[ { "id": 204461, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1962", "page_number": 93, "title": "RAS-1962", "content_text": "82 \n\nJ. W. HAYES \n\n10 \n\nstanding in loco parentis to the people of his district. An instance of this outlook is a proclamation issued by the Canton Viceroy in April 1899 in which he told the people of the New Territory that the English government had agreed that \"the people are to be treated with exceptional kindness \".10 On the reverse side of the medal the magistrate could also, like his followers in the tribunal, use his authority to evil purposes and be referred to as being as (fierce as) a tiger\" 如虎 or a dog-official\"35 whose extortions and venality were a byword \n\n44 \n\nin the district.1 \n\nC4 \n\n+ \n\n17 \n\nIn his government the Magistrate was usually assisted by an indoor and outdoor staff. The former might consist of personal adherents from his own home district who followed him from post to post, and partly of local personnel of the tribunal or yamen4 such as a legal adviser, secretaries, and land clerks, whose local knowledge it would be difficult to dispense with. All these were entirely dependent upon the magistrate for their livelihood, and upon what they could pick up in the course of their duties. To maintain his position and put food into the mouths of the members of his personal staff and their families the magistrate was given an inadequate salary by government. There were in addition the outdoor staff which comprised a considerable number of police, watchmen, runners and the like, who may have been paid by Government despite what Lockhart says to the contrary, but used their opportunities as they came, \n\nIn the San On district the Magistrate's yamen was at Nam Tau, which lies beyond the northern or further shores of Deep Bay on the far side of the Nam Tau peninsula. This was the district city where the treasury, jail and examination halls were also situated. It also contained a Confucian temple. The seat of government therefore lay outside the borders of the New Territory which, however, was served by several of his subordinate officers. He was assisted by an assistant magistrate10 whose office was at Tai Pang north-east of Mirs Bay and outside the New Territory and two deputy magistrates, one of whom was stationed within the walled city of Kowloon. They had power to make arrests and conduct preliminary enquiries but were bound to refer most cases to Nam Tau for final decision. The Kowloon deputy, like his colleagues, had a lock-up for detaining persons pending trial and there was also one each for the local", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205972, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 52, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "HONG KONG CADETS, 1862 - 1941\n\n47\n\nrelieved by H. E. Wodehouse until January 1890, resuming duties until June, when Wodehouse again acted until the end of the year. Mitchell-Innes was then appointed Treasurer on January 1, 1891, and in 1893 defalcations were discovered in the Treasury. During Mitchell-Innes' term of office, F. H. May acted for him during a six months' leave of absence. Throughout this period 1888-1892, one Alves, first Clerk in the Treasury, had been systematically embezzling crown rents paid to him as shroff for the Department. Alves was sentenced to six years imprisonment with hard labour. It seems that he had been, like many others, caught up in a tide of building speculation, and had lost most of the stolen money, amounting to $67,817, a large sum in those days.46\n\nThe fact that the defalcations occurred in the Treasury and went unnoticed by several heads of department - Lister, Wodehouse, May and Mitchell-Innes - caused a great stir in Government and in the Colony. Lister had died in 1890, and before he died he had been given a bond of $10,000 for the faithful discharge of his duties, so that only Wodehouse, May and Mitchell-Innes were called upon by Sir William Robinson, the Governor, to show cause why they should not be held pecuniarily responsible for the sums embezzled by Alves. Each of the officials replied in his own way and attempted, naturally, to exculpate himself. The Governor mildly censured Wodehouse and May but concluded that Mitchell-Innes had continuously neglected the duties of his office, especially as his was a substantive post but theirs had been merely acting posts in addition to their regular duties in other departments. A confidential despatch was sent to the Secretary of State, the Marquis of Ripon, setting out the facts of the case. Ripon replied that 'the officer to whom the heaviest amount of blame must be attributed is unquestionably Mr. Mitchell-Innes, and I regret to observe that he has not improved his position by the tone and temper of his defence'. Ripon concluded: 'I must mark my sense of his shortcomings, by directing that, as a condition of his remaining in the public service, he be required to pay into the Colonial Treasury a fine of $1,000... and that as he has not justified his selection for the headship of a department in Hong Kong, it will be necessary for me to arrange, if possible, his transfer to another Colony. But such transfer will not mean a promotion, but I trust that...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205973, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 53, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "48 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\nelsewhere and in the discharge of different duties he will gain the confidence of the Government under which he serves, and thus possibly build up a claim to promotion hereafter'.47 Wodehouse and May were also criticised but less severely, and Ripon acknowledge that May, who had already been spotted as a 'coming man', 'showed zeal and capacity in other respects during his short tenure of the office of Treasurer'. \n\nPoor Mitchell-Innes, who was a popular figure in Hong Kong society, did not leave Hong Kong at once. The fine was paid by local subscription and the Chinese petitioned the Secretary of State that he should not be removed from the Colony. The petition was successful and he remained temporarily in the Treasury; but on it becoming known in the Straits Settlements that it was the intention of the Home Government to appoint him to the position of assistant Protector of Chinese in Penang which had become vacant, vigorous opposition on the part of the Straits Settlements authorities was brought to bear, and the intention afterwards abandoned'.48 In 1895 Mitchell-Innes proceeded to England on leave of absence and in 1897 news reached the Colony that he had received appointment as Deputy Governor of a large gaol in the North of England.49 \n\nThe Mitchell-Innes case is instructive. It throws light on administrative practices in Hong Kong at that date and on the scarcity of trained administrative officers. There were only 8 cadets in office in 1893 and these were often shuffled from department to department for short periods of time and expected to master the details of their jobs in a matter of weeks. The tradition of 'omnicompetent generalism' was already believed in by Government and cadets were expected to do all things equally well. Mitchell-Innes was a victim of the system and the tradition. He had been, as the Marquis of Ripon noted, ‘a gentleman who after a comparatively short service had been promoted to a new important position'. The case also throws light on the influence the Chinese notables could exercise on certain occasions: their plea was listened to and as a consequence Mitchell-Innes continued to act as Treasurer for a further two years. Mitchell-Innes is also unique in that he is the only cadet out of the eighty-five appointed to be sacked, for all intents and purposes, from Government.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205980, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 60, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "HONG KONG CADETS, 1862 - 1941 \n\n55 \n\n19 Kenneth Myer Arthur Barnett (born 1911). Educated at Mill Hill School, London, and King's College, Cambridge, Hong Kong Civil Service 1934. Retired as Director of Census and Statistics 1970. \n\n40 Quoted in James Hope Hennessy's Verandah, London, 1964, p. 186. Hennessy is quoting, presumably, from Sir George Bowen's Thirty Years of Colonial Government, London, 1889, which I have not seen. \n\n41 Margery Perham, op. cit., p. 302. Lugard also liked and trusted A. W. Brewin, the Registrar General: \"if he once said, he was very 'pro-Chinese' this was really a compliment. He would allow Brewin to forbid his own delivery of a speech to a Chinese gathering. He could not always understand the reason ‘but I trust implicitly in him'.