[
    {
        "id": 206017,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1970",
        "page_number": 97,
        "title": "RAS-1970",
        "content_text": "92\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nand Canton, and the shorter passage between Hong Kong and Macao, was for many Chinese passengers an opportunity for a prolonged gambling and drinking session.\n\nThe peak years of Chinese emigration to South-east Asia were those immediately preceding the world-wide economic depression of the early 1930s. The rubber and tin industries of South-east Asia were particularly hard hit by this depression, and Chinese immigration into all the countries of the region was severely curtailed. There had only been a very partial revival to pre-depression levels when the Pacific War broke out, soon after which Chinese emigration completely ceased.\n\nOwing to the different countries of South-east Asia adopting different methods of classifying nationality, it is practically impossible to obtain an accurate estimate of the number of Chinese in the region at any time; but well-informed authorities agree that at the outbreak of the Pacific War the number of people who regarded themselves as of Chinese race was about 8 million, that is between 5 and 6% of the total population. By far the greatest concentration of Chinese was in Malaya, where in 1947 the Chinese population of the Federation and Singapore was 2,605,000 out of a total population of 5,823,000. Singapore was, and still is, almost a Chinese city, and in 1947 there were 730,000 Chinese in a total population of 941,000. It is even more difficult to estimate how many Chinese were moving between China and South-east Asia in any year, but considering isolated figures relating to different countries, this must have amounted to several hundred thousands when the traffic was at its height. In 1929 Indo-China had a surplus of Chinese immigrants over emigrants of 40,000; while in the same year 195,000 Chinese males entered Malaya. In 1937 again some 8,000 Chinese entered British North Borneo.\n\nAlthough mainland Chinese have been unable to travel abroad since 1949, Chinese still move between Hong Kong, Formosa, and South-east Asia; but their numbers are infinitesimal in comparison with the vast traffic during the colonial era. However, the China Navigation Company is engaged in two specialised passenger trades which bear a little resemblance to the emigrant and deck passenger trades of the old days. One is the carriage of indentured labourers from Hong Kong to the Pacific phosphate",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215293,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 70,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "Though the 1934 interdepartmental committee report had not been officially approved by the cabinet, the Colonial Office regarded it as an authoritative guide to policy. Governors were instructed to refer all proposals for industrial development to London before any changes to tariffs or excise duty were submitted to legislative councils, or any promises of financial or other assistance were made to the promoters of the project. Entrepreneurs also approached the Colonial Office directly with their own schemes for industrial development. Officials examined the proposal to see if it was economically sound. Normally the Board of Trade was consulted for advice as to whether British exports would be adversely affected. Expert advice was sometimes obtained from outside government. If the colony was receiving a grant from Britain to balance its budget, the views of the Treasury were sought. The general attitude of the Colonial Office was an exceedingly cautious one, but if the project appeared to be economically viable, officials did not feel justified in preventing its development.\n\nWhen a proposal was rejected by the Colonial Office, a governor could still protest at the decision, arguing that the special circumstances of his colony should be taken into account. Governors often submitted counterproposals suggesting a lower protective tariff or a different mix of financial incentives to enable the project to go ahead. Governors were insistent on the need for industrial development, and the Colonial Office was always very reluctant to overrule a governor who persisted in pressing his views on what was in the best interests of his colony. In 1936, the colonial secretary wrote to the chancellor of the exchequer suggesting that the cabinet should reconsider the 1934 Report, so that when writing to governors, he could refer to the principles laid down in the report as having the authority of the whole government. The Federation of British Industries had also written to the Treasury complaining about competition from dominion and colonial manufacturers which enjoyed free entry into the British market. Treasury officials believed that the Colonial Office was too ready to sanction the establishment of industries in the colonies which might adversely affect British exports, ignoring the fact that Britain bore the whole