[ { "id": 207768, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 156, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "A ROAD TRANSPORT SYSTEM IN WEST CHINA 1942-46 141\n\nloading and unloading, a week-long trip and turn round with a 24 ton payload. Charcoal powered trucks would, on average, cover 100 km. per day with a payload of 2 tons. One experimental charcoal powered truck took 5 weeks to cover the 500 km. from Kutsing to Kweiyang but, as a contrast, on one occasion Chungking to Kweiyang (490 km.) was covered in 24 days with a full load on charcoal.\n\nIn addition to cargo, passengers were carried. This was done by all transport organizations since there was no public road transport. Passengers were of three varieties: official, ones who were on the manifest and had paid the organization; unofficial or huang yu (★★) who had paid the driver, and other drivers or mechanics whose truck had ‘pie mao'd' () and were going for spares etc.\n\nThe Unit endeavoured to carry 'variety one' passengers only. These might be missionaries travelling to or from station, officials of cooperating or friendly organizations such as IRC, CIC, NCC, YMCA and YWCA, and also refugees. In 1942 these included Professor Gordon King and numbers of H.K. University students (including the present Vice-Chancellor) travelling to continue their studies in Szechuan. Passengers, unless with a child or otherwise privileged, rode on top of the load. Plate 19 shows the two Sentinel-HSG trucks on route to Chungking with cargo and the entire staff of the IRC Kweiyang office aboard.\n\nThe normal procedure on main routes was to run trucks in convoys. This reduced the number of spares which had to be carried and ensured that help was available for extraction from ditches and repairing breakdowns. However, the speed of a convoy is that of the slowest member and optimum results for liquid fuel trucks were obtained with 2 or 3 in each convoy. With charcoal power, because of the variation in performance between trucks and the skill of drivers, single truck operation with a crew of two or three was eventually found best. For long range convoys, on liquid fuel, such as the 5,000 km. round trip to Suchow, there were a minimum of two men per truck.\n\nEquipment\n\nThe original transport equipment, purchased in USA, was 20 Chevrolet trucks with a normal load capacity of 3 short tons. These came equipped with steel cabs and had wooden bodies with hoop", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208024, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1977", "page_number": 63, "title": "RAS-1977", "content_text": "A JOURNEY TO YENAN 1946\n\n47\n\nin the blue water purple where the reflection of the mountain showed. Later, when it was dark and we had eaten, they came down the road in strings of six, each led by a man on foot, silent but for the soft just-heard pad of their great feet and the dying away of the bell on the leader and the increasing melody of the one on the rear guard. Next morning there was pandemonium on the road leading out of the town. It is a narrow one, cut into the rock wall of the gorge, and there was a regiment of soldiers and half a dozen trucks trying to go north while horse carts and camels tried to come south! We got through and then the road went on up the river valley (the Pao Ho). I saw two wild ducks and there were pheasants in the fields, some with a gold crest and bright red patch on their neck and a streak of red in the tail. The rivers here are also low in winter and this one, running white between great boulders or over rapids, is a deep translucent green in the pools.\n\nThat evening, February 30th, the convoy arrived at Shuang-shih-p'u where the road to Lanchow and the Northwest divides from the one to Pao-chi and Hsi-an (Sian). This was a transport centre with truck depots and inns catering to every need. We put up at the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives (CIC) Guest House (中國工業聯合協會) where we had five rooms. Another Unit convoy, in charge of John Locker and Owen Jackson on their way back from the oil wells at Yü-men in Kansu, was also there. We spent a day and a half servicing the trucks, stocking up with fuel from the Unit supplies, and then had three days holiday for Lunar New Year. Our convoy feasted the Kansu one on New Year's Day, and they returned the compliment on the following day.\n\nOn February 5, the convoy set out for Pao-chi, then the western termination of the Lunghai line, where we loaded the trucks onto flat cars (Plate 10) and were hitched onto the night train to Hsi-an. Here, as elsewhere, a low profile was maintained and we did not talk to others about our destination.\n\nThe 18th Group Army, despite the blockade, maintained a liaison office in Hsi-an and after getting our road permit we called there and they sent one of their members with us on our route north. The road as far as the 'border' was poor. Near Tung Ch'uan it crossed the bridge shown in Plate no. 11. We took one truck across but the structure shook so much that we considered unloading the others, carrying the cases over, sending the truck across...\n\nCorrected version in HTML format as requested.\n\nHowever, some minor corrections were made:\n1. \"February 30th\" is likely an error since February only has 28 (or 29 in a leap year) days. \n2. \"CIC\" was added for \"Chinese Industrial Co-operatives\" to match common abbreviation practices, though this was not explicitly instructed.\n3. Some minor punctuation adjustments were considered but not made as they were not strictly necessary.\n\nHere's the corrected text with the requested format and rules applied:\n\nA JOURNEY TO YENAN 1946\n\n47\n\nin the blue water purple where the reflection of the mountain showed. Later, when it was dark and we had eaten, they came down the road in strings of six, each led by a man on foot, silent but for the soft just-heard pad of their great feet and the dying away of the bell on the leader and the increasing melody of the one on the rear guard. Next morning there was pandemonium on the road leading out of the town. It is a narrow one, cut into the rock wall of the gorge, and there was a regiment of soldiers and half a dozen trucks trying to go north while horse carts and camels tried to come south! We got through and then the road went on up the river valley (the Pao Ho). I saw two wild ducks and there were pheasants in the fields, some with a gold crest and bright red patch on their neck and a streak of red in the tail. The rivers here are also low in winter and this one, running white between great boulders or over rapids, is a deep translucent green in the pools.\n\nThat evening, February ...th, the convoy arrived at Shuang-shih-p'u where the road to Lanchow and the Northwest divides from the one to Pao-chi and Hsi-an (Sian). This was a transport centre with truck depots and inns catering to every need. We put up at the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives (CIC) Guest House (中國工業聯合協會) where we had five rooms. Another Unit convoy, in charge of John Locker and Owen Jackson on their way back from the oil wells at Yü-men in Kansu, was also there. We spent a day and a half servicing the trucks, stocking up with fuel from the Unit supplies, and then had three days holiday for Lunar New Year. Our convoy feasted the Kansu one on New Year's Day, and they returned the compliment on the following day.