in a systematic way.26 In fact, the Manchus seem to have been intent on compartmentalizing Western military knowledge as much as possible—presumably for reasons of internal control. In 1863, for example, the Tsungli Yamen stated explicitly that in the provinces only Bannermen should learn to make", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208313, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 37, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n21\n\nWestern-style weapons, since they lived in designated garrisons that were \"comparatively easy to guard.\" This early attempt to confine knowledge of foreign weapons to Banner forces, although ultimately unsuccessful, is nonetheless suggestive. As alien conquerors, the Manchus remained somewhat paranoid.28\n\nAnother serious problem with foreign-training programs in the 1860's and 70's was that they were not designed specifically as officer-training schools. Although the Tientsin program did train officers for the Peking Field Force and some Green Standard units as well, it trained the rank and file at the same time, in the same basic way. The emphasis was on military drill rather than on modern officer-education, and immediate military needs were always paramount. As long as rebellion raged, there were compelling reasons to continue producing Western-armed, Western-trained Chinese officers and men, despite the many difficulties involved in employing foreigners. But as the internal threat in a given area subsided, so did enthusiasm for reform; and as it did, the foreign-training programs quickly withered away.29 What remained was a certain number of Western-drilled troops and some low-ranking instructors, but very few officers with a real grasp of Western military knowledge. Again, there was little premium on acquiring it.\n\nBy the mid-1870's, the major rebellions in China had been suppressed, lulling the dynasty into a false sense of security. But it was far less Western-style military education and tactics than a new-found acquaintance with Western-style weapons that brought victory to the Ch'ing forces.30 With superior arms, traditional Chinese strategy and tactics usually sufficed against internal rebels, but such techniques were much less effective against rapidly modernizing external enemies.31 After 1875, the rise of foreign aggression on China's land and maritime frontiers complicated the dynasty's military choices, and made recourse to foreign military assistance all the more difficult.32 Yet in the absence of sufficient numbers of qualified Chinese military personnel for Western-style training, reform-minded Chinese officials continued to look to the West for aid.\n\nPerhaps the most prominent and powerful of these officials was Li Hung-chang, who, with substantial foreign assistance dating from the early 1860's, had by the 1870's built his Anhwei Army into the finest military force in the empire. An examination of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208315, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 39, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n23\n\nChou lamented the fact that the spirit of foreign drill had not more fully permeated the Anhwei Army. Hoping to remedy the situation, and appreciative of Cha's contributions to the overall efficiency of the Sheng-chün, Chou urged Li to \"break the rules\" by giving Cha a salary increase in order to reward and encourage him.42 Significantly, however, Chou did not recommend Cha for high-level promotion within the Green Standard system—a reward which most yung-ying officers especially esteemed.43 Although Chou's voluminous writings repeatedly emphasize the importance of Western-style drill, it is apparent that Chou himself was not prepared to request maximum rewards for those who had mastered it.45 How much more of a problem must this have been in other, less progressive military forces?\n\nAnother difficulty in the Anhwei Army was a certain hostility to foreigners and foreign influences. Although Chou took obvious pride in his knowledge of Western military science and technology,46 and took pains to point out that his foreign-trained officers were trusted by their men,47 it is clear that the acceptance of foreign influences within the Anhwei Army as a whole was less than complete. In the words of one well-informed observer of Li's force, \"to be smart [in Western drill] is to be like a hated foreigner and to lose caste.\" This attitude, together with an inherited distaste for active involvement in drill, undoubtedly compromised the military effectiveness of the Anhwei Army's officer corps. Although Chou repeatedly admonished his battalion and company officers to become actively involved in the training process, it is evident that they continued to resist such direct and degrading participation. Chou's writings, as well as independent foreign observations, note this crucial and persistent problem, but little could be done to remedy it.49\n\nSeveral times during the early 1880's, Chou confessed that the vaunted Sheng-chün had declined, that after two decades it had lost much of its sharpness and acquired a \"twilight air.\" The experienced officers, he complained, lacked vigor, while the new and brave officers lacked knowledge.50 In order to alleviate the problem, and to bring the force more in line with Western practice, Chou suggested shortly before his death the establishment of a foreign-style Chinese military academy (Wu-pei yüan).51 Apparently fearful of upsetting vested interests within the Anhwei Army, Chou emphasized...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208322, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "30\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nthey are fierce and they can fight. But Chinese women have bound feet, and are too weak even to bear the weight of their own clothes.98\n\n99\n\nNowhere was the burst of patriotic sentiment and the impulse to reform more obvious than in military affairs. In the years from 1895 to 1898, a spate of memorials on the question of military change reached Peking. Many dealt with the problem of military education. Chang Chih-tung, in particular, became an ardent advocate of military schools as a means of improving the Chinese army. Chang and others also put forward additional reform proposals touching on a wide range of pressing military problems. A number of officials agitated for the elimination of corruption, incompetence, and nepotism in Chinese military forces. Others suggested revisions in the traditional military examinations. Still others proposed drastic cuts in the Green Standard army and the reinvigoration of the degenerate Eight Banners. Not all of these proposals bore immediate fruit, but together they indicated a heightened awareness on the part of many of the need for basic military reform.100 The Sino-Japanese War had begun to teach its lessons.