[ { "id": 206218, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 35, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "THE TAIPINGS AT NINGPO\n\n29\n\nNingpo, for a long time had been a difficult city to administer, but the Taiping occupation seems in retrospect to have been an exceptional period. To better appreciate this it is worth considering Ningpo in a somewhat broader perspective. For example, a year and a half before the Taipings took the city, a Jardine Matheson Company agent reported that the Ch'ing officials were unable to control the pirate-infested countryside.41 Three months after the Taipings left Ningpo, the Jardine agent gloomily reported that trade was bad and would remain so until \"a stop was put to the squeezing on the part of the Imperial Authorities.\"42 Six months after the departure of the Taipings, the agent revealed that Ningpo was in the throes of civil chaos. The unpopular tao-t'ai had been forced into hiding following a dispute with men from Frederick Townsend Ward's so-called Ever Victorious Army. The situation was resolved by Captain Dew who actually had to reoccupy the city. Dew and Harvey ignominiously had to search long and hard to find the affrighted Ch'ing official.43 Small wonder then, that the Jardine agent's report of January 1863, speaks of how the country people of Ningpo are now fondly recalling that the Taipings had always paid for what they took.44\n\nJudgment on the victorious expulsion of the Taipings from Ningpo has been varied. Consul Harvey congratulated himself:\n\nFor my part, let me state that it will be a source of great satisfaction and I may add, of pride, in after time to think that I have been placed in a position to use my feeble pen, and to have exercised my humble powers (always within the limits of my official duties) in weakening and undermining, as perseveringly and indefatigably as I have been able, the most gigantic imposture and the most blasphemous structure that ever disgraced ancient or modern pages.45\n\nForeign Secretary Russell, from London, also congratulated Harvey for the \"judgment, courage, and temper, which he displayed on all occasions....\"46 Another influential writer on these events termed Dew's accomplishment \"a brilliant feat of arms.\"47 But the Hong Kong Daily Press, for one, expressed the view of many contemporaries: \"There never was a falser, more unprovoked, or more unjustifiable act than the taking of Ningpo by the allies from the Taipings. It should, in fairness, be recorded to the eternal disgrace of Captain Roderick Dew, of HMS En-", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206234, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 51, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "THE DEBATE ON NATIONAL SALVATION\n\n45\n\nHo Kai's judgment was keen indeed. China voluntarily and in an humiliating fashion concluded the Sino-Franco War on the verge of victory. The tragic end of the Foochow fleet, however, was due to the ill-judgment and incapacity of her commander-in-chief, Admiral Ho Ju-chang, which gave the French the chance to destroy the whole fleet in half-an-hour.14\n\nThe situation of the Chinese army, in the eyes of Ho Kai, was no better than that of the navy. He said:\n\nThe Chinese make fine soldiers if properly disciplined and armed, and placed under brave leaders. Let their salaries be paid regularly and adequately according to law, and not cut down and kept in arrears for months together, let their drills be conducted regularly. Does China wish to have an army worthy of the name? Let her then first reform her internal administration in this department. One point I wish to impress especially upon those who have the guidance of affairs is, that the efficiency of an army does not so much depend upon the number of soldiers composing it as on their collective and individual proficiency. I cannot leave the topic without recalling to mind the achievements of the Ever Victorious Army when under the distinguished leadership of that renowned chief, the late lamented General C. G. Gordon,\n\nAs to China's relations with foreign powers, Ho Kai admitted that she had much cause for complaint. China was bound down by treaties to do much that was incompatible with her rights and dignity as an independent sovereign state. She was often sharply pulled up and rebuked for the least semblance of a breach of an article in such treaties, while some foreign nations were not very careful in observing their part of the agreements and extremely tardy in rendering justice to her claims. The Chinese, as a matter of fact, had not always received the respect and consideration which they deserved, and in some places they were even treated as if they were more devils than men. The only way to save China from this injustice and maltreatment was to make immediate reforms. High officials must find the true cause of their country's degradation and then apply the proper remedy. The army and navy were not the key to the problem of China's weakness. The real weakness of China was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207361, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 129, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n121\n\nallies, for example, occasionally directed their military efforts against, rather than for, the dynasty; and even the Uighurs sometimes became overbearing and troublesome.42 There were, moreover, tensions between barbarian and Chinese officers, as well as conflicts between various competing barbarian commanders. But perhaps the most vivid illustration of the dangers involved in utilizing foreigners was the famous rebellion of the \"mixed-breed\" barbarian, An Lu-shan, which the Uighur heir apparent had helped combat in its early stages. Contemporary observers saw this uprising not as a civil war between the central government and a local \"warlord,\" but rather as a conflict between the Chinese and a barbarian. Chinese historians went so far, in fact, as to maintain that the rebellion occurred \"because An Lu-shan and other barbarians were given important military and political offices.\"43 Whatever the merits of this view, we may safely assume that An did not rate a biography in Li Te-yü's I-yü kuei-chung chuan; and although foreign troops and individual barbarian commanders assisted in the restoration of imperial rule, and helped sustain the Tang dynasty for nearly a century and a half after the revolt, resentment and distrust of barbarians became increasingly evident as neo-Confucianism rose to prominence.\n\nThe Use of Foreigners in Post-T'ang Times\n\nChinese anti-foreignism, already on the rise in the later years of T'ang, received reinforcement from neo-Confucianism, with its emphasis on the superiority of Chinese culture and the closer identification of Confucianism with that culture. At the same time, the stress on civil virtues and the growing importance of the vaunted examination system as a channel for upward mobility led to a general decline in martial spirit.44 Yet even as China turned inward, her ever-present need for foreign military and administrative expertise assured that outsiders would continue to find their way into the Chinese service. This proved true in the Sung, when specially trained \"barbarian troops\" (fan-ping) operated against internal and external enemies, and barbarian commanders (fan-chiang) such as Kuo Yao-shih (a surrendered Liao officer) rendered similar service. Kuo is particularly noteworthy for having led a military force known as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün) which, in some respects, resembled the contingent with the same designation raised by Frederick Townsend Ward in the latter stages of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).45", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207365, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 133, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n125\n\nmaterial superiority, and intent not on conforming to Chinese ways, but on changing them. Enjoying the privilege of extraterritoriality and other unequal treaty “rights,” they were closely linked to the policies and practices of their respective home governments, who, after 1860, maintained a diplomatic (and at times military) presence on Chinese soil. These foreign employees were at best unwitting agents of cultural change, and at worst, potential tools of the aggressive Western powers. Their use by the Chinese, therefore, introduced special new problems of responsibility and restraint.