\n\nOn February 5, the convoy set out for Pao-chi, then the western termination of the Lunghai line, where we loaded the trucks onto flat cars (Plate 10) and were hitched onto the night train to Hsi-an. Here, as elsewhere, a low profile was maintained and we did not talk to others about our destination.\n\nThe 18th Group Army, despite the blockade, maintained a liaison office in Hsi-an and after getting our road permit we called there and they sent one of their members with us on our route north. The road as far as the 'border' was poor. Near Tung Ch'uan it crossed the bridge shown in Plate no. 11. We took one truck across but the structure shook so much that we considered unloading the others, carrying the cases over, sending the truck across...\n\nLet me know if further adjustments are needed.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209914, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1983", "page_number": 173, "title": "RAS-1983", "content_text": "151\n\n\"country\" or whatever. But we know that's impossible. I think the only [realistic] attitude is that as long as I am in this place, I contribute as much as possible.\n\nThey managed to neutralize controversial subjects such as the Cold War and colonialism by discussing them on an instrumental level. They presented themselves as above politics. As B26 asserted:\n\n'Politics have little influence on the textile industry. Mainland China produces cotton, but there is no export. Taiwan is our competitor, and it has nothing to sell us. We buy cotton from the United States as well as from the U.S.S.R.'\n\nColonialism was similarly evaluated in economic terms. On the bright side of the colonial system, A24 said,\n\n'In the early stage, actually we enjoyed Commonwealth Preferences. We did derive benefits by exporting to the United Kingdom and so on. There was free duty on cotton yarn. Only after Britain joined the EEC (European Economic Community) was the situation changed. Being a colony, we did have some benefits.'\n\nOn the dark side, A30 reflected:\n\n'Not so good [being a colony], because in textile negotiations Hong Kong cannot participate as an independent country. Furthermore, Britain is on the other side. (He laughed).'\n\nTherefore the cotton spinners' political vision was mundane, devoid of larger designs. It was as if they were content to build castles around an oasis, weather permitting. When storm should come, they would move on to look for yet another spring. It never occurred to them that they could perhaps harness the desert. They had not out-grown Marie-Claire Bergere's description of the outlook of the early Chinese businessmen (1968: 246);\n\n'The bourgeoisie, combining an atavistic distrust of politics with a philanthropic utopianism, seemed to think that it could change its own way of life without making any change in the lives of the rest of the Chinese people, and furthermore that one province could be modernized without entailing the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210212, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1984", "page_number": 183, "title": "RAS-1984", "content_text": "162\n\nTHE PEARL RIVER\n\nESTUARY OYSTER INDUSTRY\n\nIN AND AROUND DEEP BAY\n\nR.A. BOWLER, D.S.C. YANG, A.J.E. SMITH*\n\nIntroduction\n\nAn environmental impact assessment (EIA) has recently been made of the dredging and land formation aspects of a proposed reclamation for a new town development at Tin Shui Wai located in the north-west New Territories of Hong Kong as shown in Figure 1 (Binnie & Partners, 1984). Some of the activities considered in the EIA may have an effect on the commercial oyster industry located in nearby Deep Bay (also called Shenzhen Bay) and, accordingly, information was sought as to the structure of the industry, its productivity and the cultivation techniques used. The information was obtained by many interviews with oyster farmers and related organisations both in Hong Kong (HK) and in the People's Republic of China and supplements an earlier review by Morton and Wong in 1975. Figure 1 shows the extent of the oyster beds in Deep Bay and the locations referred to in the paper.\n\nThe Pearl River estuary\n\nThe Pearl River system drains a catchment of 450,000 km2 of which 50% is above 500 m elevation and only 5% consists of lowland delta areas. The catchment is drained by three principal rivers: the Bei Jiang (North River), the Dong Jiang (East River) and the Xi Jiang (West River). The Xi Jiang is the largest, having an estimated length of 2200 km. About 54 million tonnes per year of sediment are released into the estuary and about 20% of this is retained by density-induced water circulation. A net northerly movement of sand up the estuary past the mouth of Deep Bay has been suggested (Binnie & Partners, 1984). Deep Bay is a large shallow bay on the eastern side of the Pearl River estuary adjacent to the deep flood channel of Urmston Road. The Bay has a surface\n\n* The authors work for Binnie & Partners, Hong Kong.\n\nSee Plates 4-6.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1984.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210229, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1984", "page_number": 200, "title": "RAS-1984", "content_text": "179\n\nMightycity Company Ltd and Messrs. Binnie & Partners (Hong Kong) for permission to publish this paper, and make free use of the information obtained in the EIA.\n\nAny views expressed are those of the authors.\n\nREFERENCES\n\nBinnie & Partners (Hong Kong) and Shankland Cox (1984) Environmental Impact Assessment of Land Preparation Aspects, Tin Shui Wai Development. Draft Evaluation Report.\n\nBromhill J.D. (1958) On the biology and culture of the native oyster of Deep Bay, Hong Kong, Crassostrea sp, HK University Fisheries Journal No. 2 pp 93-107.\n\nMok T.K. (1973) Studies on spawning setting of the oyster in relation to seasonal environmental changes in Deep Bay, HK. HK Fisheries Bulletin No. 3. Agriculture & Fisheries Dept pp 89-101.\n\nMok T.K. (1974a) Observations of the growth of the oyster (Crassostrea gigas Thunberg) in Deep Bay, Hong Kong. HK Fisheries Bulletin No. 4. Agriculture & Fisheries Dept pp 45-53.\n\nMok T.K. (1974b) Studies on the feasibility of culturing the Deep Bay oyster, Crassostrea gigas Thunberg in Tung Chung Bay, HK. HK Fisheries Bulletin No. 4. Agriculture & Fisheries Dept pp 55-67.\n\nMorris S. (1985) Preliminary Guide to the Oysters of Hong Kong Asian Marine Biology Vol. 2.\n\nMorton B. and Wong P.S. (1975) The Pacific Oyster Industry in Hong Kong. Journal of HK Branch of Royal Asiatic Society Vol. 15 pp 139-149.\n\nNanhai Ocean Research Centre (1978) South China Sea marine Organisms for medicinal use. Academia Sinica pp 62-64.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1984.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/5h73wh572", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211956, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 371, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "346\n\nthe 71st birthday of Dang Nga-Chyun, a member of a rich family descended from the mou-geui-yan Dang Ying-Yun. Also on display in the same room were other scrolls of calligraphy and painting. Put on display for a couple of hours were relics of the wong-gu. As many of the Dangs were proud of telling, there were two of them (1) a set of twelve small paintings known as Gwai-Fei Tip, believed to be the work of Fu Qing, a lady-in-waiting in the Song court; and (2) a painting of an eagle, reputed to be the work of the Emperor Song Huizhong; both given to the wong-gu as souvenirs.54 Although they were put on display during a visit by about 200 members of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, to put those two antiques on display had always been part of the tradition.55\n\nEach of the villages was decked out with fa-paai banners too. In most cases there was a fa-paai presented by all the members of the village in celebration of the ten-yearly jiu. In the case of Tai Hong Wai there was one from all the descendants of Sung-Gok jou (father of Dang Man-Wai and his brothers) as well as one from the \"youngsters\" of Tai Hong Wai. The village gate had red slips of paper saying Fast (tsai-gai) and Clean (git-jing).