[
    {
        "id": 207378,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 146,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "138\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n86 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training;\" also Yang-wu yün-tung [The “foreign matters\" movement] (Shanghai, 1961), 3: 463, 469, 492, 599, 613, etc.\n\n87 IWSM, TC 22: 12-13b; 23: 42-43.\n\n88 See the IWSM references cited in note 85. Pennell became fully sinicized, shaving his head, changing to Chinese clothing, learning Chinese, marrying a Chinese, and finally petitioning to be registered as a native of Ho-fei, Anhwei. Mesny, too, was attracted by Chinese civilization, thus reinforcing the persistent notion of barbarian \"transformation\". See especially the memorial by Wu Tang and Ch'ung-shih in 1870 requesting that Mesny be advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (ts'an-chiang) and awarded the peacock feather for his efforts against the Miao. This memorial was in many respects a replica of Hsueh Huan's request for similar awards to be granted to Ward in 1862.\n\n89 Examples in IWSM and WCSL abound. See also Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System,\" esp. 264-265; John Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 50. Traditional attitudes were, of course, reinforced by the examination system. One of the topics for the metropolitan examinations in 1880 was the following quotation: \"By indulgent treatment of men from a distance they are brought to resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of the states, the whole empire is brought to revere him.\" Cited in the North-China Herald, May 18, 1880.\n\n90 See, for example, WCSL 101: 9; 129: 17.\n\n91 See especially K. C. Liu, \"The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,\" HJAS, 30 (1970); David Pong, \"Confucian Patriotism and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877,\" Modern Asian Studies, 7.4 (1973).\n\n**\n\n92 For a discussion of the concept of r'i-chih, see Immanuel Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).\n\n93 See Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1940) and Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, 1951).\n\n94 See, for example, Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1965); Noboru Umetani, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n95 What differed was China's international situation. China had to endure far more political, economic and military pressure from the European powers than either the United States or Japan in the nineteenth century.\n\n96 The great majority of Japanese military employees in the latter half of the nineteenth century neither became Japanese subjects nor accepted Japanese culture. See, for example, Presseisen, 112.\n\n97 See the discussion in Smith, \"Foreign-Training.\"",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207640,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 28,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n13\n\niron factories and built many steamships. She has changed to the use of Western weapons. [...] Perhaps she is merely planning for self-protection. But if Japan seeks only self-protection, she is nevertheless oppressing and looking down on our China. Should not China plan for herself?\"5\n\n6\n\nThe outcome of the Sino-Japanese War perhaps causes us to cast the \"success\" of Japan and the \"failure\" of China in too sharp relief. But Cohen's protests to the contrary, modernization is a horserace. It involves the notion of catching up, or at least maintaining competitive presence. And nowhere is the race more evident than in military affairs. Yet curiously, very little attention has been given to the military as a perspective from which to view the comparative modernization of China and Japan. This is especially surprising in light of the importance attached to military reform by modernizers in both countries, the common threat posed to each by Western imperialism, and the same basic access to foreign military technology and assistance in the nineteenth century. This research note, based on my own preliminary investigations, suggests two tentative conclusions: First, that Japan's modernizing advantages in the military sphere on the eve of the Western encounter do not explain her military \"success\" in the Meiji period;7 and second, that the modernizing implications of Japan's successful military reforms, and the relative \"failure\" of China's, extend well beyond the sphere of military affairs.\n\nFour main stages have been identified with the responses of China and Japan to the Western \"impact”: (1) Recognition of Western military superiority; (2) recognition of Western scientific technology as the basis of military superiority; (3) recognition of the need to train native personnel in Western military technology; and (4) recognition that scientific technology in the military sphere is merely part of Western science and technology in general, and that in order to develop it, the pure science and general learning of the West also had to be introduced. These phases unfolded relatively slowly in China, while in Japan they occurred almost simultaneously.\n\nA common feature of the effort to achieve national strength and self-sufficiency in both China and Japan was the employment of foreigners in military affairs. This policy, which entailed certain obvious risks, brought substantial benefits to Japan in the Meiji period, as Ernst Presseisen has indicated. In China, however,",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207648,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 36,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n21\n\nvernment was, in Perkins' words, \"an almost unbelievably weak [financial] instrument.