\" \n\n42 E. J. Eitel \"Chinese Studies and Official Interpretation\", p. 8. \n\n43 Alleyne Ireland, Far Eastern Tropics, London, 1905, p. 34. In 1901 Ireland was appointed Colonial Commissioner of the University of Chicago for the purpose of visiting the Far East. \n\n44 Ibid., p. 32. \n\n45 Norman Gilbert Mitchell-Innes (1860-1947). Educated at Repton and Edinburgh Academy, Hong Kong Civil Service 1881; Treasurer 1891; left Hong Kong Service in 1896 and transferred to the Home Prison Service. Des Voeux thought highly of Mitchell-Innes. See G. B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962, Hong Kong, 1964, p. 112. \n\n46 Report on Defalcations in the Treasury, Sessional Papers, Hong Kong, 1893, p. 546. \n\n47 Ibid., p. 546. \n\n48 Norton-Kyshe, vol. 2, p. 447. \n\n49 Ibid., p. 447. \n\n50 Sir Arthur George Murchison Fletcher (1878-1954). Educated at Cheltenham College and Trinity College, Oxford, Hong Kong Civil Service 1901; transferred to Ceylon 1927; Colonial Secretary, Ceylon, 1926-9; Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner for Western Pacific 1929-36; Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Trinidad and Tobago, 1936-38. \n\n51 Geoffrey Norman Orme (1879-1966). Educated at Cheltenham College and Hertford College, Oxford, Hong Kong Civil Service 1902. Director of Education 1924-26. Left Hong Kong Service in 1926. \n\n52 The Report on the Land Court, 1900-1905, Sessional Papers, 1905, gives a list of the presidents and members of the Land Court in order of their appointment, most of whom were cadets. H. H. J. Gompertz was appointed in 1900 and resigned in 1904; Cecil Clementi in 1903; and C. M. Messer and J. R. Wood in 1904. The Registrars in order of appointment - all cadets were: J. H. Kemp, E. D. C. Wolfe, and S. B. C. Ross. The Land Court in 1905 consisted of three members: C. M. Messer, Cecil Clementi, and J. R. Wood. The New Territories became popular with cadets as a place to walk or shoot in on week-ends. Robert Oliphant Hutchison (1880-1920), the Superintendent of Imports and Exports, on his way to shoot snipe at Saikung fell off a launch in a squall and drowned. His body was never found. With him at the time was D. W. Tratman, the Colonial Treasurer. One imagines from the evidence that both had \"tiffined\" rather too well. \n\n53 \"At first British officials were limited in principle to two, dealing with police and land. In 1899 a police magistrate was appointed and also an assistant land officer to deal with land cases, and the police were placed \n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206276, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 93, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "CHINESE ELITE IN HONG KONG\n\n87\n\nOnly a few were able to survive the perils of the business. They were not accustomed to building in the Western style and therefore often underestimated on contracts, resulting in their bankruptcy. In 1844 the Land Officer comments that \"almost all contracts hitherto entered into with Chinamen have been obliged to be finished by Government, for the works were taken at far too low an estimate, and the consequence was, when the parties found they would become losers, both contractor and security decamped, and in some instances they were imprisoned.\"16\n\nOne of the few contractors who did survive in this early period of Hong Kong's history was Tam Achoy †, alias Tam Sam Tshoy, alias Tam Shek Tsun, although he too almost went into prison for debt, escaping only through the generosity of his creditor. Achoy was generally recognized as the most prominent leader of the Chinese community when an élite was first beginning to emerge out of the hodgepodge of shopkeepers, craftsmen and traders. We have noted that he and Loo Aqui built the Man-Mo Temple where they performed in part the traditional role of village elder. He was also Trustee for the I Ts'z Temple in Taipingshan (1851) and the Temple in Queen's Road East at Wanchai (1869). In 1847 the Colonial Treasury had on deposit £185.16.8 from Tam Achoy for erecting a Chinese School in the Sheung Wan (Lower Bazaar).\n\nAchoy had come to Hong Kong at its foundation in 1841, having been formerly a foreman in the Government Dockyard at Singapore. He was granted a certificate for the easternmost of the lots in the Lower Bazaar, and soon began to buy up the interests of the adjacent property owners until he had acquired an extensive sea frontage. He built some of Hong Kong's most prestigious early buildings such as the P. and O. Building and the Exchange Building, which was bought by Government and used for many years as the Supreme Court Building. With the accumulation of increasing capital he began to broaden his interests and secured permission from Government to build and operate a market. This was a most profitable venture and when the Lower Bazaar was destroyed in the Christmas fire of 1852, he soon rebuilt it, operating it under his firm's name, Kwong Yuen. During the period after 1848, when Hong Kong became a port of embarkation for thousands of emigrants, Achoy was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206290, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 107, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "CHINESE ELITE IN HONG KONG\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT SERVANTS GROUP\n\n101\n\nA life-long career by a Chinese in Government service usually would not have provided opportunity for the accumulation of sufficient capital to enable one to enter the élite group. The highest paid positions were the interpreterships, but a Chinese who had sufficient competency in English to be appointed to this position could earn more in the employment of the foreign firms. However, many of the young men who received an English language education, at first in the Mission schools or the Morrison Education Society School and after 1860 at the Government Central School (now Queens College), upon leaving school became interpreters and clerks in Government for several years. But normally they did not make a life career of Government service.\n\nThere were, however, two individuals who appear on our lists who had been employed by the British Government even before its removal to Hong Kong and who continued as Government employees until their retirement. These were Tso Aon and Cheong Assow.\n\nWhen the British established their Government offices in Hong Kong the man who became responsible for all the Chinese staff in Government offices, as well as serving as compradore to the Treasury, was Tso Aon alias Cho Yune Choong alias Cho Wing Chow. His family had lived in Macao for several generations, and in 1834 he entered the service of the British in the office of the Superintendent of Trade. By the time of his removal to Hong Kong he had accumulated enough capital to invest in real estate. When he retired from Government service in 1857 without pension, he lived off the income from real estate, pawn shops and other business ventures. He died in 1874 at Macao, survived by several sons. One of his grandsons was the Rev. Tso See Kai (**) 曹思楷) Vicar of St. Paul's (born 1895, died 1928). Tso Aon's brother, Chow Yik Chong (5) alias Chow Yin Yin alias Chow Yau () alias Chow Kam Ming (alias Chow Wai Chun (R), was a large land owner and capitalist in Macao. He was knighted by the Portuguese Government, made a member of the Macao Legislative Council, and was a leader of the Chinese community in Macao. He died in 1896. His son Tso Seen Wan came", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206388, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 205, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "THE COLONY OF HONG KONG\n\n179\n\npremises which they had marked. There was a rumour of a scheme to re-enact the gunpowder plot by means of a tunnel under the cathedral, when the governor, the bishop, and the congregation were to be blown up. The facts of this case, however, if there were any, I could never satisfactorily ascertain. The most successful exploit of this kind was perpetrated so late as January 1865, by a gang who tunneled by the hard labour of several weeks right under the treasury of the Central Bank of India, and carried off upwards of $100,000 in gold bullion and notes. In 1863 twenty-two prisoners made their escape from the gaol by tunneling under it into a drain; and not long after, I did the service to the Government of disconcerting a scheme on a larger scale, by which within a few hours, eighty-nine men would have got away. Time will not permit me to go into the details of the affair. The secrecy, skill, and perseverance with which the mining operations had been conducted were astonishing, and made me think it was a pity the ability of the scoundrels could not have been utilized in Cornwall and other parts of Great Britain.