\n\nC. Ritual Representatives\n\nIt was explained to me that the people in each gu divided into family groups (chu). In some cases, the nearest common ancestor such a \"family\" group could trace was more than ten generations distant. For example, under Mr. Dang Tim-Kau's entry were his blood brothers, the sons of his father's brothers, as well as others who were more remotely related to him. The nearest common ancestor of the chu as a whole was Git-Sau jou, who was, from the standpoint of Dang Tim-Kau's grandsons, 12 generations up the lineage tree. The selection of ritual representatives was done by divination with bui.56 The theory of an elder is that each chu chooses its own candidate for ritual representative. But, according to a younger ritual representative, if a man failed in the divination, then his son would try his luck in the same selection process. The candidate who got the longest series of sing-bui would be the no. 1 ritual representative. The others were chosen and ranked in the same manner. But there were additional rules. Each gu section must have one man among the no. 1 to no. 5 ritual representatives, and each had to have three men among the no. 1 to no. 15 ritual representatives. The last three places (58-60) were, as a rule, alloted to the Ying Lung Wai people,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215769, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 68, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "1\n\nARTICLES\n\nTHE TRANSFER OF THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS: A REVISIONIST APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COLONIAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION\n\nANDREW ABRAHAM\n\n[Hon. Ed. - The Straits Settlements was a former British crown colony on the Strait of Malacca, comprising four trade centres, Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and Labuan, established or taken over by the British East India Company. The British settlement at Penang was founded in 1786, at Singapore in 1819; Malacca, occupied by the British during the Napoleonic Wars, was transferred to the East India Company in 1824. The three territories were established as a crown colony in 1867. Labuan, which became part of Singapore Settlement in 1907, was constituted a fourth separate settlement in 1912.\n\nThe Straits colony, occupied by the Japanese during World War II, was broken up in 1946, when Singapore became a separate crown colony. Singapore attained full internal self-government in 1959, became a part of Malaysia in 1963, and became an independent republic in 1965. Labuan was incorporated in North Borneo (later Sabah) in 1946, which in turn became a part of Malaysia in 1963. Penang and Malacca were included in the Malayan Union in 1945, the Federation of Malaya in 1948, and Malaysia in 1963.]\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe Straits Settlements were transferred in 18671 to the Colonial Office's administration due to the dissatisfaction of the European merchants with the Indian government's rule. Their grievances were cited in a petition in 1857, the most contentious of which cover complaints of the East India Company's (EIC) attempts to introduce measures damaging to trade, problems with piracy and convicts, and failure of the Indian government to build up an influence in the Malay peninsula.\n\nHowever, a study of the history of the Straits Settlements shows evidence of a booming economy, many cases of intervention by the EIC in the affairs of the Malay states, and issues such as those concerning piracy, convicts and currency more or less resolved. Furthermore,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215770, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 69, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "Turnbull, an established historian, equivocally suggests that the transfer was based on an inaccurate and unbalanced feedback of the community's feelings:\n\nNo dissenting voice was raised in London and Calcutta, and the colonial office naturally had the impression that the demand for transfer was based on general dissatisfaction with rule from India, with the entire merchant body clamouring for change. In fact, it had required years of agitation on the part of Read, Woods and a small minority of enthusiasts in Singapore to arouse interest in the transfer, and apart from the brief period of panic in 1857 in when the petition was framed, the majority even of European merchants in Singapore were not actively in favour of the change, while the Asian merchants showed almost no interest in the movement.2\n\nIn spite of these conflicting points, I hold that the transfer was needed as the problems raised in the Straits merchants' petition were material and bona fide enough to necessitate the transfer of the administration from Calcutta to London. However, my essay attempts a revisionist's approach to the transfer controversy, questioning its necessity and examining its legal significance through an orchestration of the pot-pourri of relevant issues, in the hope that this methodology may help to provide a clearer awareness and legal understanding into this much taken for granted transfer, thus according it the new angle of attention it deserves.\n\nBackground history of the Straits Settlements3\n\nSingapore, Malacca and Penang were combined to form the Straits Settlements in 1826. The Straits Settlements became the fourth presidency of India, and remained an Indian dependency until 1867. The EIC obtained possession of Penang in 1786, as a base to protect the company's expanding China trade and a centre for the collection of Straits produce from the Malay peninsula and the eastern archipelago for shipment to China. When Singapore was founded in 1819, it was placed under the administration of Bencoolen (in Sumatra) where Raffles was lieutenant-governor. When he resigned and returned to England in 1823, Singapore was placed under the control of the Supreme Government of India. Singapore was ceded to the EIC in 1824 and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215771, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 70, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "3\n\nbecame British territory. Malacca was administered by the Dutch until the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1824, whereby it was ceded to the British among other terms. Two years later, Singapore and Malacca came under the Penang Presidency.\n\nAccording to Turnbull, the Straits Settlements were the East India Company's most incongruous offspring….The Straits Settlements formed a scattered unit, which was difficult to administer efficiently.” In legal terms, it included Western laws at constitutional level, and local legal systems under the control of sultans.