[ { "id": 204973, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1965", "page_number": 81, "title": "RAS-1965", "content_text": "72 \n\nA. D. BLUE \n\nFor the first few years after the cession of Hong Kong, the British Government and Royal Navy practically ignored piracy on the South China coast; and the American, French, and Portuguese governments were equally indifferent. Any attempts at suppression by the Hong Kong Government were as feeble and ineffective as those of the Canton authorities. British traders in Hong Kong and the treaty ports, however, considered that they were entitled to much greater protection, and after repeated protests and representations to the home and Hong Kong governments, the Hong Kong Government passed its first anti-piracy ordinance in 1847, and the Royal Navy began to take more effective action. As a result, many unsavoury practices were uncovered. It was found that certain British merchants were supplying arms and ammunition to the pirates against whom they were demanding protection; and that Hong Kong officials were licensing ships to provide convoy protection for Chinese traders, which ships were using the cover of the British flag to plunder the cargoes they were paid to protect. This licensed convoy system was open to much abuse, and a source of great trouble to the Navy. The Chinese called these ships \"protecting tigers.\" The Navy itself was not blameless in its anti-piracy operations. The over-generous bounty system, which made pirate hunting a lucrative profession for the first decades after the cession of Hong Kong, often led to innocent Chinese traders and sailors losing their lives and property. Admiralty records ignore most of the errors committed by overzealous naval officers, but the Navy's anti-piracy campaign was one of the many British activities to draw unfavourable criticism from Lord Elgin in his mission to China and Japan in 1858.\n\nThe Royal Navy and the Hong Kong Government faced a difficult and complex situation when they undertook serious anti-piracy operations in the late 1840's. The Navy could attack pirates anywhere on the high seas, and commit them for trial to any British or Chinese court; but Hong Kong could only free its own waters of pirates. Piracy on the coast and rivers came within the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government, and neither the Navy nor Hong Kong could operate there without permission from the Canton authorities. Anglo-Chinese co-operation, therefore, was essential for successful anti-piracy operations, and this was not always available. The Treaty of Tientsin was the first", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1965.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s752cj653", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205965, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 45, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "40 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\nRegistrar-General in 1864, a key post, Deane Superintendent of Police in 1867, and Tonnochy who held the offices of Sheriff, Coroner and Marshal of the Vice-Admiralty Court in 1865, became Assistant Harbour Master in 1867 and Superintendent of the Jail in 1875, a post he held until his death in 1882. Lister was soon sent to the Harbour Office and Russell, who also acted as Governor Sir Richard Macdonnell's private secretary, was sent to the Magistracy. James Legge, long resident in Hong Kong, was critical of the way in which the original scheme was modified by expediency and argued that \"there should have been no directing them away from their proper business of study until they had given proof of their actual interpretation in the supreme court”,22 Legge was right in principle; but although it was not the Government's intention to produce a supply of sinologues but rather administrators with a knowledge of Chinese, these early cadets did work hard at their Chinese, and one, Lister, supplied the China Review and Notes and Queries on China and Japan with many thoughtful comments on Chinese language and society. \n\nThe development of the cadet scheme can only be understood in relation to changes that occurred outside Hong Kong. The scheme was influenced - if not directly inspired by changes in public administration in India and the homeland. Open competition was first invented for India and the germ of the idea is to be found in Lord Macaulay's 1854 report on recruitment of the Indian Civil Service. In Great Britain appointments to the civil service until the year 1855 were made by nomination. In 1855 a stringent examination was introduced; and in 1870 the principle of open competition was adopted as a general rule. The year 1870 witnessed, then, the abolition of patronage and the admission of people into the civil service at prescribed ages and by means of competitive examinations; and a distinction was drawn, in terms of grades and hence of salary and prestige, between the routine and intellectual tasks of government. Competitive examinations meant, of course, that there was little chance of success into the higher grade except for candidates who had a successful university career, and, often, in addition, special preparation by a private tutor. These reforms influenced the recruitment of cadets into the Hong Kong Civil Service. \n\nIn 1869, as a result of the evolving climate of thought in English, a competitive examination by the Civil Service Commis-\n\nPage 45\n\nPage 46", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206492, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 40, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "34\n\n!\n\nLEIGH R. WRIGHT\n\nThe issue of Brooke's status revolved around, firstly, the question of whether or not a subject of the Queen could hold the position as a sovereign prince of a foreign state; and, secondly, whether Brooke was in fact an independent ruler or a vassal of the Sultan of Brunei.\n\nThe issue, however, was not a burning one in the ministries of Whitehall. Despite the fact that Borneo was of concern to Britain as the guardian of the eastern flank of the South China Sea route to the China coast, and was to assume, gradually, more strategic value as first France and later Germany began colonial operations in the area, at mid-century Britain possessed a colony and naval station at Labuan and a (“good strong”) consular treaty with Brunei which gave her a certain measure of control, if she chose to indulge it, in Brunei's relations with foreign states. Most of the Colonial and Foreign Secretaries in London, until the 1870s were not very interested in defining precisely Raja Brooke's status,\n\nFor the most part, Whitehall grudgingly approved of Brooke's “civilizing influence\" in Borneo. Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary in 1846, offered naval support for the suppression of piracy, and during a later term of office gave standing orders to the Eastern squadron to visit Sarawak at regular intervals. But the Foreign Office generally held to the view that \"it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government that British subjects should possess territory on the mainland of Borneo\".\n\nLord Clarendon, when Foreign Secretary in the mid-1850s, came close to disavowing Brooke's position in Sarawak. In 1853 the Raja took issue with a Foreign Office statement that seemed to assume that Brooke was a vassal of Brunei. Clarendon minuted,\n\nIt seems to me that the various documents tend to prove how cautiously the government abstained from recognizing his (Brooke's) independence although in various ways the anomalous character of his position has been admitted.\n\nBut Clarendon did not leave it at that. When in 1855 Spencer St. John succeeded Brooke as Consul in Brunei he suggested to the Foreign Office that he also be accredited to Sarawak as an independent state. The Raja agreed and insisted that the new consul must receive his exequatur from him. This act would render the desired\n\n6 FO to Admiralty, 24 July 1846, FO 12/4.\n\n7 Clarendon minute upon Brooke to FO, 27 September 1853, FO 12/13.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207288, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 56, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "INCIDENT BETWEEN HONG MERCHANTS AND THE SUPERCARGOES OF THE BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY IN CANTON, 1811.\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG*\n\nA detailed account of this incident was recorded by the senior officer on the British side, Captain the Hon. Hugh Lindsay,† the Commodore of the East India Company's fleet at that time. It is in the form of a letter to his sister, Lady Anne Barnard, undated, and was printed in The Lives of the Lindsays by Lord Lindsay, 2 vols., London, 1849. A full copy of this letter, retaining the original punctuation, has been supplied by Mr. Tom Lindsay, a long-time member of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. It is worth printing because of the details it supplies which are missing in the brief account of the same episode in Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, 1635-1834, Vol. III, Oxford 1926, p. 156.\n\nHistorians of early Anglo-Chinese relations, and of the British East India Company's trade with China, have to rely to a great extent for their material on Morse's five substantial volumes. It is worth examining, at this point, how Morse wrote these volumes which are based on a massive collection of hand-written documents.\n\n* Professor Cranmer-Byng belongs to the Department of History at the University of Toronto. He was the first Hon. Editor of this Journal and has contributed to it from time to time.\n\nHon. Hugh Lindsay was a younger brother of Alexander Lindsay, 6th Earl of Balcarres and 23rd Earl of Crawford. A note at the bottom of page 400 of Vol. II of Lives of the Lindsays states:\n\nMr. Hugh Lindsay was for many years Member of Parliament for the burghs of Forfar, Perth, Dundee, Cupar and St. Andrews, and Marshal of the Admiralty.\n\nIn the text on the same page it is stated that he was also a Director and Chairman of the East India Company. He died in April 1844 in his eightieth year. The biographical note goes on:\n\nHugh Hamilton Lindsay Esq., his only son, and long a resident in China, is the author of the extremely interesting 'Voyage of the Amherst, — along two thousand miles of the coast of China,- published in 8vo. by a speculating bookseller, from his report to the East India Co., which was printed by order of Parliament.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209270, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 173, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "28.48\n\nJUAN YUAN'S MANAGEMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS IN CANTON, 1817-1826\n\n159\n\nThe Topaze crisis, lasting from late 1821 into 1822, was the most serious confrontation between the Chinese and the British to that day, especially since the controversy involving all the significant issues of the day, including naval presence, jurisdiction over foreigners, and opium smuggling, came so close on the heels of the Terranova crisis. British trade at Canton was stopped for several months. The British factory, fearful that they would be held responsible for the misdeeds of sailors from the frigate Topaze, fled to their ships at Chuenpi on 11 February 1822. At the end of the crisis Juan Yüan made a compromise by not insisting on the surrender of the already departed criminals, but the British capitulated by abandoning the policy of using \"threat of force as a means of protecting or forwarding British interests in China\" at least for the time being. The Court of Directors of the East India Company \"advised the First Lord of the Admiralty to stop all peace-time visits of His Majesty's ships to the China coast unless assistance was urgently requested by the Governor-General of India\". An Order in Council was subsequently issued to this effect in 1823,\n\n1\n\n$\n\nIn December 1821, rancour from the Terranova case had hardly died down. Foreign traders realized that they could not escape completely the newly reinstituted stringent anti-opium laws even by sacrificing Terranova. The Emily, Terranova's ship, as well as three British ships, all with opium on board, were sent away from their Whampoa anchorage to Lintin, where they remained for three years without discharging or taking on cargo. During this period, two British warships, HMS Curlew and HMS Topaze, had sailed into the Pearl Estuary to \"protect\" these commercial vessels. Sailors had gone ashore \"to fetch fresh water\" from time to time. On 14 December 1821, a group of sailors from frigate Topaze came ashore. Only this time they brought along their pet goat. Unfortunately, the goat dug up potatoes, eating a number of them, and damaging the potato patch. A Chinese peasant, Huang I-ming, owner of the patch, then called upon his wife, brothers and neighbours to trample upon the sailors with sticks and stones, and in the fracas two urns of wine on the side of the hut were broken. When the sailors were driven aboard their ship, they discharged the cannon to disperse the pursuing and cursing villagers. During the skirmish among the potatoes a number of British sailors were injured, but none died. The next morning, the sailors, reinforced, went ashore again to revenge their mates. They chopped down the door of the hut of Huang I-ming, and fired a musket, killing him instantly. His son-in-law, also injured by the fusillade, died a", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 } ]