[
    {
        "id": 204498,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1962",
        "page_number": 130,
        "title": "RAS-1962",
        "content_text": "115\n\nBRITAIN AND CHINA'\n\nReviewed by COLINA LUPTON, M.A.2\n\nChina is and will probably continue for some time to be the most unpredictable element in world affairs. With the passage of time she becomes more, not less so; her motives grow more obscure, her economic development more problematical, her political life—within the echelons of the Communist Party—more a matter for conjecture. On the face which she turns to the world there is little sign of the stresses and strains which she is undergoing; the information which China publishes about herself is remarkable only for the lack of knowledge it conveys. Unhappily—in view of our ignorance China is likely by sheer weight of numbers to be the dominant influence in the world in perhaps twenty years' time, and how this unleashed dragon will deal then with other nations largely depends on the kind of handling she receives now.\n\nHence any book which sheds light on Chinese thought processes, in particular relating present policies to past treatment, is a valuable one. Mr. Luard has gone one better and conjectured the course of the future. His book sets out a sane and lucid account of relations with China since the first British ships reached her shores in 1637, and describes both what he expects to see and what he would like to see happen in the next few years. In what really amounts to a series of essays on the historical background, on the Kuomintang, the Communists and the Korean war, on missionaries and merchants, Hong Kong and Taiwan—he neatly discusses, without a superfluity of chronological detail, the past, the present, and the future. This method necessitates a little overlapping between the chapters, but it is worth this since it saves a lot of narration inessential to the point of the book. For the author is trying to discuss sentiments and policies as much as facts, and this kind of pattern gives him the scope to do so. This is certainly not to say that he has ignored facts; though the historical background is compressed, the account of Britain's dealings with the Mao Tse-tung regime is very fully treated.\n\nBy Evan Luard. Chatto and Windus, 1962. 25/-.\n\n* The writer was formerly a research assistant in the Far East Department of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. She has been living in Hong Kong since the end of 1960, and is Assistant Editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206328,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 145,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "THE DISTRICT WATCH COMMITTEE\n\n139\n\n36 In 1917 there were 31 guilds for employers only (in trades such as silk, sandalwood, wicker furniture and copper), 35 skilled craftsmen guilds (sandalwood workers, masons, tinsmiths, etc.) and 5 guilds with mixed membership (employers and workers). There were also 17 district societies, such as the Heung Shan (Hsiang-shan) resident merchants association and the General Commercial Association of the Tung Kun (Tung-kuan) merchants resident in Hong Kong. See the list of exempted and registered societies in the Gazette, 27 April 1917.\n\n37 Wei Yuk was appointed in 1891 and served until his death in 1929. He resigned several times in order to allow a newcomer to join the Committee but was soon re-appointed. Lau Chu-pak was appointed in 1902 and served until his death in 1922. Sir Shouson Chow was appointed in 1917 and was still a member in 1949, the year of the demise of the Committee.\n\n38 During the years 1929 to 1931 and in 1936 the Committee met four times a year at Government House. Lennox Mills states that members had the right to a guard of the District Watch Force on the occasion of weddings and other festivities'. The Secretary for Chinese Affairs tells us in his report for 1936 that through the kindness of His Excellency the Committee was able to meet the members of the Mui Tsai Commission on the occasion of their first visit to the Colony, 'All members attended and there was a valuable discussion with frank interchange of views'. When the Governor, Sir Henry Blake, left the Colony in 1903 on the day of his departure he inspected the District Watchmen. Clearly, everything was done by the government to give prestige and éclat to the Committee and the force.\n\n19 T. C. Cheng, op. cit., p. 18.\n\n40 Of the Chinese land population in the 1901 census 227,615 returned themselves as natives of Kwangtung Province, 179,296 of this number belonging to the Kwong Chau Prefecture, 28,844 came from Tung-kuan hsien, 28,587 from P'an-yü hsien, and 27,221 from Nan-hai hsien. The situation was substantially the same in the censuses of 1911, 1921 and 1931. In 1911, for example, 311,992 out of 350,418 Chinese in Hong Kong, exclusive of the New Territories, spoke Cantonese,\n\n41 Op. cit., pp. 399-400.\n\n42 Heung Shan, present-day Chung Shan, is the arid county on the west side of the Pearl River, stretching down to Macau. It was the Heung Ha, the Cantonese term for the province, district or village from which each person derives his ancestry, of many prominent Chinese, including Ng Choy (Wu Ting-fang), Yung Wing (Yung Hung), Wong Shing (Huang Shêng), and Sun Yat-sen. Many Chinese merchants in Hong Kong came from this county; for example, Wei Yuk, Ma Ying-piu (founder of the Sincere Company), M. Y. San (before 1941 the largest biscuit manufacturer in China), Tsang Foo, Look Poong-shan (founder of the Bank of Canton). Su Chao-cheng, organiser and leader of the Seamen' Strike in 1922, came from this county; in 1928 Su was elected to the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. The anarchist, Liu Ssu-fu, was also born there. In 1938 the Chung Shan Commercial Association had a membership of over 4,000 in Hong Kong.