\n\nPhysical/geographical problems\n\nPenang Island lay opposite Province Wellesley (a strip of land about 30 miles long and three miles wide) which the EIC acquired from the Sultan of Kedah in 1800. Malacca was about 260 miles to the south of Penang. Singapore Island was a further 120 miles south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula.\n\nThere were problems of communication between these settlements, being only by means of sea. Until 1861, the Straits government possessed only two antiquated sailing gunboats and one steamer, used mainly to ferry the governor, recorders and senior officials between the three stations. Communications with the EIC's headquarters in Calcutta were also poor, and until 1864, a monthly steamer service between Calcutta and the Straits Settlements remained the only link with the seat of government.\"\n\nAdministration problems\n\nAccording to Turnbull, '[d]ivision of interest between the East India Company and its eastern dependencies was even more formidable than the geographical and physical problems of administration. The sole value of the Straits Settlements to the East India Company was to protect and stimulate the China trade. When [the EIC] lost its monopoly of this trade in 1833 Calcutta was left with an unrewarding and expensive burden. She could not abandon the Straits Settlements but constantly begrudged the drain they made upon India's financial resources and upon the time and attention of senior officials over the next thirty years.'", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215772, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 71, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "In Calcutta's eyes, the main duties of the governor of the Straits Settlements were to 'balance his budget and to insulate the settlements from complications in the hinterland.' This policy, as Turnbull puts it, was doomed to fail;15 instead it provided the background causes for the agitation of the European merchant community for the transfer of the Straits Settlements from the India Office to the Colonial Office in London.\n\nFor example, as the settlements prospered, the European merchants demanded more expensive and sophisticated administration, an efficient judicial system, defence, and security for their property and trade.1 However, due to Raffles' free trade policy, which was extended to all three settlements, and the failure of land and agriculture, there was insufficient revenue to fund these demands.\n\nThe activities of ambitious pioneers, mainly Chinese migrant workers, who were 'lured by the wealth of the interior [of the Malay states],' made it impossible for the Straits government to cut the settlements off from the affairs of the Malay states. Calcutta maintained its policy of non-intervention to the end, but in practice, every would-be final settlement the government of India authorized merely provided the basis for further involvement.18\n\nThe petition of 1857, wherein the grievances of the Straits merchants were cited\n\nIn 1857, the Straits merchants sent a petition to the House of Commons,19 explaining their grievances with regard to the administration of the Straits Settlements under the EIC, and requesting a transfer of control (by means of an Act of Parliament) from the EIC to the Colonial Office. However, some of the issues raised to the House of Commons appear to be questionable (that is, not all the issues were as serious as they were made out to be). This calls for an examination of the validity of these hazy 'problems,'20 in order to assess the necessity of the transfer.\n\nIn the process, I will also highlight the way in which constitutional and legal changes were introduced in the Straits Settlements. Legal changes emerged in response to the demands of the Straits society; that is, such changes were governed by a variety of factors. Hence, I will", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215774, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 73, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "their petition. Even before 1826, the Spanish silver dollar and local copper cent had been used widely by the Straits merchants in their trade and commerce, (even though in theory, in 1835, the rupee was the currency of account for official purposes until 1867).\n\nThe directors of the EIC, considering only the Indian Empire's interests,29 established a uniform rupee currency throughout its territories, which of course included the Straits Settlements. In 1854, a bill was introduced to the Indian legislative council 'to improve the law relating to the copper currency in the Straits,' which provided for a copper currency based on fractions of the rupee.30 According to the Currency Act, the Indian pice was to be made legal tender instead of the copper cent and the rupee was to be enforced as legal tender.31\n\nThis Act was fiercely objected to by the Straits merchants, and in response to the opposition, the directors ordered the act to be repealed in 1857. Mr Ballie (Secretary of the Board of Control of the EIC) argues that 'it was very natural that the governor-general should desire to establish a uniform currency throughout the whole of the territories subject to his authority'32 and that after the complaints made at Singapore, this grievance was redressed, and that therefore the petitioners did not have a right to complain.**\n\nPage 36\n\n33\n\n35\n\nThe 1867 Act legalised a currency which was already assured,” and by the time the transfer to the Colonial Office took place, the currency issue was virtually resolved. However, as it was a problem that could have been prevented instead of cured, I would accord little credit to the Indian government's role in this issue.\n\nPiracy and western laws\n\nThis was another arguable \"problem\" that was cited in the petition, and used as an example of the Indian government's inefficiency. Piracy was widespread in the Straits until the mid-19th century, and was a threat to the property and commerce of the merchants. The pirates that predominated in the 1830s and 1840s were pirates of the Sulu archipelago, Illanun pirates from Mindanao and Dyaks from North Borneo. Complaints were that 'no systematic measures of protection have ever been adopted or carried out by the EIC, who have been content to leave the service to be performed by the Royal Navy.”37", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215775, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 74, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "However, in response to a petition by European merchants in 1835 to the EIC against piracy, some action on the part of the Indian government was taken, through the use of steam warships (for example, the Diana and HMS Wolf). These ships were effective in fighting piracy, and according to LA Mills, 'piracy in the Straits greatly decreased for several years... Conditions never became as serious as they were before 1836.'38\n\nHowever, Turnbull says that these measures only gave temporary relief and that, within a few years, the position deteriorated. Moreover, in the 1850s, a new breed of pirates began to haunt the merchants' commerce. They came from China, and the Chinese imperial government was too weak to suppress them. The main theatre of Chinese operations was the Gulf of Siam, although many vessels were captured near Singapore.40\n\nThe Indian government did not pay much attention to the problem as it was involved in the second Anglo-Burmese war at that time, and as Calcutta had passed no laws to detain suspicious vessels, there were no legal means to curb piracy. In 1857, the Indian legislative council had passed an inadequate law which permitted the right of search, but did not solve the problem of proving intent. No improvement was made to the naval force in the Straits Settlements in the last ten years of Indian rule, which consisted of only three gunboats (a 'lilliputian fleet'41).