\n\nIn the post-war era, the Chinese navy no longer occupied a position of prominence. Limited and largely uncoordinated efforts were still made by various provincial officials to acquire modern vessels and other types of naval material, but only about half of the naval academies established in China prior to 1895 survived past the first decade of the twentieth century. By contrast, Chinese military schools and academies grew rapidly during the late 1890's and especially the early 1900's.101 This demonstrated interest in military education suggests a new attitude toward the profession of arms, inspired by rising Chinese nationalism. To be sure, ingrained prejudices did not disappear overnight—especially since the civil service examinations continued to offer an almost irresistibly attractive alternative to military service. When Li Hung-chang established his long-term officers' training program at the Tientsin Military Academy in 1887, he was fortunate to find enough capable applicants to fill the allotted forty positions; whereas by 1896 Chang Chih-tung's announcement of the first entrance examinations for his newly-founded Hupei Military Academy attracted 4,000 applicants for only 120 positions.102\n\nChinese military academies, including Li's pioneering Tientsin establishment, eventually came to exert a profound influence on", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 48, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "32 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\npractice of \"interchangeable commanders\"--a striking departure from the personalistic command structure of yung-ying armies such as Chou's. Moreover, the Tientsin academy provided a large pool of new talent for modernizing purposes, men whose \"careers were grounded in change\" and whose \"qualifying education and . . . prominence were owed to reform.\"112 Many Tientsin Military Academy graduates became instructors in other military schools established after 1895;113 several prominent engineers were produced by the academy;114 and of course many of the most famous political and military leaders of the early Republic—including Tuan Ch'i-jui, Feng Juo-chang, Wang Shih-chen, Ts'ao K'un, Chang Huai-chih and many others—were Tientsin Military Academy graduates.\n\n \nIn short, significant changes in Chinese military education took place prior to 1895, despite the absence of meaningful reform in either the civil or military examinations and numerous other problems.116 Nonetheless, it took the successive humiliations of the Sino-Japanese War, the \"Scramble for Concessions,\" and the Boxer fiasco to prompt the Ch'ing dynasty into fundamental military reform,117 And even then, \"national\" policies were often implemented piecemeal at the local level.118 \n\nIn retrospect, it seems evident that the obstacles to meaningful reform in Chinese military education were less ideological than institutional. To be certain, Confucian critics of new-style training programs could always be found, especially after the establishment of modern military academies in China during the 1880's.120 But the throne's lack of enthusiasm for military reform along Western lines certainly cannot be explained in terms of ideology alone. In the first place, it must be remembered that little if anything in the way of Confucian learning had ever been expected of regular Ch'ing military officers. Paradoxically, it was in the innovative yung-ying armies, about which the throne had very mixed feelings, rather than the Green Standard and Banner forces of the empire, that the inculcation of Confucian virtues received special stress. Moreover, officials such as Chang Chih-tung, and even the pragmatic Li Hung-chang, emphasized the importance of Confucian education not only in their own \"personal\" armies but also in their new-style military academies.12 Surely, the subordinate officers of Chang and Li were no less \"Confucian\" than their Green Standard and Banner counterparts.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208325, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 49, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n33\n\nThe major stumbling block to more pervasive reform was simply the lack of sufficient central government incentive to change, and above all, a fear of upsetting vested interests at all levels of the military. Li Hung-chang himself had such fears, but they might easily have been overcome had the throne given wholehearted support to military reform through financial assistance and other forms of official encouragement, including adequate institutional rewards for the acquisition of new military skills.122 It is true, of course, that state revenues were extremely meager, and that Peking's fears over the threat of foreign interference in Chinese military affairs were not wholly unwarranted.123 But it is also evident that the Manchus, as alien rulers, had no desire to establish a systematic, centralized program of modern military education in China-particularly when it became apparent that Western arms and training could not be confined to the traditional Banner and Green Standard forces.\n\nIronically, had the Manchus undertaken meaningful, centralized reform during the late 1860's and early 1870's, when anti-Manchu sentiment was no longer a political problem and imperialist pressure was minimal, the dynasty might have been able to build a Meiji-style system of military education and dispense with foreign instructors by the early-1890's, as did Japan.124 Instead, the Ch'ing government by stages alienated patriotic Chinese and disappointed the foreign powers by its failure to build a modern, Western-style military force capable of doing more than simply keeping a lid on internal rebellion. Most ironic of all, in seeking foreign talent after the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese turned to the one-time \"dwarf bandits\" of Japan, who now began training large numbers of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods both at home and abroad. This new education, and the nationalism that inspired it, had revolutionary consequences.