\n\nAt the subject of piracy I can only glance. That it was for many years a terrible evil I need not say. There is no doubt, I think, that the bands who attempted the violent burglaries of which I have spoken were mainly composed of pirates, and that when the land was no longer safe for them, they confined their operations to the sea. Notwithstanding many successful expeditions of men-of-war and gun-boats against their boats, fleets, and strongholds, the thing continued. Not only were native craft the object of their prey, but foreign vessels of small size, brigs and barques, trading along the coast, repeatedly fell victims to them. The gallows found constant employment, and the most wretched experience of my life in Hong Kong was that of visiting pirates and other murderers under sentence of death in the gaol. With the exception of a few who were caught red-handed in the act, I knew only one case in which the criminal made confession of his guilt. Things are now much better in this respect. Burglaries of a milder type occasionally occur on the island, and we hear also of piracies on the waters; but as compared with former years they are both rare. Piracy received a heavy blow from the vigorous measures of Sir Richard MacDonnell at the beginning of his incumbency as Governor, and still more effective against it have been, I conceive, the organization of the armed cruisers in the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206610, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 158, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "152\n\nDAFYDD EMRYS EVANS\n\nNovember 1846, he assigned the lot to Foong Achi (otherwise Attai) for an unspecified amount. The transaction was recorded as an absolute assignment and this led Tarrant, then Clerk of Deeds in the Land Office and to whom we shall shortly return, to add a note on the lease register to the effect that the leaseholder's name could not be altered in the Lease Register until the mortgage encumbrances were cleared. Though Foong later claimed that the transaction was an absolute assignment, with $1,000 as the consideration, Tarrant rejected this on the ground that the document of assignment was a forgery.10 But in 1848 Foong re-assigned the property to Hwei's administrator, stating that all sums owing were satisfied. This is sufficient to show that, when the market passed to Hwei's brother Afoon on his death in 1847, the picture was already complicated. It was to become more so.\n\nHwei Afoon seems to have felt the need for more cash for reasons which will soon become apparent and he entered into a transaction which is very difficult to understand, though he may have done so under duress. On 28 June 1847, he assigned his interest (as administrator) to two others on trust for various purposes. These two named persons were, first, Chow Aoan who, at the time was compradore to the Government Treasury and, as such, a powerful man. He already had extensive property interests in the Chinese parts of the town and was to extend them in the years to come. The other person was Le Quong-cheong about whom less is known. He described himself on one occasion as a 'bookseller' but certainly also lent money.\n\nThe purpose of the transaction must have been to secure the repayment of monies borrowed by Hwei Afoon. Ying Wing-kee had transferred to Le on 19 June 1847 his interest in the property, the transaction being memorialised as a mortgage to secure the repayment of $2,400 owing to Le by Ying, but it may have in fact been a transfer to Le of Ying's interest under the mortgage of 12 October 1845. As shall be seen, however, Ying retained some interest in the market. The deed of assignment of 28 June 1847 required the trustees (Chow and Le) to pay the Crown Rent twice a month. Then they were to permit Ying Wing-kee to receive the rents of the nine shops fronting on the Queen's Road, showing that Ying retained some interest though precisely what it was is not clear. Hwei Afoon himself was to be paid $100 per month and the trustees were to pay", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206611, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 159, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "H.K.'S CENTRAL MARKET AND THE TARRANT AFFAIR\n\n153\n\nto themselves, in the case of Le, interest at 4% on the principal sum of $2,400 (the figure given in the deal between Ying and Le) and, in the case of Chow, at 4% on the sum of $1,000. All disbursements were to be met by them and any balance after all these purposes had been satisfied was to be put to reducing the principal outstanding to them. Once the capital sums were repaid, then the property was to be reconveyed to Hwei Afoon for a nominal $5.\n\nThus, by mid-1847, four different people had different interests in the market. There remains one other who so far has not yet appeared on the scene.\n\nHwei Afoon was a builder and contracted with the Government for some work on Government property at Stanley (Chek Chu). He completed the work and received an order for payment drawn on the Treasury. When he went to the Treasury to collect his money, the Treasury Compradore (Chow Aoan) told him that he would deduct $750 which was owing to Colonel Caine's Compradore (named Lo Een-teen) in respect of the Market. Afoon knew that his brother, Hwei Aqui, had agreed, in consideration of influence being exerted on his behalf to secure the lease of the Market, to make a payment of $150 per month to Lo Een-teen and also to allow him to select meat and produce in the Market without payment. The point was that Lo represented that he could persuade his master, Caine, then the Colonial Secretary, to give the lease to Hwei; apparently made these payments and after his death Afoon paid $400 to have the lease transferred to him but demurred at the payment of $150 per month, considering no doubt that there was little that Lo could do about it if he did not pay. But he was reckoning without Chow Aoan who attempted to dock the arrears of 'squeeze' unpaid by Afoon.\n\nThe arrangement of 28 June 1847 may have been an attempt by the parties to reach an 'honourable' solution. But matters did not stop there for Afoon unadvisedly went to the Surveyor General's Office to complain that he was not receiving all the money due to him under his Government contract and, no doubt, explained why. He told his story to William Tarrant, the Clerk of Deeds and general factotum in the office of the Surveyor General.\n\nTarrant had had a mixed career since arriving in China a few years previously. He had first come as a steward on board ship and, on the establishment of the colony, was able to secure the position of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208130, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1977", "page_number": 169, "title": "RAS-1977", "content_text": "MEMORIES OF THE DISTRICT OFFICE SOUTH \n\n153 \n\nOccasionally the D.O. was called on to do special jobs outside his district. One such job I did at the Land Officer's request in 1930 or 1931 was to enquire into the holdings in Stanley village, to discover who the various lot owners were; this meant a good deal of domiciliary visitation in searching for lot boundaries, and looking for owners who might turn out to be in Macao, Australia, or Panama, and were not infrequently in their graves. This was necessary because the Land Office had no demarcators, and the Land Officer knew law but not Chinese: and the village was to be replanned and modernised. I hope the right people got the compensation, whether in land or cash: I never heard anything over the arrangements.