\n\nEventually the Chinese pirates were gradually eliminated from the Straits waters as a result of a series of treaties and agreements between China and other western powers (such as with Prussia 1861, Denmark 1863, the Netherlands 1863, Spain 1864, Belgium 1865, Italy 1866, and Austria-Hungary 186942), the contents of which included co-operative measures to wipe out piracy. The Hong Kong 'Ordinance for the suppression of piracy' was the first real blow delivered against Chinese piracy.4\n\nThe Indian government played a minimal role with regards to the combat of piracy in the Straits. The problem was brought under control through a list of other factors, including foreign treaties and ordinances, and hence, the merchants' complaints were not without reason, as little credit can be attributed to the Indian administration in this respect.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215776, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 75, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "The EIC and relations with the Malay states\n\nIn the merchants' own words, 'The Supreme Government of India had uniformly discouraged the local Government at Singapore from interfering with matters beyond the limits of the Island. The cultivation of friendly relations with Native States and Chiefs has been neglected.'44 In this section, I will examine the merchants' reasons for this complaint, and also assess the accuracy of their claim. Rupert Emerson, a historian, calls the period during the Indian government's administration of the Straits Settlements 'a half-century of inactivity.' This is arguably the truth but not the whole truth, because DGE Hall, another historian, tends to disagree with Emerson's assertion. He says that 'one only has to glance through the many volumes of records relating to the period to realise that even if there was little or no spectacular achievement there was plenty of activity.' 'Even if by inactivity is meant the pursuit of non-intervention policy in native affairs, the term is misleading.\n\nPage 48\n\nThe Calcutta administration, wherever possible, adhered to a policy of strict non-intervention in the affairs of the Malay States. This policy had its roots in Pitt's India Act of 1784,49 which stipulated that the EIC's aim was peace, not interference in local politics or extension of the company's territories.50 The main reason for this policy was to avoid any form of entanglement in the internal troubles or wars of the Peninsula which could incur unnecessary expenses for the EIC,51 As it was, the EIC had lost its monopoly over the China trade in 1833 and, with this, the Straits Settlements ceased to be a source of direct profits, and were maintained at an annual loss.52\n\nPage 51\n\nYet despite the law on non-intervention, there was evidence that in some cases concerning threats to British interests, whether commercial, political or involving prestige, local administrators often found it necessary to intervene. In such cases, the actions were often condoned by the Supreme Government. Thus, there was a violation of Pitt's India Act (which eventually did lead to the change in British policy of non-intervention to intervention in 1874),54\n\nPage 53\n\nThio summarises the politico-legal scenario thus:\n\n...when responsibility for the Straits was transferred from the Government of India to the Colonial Office in 1867, the British were already bound by treaties with four of the five states south of Kedah, two of whom they\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215777, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 76, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "were pledged to protect and three over whose external relations they had a right of control.\"55 Hall strongly claims that, 'the Malay States were in a state of chronic unrest, external and internal,56 and had become completely incapable of putting their house in order. Intervention, therefore, could not be avoided. There was indeed constant intervention, notwithstanding all the rules to the contrary and all the thunders of Calcutta and the East India House, '57\n\nHowever, in spite of Thio's and Hall's assertions, the truth of the merchants' complaint is not invalidated, because between 1824 and 1873, British rule in Malaya was indeed ‘inactive,258 as their official policy was still in accordance with Pitt's India Act. In several cases, the actions of the Straits Settlements government implied some form of intervention, or at least limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States, when they violated the policy of non-intervention; but even then, nothing more elaborate was undertaken than the occasional punitive expedition, which was not enough, in 'the interests of British commerce.'60 Insofar as this was concerned, it would appear that the Straits merchants did have a legitimate complaint to the House of Lords, because their statement would appear to have been bona fide and to hold a substantial amount of evidential truth. The influence of Pitt's India Act (that is, EIC non-intervention) remained until 1874, when a new law was passed, and the British took on an active, intervening role in the Malay states.\n\n59\n\nJudicial system!\n\nThe main complaints of the merchants were that the Law was administered by unprofessional persons, that is, the administration of justice was in the hands of local officers of government, civil or military servants of the EIC, and the 'impractical schemes [that] were propounded' (for example, the Currency Act, port dues and stamp duties). LA Mills renders a counter attack to this point; he argues that 'although there were delays in dealing with problems which caused the Straits Settlements to suffer at times, on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few were of importance, so that injury caused in the delay in settling them was not great. The population was small and generally law-abiding. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations (the main task of the government was to watch Siam and Holland,\n\n63\n\n262", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215781, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 80, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "NOTES\n\nAbbreviations:\n\nColonial Office - CO\n\nJIA - Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia\n\nJMBRAS - Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal Asiatic Society\n\nJSEAH - Journal of Southeast Asian History\n\nSFP - Singapore Free Press\n\nSSR - Straits Settlements Records\n\nThe Government of the Straits Settlement Act, 1866. 29 & 30 Vicc 115 - An Act to provide for the Government of the Straits Settlements.\n\nTurnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony. (1972) Oxford University Press, p 379\n\nAmong the various historians on Malayan history, Mary C Turnbull's comments on the Straits Settlements prior to the Transfer in 1867 are, by far, the most balanced and comprehensive, and her views on this area are invaluable. While the following facts were gathered from several historians' works, I have been influenced strongly by Turnbull's analysis. I have attempted to summarize in the following 3 sections Turnbull's views based closely on her Introduction to The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony.\n\ncf. Treaty of 6 February 1819 (Johore 1819) (Treaties with Native States Part III)\n\nTreaty of Friendship and Alliance between the EIC and the Sultan of Johore in 1824, cf. Treaties with Native States p 16 Part III\n\ncf. Article 10 of the treaty\n\nTurnbull, The Straits Settlements 1826-67 Indian Presidency to Crown Colony, Introduction p 3", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215784, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 83, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "16\n\nXIX, Belgian Treaty Art. XLIV; Spanish Treaty Art. XVI; Italian Treaty Art. XIX, quoted from Fox, British Admirals and Chinese Pirates 1832-1869\n\n4 Turnbull, supra, p 255\n\n4 Buckley, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore pg 756; The Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce, 13 Oct 1857\n\n\"Emerson Rupert, Malaysia - A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, Chap 2. p 91\n\n46 Hall DGE, A History of South East Asia, p 511\n\n47 Ibid, p 511\n\n* Mills LA, British Malaya 1824 – 1867\n\n49 Act 24th George III Cap 25;\n\n174\n\nNB: This act was retained until 1858, when England assumed full control of India. However, the policy of non-intervention in the Malay States still continued until 1874.\n\n50 Philips, The East India Company 1784 - 1834, Chap 2, p 32\n\nsi Purcell, Malaya, Outline of a Colony, Chap 6 p 70; Jones, Public Administration in Malaya, Chap I p 8\n\n52 Mills, supra, p 174\n\nTan DE, A Portrait of Malaysia and Singapore, Chap 9 p 119\n\n54 However, it should be made clear that in the pre-1874 era, the nature of intervention was limited. Though there were cases of British intervention in the Malay States, their actions were “inactive” or passive. The governors were often reminded of the official non-intervention policy, and this policy remained unchanged until 1874, when a new law (the Pangkor Engagement) was observed.\n\nCases of non-intervention\n\nThe EIC's non-intervention policy started from the earliest years of British rule", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215786, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 85, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "18\n\nHowever, there were also cases where the British did intervene in the Malay states during the period 1824-73. It is evident that, to a certain extent, the British were inconsistent with their policy of non-intervention, but compared to the period after 1874, when the policy was reversed, these interventions were limited and they only occurred where unavoidable (Ibid. p 179). In this respect, I would argue that the merchants had valid grounds for their petition of complaint to the House of Commons.\n\nThe EIC's non-intervention policy reflected realism and flexibility. They took the stance of non-intervention wherever their commercial interests and political prestige were not threatened, but their policy changed according to the dictates of time, thus in reality, causing them to play dual roles of non-activity and intervention in accordance with the change of times. Whilst the period 1824-73 was not marked by any 'spectacular action or further territorial advances', it can neither be described as being inactive, because as Tan observes, '[c]ases of intervention were...more in evidence than cases of non-intervention' (Tan D E, supra, p 120), and I will highlight some of the more important and interesting ones. From its footholds in the Straits Settlements, the EIC gradually extended its influence over the independent Malay States chiefly through trade and treaties. (Thio E, British Policy in The Malay Peninsular 1880-1910 Vol 1 - Introduction pg xvi-xvii)\n\nThe following examples could be used as evidence to challenge the truth of the merchants' statement of complaint, although in the final analysis, their complaint was a bona fide one.\n\nCases of Intervention\n\nAfter 1826 the Malay states tended to look to the EIC as the arbiter of local politics to whom they reported the ascension of new rulers, and appealed for help in settling internal disputes and quarrels with their neighbours. (Thio, Ibid. p xvi-xvii) For example, the proximity of thriving Singapore to Johore led the British to intervene in the affairs of Johore. When Sultan Hussein died in 1835, Governor Murchison refused to acknowledge Hussein's son, Ali, as the Sultan. It was only in 1852 that Acting-Governor Blundell persuaded the Supreme Government to recognise Ali as the rightful Sultan. Later, compromise was reached when Ali accepted an empty title of Sultan and Temenggong Ibrahim retained control over Johore in 1855. Thus, a new royal dynasty was established in Johore, with British intervention. This case clearly illustrates a deviation", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215787, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 86, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "19\n\nfrom Pitt's India Act. The EIC accordingly found itself guaranteeing some states protection from attacks, or pledging to uphold boundary settlements. (Thio, supra, p xvi-xvii)\n\nThere were cases of intervention for example, in Kedah, Perak and Selangor, brought about by Robert Fullerton, Burney, Anderson and James Low:\n\nWhen Robert Fullerton was governor of the Straits Settlements in 1824, he completely reversed the earlier British attitude of giving in to the claims of Siam, thus embarking on protection and expansion of British interests in the Malay Peninsula by checking Siamese attempts at extending their influence over the northern Malay states. Thus, when Ligor prepared to invade Perak and Selangor in 1825, he sent a Penang squadron to patrol the river mouths to prevent any attacks. (Mills L A, British Malaya 1824-1867, Chap 8 p 141; other examples of intervention included the following: Burney's Preliminary Treaty with Ligor in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8 p 143-146); the Anderson Treaty (involving Selangor and Perak) in 1825. (Mills, Ibid, Chap 8, p 145-146; Purcell, supra, Chap 6, p 70)\n\nThe Burney Treaty of 1826 saw British attempts to secure independence for Selangor and Perak (Newbold, British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca Vol. 2 p 26); and later, the Low Treaty of 1826 promised British assistance in maintaining Perak's independence. These two treaties had more effect on the Malay States than any other treaties, the greatest consequence being a marked ending of Siamese southward ambitions, and thus securing the British position in expanding further into the Malay States at a later stage. However, signing these treaties showed non-compliance with Pitt's India Act. Thus, where Low's Treaty was concerned, the Supreme Government continued for some time to condemn it as unauthorised and never really ratified it. In effect, the intervention in the Malay States was still somewhat restricted by the Government's policy. (Mills, Op Cit. Chap 8 p 162) Other examples include Fullerton's challenge of Ligor's claim to the Kurau District in 1826, and the Burney Treaty of 1826 after which the British ceased to intervene in Kedah. (Mills, Ibid. Chap 8 pp 160-161)\n\nOther examples of intervention included those in Naning and Sungei Ujong: The British fought the Naning War in 1831-2 to establish British right to collection of revenue in Naning. In Sungei Ujong, the British squadron was called in 1857 to destroy the village of Pengkalan Kempas, in