[
    {
        "id": 207780,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 168,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "A ROAD TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN WEST CHINA 1942-46 153\n\n4. Addition of centrifugal fan blowers to give some supercharge to the engine. These were belt driven from the engine front drive pulley. They were obtained as part of an American-designed and manufactured producer gas kit and were about the only components which stood up to the service required. The amount of petrol used for starting was small and a charcoal truck would normally use about 2 gallons for a 500 km. 3-4 day run. It was thus possible to haul 1000 km. tons with a minimum use of imported fuel and maximum use of the local resources.\n\nConclusion\n\nThe physical and quantitative part of the Units' transport work has been outlined in this paper. It is hoped that this record can be made more accurate and detailed by further research. If the transport work had not been done, many would have died who were cured. However, perhaps equally valuable was the training given and example set by the Western members in terms of systematic maintenance and driving care. The image, held by many Chinese at that time, of the Westerner as missionary, doctor, educator, or businessman; one who in general gave directions for others to carry out, was somewhat changed by the sight of young men working with their Chinese colleagues and employees, greasing steering, repairing engines and coaxing recalcitrant trucks over the roads of West China. It was an educative experience for all those involved and showed the value of practice over precept in the establishment of efficient working methods.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 These included a 26 hour, 606 mile drive from Lashio to Rangoon to clear medical supplies from the docks, 7 trucks loaded with medical supplies as part of the last convoy out of Rangoon on March 6, 1942; and a group of members, attached to Dr. Seagrave's Medical Unit, made the trek out of Burma to Assam in the party commanded by General Joseph W. Stillwell. Medical work with Chinese and Indian troops and civilians coming out of Burma into Assam continued there until the end of 1942.\n\n2 It is appropriate to mention briefly the direct medical work of the Unit. This consisted mainly of Mobile Surgical Teams (MST) attached to Chinese Army hospitals and treating military and civilian patients. These teams usually consisted of about eight people: two surgeon/physicians, one anaesthetist and two nurses, a dispenser, a handyman/mechanic and a business manager/quartermaster. The first of these MST was stationed at Walchow in Kwangtung in mid-1942 when forces were concentrated for a projected attack on Hong Kong. Most of the MST worked in Yunnan and the Salween front.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208572,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 29,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "2\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nThe American sense of guilt was largely attributable to three factors: United States' military defeats in Southeast Asia, the American commitment to the policy of defeating Germany first before concentrating on Japan, and the American failure in delivering the bulk of lend-lease and other war materials promised to China. On the first point, according to Stanley K. Hornbeck who was political adviser to the Department of State, reports from American sources from or through Chungking indicated that the American defeat in the Philippines, together with the rapid collapse of the British position in Southeast Asia, had bred \"a sense of frustration and defeatism” among the Chinese.4 To be fair, however, one must add that China had been vastly more appalled and disillusioned by, and consequently more contemptuous of, the British performance.\n\nOn the second point, it was only natural that China was disappointed and embittered by the American policy of “Germany First”. Support for this order of priority was by no means unanimous within American government circles. Admirals Ernest J. King and William D. Leahy, General Douglas MacArthur (at his new headquarters in Australia), and Stanley Hornbeck, to give some examples, all expressed doubt about it and urged that a greater military effort should be directed against Japan. While President Roosevelt was firm on his decision to stand by the agreement reached at the 'Arcadia” Conference it did not mean that he was entirely free from embarrassment when faced with his Far Eastern ally, Chiang Kai-shek.\n\nM4\n\nOn the third point, immediately after Pearl Harbour, President Roosevelt had been generous in promising China war materials, including planes, mainly through lend-lease channels. However, the Americans soon realized that it was easier to make the promise than to implement it. Two difficulties were involved. The first was the problem of transport. After the fall of Burma and the seizure of the southern part of the Burma Road by the Japanese early in 1942, air transport became the only feasible means of getting supplies into China. Until the opening of the well-known Ledo Road (later on re-named Stilwell Road) early in 1945, the bulk of the supplies flown from India to China was transported by the Tenth United States Air Force between April and December 1942, and thereafter by the United States Air Transport Command in what Joseph W. Ballantine, who became director of the Office of",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
        "rank": 0
    }
]