[ { "id": 216381, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 140, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "90\n\n1954. But there was internal armed conflict within Cambodia, and the war in Vietnam also overflowed into Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s.\n\n1970-1975 The Khmer Republic\n\nWhile the King was absent, General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak deposed him, and declared a republic. Nevertheless, the new Republic failed to gain effective military control of the whole land, despite continuous fighting with internal and external opponents, among them the Khmer Rouge,\n\n1975-1979 Democratic Kampuchea (DK)\n\nIn April 1975, the Khmer Rouge took power, after the defeat of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic forces, and entered Phnom Penh. Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge remained in power for nearly four years, pursuing policies which resulted in the death of nearly two million people through execution, starvation, and disease.\n\n1979-1989 People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)\n\nIn 1978, the Vietnamese army advanced into Cambodia, and together with Khmer Rouge defectors, overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime. The new government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea, did not enjoy wide international recognition, and at the same time continued armed conflict with the Khmer Rouge and other forces within the country.\n\n1989-1993 The State of Cambodia\n\n[1992-1993 United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC)]\n\nWith the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the name of the country was changed to distance the new government from the Khmer Rouge period, and the use of “Kampuchea\". But armed conflict between the government in Phnom Penh and other actors continued. United Nations-sponsored negotiations finally led to the Paris Peace Agreement of 1991, the United Nations Transitional Authority, and the 1993 elections.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216382, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 141, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "91\n\n1993-now Kingdom of Cambodia\n\nSihanouk returned as king, and the name Kingdom of Cambodia was again used. The Khmer Rouge withdrew from participation in the political process, and continued armed conflict until 1997. As the military strength of the Khmer Rouge declined, this conflict became more and more sporadic.\n\n2. The proposed Tribunal\n\nThe atrocities of the Khmer Rouge began to be documented in the period of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. For example, the S-21 \"Tuol Sleng\" was established from 1975 to 1978 as a security office for interrogation and extermination of prisoners. The site, in a suburban Phnom Penh high school, has been a museum to the victims since 1980. Assessment and documentation of the many cases has continued through the subsequent two decades, and a substantial record is maintained by the Documentation Centre of Cambodia (DC-Cam).\n\nIn 1979, the PRK government had held a trial, in which Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were convicted and sentenced to death in absentia for their crimes. However, the trial was not accepted internationally because of concerns about the processes, and because of the diplomatic isolation of the PRK government.\n\nResponses to the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda, included the establishment by the United Nations of international tribunals at The Hague and at Arusha, respectively. International pressure for some kind of legal resolution of the atrocities in the period of Democratic Khmer also increased, as did pressure within Cambodia itself.\n\nIn 1997, the Cambodian government asked the United Nations for assistance in organising a process for the Khmer Rouge trials. This led to the adoption of a resolution in the UN General Assembly in December 1997, enabling the Secretary-General to negotiate. Negotiations dragged on, with Cambodia producing a draft law in 1999, and that law passed the National Assembly in 2001.2 The United Nations negotiator, Hans Correll, objected that the law did not give effect to the agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government. Early in 2002,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216387, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 146, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "96\n\non Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, Cultural and Economic Rights, in claiming that rights inhere in individuals and in communities to a fair allocation of the earth's resources and opportunities. This includes access to the legal system.\n\n6.1 Distributive Justice and a Fair Trial\n\nMany international conventions and other instruments emphasise the right to a fair trial, although they may differ in practice as to what such a trial might involve. Article 13 of the Agreement of March 2003 refers to the right to a fair and public hearing, to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, to engage a counsel of his or her choice, to have adequate time and facilities for preparation of defence, to have counsel provided if lacking means to pay for one, and to examine the witness against him or her.\n\nThe issue which caused the United Nations to withdraw from negotiations with the Royal Government was the question of a fair trial. The Khmer Rouge had particularly targeted intellectuals of various kinds, including lawyers. The courts formed in the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime were created using judges with few if any legal qualifications. Prosecutors had even less legal formation.1 Besides the lack of trained personnel, participants and commentators have drawn attention to the lack of independence of judges and prosecutors, who are subjected to government interference.1 The recent history of Cambodian governments suggests that the concept of judicial independence is an alien concept: courts are expected to respond to government directives.1 Even in the absence of interference, the prosecutors may claim that they lack the funds to carry out investigations.