\n\nNOTES\n\nAbbreviations:\n\nCJCC - Chung-Jih chan-cheng\n\nCWCK - Ch'ou Wu-chuang-kung i-shu\n\nFRUS - Foreign Relations of the United States\n\nIWSM - Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo\n\nLWCK - Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi\n\nNCH - North-China Herald\n\nYWYT - Yang-wu yün-tung", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208328, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 52, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "36 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n38 Holcombe, 82-83; LWCK. Memorials, 27: 405. See also Wang Chia-chien, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang ti chuang-she chi ch'i yin-hsiang,\" Kuo-li T'ai-wan shih-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-pao (April, 1976), 3. \n\n39 LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39-41. \n\n40 Wang, Huai-chün, 203 and passim; LWCK Memorials, 35; 33b-34, 34b-35. On Wang, see also Bell, 2: 49. \n\n41 On Chou's army, see Japan, Ministry of War, comp. Rimpō heibi ryaku (1882), 3: 45b-46b; Bell, 2: 4, 57-59; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 128-130; FRUS, 1873, part 1, 182-188; CWCK, 1.4: 36b-32; etc. Chou's nien-p'u is included in CWCK. His writings and nien-p'u indicate a rather progressive outlook, including an appreciation not only of Western weapons and military methods, but also of certain aspects of Western science and medicine. \n\n42 CWCK, 2.2: 13a-b; also 1.4; 2b-3, 32-33. \n\n43 Ibid., see also 2.2: 1-8. On the attractiveness of Green Standard rank, consult K. C. Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal,\" Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 10.2 (July, 1974), 210, and esp. 218. \n\n44 See, for example, CWCK 1.1.2: 24b; 1.4: 2-3, 5-13b, 19-24, 26b-27, 32-33b; 2.2: 1-2b; \"supplement,\" 1: 11-23, 44; etc. \n\n45 See, for example, CWCK, 1.1.2: 16b-17, 23-24, 27-28; 1.4: 3b-4, 10a-b, 27, 30-32; \"supplement,” 1: 7-24. \n\n46 CWCK, 1.1.2: 17b-18; 1.4: 30-41; etc. \n\n47 Ibid., 1.4: 33b. \n\n48 Bell, 2: 57; see also Cavendish, 721. \n\n49 Bell, 2: 57, 197; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 129, \"The Army of Li Hung-chang\"; CWCK, “supplement,\" 1: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b-37b; see also CWCK, 1.4: 36b-37. \n\n50 CWCK, 1.1: 19b; 1.1.2: 41b-42; 2.2: 22b. \n\n51 Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang,\" 3-4, 23-24, note 18. \n\n52 CWCK, 1.4: 34. \n\n53 CWCK, 1.4: 33b-34; also 1.1.2: 41b-42. \n\n54 See note 40. \n\n55 Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca, 1961), 61-62; Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York, 1932), 10-12; Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang,\" 7-8. \n\n56 Ibid. (Wang), 7-8. \n\n57 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887. The entrance examination consisted of three parts. The theme for the essay was: \"(When the people have been taught patriotism and loyalty) they may easily overcome their enemies.\" The theme for the discourse was: \"Much planning brings success.\" And the subject for the poetry exercise was: \"Though summer has come, nature is still mild and pleasant.\" Ibid. \n\n58 Biggerstaff, 63; NCH, April 13, 1887; Chinese Times, April 23, 1887, \"The Tientsin Military School\"; etc. The most complete discussion of the establishment, rise, structure, administration and influence of the Tientsin Military Academy is Wang Chia-chien's, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang.\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211634, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 49, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "24 \n\nand not even a tablet is permitted. Images of the Jade Emperor seen in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and in South-East Asia are all very similar, portraying him as a bearded, usually gilded, image of an official seated on a throne, with a jade tablet clasped in both hands before his chest (see Plates 2 and 3). His head-dress is not a crown in the western sense, but a classic hat, the mien (mian) the rectangular mortar board cap from which is suspended, front and back, thirteen red cords bearing green, red and blue beads and descending almost to the level of his eyes. Thirteen indicates his supreme rank. This, it should be noted, is the typical standard image of a great number of official deities other than the Jade Emperor, and the only way one can categorically identify his image is to see it on his altar, or to find that it bears an original inscription describing it as the image of the Jade Emperor.\n\nHis image is placed as high on the altar as possible, even to the extent of placing it on as many as three to four tiers; his image, even more than most, must never permit his feet to be touching the ground. In a number of places he is considered to be too holy and too powerful to be portrayed by an image; his title only being recorded on a tablet which occupies the centre of his altar. Images of the Jade Emperor are to be seen not only on the main altars of temples dedicated to him but also, in a small number of instances, on secondary altars in temples dedicated to lesser deities. In Suifu in Szechuan, Graham in 1928 counted nineteen images of the Jade Emperor on altars in the town. The images were placed on the first floor of the temples whereas other gods were normally on the ground floor.\n\n7\n\nGrootaers noted that the cult of Yuh Huang was well represented in the sanctuaries built in high spots in the city of Hsuan Hua (south of Chang Chia Kou [Kalgan] and northwest of Peking). The earliest was dated 1535 AD. Yuh Huang was better known there as Hao T'ien Shang Ti and his image portrayed him as a bearded scholar with a mortar board cap.