[
    {
        "id": 207642,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 30,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n15\n\nThe modernizing activities of Li and others were never coordinated by the central government. Nor were any efforts made to integrate the \"regional\" armies of these leaders into the dynasty's \"regular\" military system. At the time of the Sino-Japanese War, the Ch'ing army was little more than a motley collection of diverse armies at various stages of development. There was no standardization in arms, dress or training, no unity in command, and only the most rudimentary commissariat, transport, medical and other services.17 China's two small, uncoordinated provincial military academies did little to improve the situation. China had no draft system and no General Staff. Funding for most modernizing projects (including the armies of Li and others) was irregular and unpredictable. Meanwhile, the \"regular\" military forces of the empire—some of which had undergone cosmetic surgery to become \"re-trained troops\" (lien-chün) or members of the Peking Field Force (shen-chi ying)—continued to consume about two-thirds of the national \"budget.\"t\n\nChina's failure to reform her military institutions in the nineteenth century prevented the emergence of a modern, Western-trained Chinese officer corps. In the eyes of most foreign observers in China, this was the key deficiency of the Chinese army.19 Lacking sufficient numbers of competent Chinese officers, individual Ch'ing officials found it necessary to continue employing foreigners not only to instruct and drill Chinese troops, but also occasionally to lead them.20 The presence of these individuals in Chinese armies often produced or exacerbated anti-foreign feelings, encouraged foreign interference, and created security problems.21 The existence of neutrality laws and other legal obstacles complicated the problem of employing foreigners in a military capacity after the breakdown of the \"Cooperative Policy,\" and the absence of central government guidelines for the employment of foreign nationals encouraged rivalry and intrigue among the Western powers for heightened influence in Chinese military affairs.22 In all, the experience of using foreign military assistance was humiliating, expensive and frustrating.\n\nThe contrast with Japan is striking. Although no less anxious than the Chinese to maintain control over foreign military employees, and to avoid surrendering administrative authority to them, the Japanese treated foreigners far more regularly, rationally, and regally.23 Extremely careful in its centrally-supervised hiring\n\nPage 30\n\nPage 31",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208919,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 81,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "PERSISTENCE & PRESERVATION OF HAKKA CULTURE\n\n49\n\nall segments, cut across diverse organizational identities, emphasize what is common to all, regulate competition among the associations in complementary and cooperative rather than in emulative and suppressive terms, and thus maintain a holistic and united community.\n\nDo the problems stated above imply that the Waichow Hakkas' voluntary associations in Hong Kong will disappear after the vanishing of their culture? Of course not. As anthropologist R. Anderson (1972:21) said: “Voluntary associations do not themselves initiate or hinder socio-cultural change.\" Man, only man, is the master of social institutions. It has been shown in my survey that the Waichow Hakkas' voluntary associations based on traditional organizing principles have changed both their organization and content in certain circumstances in order to adapt to the ever-changing urban situation in Hong Kong. In the future, as long as division of labor by locality and dialect exist, their associations will still be an important adaptive device. Therefore, the only real problem to be examined is: How will they change? This is a problem which demands long-term field research (Foster et al, 1978).\n\nNOTES\n\n1 To my knowledge, only Aline K. Wong's papers on the Kai-fong associations describe voluntary associations in Hong Kong (1968, 1971, 1972a, 1972b).\n\n2 The bulk of my expenses for the present study was borne by a generous grant from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which I acknowledge with deep gratitude. Help was also received from the Institute of Social Studies and the Humanities and the Social Research Centre of the same university, for which I am grateful. I also wish to express my gratitude to many association leaders who spent hours talking to me and instructing me in the history of their associations.\n\n3 In the early Ch'ing Dynasty the imperial court adopted a policy of \"clearing up the border,\" i.e., removing the people living along the sea coast, in order to prevent them from a possible collusion with the rebels overseas (CCCHS, 1950: 27-29).\n\n4 According to my survey made in 1970, some single-surname villages in the New Territories of Hong Kong still exist even under the strong impact of the modern delocalization process. The Lis' village in So Kwun Wat is a good example.\n\n5 In 1975 there were 185 clan and surname associations in the Chinese community of Singapore; the organization of some of these associations cut across locality or dialect boundaries (Hsieh, 1977: 87).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207",
        "rank": 0
    }
]