\n\nThis was particularly true in light of China’s all-too-obvious military weakness and the new role Western technology was beginning to play in Chinese military affairs. The Manchus, obsessed with internal security, were fearful enough of modern Western weapons in the hands of Chinese (as opposed to Manchu) soldiers. To allow foreigners to train and command Western-armed Chinese troops introduced an additional element of risk. Yet under the exigencies of the massive Taiping Rebellion, the dynasty sanctioned the rise of foreign-trained and foreign-officered Chinese contingents in a desperate effort to stem the threatening rebel tide.63 And despite the changed circumstances of China’s internal and external situation after 1860, Ch’ing policymakers instinctively looked to the past for policy guidelines.\n\nPage 04\n\nAs the first Westerner to hold high military rank in the new situation, the career of Frederick Townsend Ward is worthy of special attention. Like many other barbarian employees in China’s past, this outlaw-adventurer from Salem, Massachusetts owed his position in the Chinese military service to singular circumstances. At a crucial juncture in the Taiping Rebellion, Ward raised a unique, foreign-officered Chinese military force, the Ever-Victorious Army, which proved useful not only as a weapon against the Taipings, but also as a means to limit Western intervention in the Chinese civil war.65 In the course of his brief career, Ward attained the rank of colonel (fu-chiang), and upon his death in 1862 he received high posthumous honors and abundant praise for his loyal service to the dynasty. But during his lifetime, Ward’s behavior was under close and constant scrutiny. So innovative was his position that Chinese officials were reluctant to suggest historical parallels, and it was not until well after his death that the “Yankee adventurer” began to be compared with such noteworthy barbarian employees in the past as Yu Yu and Chin Mi-ti.66", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207367, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 135, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n127\n\nchang, for example, noted in a private letter: \"Although up to now Ward has not yet shaved his head or paid me a visit, do I have time to quarrel with foreigners over such petty indiscretion?”*69 To be certain, Li, no less than the throne, sought a means to exercise effective control over Ward; but he did not place much stock in superficial indicators of cultural submission. More important were the administrative, personal and financial ties that bound the barbarian commander to the Chinese. Ostensibly, at least, Ward was held in check by his superiors in the Ch'ing military hierarchy. At the same time, honors from the throne and substantial emoluments provided material incentives for the ambitious and avaricious foreigner. But Ward's closest tie with the Chinese was his special relationship with the merchant-turned-official, Yang Fang, who sponsored the Ever-Victorious Army in its initial stages and later became a co-commander of the force. Ward owed much of his early success to Yang, who in turn benefitted from his association with the vaunted foreign-officered contingent. In 1862, Ward married Yang's daughter and acquired a large tract of land (probably through Yang), upon which he began building a house shortly before his death. He also became Yang's business partner in a few lucrative undertakings (such as steamship rental), and, through Yang's machinations, invested a reported one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in the Ch'ing government's salt monopoly. Such a stake in the established order assured that Ward would remain a loyal, if not always completely satisfied, servant of the dynasty.70\n\nFar from the scene of Ward's operations, the throne could not easily see that he was responding positively to the patchwork of formal and informal controls operating on him at the local level. From Peking's perspective, Ward was valiant and effective, but insufficiently submissive, and anxious edicts from the throne admonished local officials to keep him under tight rein. Prince Kung articulated Peking's fears: \"Although Ward exerts himself on China's behalf, he is still a foreigner. His nature is basically unrestrained and his heart even more difficult to fathom.\"71 Yet when Ward died in battle, whatever doubts Peking may have had about his reliability were all but forgotten, and the American commander became at once a conspicuous symbol of foreign devotion. Li Hung-chang glowingly summarized his career in China, praising Ward's complete dedication to the dynasty and recommending that special temples be erected at Shanghai and Ningpo \"to give comfort\n\nPage 135\n\nPage 136", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207368, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 136, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "128\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nto his loyal soul” (i-wei chung-hun). The throne, for its part, expressed profound grief over Ward's death, and ordered that special posthumous honors, including the erection of memorial temples, be bestowed upon this upright, brave, and “irreproachable” warrior.72\n\nWard as a Model for Barbarian Employees\n\nIt is perhaps not surprising that Ward's employment became the standard for other foreign employees in the Chinese military service. Soon after his death, an imperial edict expressed the view that if foreigners were to lead Chinese troops and be granted military authority, they had, like Ward, \"to petition requesting to be enrolled on the Chinese population register [p'an-t'u] and be willing to accept Chinese control [chieh-chih].\"73 At least in part because of such stipulations, Ward's second in command, Henry Burgevine, assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army in October, 1862. Like his predecessor, Burgevine had petitioned to become a Chinese subject, and expressed his willingness not only to accept Chinese control, but also to be bound by Chinese law.74 In the course of his career he had been granted honors similar to those bestowed upon Ward, and had also married a Chinese. But he did not enjoy a close personal or business relationship with any Chinese officials, and in time he clashed with his Chinese sponsors. After a quarrel with Yang Fang in early 1863, Burgevine was dismissed by the Ch'ing authorities and branded a “rebel” (ni).75 Eventually he joined the Taipings, and although subject to Chinese jurisdiction by the terms of his own petition, Burgevine avoided prosecution owing to the intercession of foreign officials. In 1865, he drowned under mysterious circumstances while in the custody of the Chinese authorities.76\n\nThe Burgevine episode highlighted the inadequacy of cultural controls in \"managing\" barbarian employees. But even before Burgevine's \"rebellion,\" the Chinese had begun to appreciate the limitations of cultural submission as a determinant of loyalty. On December 6, 1862, the throne received a joint memorial from Hsüeh Huan and Li Hung-chang which spelled out these limitations on the basis of their experience with Ward. Hsüeh and Li harbored few illusions about the American commander and his motives. Pointing out that Ward had indicated his willingness to become a Chinese subject, but had never shaved his head or changed to Chinese clothing, the two officials went on to state that despite his", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207369, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 137, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n129\n\nloyal service to the dynasty, he had shown himself to be ungrateful, greedy, power-hungry and difficult to control. Given the privileged position such Westerners enjoyed in China, transgressions by them could not easily be punished--even if they were to become Chinese subjects.77\n\nWhat could not be expected of Ward could hardly be expected of other foreigners in the Chinese military service. Emphasizing that Westerners did not delight in Chinese clothes and customs, Hsüeh and Li argued that China “need not force them to do what they find difficult.