\n\nThe collection of revenue from the District, excluding lots held directly from the Government as Inland Lots granted through the Land Office, was always a most important duty of the District Officer. The Crown rent was collected both at the District Office and at various outstations, chiefly Tai O, Cheung Chau, Tsun Wan, and the small police quarters at Yung Shue Wan on Lamma. The outstation collections were done by a shroff accompanied by an Indian constable, and in the remotest places the Water Police gave their assistance. As a rule I believe the Water Police brought back the shroff and the money, though I think the ordinary ferry conveyed him to the scene of action. The collecting was done at the local police stations. It always began about the end of July, after the first rice crop, and went on at full blast till about October: defaulters were dealt with early the next year. Licence fees for forestry, squatters' fees, and pineapple plantation licence fees were usually paid before midsummer at the District Office.\n\nIn 1925, the year of the big Communist-inspired Nationalist general strike, the office shroff was transferred on promotion. His substitute was a young fellow fresh from the Treasury, who took advantage of the disturbance and the preoccupations of his superiors to embezzle part of the receipts, and finally absconded three months after the strike began. A former District Officer South remarked to me later that he had always been worried by the possibility of this kind of thing happening to him, and the almost total impossibility of keeping a tight check on shroffs when frequent absence from the office, sometimes all day, is part of the D.O's duty. Luckily his security just covered his defalcations: and another shroff in the same racket was caught out by me and part of his loot recovered.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208573, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 30, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\nFar Eastern Affairs in the Department of State in 1944, terms “the most difficult supply operation of the entire war\" over the towering hump of the Himalayas. The second difficulty was connected with the priority given to the European theatre. The result was that much of the promised materials to China was often diverted, much to the distress of Hornbeck and others, from its original destination for the European fronts.? Speaking in more specific terms, by late September 1942, US$3.1 billion worth of lend-lease materials were sent to the British Empire, $750 million to Russia, and only $112 million to China. The disparity became even more remarkable by early June: $7,030,000,000 to the British Empire, $1,899,000,000 to Russia, and only $133,000,000 to China.8\n\nUnder the circumstances, it is understandable that the United States should entertain grave anxiety regarding China, especially over a possible collapse of Chinese resistance against Japan. This concern, which the Chinese did everything to keep alive, was universally shared by senior men in the Washington government, including the president himself, H. L. Stimson, then secretary of war, Henry Morgenthau, secretary of the Treasury, Leahy, and many involved in Far Eastern affairs in the Department of State, principally Hornbeck.9 While some doubt was expressed as to how much China could and was willing to contribute to the war effort in the east, the consensus was that her collapse would be a fatal blow to the United Nations, especially the United States, in the Pacific theatre. This event, therefore, must be prevented at all cost.\n\nIt was only natural that the United States, torn by anxiety, should be obsessed with the desire to compensate China as best she could. Consequently, the American government announced at the beginning of 1942 a loan of 500 million dollars to China, with next to no strings attached.10 Meanwhile, the move to push for the allies' recognition of China as one of the great powers, of which Hornbeck claimed himself to be the originator, became increasingly prominent in the American government.11 The outcome was the American insistence that China be included as a signatory, together with Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States, of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, signed in Moscow on 30 December 1943, and that Chiang Kai-shek, together with Roosevelt and Churchill, be a party to the Cairo Declaration, issued on 1 December 1943.12 The American eagerness to compensate naturally did not allow Madame Chiang Kai-shek's visit to the United States,\n\nPage 30\nPage 31", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208581, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 38, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n11\n\nBritain of Hong Kong, and the development by Great Britain of a great port which he felt had benefited the whole world. He said that it was British territory and he saw no good reason why it should cease to be such. He went on to say that perhaps some arrangement could be made with the Chinese whereby the question of sovereignty could be adjusted but the political control and administrative responsibility remain with Great Britain. He referred to public utterances of his own to the effect that he was not Prime Minister for the purpose of being a party to a liquidation of the British Empire. He said that he had convictions on that subject and that he was perfectly willing to say so frankly to anybody.\"45\n\nIt might well have been his own weak performance in London, among other things, which prompted Hornbeck early in January 1944 to urge the Secretary of State not to repeat Woodrow Wilson's mistake in being too much of a \"gentleman\". The American government must obtain from Britain agreement and cooperation in any reasonable course of action upon which the United States might choose to insist, especially in relation to colonial matters, before the defeat of Germany when Britain still depended on the Americans for their preservation.46\n\nThe Secretary's reaction to the advice is not known. But it appears from his memoirs that he was not in favour of coercion in dealing with the Anglo-American differences, and specifically with the question of Hong Kong.47 In any case, the Department of State had become less and less consulted by the President with regard to general war and foreign policies. The War and Navy Departments and the Treasury were far more important in the President's mind. On the personal level, moreover, Hull was certainly not one of Roosevelt's trusted few. Hull himself was conscious and sensitive of the truth: that FDR was his own Secretary of State.\"48 In fact, many of Roosevelt's utterances at the major Allied conferences, beginning with the Cairo Conference late in 1943, were made without prior reference to and consultation with the Department of State. Hull resigned late in 1944, frustrated and in poor health.