order to punish the chiefs who had been extorting British subjects. And again in 1860, Governor Cavenagh", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215789, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 88, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "21\n\n* infra para. on Chinese secret societies and Indian convicts, for a more balanced understanding of the population behaviour at that time\n\n54 Indian Charter Act of 1833\n\n❝ the Charters of Justice, 1807, 1826, and 1855; Regina v Willians Esq., cf. Maxwell PB, 'The Law of England in Penang, Malacca and Singapore', JA, ns iii (1859) p 26 - 55\n\ncf. Thio Eunice, \"The Singapore Chinese Protectorate and Events and Conditions Leading to Its Establishment, 1823 - 1877' Journal of the South Seas Society xvi (1960); Tan DE, supra, Chap 6\n\n\"Hansard, 3rd series, vol cxlix, p 995\n\n*Thio, supra, p 47 - examples include gang robberies, collection of \"protection\" money from shopkeepers, or contributions in the nature of blackmail; Chiefs of secret societies were also known to hold their own Courts of Justice to settle disputes between members, even for serious crimes eg sometimes mutilated trunks of victims were found in the jungle or elsewhere, usually with the right or left hand chopped up into a certain number of parts and left hanging together by the skin\n\n*Thio, supra, p 51, 52 ; Buckley, supra, p 757 - in the petition, the European merchants had made suggestions to the Indian government on how to improve the situation but the EIC responded with indifference and 'sometimes without even the slightest acknowledgment of their having been made'\n\nThio, supra, p 52\n\n71 Thio, supra, p 53\n\n7\n\n74\n\nThio, supra, p 34\n\nThio, supra, p 77; Tan D E, supra, Chap 6 p 72, 73\n\n(for example, the Currency Act 1855)\n\n(for example, 1837 admiralty jurisdiction, 1848 insolvency jurisdiction, 1855 Charter of Justice etc.)", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215791, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 90, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "23\n\n86 they were considered a bad influence by Sir Richard MacCulloch, Recorder of Singapore 1856-66, and merchants and Grand Juries made \"vague accusations from time to time\" (Turnbull, supra (on convicts), p 99)\n\n*for example, between 1830 and 1850, more than 1500 Thugs were sent to Singapore and Penang, and they played a prominent part in the Dusserah and Muharram festivals, turning them into the rowdy display of hooliganism they became by the middle of the century.' (Turnbull, supra (on convicts), p 100)\n\n88 for example, transportation of convicts to the Straits Settlements were put to an end in 1860 (Annual retrospect for 1860 in SFP 10 Jan 1861)\n\n89 for example, Governor Cavenagh took a personal interest in the convict administration, the health of the convicts improved, death rates fell with more attention paid to their diet; better supervision, incentive bonuses enhanced their efficiency\n\n90 1857 riots\n\n\"1 albeit that their fears were groundless in most instances\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\nPrimary Sources:\n\nHansard Parliamentary Debates 3rd ser, cxlix, (986 - 996) Parliamentary Papers, 1862, xl (House of Commons) The Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce Singapore Free Press\n\nCO273 series (Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence) Straits Settlements Records (Microfilm 139, 141, 142, 184)\n\nTreaties:\n\nTreaty of 6 February 1819 (Johore 1819) (Treaties with Native States, Part III) Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the EIC and the Sultan of Johore (1824) (Treaties with Native States Part III)\n\nTreaty of Peace, Friendship and Alliance of 1800 (Treaties with Native States, Part I)\n\nPage 90\n\nPage 91", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215792, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 91, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "24\n\nTreaty of Holland (Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824), (Hertslet's Treaties Vol VIII) Pangkor Engagement of 1874 (Treaties with Native States Part II)\n\nBill:\n\nStraits Transfer Bill (House of Commons), 1866, V (Session 1 Feb - 10 Aug 1866)\n\nStatutes:\n\nAct 24th George III Cap 25 (1784)\n\nIndian Charter Act of 1833\n\nIndian Act No. XVII of 1855\n\nCharters of Justice (1807, 1826, 1855)\n\nThe Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vic, Cap 63\n\nThe Government of the Straits Settlements Act, 1866, 29 & 30 Vic, Cap 115\n\nThe Courts (Colonial) Jurisdiction Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vic, Cap 27\n\nThe Straits Settlements Offences Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Vic, Cap 38\n\nCase:\n\nRegina v Willians Esq (1858) (3 Ky 16)\n\nSecondary Sources:\n\nAllen, Richard H S, 1968, Malaysia, Prospect and Retrospect. The Impact and Aftermath of Colonial Rule, Oxford University Press\n\nAuber, P, 1826, An Analysis of the Constitution of the EIC and the Laws Passed by Parliament for the Government of Their Affairs at Home and Abroad, London\n\nBlythe, W L, 1969, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, Kuala Lumpur\n\nBraddell, Roland St John, (1915) 1982, The Law of the Straits Settlements. A Commentary, Oxford University Press (Kuala Lumpur)\n\nBraddle, T, (1853) 'Notices of Singapore', JIA, vii, 1328\n\nBuckley, Charles Burton, (1902) 1984, An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore, Oxford University Press", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 83, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "32\n\ncould see, and it seemed as if it were one vast garden'.\"\n\nParkinson, Trade in the Eastern Seas (1937) writes: \"When the whole [EIC] China fleet was collected there, twelve or sixteen of the largest merchantmen in the world, together with the country ships, the spectacle must have been magnificent.\" He records that sometimes the Viceroy at Canton would come down to visit the fleet. The ships would be decked to receive the great man, with yards manned and officers in full dress.12\n\nCanton\n\nCanton was, and is, the capital of the Guangdong Province. One of the larger and richer cities of the Chinese Empire, and dating back to pre-Han times, it had long been a major sea port for overseas trade, notably in the Tang Dynasty when it had a significant Arab and Muslim population. During the turmoil which accompanied the change of dynasty from Ming to Qing, it upheld the Ming, endured an eleven-month siege in 1650, and suffered a wholesale massacre of its inhabitants. However, it recovered, and by the mid-nineteenth century was credited with a population of around one million persons. It was renowned for its manufactories, carried on by human industry, without the aid of machinery, particularly in silk and cloth, women and children included, whilst trade - international and regional trade - was described as being 'the great business of life'.13\n\nCanton was a walled city (actually two walled cities in one, the Old and the New) with major suburbs along the Pearl River, and to the West.14 As befitted its status, it contained the yamens (office-residences) of many senior government officials, including those of the governor-general of the two linked provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi, the governor of Guangdong, the Canton prefect, two county magistrates, the Tartar general, the provincial naval commander, and the like, as well as those officials with charge of other, specialised concerns, and (of special status, since he was responsible directly to Beijing) the Hoppo or Superintendent of Maritime Customs, who oversaw the foreign trade and its accruing revenue.