\n\nIn many folk religion temples in Ch'aochou (Teochew) communities his tablet stands in the front centre of the altar table nearest the main entrance, and in front of the main altar, with only an image of the Third Prince on his altar table standing between the Jade Emperor's tablet and the entrance. The altar of the Jade Emperor is referred to as the T'ien Kung T'an (Tiangong Tan). On his birthday, the 9th of the first lunar month, large sacrificial offerings to T'ien Kung are placed on this special altar", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211645, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 60, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "35\n\nprotectors. The latter were either genuine princes and lords or folk heroes whose normal title would not include the term Wang Yeh. The best example of a Wang Yeh of the second category is the most famous of all Taiwanese protective folk deities, Koxinga who, when he appears on altars, is known by a great number of titles, the most common being \"The Lord who opened up Taiwan' (Kai T'ai Tsun Wang). One of his many other titles is 'Chu Wang Yeh' (His Excellency Chu). Chu, the surname of the Ming royal family, was awarded to Koxinga as a personal honour by the Ming, permitting him to adopt it as his surname. Thus, images of Koxinga in temples where he is known as Chu Wang Yeh cannot easily be differentiated from the images of the entirely different Chu Wang Yeh, the pestilence Wang Yeh with the same surname.\n\nAlthough one rule of thumb suggests that Pestilence Wang Yeh are to be seen in groups of three, five or seven on altars whilst non-Pestilence Wang Yeh appear singly, often the only way to identify a Wang Yeh precisely is to enquire of the temple keeper, identify the images colocated with the Wang Yeh, identify any unique iconographical features or identify the deity from the characters in the title on the front of the base of the image if and when these exist or on or above the altar itself or from over the temple's main entrance doorway. We shall examine titles later.\n\nPestilence Wang Yeh normally have no unique and easily recognisable features. All Pestilence Wang Yeh are believed to have died violent deaths, none from natural causes: some were the victims of manslaughter, others committed suicide. Their effigies, often ferocious, consequently tend to solemn colours. Some are standard military mandarins and others civil; some have fierce faces, others normal and natural ones. It is quite common for the groups of Pestilence Wang Yeh to have different coloured faces. Examination has shown that a specific Wang Yeh in one area might have a red face whereas in another area it has a blue, yellow or green one. Others have striped faces, such as yellow on green or red on black. Some have red beards, others black and still others are clean shaven. The specific iconographical feature in each case depends upon the wish of the temple committee concerned who have requested guidance from the spirit of the Wang Yeh himself by means of “spirit communication' normally by means of throwing spirit blocks. In one book on Taiwanese deities a passing reference mentioned 'Wang Yeh crowns' without elaborating. A number of the Pestilence Wang Yeh do wear a normal coronet or what is possibly a tiara-shaped gilded coronet. These appear\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212775, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 84, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "69\n\nGreen Standard forces and not so about the Lien-chün, we can assume that he was a member of, or attached to one of the Lien-chün.\n\nMesny wrote relatively short explanatory notes in the first volume of his Miscellanies on the three armies, the Army of the Huai River, the Army of the Hsiang River and the Army of Ch'u, about which he felt he had unique knowledge having served with the Chinese military.\n\n'The Huai Army, an important Field Force raised in the area drained by the River Huai, did such good service to the Imperial cause under the C-in-C Li Hung-chang, who had been wise enough to advocate and introduce the use of foreign weapons. The Ever-victorious Army, styled Chang-sheng Chün, first organised and disciplined in a foreign manner by General Ward and subsequently rendered so famous under the command of General Gordon, was the principal corps of this army, and consisted of 5,000 men all told. The Ming-tzu Ying, another corps of the same army, raised by General and later Governor Liu Ming-ch'uan, and disciplined by General Pinel and Colonel Lucas, though senior to the Ever-victorious was, however, secondary in importance at the time' [but still existed when Mesny was writing this in 1895].\n\nAt no time did Mesny allude to a general staff in the sense we understand it today. This raises the question what did the Force have by way of what we now call an operations staff or department? Nor did Mesny refer to staff officers responsible for the organisation of manpower or materials; and although he mentioned procurement officers and a staff of officers surrounding the General commanding to carry out his bidding, 'operations' as such, the most crucial aspect of an army's functioning was kept strictly in the hands of the Szechuan force C-in-C. It would appear that military operations in their wider sense were directed by civil mandarins who were more interested in cost cutting than in the direction of the campaign, whereas the military officers, who grade for grade were very much the juniors to the civil mandarins, were responsible for the day to day running of the various forces.\n\nForward planning was always limited by financial constraints. Arms and ammunition, rations and reinforcements had to be reviewed and planned well in advance, but with the attitude of the Viceroy in Ch'eng-tu [according to Mesny] and the restraints imposed by him little could ever be expected to be achieved.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212781, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 90, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "75\n\nof the Szechuan Force under the C-in-C had been badly defeated and had left him in the lurch without support. However, the other half of the fourteen battalions remained in Ch'ing-p'ing Hsien and stood firm, and even recovered much of the abandoned equipment. This was not reported to Kuei-yang and Ch'engtu in Szechuan in time to benefit the C-in-C of the Szechuan Force, the story put about by the commander of the seven battalions who had evacuated Ch'ing-p'ing Hsien being believed and acted upon. The C-in-C, T’ang, was therefore degraded and posted to Szechuan,\n\nThe story, according to Mesny's narrative, ended with the demobilisation of several units of the Szechuan Force, the C-in-C's guards and the Ko-i Brigade in particular, and with Mesny settling into life as an adviser to the new supreme commander of all the Imperial forces in Kueichou, Chou Ta-wu; leaving us in anticipation of the next and successful campaign to suppress the rebel Miao, beginning later the same year, 1871, to be published by Mesny. Regrettably it never seems to have got beyond either Mesny's pencil jottings or good intentions.