\" In their view, nothing was to be gained by foreign military employees going through the motions of either changing to Chinese clothing or registering as Chinese subjects. The throne voiced substantial agreement.78 Allowing foreigners to follow their own customs was, after all, consistent with the traditional policy of \"keeping [barbarians] under loose rein [chi-mi],” which did not exclude the idea of cultural submission, but neither did it demand it. Meanwhile, local officials were expected to devise effective means for establishing control over barbarian employees until such time as their services could be dispensed with.\n\nWhen Charles G. Gordon received command of the Ever-Victorious Army after Burgevine's dismissal, the throne did not require that he register as a Chinese subject or change to Chinese ways.79 It did, however, demand that he be effectively controlled. Unmoved by the prospect of material gain, and comparatively aloof, Gordon was a difficult barbarian to ensnare. Yet through a combination of flattery, honors, shrewd diplomacy, and administrative pressures (including the presence of Li Hung-chang's growing Anhwei Army) the Chinese succeeded in winning and maintaining Gordon's devotion.80 Throughout his career in China Gordon carried the stigma of being an \"unsubmissive\" foreign commander,81 but he received unprecedented honors from the throne. Eventually, with Li Hung-chang as his sponsor, Gordon achieved the exalted rank of provincial commander-in-chief (ti-tu) and the coveted yellow riding-jacket (huang ma-kua). By the end of his tumultuous career as head of the Ever-Victorious Army in 1864, he and Li Hung-chang had become fast friends, and they remained so for many years to come.\n\n82\n\nDuring the T'ung-chih period, a considerable number of other foreigners entered the Chinese military service. Some, such as A. E. LeBrethon de Caligny, Prosper Giquel, and Paul d'Aiguebelle, led foreign-officered contingents patterned after the Ever-Victorious", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207377, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 145, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n63 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training,” 83-86.\n\n64 Ward and other foreigners in the Chinese military service are studied in depth in Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army.\n\n65 For basic Chinese documentation on Ward's career, see IWSM TC 4: 25-276; 4: 40a; 4; 51b-52; 5: 6b-8b; 5: 33-36b; 5: 51-52; 5: 54; 6: 2a-b; 6: 14b; 6: 17b-18; 6: 19b-20; 6: 30-31; 7; 47b-48b; 9; 3-4.\n\n66 IWSM TC 79: 11.\n\n67 Ibid., TC 4: 25-26; see also John K. Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System,\" 270.\n\n68 IWSM, TC 5: 33-36b; 5: 51-52; 6: 19b-20; 6: 30a-b.\n\n69 Li Hung-chang, Letters to Friends, 1: 29.\n\n70 Foreign Relations of the United States (1888), part 1, 211-217.\n\n71 IWSM, TC 6: 17.\n\n72 Ibid., TC 9; 3b.\n\n73 Ibid., TC 9: 4.\n\n74 Ching Wu and Chung Ting, eds., Wu Hsu tang-an chung ti T'al-p'ing r'ien-kuo shih-liao hsüan-chi [Selections of historical materials concerning the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in Wu Hsu's archives] (Peking, 1958), 128-129,\n\n75 See Martin Ring, \"The Burgevine Case and Extrality in China, 1863-1866,\" Papers on China 20 (1969). In mid-1863, Prince Kung requested that Burgevine be expunged from the Chinese population register. See IWSM, TC 17: 136 and 20b.\n\n76 Ring, 145-146, 156 note 70.\n\n77 IWSM, TC 10: 46-49.\n\n78 Ibid., TC 10: 50a-b.\n\n79 Ibid., TC 15: 10b-11.\n\n80 I have discussed this combination in Ward, Gordon and the Ever Victorious Army. For some indications of Li's approach, consult J. O. P. Bland, Li Hung-chang (New York, 1917); I. C. Cheng, Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion, 1850-1864 (Hong Kong, 1963), 120-132; Gordon Papers (British Museum), Ad. Mss. 53, 386, Robert Hart to Charles Gordon, October 7, 1863.\n\n81 See, for example, Feng Kuei-fen's Hsien-chih-r'ang chi [Collected essays from the Hall of Manifest Aspirations] (1876), 6: 46.\n\n82 IWSM, TC 22; 3b; 24: 29a-b; 25: 27b-28b; 27: 28-29. On Gordon's return to China in 1880 to assist Li during the so-called Ili Crisis, consult Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, \"Gordon in China, 1880,\" Pacific Historical Review 30.2 (May, 1964).\n\n83 See Kuo T'ing-i, Taiping t'ien-kuo shih-shih jih-chih (A daily record of historical events of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom] (Taipei, 1963), appendix, 165-167.\n\n84 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training\".\n\n85 See Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T’ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (New York, 1967), 216; IWSM, TC 16; 11; 39; 22-29; 70: 38a-b and 41-42b; 85: 39a-b; 87; 31, 34-35.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207641, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 29, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "14\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nforeign military aid reaped few long-term gains. Western officers from \"Chinese\" Gordon to Constantin von Hanneken introduced a measure of modernity to at least a few armies in the late Ch'ing period, but none of these individuals was able to promote more basic institutional reform.10 The effects of Japan's success and China's failure in this regard were far-reaching.\n\nGenerally speaking, China's approach to military reform in the years from 1860 to 1895 may be compared with that of Japan in the years from 1853 to 1868. In each instance, foreign assistance was acquired piecemeal by both the central government and local governments, with no real coordination between the two. Similar rationales were offered, and similar results obtained, although in the case of China the new knowledge and technology acquired was used to bolster rather than to undermine the existing central government.11\n\nA high priority for both pre-Meiji Japan and late Ch'ing China was the training of troops and officers in Western techniques. In each country, the use of foreign military assistance followed similar lines. The training program established for the Bakufu by the French Minister, Leon Roches, at Yokohama during the mid-1860's, for example, may be compared with the central government training program set up by the British Minister, Frederick Bruce, at Tientsin in the early 1860's.12 Similarly, the various foreign-training efforts begun in Chōshu and other han during the 1860's bear a basic resemblance to the post-Taiping training camps established at Shanghai, Canton, Foochow and elsewhere.13 The Japanese even had their own rough equivalent of China's famous Ever-Victorious Army.14 Common problems in these early military improvement programs included language difficulties, foreign rivalries, financial limitations, lack of standardization in arms and training, and foreign meddling.15\n\nChina never overcame these problems. From the 1860's to the early 1890's, a handful of foresighted individuals, most notably Li Hung-chang, undertook a variety of modernizing enterprises aimed at building up China's “wealth and power.” Their efforts succeeded in a limited way, but were severely hindered by obscurantism, official opposition, bureaucratic inertia, and the deliberate policies of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, who carefully manipulated political factions in order to maintain and enhance her own power.16", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207648, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n21\n\nvernment was, in Perkins' words, \"an almost unbelievably weak [financial] instrument.\"\n\nEven if the Ch'ing government had been moved to undertake more fundamental military reform, China's transition to modernity would have been painful; but without such reform, it was virtually impossible.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4.\n\n2 Ibid.; see also 148-149.\n\n3 Thomas Kennedy, \"Self-Strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings,” Ching-shih wen-t'i, 3.1 (November, 1974), 27.\n\n4 Cohen, 149.\n\n5 Quoted in S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923 (New York, 1966), 109.