\n\n6.2 Distributive Justice and Fair Trials\n\nDistributive justice requires that like cases should be treated alike. But the proposed tribunal for the Khmer Rouge is limited in jurisdiction to one period in Cambodia's history, the period of Democratic Kampuchea. Yet commentators have pointed out that there may have been breaches of law committed by other participants in the long-running wars which have affected Cambodia.12 If these are excluded from scrutiny, then the legal process becomes a kind of \"victor's justice\"", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216388, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 147, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "and fails to satisfy the demands of distributive justice.\n\n97\n\nNevertheless, the Agreement limits the jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Chamber to senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea, and to the period 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.\n\n6.3 Distributive Justice and the Justice System:\n\nIn an ideal world, adequate financial and other resources should be made available for the justice system, so that every case would receive quality justice. But in reality, no society has unlimited resources. Distributive justice then requires that the resources should be allocated in such a way as to maximise or equalise each person's access to justice.\n\nA common response to this has been to propose that international tribunals, which are very expensive, should concentrate on the leadership, and not undertake every case involving an atrocity. The proposed tribunal for Cambodia will be costly - budgets of up to USD $60 million have been suggested. The number of trials is likely to be less than ten, and may not lead to a conviction.14 While such costs may compare favourably with the costs in other international tribunals, nevertheless it is a major allocation of resources for a few cases.\n\n13\n\nNevertheless, it could be argued that distributive justice would be better achieved by using these funds to improve the capacity of the Cambodian legal system to handle these cases, and the many other cases which come before the courts.\n\n16\n\nFor international donors, the tribunal is important for its symbolic role, as a special part of the legal system. Other states,15 international organisations,1 and non-government organisations have contributed considerable funding and effort to the improvement of the Cambodian legal system (capacity building), and these states and organisations are often most supportive of the proposed tribunal.\n\nIn Rwanda, an alternative approach has been taken in order to handle the large number of outstanding cases awaiting trial. This has been the adoption of an economical and indigenous reconciliation programme, known as Gacaca.... However, there is no parallel process", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216390, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 149, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "99\n\n7.2 From Truth to Reconciliation:\n\nOne of the more successful examples of such a structure is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process in South Africa. But a limitation is apparent: while the Commissions may be able to discover the truth, this does not automatically lead to reconciliation. Reconciliation is a more complex process, involving acknowledgement of fault (perhaps on both sides), a change of heart or repentance, a giving and receiving of forgiveness, and a desire to walk together again. The law is a very limited instrument, and cannot by itself bring about internal change.19\n\nReconciliation also requires sensitivity to the particular culture of those involved. The primary source of meaning for many Cambodians is their religion. The majority are Buddhist, and the process of reconciliation needs to be based on a Buddhist understanding of what reconciliation means. But Buddhism, as with other religions, suffered great losses during the period of Khmer Rouge rule, and both monks and people may lack the religious sophistication to approach the task well20. One of the questions, for example, is the Buddhist belief in Karma, which sees suffering in this life as the consequence of wrong-doing in a previous life. If taken in an over-simplified way, this may lead to blaming the victim of atrocities for their suffering, and taking the focus away from the perpetrator.\n\nAlthough Buddhism is the principal religion of Cambodia, and is the state religion, observations have suggested that the generation who were formed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea may not be committed to religion, and may indeed be in practice secular.21 Their approach to reconciliation will be different from the approach of those who are deeply rooted in Buddhism.\n\nSmaller groups in Cambodia are the Muslims (especially the Chams and those of Malay descent) and Christians. Both groups were particular targets of the Khmer Rouge. Both religions have sophisticated approaches to reconciliation, although because of the years of troubles, individual Muslims or Christians may be poorly informed about these approaches.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216393, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 152, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "102\n\nNevertheless, the use of the tribunal can only be one step in the long process of rebuilding Cambodia. Simultaneous efforts must be made to create, almost from nothing, a viable and just legal system. The slow process of individual and community reconciliation must also be pursued.\n\nREFERENCE WEBSITES\n\nDocumentation Center of Cambodia [DC-CAM] www.bigpond.com.kh/users/dccam.genocide\n\nRoyal Government of Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/\n\nPhnom Penh Post www.phnompenhpost.com\n\nNOTES\n\n1 See Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135 (Feb 1999) Annex. UN doc A/53/850, S/1999/231.\n\n2 Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. (10 August 2001) NS/RKM/0801/12.\n\n* \"Draft Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea\" 17 March 2003. See UN General Assembly: Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, UN doc A/57/769, 31 March 2003.\n\n4 UN Doc GA/10135 (13 May 2003).\n\n5 Vong Sokheng and Richard Woodd: \"Jumbo cabinet ends stalemate\" Phnom Penh Post, 2-15 July 2004, page 1-2.\n\n6 Yun Samean: “Hun Sen Says Only UN Can Arrest KR”, Cambodia Daily, 7 June 2004, page 1-2.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]