\n\nThe Organisation of the Szechuan Force\n\nIn his Notes on Chinese Military Services Mesny explained that there were several branches of the Army, the Manchu Banner Corps, the Mongol Banner Corps and the Chinese Banner Corps, each with eight banners. There were also the Chinese militia called Chih-ping; volunteer troops raised during the Taiping Rebellion and on many other occasions of emergency, called Yung-ying or simply Yung i.e. braves [known to Mesny as the Mobile Volunteer Force], and the local train bands\", Tuan-lien [known to Mesny as the Sedentary Volunteer Force]; armed peasants trained in the use of weapons for the defence of their homes in both town and country.\n\nMesny appears to have used notes written during the early 1870s to compile his descriptions of the Chinese Imperial forces and seems not to have taken much advantage of the benefit of hindsight to amend them prior to going to press in 1895. It had proved difficult to differentiate between Mesny's personal knowledge and his accuracy in recording detail, and information he acquired from other non-Chinese sources. Many of his notes on the Manchu Army and the Green Standard Regiments have been taken from Mayers'\n\nPage 90\n\nPage 91", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212782, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 91, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "76\n\nThe Chinese Government, Mayers does not refer to the Lien-chûn Ying. Mesny's ambiguous descriptions are confusing though it would seem that there were four separate bodies, the Banner Forces, the ill-trained Green Standard armies under provincial control, the Disciplined Battalions formed from the Green Standards forces, and the local defence train bands.\n\nThe standing army was divided into two great classes, the Banner Forces, [Ch'i-ping], and the Militia Forces (Chih-ping]. The real Chinese National Army also called Ying-ping generally styled by foreigners as the Green Banner Force [Lu-ch'i Ying'] derived its title from the colour of their triangular standard, green satin with a red satin scalloped border and a golden dragon embroidered in the centre. Each province had a separate army corps under a C-in-C styled Ti-tu Chün-men [one such force was the Kueichou Provincial Force operating alongside the Szechuan Force in which Mesny served]. The forces consisted entirely of Chinese and were, in fact, a part of the local militia. Three centuries ago, wrote Mesny, it was the finest military force in the world: as it was in 1895, he added. The force was beneath criticism.\n\nThe Disciplined Army battalions, the Lien-Chün Ying [troops trained by and after foreign advisers], was a new organisation instituted by Ts'en Yü-ying, formerly Governor of Yunnan, Kueichou, Fukien and subsequently Governor-General of the Yun-kuei provinces. It consisted of detachments from the various Territorial Green Regiments formed into battalions and bearing the same territorial name as the regiment from which they had been detached and of which these detachments actually formed or constituted a fighting or field battalion. The Disciplined Battalions were armed with obsolete rifles but far superior to anything opposed to them in Yunnan or Kueichou. These Disciplined Armies, often referred to as the Anhui and Hunan Armies, were originally privately raised and financed by Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang to combat the Taiping rebel armies and were under the personal command of Han Chinese generals. Later, they employed westerners such as Mesny to assist China's programme of 'self-strengthening', primarily in the sphere of armaments.\n\nAlthough Mesny explained that there was a lack of uniformity in organisation throughout the whole of China he went into some detail, and added that each provincial army corps was considered a regular", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212786, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 95, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "80 + broken up in 1871 on the change of command, there was scarcely a man left in the Force who did not bear one or more scars about his head or face, and it was customary to designate the men in familiar conversation as 'the decorated ones', tai-hua ti Æ9, on account of their wounds. They all received double pay, and deserved it too. Many soldiers served until they were sixty without getting beyond the step of veteran leader of a squad, not even getting the rank of an NCO. When a private soldier desired to get married he received a sum of money varying from two to four taels, and when he died, a similar sum of money was allowed to his relations to bury him with.\n\nA typical example of one of the number of items on military matters published by Mesny in his Miscellany was the system of recruitment for the Chinese Territorial Army of the Green Standard [Lu-ying]. It was, wrote Mesny, by voluntary enlistment. In every garrison town there were a number of young men styled Yu-ting or novices, on probation as it were, for vacancies in the lowest rank of soldiery. These novices received neither pay nor pension but generally got odd jobs about the garrison for which they were given rations and some pittance as a reward. They did however attend all drills and exhibited their skill in handling weapons in the presence of the drill instructors and drill inspectors and obtained certain marks of approbation if considered deserving of such as an encouragement to perseverance in the prosecution of their exercises. When a vacancy in the lowest rank of the soldiery, second class private soldier, occurred these novices were summoned to pass an examination, and the most expert in his exercises and the manliest in appearance usually got the appointment which was that of a garrison soldier, shou-ping, and entered on the pay and ration roll, and were immediately available for active service in garrison or field force units, and would then receive both pay and rations accordingly.