\n\nDespite Roosevelt's well-known anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stand and his interest in Hong Kong, his behaviour regarding the future of the British colony was generally characterized by weakness and the lack of persistent and direct pressure on Britain. At the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208944, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1980", "page_number": 106, "title": "RAS-1980", "content_text": "74\n\nJOHN VILLIERS\n\nOriginally the Spanish had hoped to gain a share of the Moluccan spice trade from Manila, but the Portuguese and later the Dutch were too strongly entrenched and the trade with China soon became virtually the Philippines' only economic resource. Silk and other Chinese goods were brought to Manila at first by Chinese junks and after about 1604 also by Portuguese ships from Macau. In the 1630s the annual value of imports from Macau to Manila averaged about 1.5 million silver pesos. At the end of the 16th century between 40 and 50 large seagoing junks were still coming yearly to Manila from Fukien bringing Chinese goods, which they sold for Mexican and Peruvian silver pesos and rials-of-eight.20 In 1573, for example, the two galleons bound for Acapulco carried 712 bolts of Chinese silk and 22,300 pieces of fine china gilt and other porcelain wares.21\n\nAlthough the Manila merchants gained enormous profits from this trade, the government of the colony had an annual deficit of between 85 to 350 thousand pesos. The Mexico treasury made up this deficit with silver bullion, much of which found its way into the coffers of the Chinese merchants. This tremendous drain on Spanish resources led to various proposals being put forward to abandon the Philippines altogether. The merchants of Seville, who enjoyed a monopoly of the trans-Atlantic carrying trade with Nueva España, and the Andalusian textile manufacturers, who feared that Mexico and Peru would be flooded with cheap Chinese silks, were especially hostile to the Philippine colony. In the end, they succeeded only in having the trade restricted to the Manila-Acapulco route, the trade between Mexico and Peru abolished, and the value of the goods to be shipped annually from Manila to Acapulco restricted to 250,000 pesos, which was deemed a large enough quota to maintain the Philippine colony and small enough to be easily absorbed in Mexico. In practice, however, the value of the goods shipped from Manila was closer to 2 million pesos a year, the quantity of merchandise loaded being determined not by royal decree but by the amount of cargo space available on the galleons. The Chinese packers were extremely skilled at cramming goods into the galleons, with resulting overlading, which caused many shipwrecks. Individual seamen were also each allowed to carry one chest, which, as one contemporary wryly observed, had a most expansive capacity.22 Space on the galleons was bought by a few wealthy entrepreneurs and by groups such as the cathedral chapter and charitable foundations such as orphanages and hospitals, which often amassed enough", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210785, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 136, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "119\n\nTo suppress these frequent insurrections, enormous expenditure was required to maintain the garrisons of the walled cities and to import, when necessary, troop reinforcements. The three major uprisings in 1501, 1541 and 1550, for example, required more than ten thousand troops apiece and hundreds of thousands of taels to restore order (Henry, 1886). This significant drain on treasury coffers caused Hai Jui,1 the great native statesman of Hainan, to present his “Crossroads proposal\" to the Ming Government. He suggested that by building two roads (one extending north-south, the other east-west) to intersect in the centre of the Li strongholds, the whole island could be brought under immediate control and at the same time trade with the interior could be enhanced. Unfortunately, in spite of Hai Jui's reputation as a source of sound advice, the plan was not taken seriously, with the result that the interior of Hainan remained a terra incognita until the early part of this century. As late as 1882, when B.C. Henry, the missionary-botanist, penetrated the interior of Hainan, the only road of note was that between Nan Fung and Ka Lit, a distance of about 100 km. Goods such as hides, rattan and fragrant wood, bartered from the Li in the mountains were transported by ox-cart over this rough track to Ka Lit and thence to Hai Kou by boat along the Nan Du River. Travel along this road without a strong escort was foolhardy as bandits constantly patrolled the road preying on unprotected travellers. It was not until after Liberation in 1952 that a road was built through the mountainous centre of the island (Fairfax-Cholmeley, 1963).\n\nWhile local rebellion undoubtedly disrupted trade, it was the burden of taxes and piracy which choked commerce in Hainan. The effect of taxes imposed by the powerful Chinese administrators is well illustrated in the salt-industry. Like most coastal towns elsewhere in China, salt extraction from the sea became a thriving industry in Hainan's coastal cities. However, it was not long before salt-makers were compelled to turn over most of their produce in taxes to corrupt local officials who hoarded it and then forbade producers, under threat of heavy penalty, to sell it elsewhere. This monopolistic practice resulted in the collapse of the industry, though doubtless it enriched the few officials who traded their spoils with the Li for the prized incense timbers of the interior (Schafer, 1969).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211022, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 84, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "59\n\n30\n\nPope Hennessy. This was the Normal School, which was opened in Queen's Road East, Wanchai, on 12th September, 1881, under the headmastership of A.J. May, previously Acting Third Master at the Central School. Partly because Hennessy had not taken the precaution of gaining the prior approval of the Colonial Office in London, and partly because several members of the Education Commission then sitting to consider the elevation of the Central School to collegiate status were unconvinced of the necessity for separate provision of teacher education, the scheme failed. On the recommendation of Dr. George Bateson Wright, the Acting Inspector of Schools who, as Headmaster of the Central School, was normally in a state of dispute with the substantive Inspector, E.J. Eitel, the Wanchai Normal School was closed in October 1883. A.J. May returned to his ordinary teaching duties at the Central School, at first as merely an “extra-master” and, according to Gwenneth Stokes, “always very much on his dignity.”\n\n31\n\nAnd of the original 1881 intake of ten students, only two eventually became teachers. Meanwhile, the failure of the Normal School project led to a resumption of the pupil teacher scheme at the Central School. To avoid the problems faced earlier, first by Stewart and then by May, the revised pupil-teacher scheme gained additional stability by the requirement that each pupil-teacher articled had to deposit $100 with the Government Treasury. Further progress in the field of teacher education in Hong Kong was slow, the next major step being the establishment of “evening extension courses” in 1906, the formalization of these under the aegis of the newly established Technical Institute in 1907, the running of teacher education courses as a part of the Arts Faculty curriculum at the University of Hong Kong from 1916 onwards, and, finally, the establishment of the first permanent training college for teachers in Hong Kong in 1939.\n\n32\n\nAlthough the Normal School was shortlived and made only a minimal contribution to the teaching supply of Hong Kong schools, it was an interesting experiment. Comparable British colonies in Asia, the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States launched no such experiment to supply teachers capable of using English as the medium of instruction. Instead, for these colonies, a Select Committee of 1870 recommended reliance on", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211184, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 245, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "220\n\nThe Government faced the vexing problem of compensation to the owners of the fields. This problem still troubles the Government. The compensation to people whose ancestral lands are resumed is a thorny issue.\n\nIn 1844 a three-member commission was formed to consider claims and recommend suitable payment for the land given up. It was composed of the Land Officer, Mr. Gordon, the Chief Magistrate, Major William Caine, and the Chinese Secretary, the Rev. Mr. Charles Gutzlaff.\n\nMr. Gutzlaff did most of the work interviewing the villagers and attempting to ascertain current land values.\n\nThe Colonial Office inquired of the Governor under what circumstances it had been necessary to purchase the land when, with the cession of the island to Britain, all land automatically had become the property of the Crown.