\n\n6 See, for example, William Lockwood, \"Japan's Response to the West: The Contrast With China,\" World Politics, 9.1 (October, 1956); Marion Levy, \"Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,\" Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2 (October, 1953); Marion Levy, \"Some Structural Problems of Modernization and High Modernization: China and Japan,\" Proceedings of the Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East (1962); Allan Cole, \"Contrasting Modernization in China and Japan,\" Ch'ung-chi hsieh-pao, 4.2 (May, 1965); E.O. Reischauer, “Modernization in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan,\" Japan Quarterly, 10.3 (July-September, 1963), etc. A partial exception is the fine article by John K. Fairbank, et al., entitled \"The Influence of Modern Western Science and Technology on Japan and China,\" Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 7 (1954).\n\n7 Two of the most obvious advantages were, of course, Japan's greater and more immediate awareness of the Western military challenge (a product of geography and historical timing), and the military orientation and ethos (bushido) of the Japanese elite, as compared to the civil orientation and ethos (wen-te) of the Chinese elite. Other factors were also important, including the absence of opium smoking among Japanese officers and the rank and file, which again contrasts so markedly with the case in China. See Jonathan Spence, \"Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China,\" in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and Carolyn Grant, eds., Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1975).\n\n8 See Fairbank, et al., \"The Influence,\" 192-194, esp. 193.\n\n9 Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1955), 139.\n\n10 See Richard J. Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army: Foreign Assistance and Military Modernization in Nineteenth Century China (manuscript).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208312, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "20 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\ntingents such as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün) brought Western drill and tactics to literally thousands of Chinese soldiers. Officers from these forces not only instructed their own men, but also trained large numbers of troops for Chinese officials, most notably Li Hung-chang.23 At about the same time, foreign-training programs arose in several port areas, including Tientsin, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow and Canton. A number of Green Standard forces at the capital (and eventually elsewhere) were transformed into Western-armed \"retrained armies\" (lien-chün) on the yung-ying model, and several thousand Bannermen were molded into the famous Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), established by Wen-hsiang and others.24 \n\nThe Peking Field Force was an especially interesting experiment. Until the late 1860's, selected members of the force were drilled by foreign instructors using English words of command but thereafter, Western-trained Bannermen carried on instruction independently in Manchu. Nominally 20,000 strong throughout most of the late nineteenth century, the Peking Field Force usually numbered closer to half that amount. According to Major A. E. J. Cavendish, a British military attaché in China, the force as late as 1894 was considered to be an elite organization with \"higher pay and quicker promotion\" than in any other Banner units at the capital. Officers in the force were described as \"the pick of the Banners,\" and posts in it were \"eagerly sought after.\" Yet Cavendish formed a decidedly negative opinion of the force, which he described as poorly armed and superficially trained, with emphasis on form rather than content. One can imagine the shape of the rest of the traditional Ch'ing military establishment.25 \n\nA major deficiency in all of the early foreign-training efforts was lack of centralized direction and support. In the absence of adequate central government guidelines, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely from force to force and area to area. There was virtually no effort on the part of the Ch'ing government to co-ordinate its military programs, or to expand foreign-training in a systematic way.26 In fact, the Manchus seem to have been intent on compartmentalizing Western military knowledge as much as possible—presumably for reasons of internal control. In 1863, for example, the Tsungli Yamen stated explicitly that in the provinces only Bannermen should learn to make", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208319, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n27\n\nestablishment of a Directorate for Military Affairs (Tu-pan chün-wu ch'u) in early November, 1894, did virtually nothing to alter the course of the war, and the nearly useless Naval Board (Hai-chün ya-men) was disbanded even prior to the end of the fighting. Neither body found it possible to effectively coordinate land fighting or to insure cooperation between the army and navy.76 Meanwhile, poor field communications and transport facilities, inadequate preparation, faulty intelligence, and widespread corruption in pay and supply, made it virtually impossible for Chinese forces to fight efficiently.77 Ammunition shortages, worthless shells, and lack of standardization in weapons proved especially troublesome at sea. On land, ammunition shortages seem to have been less acute, but morale undoubtedly suffered from the absence of a modern hospital corps and ambulance service such as Japan possessed.78\n\nSurprisingly, Chinese forces did not always do poorly, in spite of these handicaps. Portions of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army under Chang Kao-yüan, for example, performed admirably during the war, as they had done a decade earlier under Chang on Taiwan during the Sino-French hostilities. Chang, who had once served with the Ever-Victorious Army, received the praise of foreign observers not only prior to Sino-Japanese War but also during and after the conflict for his tactical ability and the training, discipline, and effective weapons of the troops under his command.79 I-k'o-tang-a, a Manchu general, also gained plaudits from foreigners, including the Japanese, who acknowledged that he had surprising tactical talent for \"a Chinese warrior of the old school.\"80 A few other Ch'ing commanders, such as Tso Pao-kuei, at least received praise for their bravery against the Japanese. But overall, Chinese troops were poorly-led and unsuitably trained. Lack of effective leadership exacerbated all of China's military problems and undermined both discipline and morale. The overwhelming majority of China's field commanders and middle-grade officers were not graduates of China's two infant military academies, and although some such individuals served with distinction in low-ranking positions, their mere presence within a given army was seldom enough to inspire confidence among either officers or the rank and file.81\n\nGenerally, the Chinese were extremely timid on land and sea, encouraging the Japanese to attempt daring and highly successful tactics that would ordinarily be considered too hazardous for use", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208321, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 45, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n29\n\nthe Yalu River in mid-September, 1894, China and Japan each had twelve ships, but the encounter was no contest. China's problem was less the quality of her ships than the lack of an effective command structure, poor communications, cowardice (on the part of Liu Pu-ch'an), poor training, and ammunition shortages.