\"\n\nEven if the Ch'ing government had been moved to undertake more fundamental military reform, China's transition to modernity would have been painful; but without such reform, it was virtually impossible.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang Tao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4.\n\n2 Ibid.; see also 148-149.\n\n3 Thomas Kennedy, \"Self-Strengthening: An Analysis Based on Some Recent Writings,” Ching-shih wen-t'i, 3.1 (November, 1974), 27.\n\n4 Cohen, 149.\n\n5 Quoted in S. Y. Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839-1923 (New York, 1966), 109.\n\n6 See, for example, William Lockwood, \"Japan's Response to the West: The Contrast With China,\" World Politics, 9.1 (October, 1956); Marion Levy, \"Contrasting Factors in the Modernization of China and Japan,\" Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2 (October, 1953); Marion Levy, \"Some Structural Problems of Modernization and High Modernization: China and Japan,\" Proceedings of the Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East (1962); Allan Cole, \"Contrasting Modernization in China and Japan,\" Ch'ung-chi hsieh-pao, 4.2 (May, 1965); E.O. Reischauer, “Modernization in Nineteenth-Century China and Japan,\" Japan Quarterly, 10.3 (July-September, 1963), etc. A partial exception is the fine article by John K. Fairbank, et al., entitled \"The Influence of Modern Western Science and Technology on Japan and China,\" Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, 7 (1954).\n\n7 Two of the most obvious advantages were, of course, Japan's greater and more immediate awareness of the Western military challenge (a product of geography and historical timing), and the military orientation and ethos (bushido) of the Japanese elite, as compared to the civil orientation and ethos (wen-te) of the Chinese elite. Other factors were also important, including the absence of opium smoking among Japanese officers and the rank and file, which again contrasts so markedly with the case in China. See Jonathan Spence, \"Opium Smoking in Ch'ing China,\" in Frederic Wakeman, Jr., and Carolyn Grant, eds., Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, 1975).\n\n8 See Fairbank, et al., \"The Influence,\" 192-194, esp. 193.\n\n9 Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1955), 139.\n\n10 See Richard J. Smith, Ward, Gordon and the Ever-Victorious Army: Foreign Assistance and Military Modernization in Nineteenth Century China (manuscript).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208329,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 53,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n59 Ibid. (Wang), 8.\n\n37\n\n60 Ibid. Wang notes that branch schools of the Tientsin Military Academy were established at Shan-hai-kuan and Wei-hai-wei.\n\n61 Ibid., citing LWCK, Memorials, 74: 25.\n\n62 Ibid., 8-9.\n\n63 Ibid., 7. On Li's financial difficulties, consult Wang, Hual-chin, 275-290; Spector, chapter 7.\n\n64 Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang,\" 9-12. The major problems, according to Wang, were: (1) The administrators of the academy were not well suited to their tasks (non-specialists); (2) the foreign instructors were arrogant, overpaid, unappreciative, and remiss in their teaching responsibilities; (3) heavy reliance on interpreters was inefficient and confusing; and (4) both academic and practical training tended to degenerate into formalism. Other problems included capricious grading, reports of cheating, and shortages and lack of standardization in equipment. For problems in China's other military and naval schools, consult Ayers, 108-113, 179-180, and John Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), passim.\n\n65 Rawlinson, 163, 169; Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression (Tucson, 1965), 140-141; NCH, September 21, 1894.\n\n66 For a summary of the fighting on land and sea, consult Liu and Smith, \"The Military Challenge.\"\n\n**\n\n67 See, for example, E. Bujac, Précis de quelques campagnes contemporaines (Paris, 1896), vol. 2; N.W.H. Du Boulay, An Epitome of the China-Japanese War, 1894-95 (London, 1896); Lieutenant Sauvage, La guerre Sino-Japonaise 1894-1895 (Paris, 1897); Richard Wallach, \"The War in the East,\" Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, 21, 4 (1895); T. A. Brassey, ed., The Naval Annual (Portsmouth, 1895); Vladimir (pseudonym for Zenone Volpicelli), The China-Japan War (London, 1896).\n\n68 On the Japanese response to the war, see Donald Keene, \"The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,\" in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971); also Jeffery Dorwart, The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (Amherst, Mass., 1975), 94-96.\n\n69 Professor Samuel Chu of Ohio State University is currently studying the Chinese response to the war, and has produced several illuminating but as yet unpublished papers on the subject. For the time being, the best available discussion of Chinese attitudes is Kuo Sung-p'ing, \"The Chinese Reaction to Foreign Encroachment\" (unpublished dissertation, Columbia University, 1953).\n\n70 See Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's critique, cited in Joseph Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), 111; consult also Kuo, 49-50, 81-83, etc.\n\n71 Cited in Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1928, translated and edited by S. Y. Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton, Toronto, London and New York, 1956). See also Japanese Imperial General Staff, eds., History of the War between Japan and China (Tokyo, 1904), 1; 30-32.\n\n72 Rawlinson, 190.\n\n73 Liu Feng-han, \"Chia-wu chan-cheng shuang-fang ping-li ti fen-hsi,\" Chung-kuo i-chou, 829 (March 14, 1966) and 830 (March 21, 1966); CJCC,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593",
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