\n\nThe Governor explained: “That Rule laid down since the occupation of the island has been that the property of those Chinese who were possessed previous to the cession of the colony should be respected, but none other.\n\n“The land in question is among the oldest under cultivation in the island, being a rich alluvial soil adapted to the growing of rice. It therefore came strictly under this rule.”\n\nThe committee determined to its satisfaction that the price of the second-class paddy land was between $20 and $40 a mow (a Chinese land measure). It recommended the average of $30.\n\nThrough a mistake by the committee in stating the number of mow in an acre, the Government almost blundered into paying three times as much for the land. Fortunately for the Government treasury, but not the villagers, the error was discovered before a settlement was made.\n\nIt took a year to complete the project. The land was surveyed. The owners were compensated and the drainage and undertaken.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211193, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 254, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "229\n\nAccommodation was needed until the girls could be repatriated. There were others who had no one in China to receive them and they needed to be cared for until proper arrangements could be made for their future.\n\nThe Tung Wah Hospital, however, agreed to make room for them, but, as a Government report states: \"There were no arrangements for the separation of the older from the younger girls, and no attempt at education, and the girls were, not unnaturally, a cause of annoyance to the Tung Wah Hospital patients.\"\n\nThe proposal for a hostel for children and young women, \"who have been rescued from a life of infamy and vice,\" was not adopted as a jubilee memorial. The discussion, however, prompted the Tung Wah to build five houses on New Street nearby the hospital.\n\nThe top floors of the houses were to be used as a home for the girls and women and the ground and first floors were to be let as shops and residences. The Po Leung Kuk had anticipated that the rent income would be handed to them for the expenses of the hostel. Instead, the Government decided they should be paid to the general fund of the Government treasury.\n\nThe Po Leung Kuk refused to occupy the quarters. It claimed they were not suitable and that the Kuk had no funds for their maintenance. It was also reluctant to sever connections with the Tung Wah Hospital for it had been underwriting some of the Kuk's expenses.\n\nTung Wah also featured in another proposal. There was a need for an institution for the poor. This would relieve the hospital from being used as a temporary refuge for them.\n\nNone of these schemes was greeted with much enthusiasm by the expatriate community because they would be of benefit to the Chinese only. And the Chinese when they came to consider their own jubilee memorial did not choose a charitable institution but settled for a meeting hall for a Chinese Chamber of Commerce.\n\nThe proposed park scheme, which had been adopted at the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212984, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1993", "page_number": 52, "title": "RAS-1993", "content_text": "31\n\nMoreover, sports has been a vivid stage of life. Participants (players and spectators) often commit wholeheartedly. Sports time is a time for relieving the suppressed emotions, manners, ... etc. It is a time for reshuffling statuses, performances against those in real life. Participants would play a game in sports as if they were playing it in real life. The values, the rules of the game, the manners of participation in sports all reflect the order of life. As such, depictions of sports events could be taken as mirrors of life. If the concept of face is found in these mirrors, it would be reasonable to infer that it exists in real life.\n\n18\n\nSports events cover themes that are present in the concept of face. Rewards and punishments in sports correlate with the variable factors and attributes of face. Examples are prestige, recognition, pride, loss of status, embarrassment that would threaten one's identity (Snyder and Spreitzer, 1982: Chapter 5) The functions of sports also find similarities with the working of face and, particularly, with pertinence to the present study are:\n\n1) Identity and self-image of nations;\n\n2) Dominance and propaganda among powers;\n\n3) Recognition of governments,\n\n4) Political sanction through the boycott;\n\n5) Sport as a stage for ideological expression;\n\n6) Sporting image of politicians (Figle1, 1981: Chapter 8)\n\n19\n\nSport events are preferred to political or economic affairs because they belong to the socio-cultural stratum It is therefore more suited to the study of face which is of a socio-cultural nature. Social-psychological considerations should be more important in the concern of face. In political or economic affairs, political, strategic, economic considerations etc appear to be overarching and may overshadow socio-cultural factors. Hence, it may be difficult to extricate the consideration for face in these affairs\n\n20\n\nMore specifically, sports organisations in China are nationalized. They are funded by the bureaucracy The coaches, athletes, supporting staff etc are government employees. They are given government housing, paid by the national treasury etc. The performance of the athletes, the status they gain, could therefore be easily associated with the whole nation and the Government. The face they increase or reduce would have repercussions on the face of the nation and the Government. As this paper concerns the collective face of China at the national level as reported in the press, sports events would provide a suitable pool of data", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213887, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1996", "page_number": 239, "title": "RAS-1996", "content_text": "213\n\nrelationship with Chen - they \"did not see eye to eye... [they] thrashed out their differences round the Council table which... they thumped.\"\n\nTo arrange the finance of the new Government, Sun decided to reorganize the province's currency. The new policy was a total abolition of the existing currency and the introduction of a brand new currency under a new government bank. Originally, the new bank was to have had a reserve of $10,000,000, but it turned out that the Canton government could only put up 30% of the original amount. As a government bank, it had the right to issue new currency, to control the treasury and the salt gabelle in Guangdong. The crucial thing it lacked, as shall be seen, was credit worthiness. The merchant's prediction proved correct. In response, the chambers of Commerce wrote a joint letter to Sun, stating that \"to cancel the existing currency (issued by the Bank of China in Canton) was equivalent to an act of sentencing them to the death penalty.\" Ending the letter, the chambers warned the government that \"if the creditability of the Government was shattered [by this incident], the new notes issued by the Provincial Bank of Guangdong may suffer too.\" The brand new currency issued by the new government bank, amounting to $1,500,000, depreciated sharply once it began circulation.\n\nIt was in March 1921 that Chen Jiongming secretly approached \"the leading Chinese merchants in Hong Kong,\" requesting them to form into an advisory council for the Guangdong Government, which was responsible for giving advice on the \"administration of the province in relation to civil and financial matters.\"\n\n**\n\nCoinciding with Chen's move, it was Liu Zhubo who submitted a confidential report to the Governor of Hong Kong on a scheme to finance a new government in Canton - \"the object of the proposed organization was to finance Chen Ch'iung-ming (Chen Jiongming) and enable him to sever [his] connection with Sun Yat-sen.