\" Chinese firing was comparatively effective, especially in the early stages of the fighting, but too often the shells were faulty. At Wei-hai-wei, in early 1895, the situation was even more grim. By this time, the war had been lost, and Chinese naval forces were completely demoralized, even mutinous.92\n\nChina's use of foreign talent could not remedy her military deficiencies. Unlike the Japanese, who succeeded in eliminating reliance on foreigners entirely by the outbreak of the war, the Chinese were forced to continue using them on both land and sea. A surprising number served, in spite of the existence of various neutrality ordinances and foreign enlistment acts.93 At one point, the Ch'ing government even contemplated establishing an army of 100,000 Chinese troops under 2,000 foreign officers—an effort, in the words of the North-China Herald to \"re-create an Ever-Victorious Army” under Constantin von Hanneken.94 Predictably, however, the plan met heavy opposition from Ch'ing officials, including Li Hung-chang, and it was never implemented.95\n\nIn all, the Sino-Japanese War was a disaster for China. Yet there were optimistic voices to be heard even in the midst of China's despair. The journalist, Wang T'ao—as shocked as anyone by Japan's sudden victory—undoubtedly spoke for many reform-minded Chinese in expressing the hope that defeat by the Japanese would finally shake China out of her lethargy. National humiliation was a prelude, he felt, to meaningful change,\n\nThe alliance between Chinese nationalism and agitation for reform, was evident in many sectors of Chinese society during the first few years following the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The writings of newly-politicized Chinese intellectuals, as well as the publications of the burgeoning Chinese periodical press, reflected these related concerns.97 The immediate post-war era also witnessed the proliferation of Chinese reform associations and study groups. Even remote Szechwan was touched by the reform spirit. In late 1896, a group of gentry members issued a manifesto which called for the abolition of footbinding and argued with tortured but telling logic: \"The present is no time of peace. Foreign women have natural feet,\n\nPage 30 is missing, actual page number in original text is \"45\" and \"46\"\n\nPage 45\n\nPage 46", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208327, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1978", "page_number": 51, "title": "RAS-1978", "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n35\n\n22 See Jonathon Porter, Tseng Kuo-fan's Private Bureaucracy (Berkeley, 1972), 74-76, 127.\n\n23 Consult Richard J. Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China (Millwood, New York, 1978).\n\n24 Richard J. Smith, \"Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864-1873,\" Modern Asian Studies, 10.2 (1976), 196-197; also Kwang-ching Liu and Richard J. Smith, \"The Military Challenge: The Northwest and the Coast,\" in The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, Part Two, Chapter 4, forthcoming.\n\n25 Cavendish, 709-710. See also the sources cited above, note 24.\n\n26 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,” 196, 220-223.\n\n27 IWSM, Tung-chih, 25: 3.\n\n28 Smith, “Foreign-Training,” 220-223; also Richard J. Smith, “Reflections on the Comparative Study of Modernization in China and Japan; Military Aspects,” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (1976).\n\n29 Ibid., (both sources); Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapters 8 and 9.\n\n30 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 215-223. See also Mark Bell, China (Simla, 1884), 2: 58; William Bales, Tso Tsung-tang Soldier and Statesman of Old China (Shanghai, 1937), 339; K. C. Liu, \"Nineteenth-Century China,\" in Tang Tsou and P. T. Ho, eds., China in Crisis (Chicago, 1966), 120.\n\n31 On the relationship between modern weapons and tactics and officer-training in the West, see Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York, 1878), 270-271, 318-319, 324, 328-330 and passim. See also NCH, July 28, 1866, cited in Wright, The Last Stand, 201. For Upton's critique of Chinese tactics and training in the mid-1870's consult The Armies, 20-23. For the use of lien-chün in suppressing internal rebels, see Kung-chung tang Kuang-hsi ch'ao tsou-che, 2: 302, 664, 667; 3: 172, 318, 323, 399, 445, 518, 753, etc. I am indebted to Professor K. C. Liu for supplying this reference. For a critique of yung-ying and lien-chin forces in the 1890's, consult Cavendish, 712-714.\n\n32 Smith, \"Foreign-Training,\" 216 and notes.\n\n33 Bell, 2: 4. The standard works on Li's army are: Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, 1964); Wang, Huai-chün chih (Hong Kong, 1973).\n\n34 See Chang Chih-tung's somewhat comparable effort in the 1880's and 1890's, discussed in Ayers, chapter 5. For a brief overview of the problems connected with officer education in late Ch'ing China, consult Powell, 40-45.\n\n35 Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins, chapter 9.\n\n36 Wang, Huai-chün, 203; LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39-41, 41-43; LWCK, Memorials, 27: 4-5.\n\n37 On the West Point inquiry, see Chester Holcombe, China's Past and Future (London, 1904), 82-83; FRUS, 1875, part 1, 227-228. On Li's negotiations with Upton, consult LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39a-41a; YWYT, 3: 592; Peter Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton (New York, 1885), 29-298, 309-310.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212220, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 162, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "139\n\nI was in Ningpo when the announcement of the closing of the Burma road was received. It was a severe blow for the Chinese, but I think they appreciated the difficulties of Britain's position and that she had only been compelled by the force of circumstances to accede to the Japanese demand. Nothing could have exceeded the kindness and courtesy shown to me by the merchants and officials whom I met.\n\nNingpo was one of the first five treaty ports, opened to trade in 1842. Early promises had not been fulfilled, and the port, overshadowed by Shanghai, had remained small. Off the mouth of the Ningpo river on the largest island of the Chusan archipelago lay the walled city of Tinghai, occupied by British troops twice for a space of several years between 1840 and 1860. Tinghai at one time was designated, instead of Hongkong, as the place to be ceded to Britain for the repair of vessels. It looks a healthy enough place, built up the slopes of a high hill, yet the troops suffered much from sickness and the stones in the graveyard bear witness to the numbers buried there. The garrison imported some turkeys, to provide variety for the larder. The British troops have long since left, but the climate was favourable to turkeys, and now large flocks descended from the original birds are bred to supply the Christmas market in Shanghai.\n\nIn Ningpo, the graveyard contains the stone monument, first erected outside the East gate of the city, to commemorate the assistance given by Captain Roderick Dew, R.N., and Lieutenant Kenny of the French Navy and their respective ships' companies, in 1862, to the Imperial Chinese troops in expelling the Taiping rebels from the town. It was nearby that the American General Ward, Gordon's predecessor in command of the Ever Victorious army, was killed. But times change. To Dr. Sun Yat Sen and the Kuo Min Tang the Taiping rebels are the glorious forerunners of their own revolution, and it is doubtful whether General Gordon, or the British, are given any credit for having assisted the Imperial Government to quell the rebellion.\n\nThe country round the little Ningpo plain is very beautiful. In previous winters I used to shoot on the shallow lakes which lay amongst the hills to the west. Most sportsmen waited to go after the early morning and evening flights of duck, but I preferred to work along the edge of the hills with my dog for the occasional pheasant. They were not so numerous here as amongst the reedbeds of the Yangtze. Beyond the lakes, the deep waters of Nimrod Sound were", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212417, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 359, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "336\n\nJonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, W.W Norton and Company: $29.95; cloth; 876 pages.\n\nJonathan D. Spence in \"The Search for Modern China” endeavours to facilitate an understanding of China. He says, quite rightly, that \"in trying to understand China today we need to know about China in the past\" (pp. xix-xx). That is why Spence begins his narrative in the late 16th century, when China was ruled by its last native dynasty on the eve of the Manchu conquest.\n\nInterestingly, the Yale historian explains that his book is not about modern China. Rather, it is about a centuries-long effort to create such a country, one which is both integrated and receptive, fairly sure of its own identity yet able to join others on equal terms in the quest for new markets, new technologies, new ideas\" (p.xx).\n\nBy this definition, Spence says, China is not today and never has been a modern country.