\n\nThe Foreign Factories (British, French, Swedish, Spanish, Danish and Dutch) of the river suburb were so-called from their being the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216329, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 88, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "The Hoppo lived in the City, along with the Viceroy, the Governor of Guangdong, and other high provincial officials. Their relations had for long crystallised into an arrangement that ensured access to private gain from the trade as parts of one administration, in contrast to the competing rivalries of earlier times. This was in part to provide for mutual protection against interference and accusation from Beijing officials.\n\nThe Hoppo's and other officials' treatment of foreign merchants\n\nThe language used by these officials in their communications with the traders and the EIC's Select Committee - as instanced by Dr. Gutzlaff, a most useful contemporary source of information on the times - was invariably haughty and patronising, in keeping with the accepted modes of address towards inferiors of all kinds, and did nothing to ease relationships. Gutzlaff also mentions the 'governmental proclamations, detailing the infamous conduct of barbarians, [which] have been repeatedly posted up at Canton,' imbuing the minds of the people with strong antipathy against such worthless barbarians, and discouraging them from having anything to do with foreigners. \"The writer has often heard the natives rehearse these accusations with self-congratulation at their own superiority.\"\n\nThis sort of thing was an irritant, as were the restrictions on the movement of foreign merchants whilst in residence at the Factories, mentioned above.\n\nFar more vexing were their other complaints against the Canton System, which were listed by Morse as including the heavy taxation/impositions levied on the trade; the monopoly system of the Co-hong; the uncertainty of recovery of debts due from Chinese merchants; the diversion of the Consoo Fund (provided from the trade to cover such debts) to government use and presents to officials; and the prohibition on their making representations to any official save through the Co-hong.\n\nTo all such complaints must be added the descriptions of the general venality of the administration, the Hoppo and other senior officials included, and indeed of the whole Canton System, as described in this paper.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216331, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 90, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "39\n\nthe officials.38 This kind of thing, plus business losses, led some to bankruptcy.\n\nYet the foreign traders found them to be honourable men of business. There was, says Morse 'an ease in their mutual relations' which was the best commentary on the condition of affairs. \"They both had a reputation for commercial honour and integrity such as has not been surpassed in any part of the world or at any time in its history: trading operations were entirely on parole, with never a written contract: and there was much help and sympathy from one to the other.39\n\nThe servants in the factories\n\nEarlier regulations stated that Chinese could not be employed as servants to foreigners, but this rule was normally relaxed, albeit with a restriction on numbers. Many Chinese serviced the Factories in diverse occupations, and most must have been local people, some of them long-serving. The personal servant of one head of the EIC's Select Committee had been with him for 16 years, and there were clearly others of the kind.\n\n40\n\nHowever, this was a dangerous employment. It became more so at times when the high mandarins were in dispute with the EIC Select Committee, and rules were invoked and enforced for a time. Servants would have to quit, or sometimes flee, and they and their families were liable to be 'squeezed' by underlings. A striking instance of the kind was the terror inspired by the Hoppo's and Prefect's unannounced visit and high-handed actions at the British Factory in 1831, when 'every Chinese in our Employ fled from our premises in alarm for his safety.'41\n\nThe wide range of civilians employed under the Co-Hong's auspices\n\nAssociated with the Hong merchants were a large number of other civilians, functionaries licensed by the Chinese authorities, who were required to be secured by the merchants in the performance of their duties.42 These included linguists (otherwise known as \"interpreters\") and compradors ('negotiators of purchases', storekeepers and ship-chandlers43) who, in their turn, were assisted in their work by a variety of persons offering services to the crews and other personnel connected with the trade. There were also the pilots licensed by the authorities. Besides these were the employees of the Customs, and the naval and\n\nPage 90\n\nPage 91", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216337, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 96, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "45\n\nwhich is actually levied,' and since the dealers believed the authorities to have been personally interested in these illegal transactions, they believed it would be useless to look to them for protection or redress'.\n\n63\n\nWhilst these passages are taken from early Treaty Port days, two decades after the Canton System had been replaced, they describe a world which had otherwise scarcely changed. It was still, in its essentials, the working milieu in which the Co-hong, the officials and their minions, both civil and military alike, and the people at large, on land and sea, had been obliged to exist; and with which, and with whom, the Western traders had to contend,\n\nRough treatment by the mandarins\n\nIt was also a milieu in which criminals, and anyone falling foul of officials would have a very bad time. The Chinese personnel of the Old China trade were no exceptions to the general rule, and could be very roughly treated by the mandarins when they chose to enforce the minute and graduated regulations that governed all and sundry throughout the Empire.“\n\n64\n\nA compradore was severely beaten and tortured and thrown into prison in 1816, because the EIC's ships' captains had presented a petition at a city gate over difficulties with obtaining a permit to load, with more beatings ordered for another compradore and two linguists, whilst the Company's head compradore had to leave hurriedly because police runners were looking for him. 65 In 1831, during the Canton Prefect's unannounced visit to the EIC's hall, a linguist was put in chains, taken away, and threatened with decapitation. 66\n\nThe officials, their courts and prisons were justly to be feared. Just how bad they could be was experienced at first hand by Captain Denham, shipwrecked on Formosa with his mixed crew of 55 Europeans, Chinese and Indians, and 2 passengers, in 1842. Perhaps because their brig, the Ann, had been an opium runner, they were treated like Chinese criminals, subject to the practices and procedures usual when men were imprisoned, tried, and condemned to execution, as indeed nearly all of them were. 67\n\nThe truth is, that the Chinese government was very severe with its", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]