\" According to Liu Zhubo's proposal, this new Canton government was to be modelled \"after the form of government of Hong Kong\" under the supervision of the Cantonese merchants. In Liu's words:\n\nThe Political ship of Canton - officiated, manned and navigated as it now is - is bound to strike rock... what the Chinese merchants in Hong Kong and Canton should do, and do at once, is to prepare and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213982, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 51, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "the Social Welfare Department), co-ordinated by regional generalist officers comparable with NT DOs, leading to advisory Regional Councils which might eventually become the main report's Local Authorities. They pointed up more outspokenly than the emollient main report the shortcomings of an out-of-touch government administering a non-English-speaking population that was only too open to misunderstandings and misconceptions (such as that taxes levied were drained off to the UK Treasury.) Interim steps should concentrate strongly on building up public confidence in the unaccustomed principles and practice of popular elected representation (the ‘political education' mentioned above.) The provisional system of regional advisory councils, coupled with departmental decentralisation and administrative co-ordination, should then lead to full local authorities in about six years. Meanwhile Tsuen Wan was indeed a unique opportunity for immediate action (the new towns to come of Tuen Mun, Sha Tin, Tai Po et al had yet to be envisaged.) These three semi-dissenters did not co-ordinate their Note with the other.\n\nDickinson has been described by one of his working party as “the least understood and worst treated member of the Cadet Service\" (the original title of Hong Kong's Administrative Branch of the HMOCS, which survived in common parlance long after the absorption into the Colonial Service of the pre-war Eastern Cadetships.) He chose to retire early for personal reasons. It is ironic that in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution overspill, when special duties officers in the defence branch of the secretariat, the SCA and the Information Services Department became so active in devising new ways to win hearts and minds, to keep in touch with the people and to encourage the use of Chinese language, so much of what had been adumbrated in the Working Party Report re-appeared; but because the new ideas now came from well-established senior sources, they became respectable and it was to be long before they offered electoral participation in executive decisions. The SCA became the Secretariat for Home Affairs; City District Officers were created in ten urban districts, and found much to do that had not been done before; City District Committees were established in 1972; a Tsuen Wan District Advisory Board was at last set up in 1977, followed by others; in 1980 a new pattern for district administration was at last suggested, with direct elections to District Boards. But in all these and still later developments that affect present history, there was no official backward recognition that the ground", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215277, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 54, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "2\n\nThere is one exception to these generalisations, a deviant case which has never been analysed by the economists who deplore the underdevelopment of the colonial empire. The amazing economic growth of Hong Kong since its liberation from the Japanese occupation in 1945 is well known, but it is widely assumed that before the war the Hong Kong economy was almost entirely based upon the entrepôt trade transporting goods to and from China and that its transformation from a trading mart to a manufacturing centre began with the post-war arrival of industrialists from Shanghai fleeing from the chaos of China's civil war. In fact, the development of industry had begun in the nineteenth century and by 1939 Hong Kong had built up a flourishing export trade in manufactured goods to China and neighbouring Asian countries and was even successfully competing with British firms in a few items in the British home market.\n\nThe growth of Hong Kong industry was accelerated in the 1930s by decisions taken at the Imperial Economic Conference which met at Ottawa in August 1932. The conference was called to find ways of combating the worldwide economic depression by stimulating trade between the countries of the empire after the British government had decided to abandon its long-standing commitment to free trade and to impose a ten per cent tariff on foreign imports. The conference was mainly occupied with bargaining between Britain and the dominions over the terms on which agricultural products from the dominions would enter the British market and the access of British manufactured goods to the dominions.\n\nThe ministers meeting at Ottawa also decided to impose stringent restrictions by tariffs and specific duties on imports of textiles and other goods from Japan which were beginning to penetrate empire markets, displacing British and Canadian manufactures. Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong took advantage of this attempt to exclude Japanese goods from dominion and colonial markets to export large quantities of cheap footwear and textiles to the empire. This provoked indignant complaints from industrialists in Britain and Canada who demanded that restrictions should be placed on the supercompetitive Hong Kong manufactures.\n\nHong Kong's successful penetration of empire markets forced the British government for the first time to consider what its policy should be towards the industrial development of the colonial empire. Two interdepartmental committees of civil servants were set up in 1933 and 1937, but no authoritative decision was reached by the cabinet before the outbreak of war in 1939. Officials at the Colonial Office defended the right of the colonies to diversify their economies by moving into manufacturing, but the Board of Trade and the Treasury were generally unenthusiastic about such schemes where they might result in a reduction of British exports.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215293, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 70, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "Though the 1934 interdepartmental committee report had not been officially approved by the cabinet, the Colonial Office regarded it as an authoritative guide to policy. Governors were instructed to refer all proposals for industrial development to London before any changes to tariffs or excise duty were submitted to legislative councils, or any promises of financial or other assistance were made to the promoters of the project. Entrepreneurs also approached the Colonial Office directly with their own schemes for industrial development. Officials examined the proposal to see if it was economically sound. Normally the Board of Trade was consulted for advice as to whether British exports would be adversely affected. Expert advice was sometimes obtained from outside government. If the colony was receiving a grant from Britain to balance its budget, the views of the Treasury were sought. The general attitude of the Colonial Office was an exceedingly cautious one, but if the project appeared to be economically viable, officials did not feel justified in preventing its development.\n\nWhen a proposal was rejected by the Colonial Office, a governor could still protest at the decision, arguing that the special circumstances of his colony should be taken into account. Governors often submitted counterproposals suggesting a lower protective tariff or a different mix of financial incentives to enable the project to go ahead. Governors were insistent on the need for industrial development, and the Colonial Office was always very reluctant to overrule a governor who persisted in pressing his views on what was in the best interests of his colony. In 1936, the colonial secretary wrote to the chancellor of the exchequer suggesting that the cabinet should reconsider the 1934 Report, so that when writing to governors, he could refer to the principles laid down in the report as having the authority of the whole government. The Federation of British Industries had also written to the Treasury complaining about competition from dominion and colonial manufacturers which enjoyed free entry into the British market. Treasury officials believed that the Colonial Office was too ready to sanction the establishment of industries in the colonies which might adversely affect British exports, ignoring the fact that Britain bore the whole cost and responsibility for the Royal Navy and colonial defence.68\n\nA new committee was set up, which, unlike the 1933 committee, included representatives from the Treasury and the Bank of England. It met for the first time in February 1937. The committee tried to formulate general principles, but found that in every case they examined, special considerations could be adduced to justify the new industrial development. For example, a brewery in the Gold Coast which competed with imported British beer was defended by the governor as a means to turn the natives away from gin and neat drinks to (cheaper) beer; the capital investment of £250,000 would be", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215294, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 71, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "19\n\nvery useful in the depression, and the factory would provide employment for 100 Africans.