\n\nCertainly, China in the Qing dynasty was far from being **fairly sure of its own identity yet able to join others on equal terms**. As Spence points out, China did not even have a national flag in its 4,000 years of existence, until one was created in the nineteenth century, when it consciously began to acquire what it thought were the attributes of a modern nation.\n\nAs is to be expected, Spence finds numerous parallels in Chinese history. Thus, he likens General Claire Chennault's World War II \"Flying Tigers\" to the foreign mercenary Ever-Victorious Army formed to fight the Taiping rebels; he sees similarities between Great Leap Forward rhetoric and the vision of Hong Xiuquan, the Taiping Heavenly King, and he compares the Shanghai Communique of 1972 with the Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689.\n\nThis does not mean, of course, that China is unchanging. During the Qing dynasty, for example, China spurned British requests for developing trade. Spence quotes the Qianlong emperor's message to George III of England:\n\n\"We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of your country's manufactures. Therefore, O king,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212775, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 84, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "69\n\nGreen Standard forces and not so about the Lien-chün, we can assume that he was a member of, or attached to one of the Lien-chün.\n\nMesny wrote relatively short explanatory notes in the first volume of his Miscellanies on the three armies, the Army of the Huai River, the Army of the Hsiang River and the Army of Ch'u, about which he felt he had unique knowledge having served with the Chinese military.\n\n'The Huai Army, an important Field Force raised in the area drained by the River Huai, did such good service to the Imperial cause under the C-in-C Li Hung-chang, who had been wise enough to advocate and introduce the use of foreign weapons. The Ever-victorious Army, styled Chang-sheng Chün, first organised and disciplined in a foreign manner by General Ward and subsequently rendered so famous under the command of General Gordon, was the principal corps of this army, and consisted of 5,000 men all told. The Ming-tzu Ying, another corps of the same army, raised by General and later Governor Liu Ming-ch'uan, and disciplined by General Pinel and Colonel Lucas, though senior to the Ever-victorious was, however, secondary in importance at the time' [but still existed when Mesny was writing this in 1895].\n\nAt no time did Mesny allude to a general staff in the sense we understand it today. This raises the question what did the Force have by way of what we now call an operations staff or department? Nor did Mesny refer to staff officers responsible for the organisation of manpower or materials; and although he mentioned procurement officers and a staff of officers surrounding the General commanding to carry out his bidding, 'operations' as such, the most crucial aspect of an army's functioning was kept strictly in the hands of the Szechuan force C-in-C. It would appear that military operations in their wider sense were directed by civil mandarins who were more interested in cost cutting than in the direction of the campaign, whereas the military officers, who grade for grade were very much the juniors to the civil mandarins, were responsible for the day to day running of the various forces.\n\nForward planning was always limited by financial constraints. Arms and ammunition, rations and reinforcements had to be reviewed and planned well in advance, but with the attitude of the Viceroy in Ch'eng-tu [according to Mesny] and the restraints imposed by him little could ever be expected to be achieved.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212792, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 101, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "86\n\nNOTES\n\nIn one of the notes written by Mesny in his Miscellany, [Volume 4 page 34], he listed the various classes and degrees of military rank in what he terms the Chinese Militia Service. A marshal or general was a T'i-tu Chün-men, a lieutenant-general was a Tsung-ping Kuan, a major-general a Fu-chiang; and a colonel a Ts'an-chiang.\n\n2 Mesny gives various totals for the number of battalions serving with the Szechuan Force and in particular with the Ko-i Brigade, with a grand total of thirty-three battalions in the whole Force. These vary from eight to fifteen and a half operating with the Ko-i Brigade. Presumably the explanation lies in the arrival of new battalions to support the Force from time to time, though we are unable to be certain how many battalions were serving at any one particular moment.\n\nMesny states at the beginning of Volume 1 of his Miscellanies that in 1861 General Ward had organised a disciplined force for the Chinese Government, at first locally styled \"Ward's Force\" and later as the 'Ever-victorious Legion'.\n\n4 Mesny later keeps referring to thirty-five battalions.\n\nThe I-ho-t'uan, the \"Patriotic Train Band\", was the official title of the Boxers, of ill-repute.\n\n6 Mesny too had been a member of a train band, the volunteer force in Hankow between 1863-67, under arms several times during the approach of the Nien-fei rebels, when he wore the uniform of the Queen's Western Rifles [sic].\n\n7 Mesny goes into some detail providing recruitment policy, promotion schemes, ranks and titles, training and duties.\n\nUse of the term Disciplined Force was a contemporary fashion. It later became popular to refer to the Lien-chun Ying as Field Forces.\n\n9\n\nMost of the ranks of unit commanders given by Mesny do not tally with those given by Hucker in his Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China.\n\n10 All commanders of divisions and corps had one or more battalions, regiments or brigades, serving a sort of staff brigade and forming the headquarters of that particular army corps. It was popularly designated the Body Guard Battalion or Regiment.\n\nPresumably Han Chinese rebels such as the Huang-hao or the Pai-hao, the remnants of the Taipings or even the Moslem rebels.\n\n12 This is the same title as the Force previously operating under the command of General Gordon during the Taiping Rebellion. Either Mesny has incorrectly recalled the title of the new Force or the new Force continued to bear the former title.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212797, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 106, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "91\n\nHart, Sir Robert [1835-1911]\n\nKnown as the \"I G” [Inspector-General of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs]. His Bureau was the one financial stay and prop, the negotiable asset, the one honestly administered and creditable branch within the Imperial government. He left the British Consular Service in 1861 to join the Customs Service, appointed I G in 1863.\n\nHill, David [1840-1896]\n\nWesleyan missionary stationed in Hankow until 1867. Died of typhus in Hankow. Hill was not only a witness with Griffith John at the re-marriage of William Mesny's brother's widow to E.G. Wilson in October 1884; he was also guardian with William Mesny to John's children.\n\nHung Hsiu-ch'uan ## [1813-1864] a Hakka\n\nLeader of the Taiping Rebellion: believed himself to be entrusted as the brother of Jesus to lead China and destroy the Manchu regime. [There is an inexplicable reference in Mesny's Miscellanies to a daughter 'of Hung?' wishing Mesny to return to Nanking to marry her]\n\nGordon, C G [1833-1885]\n\nAn English officer in the Royal Engineers who commanded the 'Ever-Victorious Army' against the Taiping rebels. He was appreciated by the Ch'ing Imperial government and was the first foreigner to be awarded the prestigious Yellow Riding Jacket. He later helped advise the Chinese during the Ili uprising in the early 1880s. He died in Khartoum during the Mahdi Uprising.\n\nJohn, Griffith [1831-1912]\n\nMissionary, LMS, Hankow 1861-1912. (Hill: q.v.)\n\nPrince Kung: also known as I-hsin [1832-1898]\n\nSixth son of the Tao Kuang emperor and half brother of the Hsien Feng emperor. Probably one of the most important Ch'ing dynasty officials in foreign affairs.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212800, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 109, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "94\n\n[passport) of Prince Su was printed on page 235 of Volume 4 [18 March 1904] of Mesny's Miscellanies.