\n\nOther items included descriptions of the secretariat, orderly officers, and quartermasters. In every battalion brigade and division or corps of field troops there were always a few officers known as ch'ai-kuan or orderly officers, most of them men of experience risen from the ranks with ranging from a general down to the lowest, the lieutenant. These form the staff of the commander under whose orders they are.\n\nViceroys and governors of provinces and commanders of divisions of field troops had one or more officers, each and a military secretariat usually of the civil rank of tao-t’ai, styled as Ying-wu Ch'u, established", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213312, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 134, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "114\n\nSmith, Michael G. Crystal Power, Llewellyn Publications, 1993\n\nSung, Z.D., The Symbols of 'Yi King' or the Symbols of the Chinese Logic of Changes, The China Modern Education Co., Shanghai, 1934\n\nThe Text of Yi King', The China Modern Education Co, Shanghai, 1935\n\nWalters, Derek, The Fung Shui Handbook: A Practical Guide to Chinese Geomancy, Aquarian Press, London, 1991.\n\nFeng Shui, Pagoda Books, 1988.\n\nWebb, Richard, \"The Village Landscape'. Beyond the Metropolis: Villages in Hong Kong, eds, P.H. Hase and E. Sinn, Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 1995.\n\nWilliams, C.A.S. Chinese Symbolism and Art Motifs, Charles E. Tuttle, USA, 1974\n\n- Outlines of Chinese Symbolism, Hong Kong's Living Environment, Customs College, Peiping, 1931\n\nWilliams, Martin and Richard Webb, 'Rural Landscapes', The Green Dragon, Hong Kong's Living Environment, Green Dragon Publishing, Hong Kong, 1994.\n\nWilson, B.D., 'Notes on Some Chinese Customs in the New Territories', Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 23, 1983\n\nWilson, Colin, The Occult, Grafton Books, 1971\n\nYau, Hong-key, Geomantic Relationships, Beliefs, Culture and Nature in Korea, University of California, Berkeley, Chinese Association for Folklore, Corporate Unit Cultural Service, Taipei, 1976.\n\nAcademic Papers, Newspaper and Magazine Articles\n\nAu Yeung, Mabel and Arthur Kan, 'Let the Good Times Roll', Magazine, undated,\n\nChung, Challina, \"Two Lions Wait for their Tryst with Destiny\", Hong Kong Standard, 28 January, 1985\n\n'Countering Fung Shui', Building, Development, Real Estate and Construction Review, South China Morning Post, August 1982", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213318, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 140, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "121\n\nWhen Gutzlaff had first landed at Chapu an armed force of Chinese was drawn up along the shore. The Chinese soldiers had matchlocks and burning matches ready for a charge, and a Tatar general had placed himself in a temple to superintend the operation; however, wrote Gutzlaff, \"being accustomed to the fire of Chinese batteries which seldom do hurt, and knowing their matchlocks cannot hit, we passed through their line of defence in peace\". The soldiers retreated and crowds of people in the rear being very dense the camp was overrun and tents fell to the ground. After this nothing disagreeable happened. On one excursion Gutzlaff went to a temple on a high hill overlooking the populous region, \"with its abomination of idolatry.\"\n\nToday little remains of old Chapu. The harbour, still used by fishing boats, is overlooked by a broken wall pierced for cannon, with three old cannon still mounted but on modern concrete bases, two being breech loaders and one a comparatively old muzzle loader. There is no sign now of the old city walls, nor of the old Tatar Quarter. It is a sleepy rural town on a former main road now left more or less isolated by the modern highway between Hangchou and Shanghai, by-passing Chapu by some fifteen miles.\n\nThe British Expeditionary Force began the 1842 campaigning season by evacuating Ningpo and Chinghai in early May to raise sufficient troops for the attack on Chapu. The force left Ningpo on 7 May for Chapu where some six thousand Chinese Green Standard troops and some seventeen hundred Manchu soldiers held the beaches and the adjacent heights and were waiting for the British to land and attack. It took the wooden-sided troop transports nine days under sail to cover the sixty miles from Chinhai to Chapu. Theoretically Chapu was strongly fortified but, as had happened before, the Chinese proved unprepared for anything but frontal attack.\n\nThe British Order of Battle consisted of the Force Headquarters under Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Gough, a fleet of seven ships of war, four steamers and troop transports, a naval brigade of some two hundred and fifty men, and four regiments.\n\nThe plan called for three columns, with the Left Column under Lieutenant Colonel Morris, consisting of the 18th Royal Irish under Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas R. Tomlinson (consisting of 492 all ranks),", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213322, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 144, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "125\n\ncalling the Chinese \"disloyalists\", the Fukien braves sided with the enemy and set fire to the town. The foreigners then got over the wall and burnt the Manchu quarter, the Assistant Tatar-General and the acting Sub-Prefect losing their lives, and the taotai escaping to Kashing. The Magistrate Wei Feng-chia led a body of militia to oppose the British advance on the town and was killed, and whilst Heng Hsing, the Chinese Force commander at Hangchou was cashiered, the Chinese commander at Chapu, Chang Hsi, escaped death and capture but was later, posthumously, accused of having run away. The official toll of Chinese casualties including civilian casualties was said to exceed 1300. This figure includes more than 400 officers and men from the Green Standard force and 280 Manchu Bannermen.\n\nWhen I-li-pu \"arrived at Chapu, the English demands, so the Chinese version continues, were so extravagant that nothing definite could be arrived at; and, when the Governor requested the Emperor's sanction to the restoration of the score or two of white and black barbarian prisoners, the foreign ships had left Chapu. The prisoners were then sent to Chen-hai, and it was suggested that bygones should be bygones; but the English would not listen any more.