\" Hong Kong was also seen as a special case where the decline of the entrepôt trade with China justified the policy of fostering industrial development. After much discussion the only specific recommendation made by the committee was that when a protective tariff was granted an excise duty equivalent to the import duty should always be imposed. The final report of the committee was never published and apparently was never considered by the cabinet.\n\nSo the Colonial Office continued to vet proposals for new industries according to the guidelines laid down in the 1934 Report, that manufacturing should not be 'artificially encouraged'. Officials were concerned to safeguard colonial revenues at a time when most colonies were in financial difficulties as a result of the world depression. The Colonial Office insisted that budgets must be balanced, to avoid the need for a grant from the British government and the consequent Treasury control of the colony's finances. The Colonial Office had no money available in its own account to subsidise ingenious schemes, such as a project put forward by an entrepreneur from Trinidad to produce newsprint paper from bagasse and to power the factory with anhydrous alcohol distilled from sugar cane juice.70 Governors could apply for funds from the Colonial Development Advisory Committee which provided £36,500,000 for development assistance from 1929 to 1939. But this fund was originally set up to alleviate unemployment in Britain and no application for industrial development would be entertained which would be likely to compete with British industry.? Officials believed that by discouraging uneconomic industrial development they were acting in the best interests of the native inhabitants. An assistant secretary minuted, 'Manufacturing industry, which can be established in a colony only at the price of a monopoly protected by a high tariff, ends in producing a locally manufactured article which is too expensive for the primary agricultural producers to buy.' Governors were more suspicious of the motives of Colonial Office officials. The governor of Sierra Leone complained that any industrial project was approached from the standpoint that British trade interests must rank first, dominions' interests second and those of the colonies last. Perhaps the fairest summary of Colonial Office policy was made by a junior official: 'Generally speaking we do not want to encourage industrial development in the colonial empire, but we are reluctant to go so far as actually to prohibit it.'\"\n\nWhy then was it that Hong Kong was able to develop a flourishing export-oriented industry without any subsidy or assistance from the colonial government whatsoever when in all the other dependent territories the development of manufacturing industry was derisory, and the few factories that were established were heavily dependent on protective tariffs, special", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215298, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 75, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "23\n\n45. Cabinet Minutes, 6 June 1934, 23(34)6, 13 June 1934, 24(34)6, 3 Oct. 1934, 33(34)5, CAB23/79, PRO.\n\n46. Confidential Circular Despatch, June 1934, CO323/1298/10 and CO854/175.\n\n47. Colonial Office to Governor Hong Kong, 6 April 1934, CO323/1298/11.\n\n48. Information from R.R. Todd, an administrative officer in Hong Kong 1924-56, interviewed in 1986.\n\n49. CO323/1298/11. CO852/16/10.\n\n50. CO852/219/13.\n\n51. Circular Despatches, 13 April 1934, and 15 May 1934, CO854/175.\n\n52. Havinden and Meredith, 188-90. Governor Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 2 May 1934, CO323/1290/6.\n\n53. Circular Despatch, 19 Sept. 1936, CO854/170.\n\n54. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 6 July 1936 and 11 Aug, 1936, CO852/51/9. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 3 June 1937, CO852/106/19.\n\n55. An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire, HMSO Colonial No 95 (London, 1934), 137. Economic Survey Col. 109, 170; Economic Survey Col. 126, 170. Hong Kong Trade Statistics 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935.\n\n56. Circular Despatch, 13 March 1933, CO323/1230/11.\n\n57. Letters and Memorandum from Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce in Caldecott to Colonial Office, 25 July and 4 Aug. 1936, CO852/51/9. McKenzie (Custom House) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 18 Sept 1936. Rydderch (Custom House) to Colonial Office, 26 Feb. 1937, CO852/107/1.\n\n58. In 1936 exports of electric flashlight torches totalled HK$2,930,000, including India HK$595,000, Netherlands East Indies HK$379,000, and Britain HK$167,000. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1936.\n\n59. Minutes on Caldecott to Clauson, 15 Oct. 1936, CO852/51/9. Clauson commented: 'It is all too seldom we get from a colonial governor so thoughtful and comprehensive a review of the future of the colony he governs.'\n\n60. Officer Administering Government, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 30 Sept. 1937, with enclosures, CO853/109/5. King (Board of Trade) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 13 Nov, 1937, CO852/109/5.\n\n61. Circular Despatch, 2 June 1937, CO854/176.\n\n62. Memorandum by Hamilton (Superintendent of Imports and Exports Hong Kong), 22 April 1937 CO852/106/19. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1937.\n\n63. Circular Despatch, 24 Feb. 1938, CO854/177.\n\n64. Minute by Caine (Financial Secretary Hong Kong 1937-39), 24 Jan. 1940, CO852/215/3. Gas masks, CO129/580/9. Aircraft assembly, CO129/571/15 and CO129/580/4.\n\n65. Hong Kong Blue Book 1936, 1938, 1939, 1940.\n\n66. Calculations made as in note 5 from Hong Kong Trade Returns 1938 omitting all raw materials, unprocessed agricultural products and exports of banknotes (valued at HK$36,000,000).\n\n67. Clausen described the policy of the Colonial Office in these words when speaking at a meeting of the Overseas Trade Development Council, 31 July 1935, CO852/16/7.\n\n68. Colonial Office to Neville Chamberlain, 15 Jan. 1936. Federation of British Industries to Warren Fisher, 14 Feb. 1936. Minutes in Treasury file T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n69. Minutes of the second meeting of the committee, 23 April 1937, T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n70. CO852/16/13, The inventor approached the Colonial Office directly and officials referred the project to the governor of Trinidad. The governor appointed a committee which doubted if the project was feasible. The Colonial Office received a number of similar proposals in the 1930s. Often the entrepreneur was eager to set up a factory provided that he was granted a high protective tariff, an exclusive license, part of the capital costs, subsidised freight rates and other financial privileges. In effect the businessman was asking the colonial government to bear all the risks while he would enjoy the profits if the project was successful. See for example CO852/16/9, a proposal to set up a factory in Nyasaland to process sisal into binder twine. An official commented that this was a last desperate attempt by a bankrupt farmer to keep his own sisal estates going.\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 } ]