\n\nTseng Kuo-fan [1811-1872]\n\nA Confucian statesman and general who defeated the Taiping rebels in Nanking and put an end to the rebellion. He was first a militia leader, then a Governor-General of the Two Kiang provinces and finally the Imperial Commissioner for the suppression of the Taiping Rebels. Later he became the Imperial Commissioner ordered to suppress the Nien rebellion. He was Viceroy of Chihli in 1869. His Hunan Army provided the Manchu dynasty with a new lease of life.\n\nTso Tsung-t’ang [1812-1885]\n\nAn official who first came to the notice of his emperor when he was an active and successful military officer during the Taiping Rebellion. He was raised to an earldom and up to 1866 earned renown as an administrator in the provinces of Fukien and Chekiang. With his experience during the Taiping Rebellion he was sent to Shensi and Kansu to suppress the Muslim revolt [1862-1873] and, en route, he helped suppress the Nien rebels. He remained Governor General of Shensi and Kansu for many years and later in 1884 he became Governor of Fukien province during the French attack on Foochow and Keelung in Taiwan. He died in Foochow the following year.\n\nWard F T [1831-1862]\n\nAn American mercenary and founder of the 'Ever-Victorious Army', a Sino-foreign military force which aided the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty suppress the Taiping rebellion. He was killed in battle in September 1862 near Ningpo and was at first succeeded by another American, Burgevine, and then by Charles Gordon [q.v.]. Ward married Miss Yang, the daughter of the official banker Yang Ta-Ki, a Tartar. A magnificent mausoleum was erected over his grave in Sungkiang in 1877.\n\nWylie, Alexander [1815-1887]\n\nA missionary and scholar, editor of the Chinese Recorder.\n\nT", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212802, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 111, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "96\n\nCh'in-ch'ai Ta-ch'en ✯✯E : Imperial High Commissioner, a very senior appointment.\n\nEver Victorious Army ET: A European-officered Chinese force of the Imperial Army raised by the American, Ward, which ultimately, under the command of Colonel Gordon, assisted in putting an end to the Taiping Rebellion.\n\nExpectant... (Ho-ju) ✩A : A prefix indicating that an official was qualified and certified to take up duty in the post named.\n\nFan-t'ai #: A provincial treasurer known to foreigners as the Commissioner of Finance; charged with the fiscal or financial administration of a province.\n\nFormosa: The Portuguese name for the island of Taiwan.\n\nHakkas [Ko-chia] ** : One of the southern Chinese ethnic groups said to have migrated from northern China during the Mongol dynasty, ca the thirteenth century AD.\n\nHan-lin Yuan #: The Chinese National Academy, admission to which was the highest literary honour obtainable by a Chinese scholar.\n\nHo-shang : Buddhist monk or priest.\n\nHongkew : Site of the American Settlement in Shanghai, where Mesny later lived.\n\nHsien : Administrative district.\n\nHuang Ma-kua : The Yellow Riding Jacket. A high award from the emperor to his senior officials.\n\nImperial Maritime Customs: Chinese customs service with a foreign inspectorate largely able to control the collection of duties and taxes without the usual Chinese squeeze [q.v.]. Robert Hart became Inspector General in 1863.\n\nJingal (gingal): The Chinese blunderbuss. It was generally fired from a swivel fixed on a wall or wooden post, but sometimes it was fired with", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213402, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 224, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "212\n\nStockholm Statens Etnografiska Museum, 1866\n\nSkrine, CP, Chinese Central Asia, London. Methuen, 1926 (Hong Kong Reprint Oxford University Press)\n\nSladen, Douglas Brooke Wheelton, The Japanese at Home, 5th edition, with Bits of China, London and New York Waid, Lock and Bowden, 1895\n\nSmedley, Agnes, Chinese Destinies - Sketches, New York Vanguard, 1933\n\n- China Correspondent, London Routledge and Kegan. 1934\n\n- Battle Hymn of China, New York Knopf, 1943\n\n+\n\nSmith, Carl T, Chinese Christians Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 1985\n\nSmith, Richard J, Mercenaries and Mandarins: the Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China, New York KTO Press, 1978\n\nSmith, Ronald Bishop, A Projected Portuguese Voyage to China in 1512 and New Notices Relative to Tome Pires in Canton, Bethesda (Maryland) L Decatur Press, 1972\n\nSpence, Jonathan, To Change China: Western Advisers in China 1620-1960, Boston Little Brown, 1969\n\nThe Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci, New York Viking Penguin, 1984\n\nStaunton, Sir George Leonard, An Authentic Account of An Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China, London G Nicol, 1798\n\nStein, Sir Mark Aurel, Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia and Westernmost China. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1921\n\nStern, Simon Adler, Jettings of Travel in China and Japan, Philadelphia Porter and Coates, 1888 (WB11894)\n\nSzczesniak, Boleslaw, The Writings of Michael Boym, Monumenta Serica XIV (1949-55), 481-538\n\nTaylor, Francis, mss (Bodleian Library Ms Rawl D391/95-98) Letters of Francis Taylor to Dr Edward Browne April 25, 1703 off Ancuago on coast of China,\n\nTeignmouth, Henry Noel Shore, (b 1847), The Flight of Lapwing, a Naval Officer's Jottings in China, London Longmans, 1881\n\nThomas, James A, A Pioneer Tobacco Merchant in the Orient, Durham NC Duke University Press, 1928.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214461, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 319, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "286\n\narms Force, and at about this time Ward was strongly praised by Hope,1 the British Admiral who appealed for a large expansion to Ward's force. The eventual force of about 8,000, under a number of foreign officers and several Chinese was, after several very successful battles, named by imperial decree the \"Ever Victorious Army [Ch'ang-sheng Chün].” It was under the overall command of the Governor of Kiangsu province. He was awarded the fourth rank button with peacock feather, though he has also been said to have received the higher imperial award of the Yellow Riding Jacket. At about this time Ward married the daughter of his Shanghai Chinese merchant-patron, Yang Fang. Referred to as Major Ward or General Ward, his rank was immaterial. He was the commander and, in Chinese terminology, commanders in action of forces larger than company level, that is over about one hundred men, were referred to as Chiang-chün, a term translated into English as General.\n\nHe died in Ningpo in September 1862 having been mortally wounded in action at nearby Tz'u-ch'i while reconnoitring by himself and having asked to be buried in the court of the Confucian Temple at Sungkiang, his unthinkable request was granted. He was succeeded for a short time first by another American, Burgevine [of whom more later], and then temporarily by Captain Holland before being finally replaced by Charles Gordon, a British officer in the Royal Engineers. The latter was generally credited by foreigners with the eventual defeat of the Taiping forces. In reality, by the time of Ward's death the corner had already been turned by the much larger Imperial forces under Li Hung-chang, supported by the Ever Victorious Army and other similar small units of foreign led Chinese, and within a short time they, together with British [a brigade of some two and a half thousand men under Brigadier-General Charles Staveley] and French forces, had the Taiping in retreat. Harry Franck, the American traveller of the 1920s, explained probably quite accurately that \"Gordon did the least of the work and won most of the credit for the 'Ever Victorious Army'.