\n\nThe idea of an attack on Hangchou itself by the British forces was now abandoned and attention was directed to the important trade centre of Shanghai. The British, having destroyed the Chinese arsenal, guns and all Chinese government stores in Chapu, released all their prisoners of war cash with a small present, and then on the 28th May embarked for the Yangtze and Woosung, the town at the mouth of the river leading to Shanghai. The transports took fifteen days to cover the hundred miles to Woosung which was bombarded and captured by naval forces. The war ended two months later before the walls of Nanking,\n\nThe 18th Royal Irish was disbanded in 1922 and amongst its many battle honours was 'China 1840-42'. The men of the regiment who took part in the campaign were eligible for the medal awarded for the 'China War' though, regrettably, there was no bar for Chapu.\n\nIn March 1994 my daughter and I tried to find the site of the joss house. Enquiries in the town of Chapu itself were received with polite replies that no such place existed and that there were no temples now near Chapu, this despite the fact that standing less than thirty yards from the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214064, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 132, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "99\n\n1941 there were thirteen operational batteries (complete with underground ammunition magazines, living quarters and access roads) on the Island, the earliest emplacements for these being built around 1895, an underground battle headquarters off Queen's Road near the naval dockyard (completed in 1940) and scores of reinforced-concrete structures comprising pill-boxes, observation posts, searchlight positions, anti-aircraft sites, bunkers, shelters, ammunition and stores dumps, tunnels and water tanks. On Stonecutters' Island the Royal Navy built between the World Wars a huge ammunition depot which included eleven large underground magazines; earlier the first land-based explosives' depot was completed here in 1876 from where it was transferred to Green Island in 1906. Of the original six battery emplacements designed and constructed on Stonecutters' Island during the period 1880-1905, only one remained commissioned at the outbreak of hostilities.\n\nThe two battery positions on Devil's Peak in Kowloon overlooking Lai Yue Mun gap were constructed soon after the New Territories' lease was signed in 1898 and a redoubt on top of the hill was completed by the Royal Engineers in 1914. The guns however were removed in 1936 and transferred to the Island. Subsequently the 18km-long Gin Drinkers' defence line was constructed during the mid-1930s across the hills to the north of the Kowloon peninsula and comprised a series of pill-boxes, trenches, bunkers and tunnels, the key feature being the underground Shing Mun Redoubt covering some five hectares on the northern flank of Smugglers' Ridge.\n\nThe decision to construct air raid shelters so that the whole urban population could be protected was not taken until 1940. In the space of about a year some 22 kilometres of 2.5m-size tunnels (of which about 80% still exist) were constructed on the Island and in Kowloon, including one adjacent to the Secretariat in Lower Albert Road which extended to Government House causing structural damage. In view of the urgent need for these tunnels, the project was arranged on a cost-plus basis and gave rise to rampant corruption, one architect involved even committing suicide to avoid giving evidence. The sub-standard pre-cast concrete breeze blocks made by the Director of Air Raid Precaution's girlfriend's firm are still (or at least until recently) known in the trade as Mimi blocks. Unfortunately the report on the Commission of Enquiry was never made public; it was taken into the Stanley internment", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214224, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 82, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "45\n\nCheung, Priscilla (1996, December 6), 'Laughing their way through life,' Culture, Hong Kong Standard.\n\nCousins, Norman (1979), Anatomy of an Illness, as Perceived by the Patient: Reflections on Healing and Regeneration, Bantam books.\n\nDing Cong (1993), Wit and Humour in Modern China, Asiapac, Singapore.\n\nDoran, John (1858), The History of Court Fools, London.\n\nFindlay, Victoria (1998, September 4), 'Slapstick without shame, South China Morning Post.\n\nFraser, John (1981), The Chinese, Portrait of a People, William Collins.\n\nFreud, Sigmund (1960), Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, W.W. Norton.\n\nGarner, Leslie (1991), 'Talk About Laugh: Laughter is good for you and that's official,' The M & S Magazine.\n\nGiles, Herbert A. (1925), Quips from a Chinese Jest Book, Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai.\n\nGreen, Sue (1998, February 7), 'Funny side of being Chinese,' South China Morning Post.\n\nHumes, James C. (1994) The Wit and Wisdom of Winston Churchill, Harper Perennial.\n\n'Humor' (1997) Lexikon der Agyptologie.\n\nHsu Pi-ching (1998 November), ‘Feng Meng-lung's Treasury of Laughs: Humorous Satire on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Culture and Society,' The Journal of Asian Studies 57, No. 4, pp. 1042-1067.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214257, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 115, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "78\n\nthe Twenty-four Heavenly Lords. The Four, said to be brothers, are believed to have been born during the 11th century BC and are now protectors of Mi-lo Fo. The 16th century novel, Feng-shen Yen-i, describes the popular myths surrounding the defeat of the four Mo-li brothers during the legendary wars of the 12th century BC who fought with their magical weapons but whose main weapon was the white rat which devoured all enemies. However, Yang Chien, the nephew of the Jade Emperor and son of Li Ching [the General with the Pagoda] was swallowed by the white rat but once inside it he ate the rat's heart and at the same time transformed himself into the white rat which was unsuspectingly put back into its bag by one of the Mo-li brothers. Yang Chien stole out whilst the Four brothers were in a drunken sleep and stole the magic umbrella, whilst Na-cha who had fought and defeated them broke their magic jade ring. The Four lost heart, were defeated and slain. The war was followed by their canonisation by Chiang Tzu-ya who appointed them to the posts of the Heavenly Kings, controllers of the elements, from whom people sought protection from calamities.