cost and responsibility for the Royal Navy and colonial defence.68\n\nA new committee was set up, which, unlike the 1933 committee, included representatives from the Treasury and the Bank of England. It met for the first time in February 1937. The committee tried to formulate general principles, but found that in every case they examined, special considerations could be adduced to justify the new industrial development. For example, a brewery in the Gold Coast which competed with imported British beer was defended by the governor as a means to turn the natives away from gin and neat drinks to (cheaper) beer; the capital investment of £250,000 would be",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215298,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 75,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "23\n\n45. Cabinet Minutes, 6 June 1934, 23(34)6, 13 June 1934, 24(34)6, 3 Oct. 1934, 33(34)5, CAB23/79, PRO.\n\n46. Confidential Circular Despatch, June 1934, CO323/1298/10 and CO854/175.\n\n47. Colonial Office to Governor Hong Kong, 6 April 1934, CO323/1298/11.\n\n48. Information from R.R. Todd, an administrative officer in Hong Kong 1924-56, interviewed in 1986.\n\n49. CO323/1298/11. CO852/16/10.\n\n50. CO852/219/13.\n\n51. Circular Despatches, 13 April 1934, and 15 May 1934, CO854/175.\n\n52. Havinden and Meredith, 188-90. Governor Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 2 May 1934, CO323/1290/6.\n\n53. Circular Despatch, 19 Sept. 1936, CO854/170.\n\n54. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 6 July 1936 and 11 Aug, 1936, CO852/51/9. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 3 June 1937, CO852/106/19.\n\n55. An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire, HMSO Colonial No 95 (London, 1934), 137. Economic Survey Col. 109, 170; Economic Survey Col. 126, 170. Hong Kong Trade Statistics 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935.\n\n56. Circular Despatch, 13 March 1933, CO323/1230/11.\n\n57. Letters and Memorandum from Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce in Caldecott to Colonial Office, 25 July and 4 Aug. 1936, CO852/51/9. McKenzie (Custom House) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 18 Sept 1936. Rydderch (Custom House) to Colonial Office, 26 Feb. 1937, CO852/107/1.\n\n58. In 1936 exports of electric flashlight torches totalled HK$2,930,000, including India HK$595,000, Netherlands East Indies HK$379,000, and Britain HK$167,000. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1936.\n\n59. Minutes on Caldecott to Clauson, 15 Oct. 1936, CO852/51/9. Clauson commented: 'It is all too seldom we get from a colonial governor so thoughtful and comprehensive a review of the future of the colony he governs.'\n\n60. Officer Administering Government, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 30 Sept. 1937, with enclosures, CO853/109/5. King (Board of Trade) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 13 Nov, 1937, CO852/109/5.\n\n61. Circular Despatch, 2 June 1937, CO854/176.\n\n62. Memorandum by Hamilton (Superintendent of Imports and Exports Hong Kong), 22 April 1937 CO852/106/19. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1937.\n\n63. Circular Despatch, 24 Feb. 1938, CO854/177.\n\n64. Minute by Caine (Financial Secretary Hong Kong 1937-39), 24 Jan. 1940, CO852/215/3. Gas masks, CO129/580/9. Aircraft assembly, CO129/571/15 and CO129/580/4.\n\n65. Hong Kong Blue Book 1936, 1938, 1939, 1940.\n\n66. Calculations made as in note 5 from Hong Kong Trade Returns 1938 omitting all raw materials, unprocessed agricultural products and exports of banknotes (valued at HK$36,000,000).\n\n67. Clausen described the policy of the Colonial Office in these words when speaking at a meeting of the Overseas Trade Development Council, 31 July 1935, CO852/16/7.\n\n68. Colonial Office to Neville Chamberlain, 15 Jan. 1936. Federation of British Industries to Warren Fisher, 14 Feb. 1936. Minutes in Treasury file T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n69. Minutes of the second meeting of the committee, 23 April 1937, T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n70. CO852/16/13, The inventor approached the Colonial Office directly and officials referred the project to the governor of Trinidad. The governor appointed a committee which doubted if the project was feasible. The Colonial Office received a number of similar proposals in the 1930s. Often the entrepreneur was eager to set up a factory provided that he was granted a high protective tariff, an exclusive license, part of the capital costs, subsidised freight rates and other financial privileges. In effect the businessman was asking the colonial government to bear all the risks while he would enjoy the profits if the project was successful. See for example CO852/16/9, a proposal to set up a factory in Nyasaland to process sisal into binder twine. An official commented that this was a last desperate attempt by a bankrupt farmer to keep his own sisal estates going.\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    }
]