\"\n\nFranck retold a legend that \"Ward had planned, in case the Trent affair [during the US civil war] resulted in war with England, to seize British warships and merchantmen in Chinese waters. He had converted his large possessions into cash and negotiable securities, which disappeared when he was killed. An English officer last seen with him was accused of the theft, and there were long proceedings in the U.S. Consular Court in Shanghai.”", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214462, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 320, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "287\n\nWard was buried on his old drill-field near the Temple of Confucius just within the walls of the city of Sungkiang [Songjiang: pinyin], the prefectural capital of the area now dominated by Shanghai, and the city around which much of his military service with the Ever Victorious Army took place. Harry Franck2 visited the site in 1923 and wrote that “the Chinese built a temple of remembrance over his grave, similar to those built by Chinese for their famous men over the centuries, though unlike the majority with their gleaming yellow roof tiles his was a pathetic little gray-walled enclosure, covered with ordinary tiles, in an open space inside the West Gate, littered here and there with graves and unburied coffins. It was not imposing yet it was several times more so than the tomb the adventurer would probably have had in Massachusetts. Though the temple was but a single-room building, it had an altar with the spirit tablet of Ward, and all the other features of a Chinese temple, and now and again Chinese still come to burn incense and bow down before their hero of Taiping days. A conspicuous tablet in red and black tells those who know their Chinese that:\n\nAn illustrious man from beyond the seas, he came 6000 li to accomplish great deeds and acquire immortal fame by shedding his noble blood. Because of him Sungkiang will be a happy land for a thousand autumns”.\n\nFranck tells us that the temple was not badly kept, as things went in China. There were some trees and flowers in season, inside the compound, and the whole place has been recently repaired and repainted. Rice-straw and cabbages were drying on everything but the altar itself, and the woman caretaker had gone to market to \"buy things\" leaving her small son locked inside. The only foreign hint about the place was an unfinished stone recently set up by the \"Frederick Ward Post of the American Legion\" of Shanghai. He added that the most touching feature of the whole memorial was the mound of earth, like a common Chinese grave, behind the temple, but within the enclosure, under which Ward's big mastiff was buried. After his master's death, the story goes, the dog refused to take food and went wandering about looking for him until it died of starvation.\n\nSo, having seen an early photograph of the official temple,3 altar and tablet dedicated to Ward in Sungkiang some dozen or so years previously, I was determined to see for myself whether it still existed", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214466, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 324, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "秋\n\nThe altar of the temple-tomb of Frederick Ward, American organizer of the \"Ever Victorious Army\" of Taiping days\n\n291", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216036, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 335, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "269\n\nthe time ripe for an insurrection..\n\nThe rebellion began among the Hakka people in the southern provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong and by 1853 was spreading north and west, led by Hong Xiuquan, a schoolmaster who had picked up a smattering of Christianity. Whilst suffering from an illness he experienced severe hallucinations and saw that his mission was to free the Chinese from Manchu rule. He also convinced himself and others that he was the younger brother of Christ and a son of God sent to save mankind. The Taiping rebels were known colloquially by the Chinese peasants as the Long-haired Rebels, Chang Mao, as they refused to shave the front of their head. [China's Manchu conquerors had ordered that all Chinese males would shave the front half of their head and wear the rest tied into a lengthy queue or 'pigtail'.] Hong Xiuquan's liberated territory was known as the Kingdom of Great Peace, Taiping Tianguo and by 1860 he had more than a quarter of China under his control. Much of the fighting between the Manchu Imperial forces and the Taiping rebel armies took place across Zhejiang province and down the Yangzi, especially around the Taiping capital at Nanjing. With Zhenjiang captured by the Taiping in April 1853 [a mere eleven years after the British had taken the city], their control of the southern bank of the Yangzi was virtually complete. Zhenjiang lay deserted during the Taiping era, being no more than a fort occupied by the Taiping rebels. The pagodas and temples were all destroyed with the usual Taiping iconoclastic fervour, and in many places their stones used as fortifications. The city, surrounded on three sides by a remarkable line of Taiping trenches some ten to eleven miles in length, was besieged several times by the Imperial forces. Each time they were driven off, with the city remaining in Taiping hands until compelled by a failure of supplies the rebels were forced to evacuate it early in 1857. Zhenjiang never fully recovered. The Taiping were finally defeated in 1864 when their capital at Nanjing finally fell to the Imperial forces - assisted by several foreign-led armies of Chinese and western mercenaries, one of which was the Ever-Victorious Army under General Gordon. Rasmussen in 1905 refers to the decayed trench system as 'Gordon's trenches', with some of his guns still to be found sunk deep into the soil of their old embrasures. He added that 'the only reminder now [1905] of the Taiping Rebellion was the thousands of graves covering the countryside, and the ghost-ridden walled city where the whole population had been put to the sword'. Thomas Adkins, the British Consul in Zhenjiang,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216060, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 359, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "293\n\nwas a young man of twenty just starting his lifelong career in China. In his Miscellanies he described how on his arrival at Hankou commanding the sailing lorcha, Hailong Wang [the Dragon King], he was paid off by the owners, the Mc Twins, who offered him a job as superintendent builder of a large hong [company office/warehouse] they intended erecting on the Bund. He accepted - as the Hailong Wang was laid up. However, as he actually wished to return to Shanghai to marry a local maiden, Zhu Wenjing, he took leave and in one statement he claimed that he sailed aboard the Huguang, a new beam-engine paddlewheel river steamer on her maiden voyage.\" In another he explained that he had left Hankou at the end of 1862 in charge of a cargo boat which was captured by the Taipings. This occurred when, having called at Zhenjiang on 1st or 3rd of November 1862 [his accounts vary], he was on his way to Shanghai in charge of a cargo boat, and was captured, with his crew, by the Taiping rebels, midstream, at Fu Shan Zhen. Mesny's colourful description of his time with the Taipings began with him being brought in chains before a senior Taiping who ordered him to ketou [kowtow]. Mesny wrote that he refused and that he only bowed to God. ‘So do we', cried the Taiping, and promptly ordered Mesny's release. Mesny continued his tale describing how the Senior Taiping had dined Mesny and offered him his daughter in marriage and the command of a Taiping vessel with the rank of vice-admiral. In another version elsewhere in his Miscellanies Mesny claimed to have been wounded twice during the capture and was at first badly treated by his captors. But once the Taiping discovered that he could play Chinese tunes on his four-octave flutina, their behaviour entirely altered. On a more credible note he was required to write to his employers in Shanghai demanding 100,000 Spanish Carolus dollars ransom.\n\nMesny was puzzled at the time why various senior Taiping officials should have vied to hold him their captive. It later transpired that at first these officials had not appreciated the power and capabilities of the foreign-led Chinese force [meaning the Ever-Victorious Army] sent against them; and when they did the Taiping officials' first act was to obtain and hold foreigners to prevent the violent wrath of the foreign-led force being brought down on them. One of the foreigners Mesny saw momentarily, also in Taiping hands, was Frank Phillip de la Cour, another Jerseyman, who had been taken whilst shipping arms.\n\nHaving managed to send a secret message to Shanghai that he was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]