\n\nThere are standard images of all four of the Great Celestial Kings in both the Ta Pei Ssu and the Pi-yun Ssu.\n\nThere has been a certain amount of confusion over the colours, names, and titles of these guardians; even their characteristics and attributes vary from monastery to monastery. Confusion has arisen over the centuries due to non-Buddhist and even pre-Buddhist factors, with every combination to be seen, such as the General of the North with the Umbrella, the General of the West with the Rat or Mongoose, and so on. The most frequently noted observations are as follows:\n\n \n Taoist Titles\n Symbol\n Characteristics\n Buddhist title\n Sanskrit title\n \n \n Mo-li Ch'ing\n Magic weapons or Sword/lance or Jade Ring or Parasol\n black face or black beard\n Ch'ih-kuo T'ien-wang\n Dhrtarastra 持國天王 or 東方大王\n \n \n \n [colours: blue/green] or Lyre/lute", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215558, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 335, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "285\n\nOrder 1,000 mm, the fourth Order 500 mm, the fifth Order 375 mm and the sixth Order 300 mm.\n\n10\n\nHowever, the brightness of a light does not depend only on focal distance. Different kinds of burners and fuel also affect its power. At first coal and wood were used as fuel for lighthouses. Starting from the 19th century sperm oil derived from the whale was used but was later completely replaced by colza oil, which was cheaper. Mineral oils were used starting in the mid 19th century. The next kind of fuel was gas. Oil gas was introduced in the 1870s. Because it required huge containers for storage it was quickly replaced by acetylene and dissolved acetylene. This burns to a bright incandescence far beyond that of many other fuels. Another kind of fuel is liquid petroleum (incandescent mineral oil), which was first used at the end of the 19th century. Liquid petroleum was injected into a vaporizer, where the liquid was heated and vaporized. The vapour moves into the burner where it combusts. Normal oil burners are improved about sixfold with this burner. The latest development was electric arc lamps. Once electricity became a common commodity many lighthouses were converted to its use often using gas as a backup fuel. In Hong Kong, coal and paraffin were used in most of the lighthouses at the beginning. Only after 1915 was acetylene gas installed in Hong Kong's lighthouses.\n\nThe lights of lighthouses also have colour, usually red or green in addition to white. White is generally preferred because white lights can be made brighter. Colours are used in some sectors. White lights are used to indicate the most desirable route to port while coloured sectors indicate dangerous waters.\n\nThe distance a lighthouse light is visible depends on its height and the elevation of an observer when light intensity and weather conditions are considered equal. The lighthouse at Cape D'Aguilar has the standard height of 200 feet above mean sea level; therefore its light can be seen 23 nautical miles away by an observer at an elevation of 30 feet.\n\nThe lighthouse at Cape D'Aguilar, situated at the southeast of Hong Kong Island, was also known as Hok Tsui Lighthouse. Its tower was of stone, of conical shape, with a circular and smooth outer surface. This specific structure is typical of lighthouses in order to keep the centre...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216059, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 358, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "292\n\nwas buried there beside his first wife in the Zhenjiang cemetery when he died in Changsha a mere two months later. By the late forties, the cemetery had disappeared beneath industrial buildings.\n\nThere was quite a scandal about the Methodist chapel in about 1907 when, during an evening service, the whole congregation started to wriggle and scratch themselves. Many left hurriedly, and the preacher was almost alone when the service ended. It was then discovered that the Chinese caretaker had turned the place into a paying doss-house for coolies and beggars, and every pew was crawling with bedbugs and lice.\n\nMesny's Involvement with Zhenjiang 1863/5\n\nNow to an entirely different slant on activities within Zhenjiang. William Mesny was a Jerseyman who ran away from home in 1854 at the age of 12 and arrived in China in 1860. His autobiographical writings describe scenes from his diverse and exciting career in China from his earliest days as a lowly gaoler in Hong Kong, through his sailing days as a master on a small Yangzi trader, his time as an Imperial Customs Tide-waiter in Hankou, to the peak of his career serving with the Chinese Sichuan Provincial Green Standard army, ending up as a brevet Lieutenant-General. From there on, he was a self-appointed adviser to senior Chinese officials, travelling far and wide throughout China, and ending his days as an impoverished 'poor white' first in Shanghai and towards the end in Hankou, where he died in 1919. Although he had little to do with Zhenjiang itself during his time on the Yangzi, he was involved with others who had.29\n\nMesny, writing about his time on the Yangzi, first as a youth commanding a lorcha and then as a Customs Officer with the Chinese Imperial Customs, explained that on his first trip up the River, the comparatively short journey on from Zhenjiang to Nanjing took five hours with a call at Shi'er Wei, an important salt town on the northern bank of the river. An hour and a half before reaching Nanjing, ships would pass the Third Fort guarding the narrow defile under Guanyin Shan. It was there that in April 1862, Mesny was wounded and captured by a fleet of Imperial gunboats whose role it was to stop supplies of all kinds reaching the Taiping rebels. Mesny was sailing for Hankou from Shanghai with a full legal cargo, but to the Imperial gunboats, the 'Imps' as they were referred to by westerners, all vessels were fair game. Mesny", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]