\n\n43 In 1905, for example, at least seven members of the Committee were compradores to important western firms; one was manager of a native bank; another of a prosperous pawnshop; a third ran a large export firm. Ho Kai was primarily a financier rather than an entrepreneur. See on this point the Chinese speculator Marie-Claire Bergère, \"The Role of the Bourgeoisie' in M. C. Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 236.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 206874,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1973",
        "page_number": 151,
        "title": "RAS-1973",
        "content_text": "NOTES AND QUERIES\n\n145\n\nning among other matters the subjugation of the non-Chinese tribes of the interior.*\n\nAt the age of 71 he was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Civil Affairs in Nanking and later Vice-President of the Censorate. He died in great poverty in 1587 aged 74, his friends defraying the cost of his burial.\n\nIn November 1965 the editor of the Shanghai Wen Wei Pao, Yao Wen-yuan, who was also a left-inclined literary and theatre critic, published an article in which he criticised an historical drama \"The dismissal of Hai Jui\" written by the then Deputy Mayor of Peking, Wu Han. Yao's article was the opening volley in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which created such turmoil in China and purged so many of the senior communist cadres including Wu Han himself. Yao rose quickly and by 1969 was sixth in the leadership of the Chinese People's Republic only to slip to a lower position at the 10th Party Congress in August 1973. Yao, still a member of the Politbureau, is reported to be the son-in-law of Chairman Mao and a close associate of the radical Madame Mao.\n\nWu Han's historical play which cost him so dearly was criticised by Yao as an analogy of Mao's treatment of his \"loyal minister” Peng Te-huai, the Minister of National Defence purged by Mao in 1959. P'eng had been very outspoken in his opposition to two of the things closest to Mao's heart, the Great Leap Forward and the establishment of the People's Communes.\n\nHai Jui is well known to many Chinese as the minister who steadfastly opposed corruption. A legend told to me in Singapore by an elderly Buddhist nun recounted how Hai Jui as a very young junior official had been posted to the Swatow region (Ch'aochow) where a group of tyrannical landowners together with the local magistrate's police runners were terrorizing the people. The legend then told of Hai Jui's fight, first against his local superiors in support of the poor, later against the Prime Minister and finally against the Emperor himself. Hai Jui was forced to commit suicide, she said, to compel the Emperor to take notice of the problems of the masses and for this he was deified by the subsequent Emperor and is now one of the patrons of the Ch'aochow people.\n\nSee, in part, Herbert A. Giles, A Chinese Biographical Dictionary (London and Shanghai, Bernard Quaritch and Kelly and Walsh, 1898) pp. 242-243. Also W. F. Mayers, The Chinese Reader's Manual (Shanghai, American Presbyterian Mission Press, and London, Trübner and Co., 1874) pp. 45-46. Ed.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1973.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8910rj06r",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208020,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "A JOURNEY TO YENAN, 1946\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS*\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to record some experiences of a truck journey in early 1946 from Chungking, the wartime capital of the Republic of China, to Yenan, the Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, the Chinese Communist Party and capital of the Kansu-Ninghsia-Shensi Border Region, and back. This three-truck convoy carrying medical supplies was the first delivery to take place for a period of about four years, and a very brief review of the political background is perhaps required to set the scene.\n\nFollowing the Sian incident of December 1936, there were moves towards a united anti-Japanese front between the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists (Kungchangtang). This was followed on July 7, 1937, by the Marco Polo Bridge fighting and the start of the Japanese invasion of the heartland of China. In this period, there was a nominal united command of Kuomintang and Kungchangtang with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander. The New Fourth Army, based in Anhwei, had been formed from the Communist guerilla groups left behind in Central China, but friction developed between this and the Kuomintang forces, and in January 1941, it was attacked in South Anhwei and partly destroyed. This marked the end of the united front, and the Kuomintang re-introduced the blockade of the Liberated Areas under 18th Group Army control. These Liberated Areas were basically the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Suiyuan, Honan, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Jehol. Much of these areas were also under Japanese occupation of the cities, railways, and roads, but the countryside was effectively under the control of the Liberated Areas Regional Councils.\n\nThe reintroduction of the blockade meant that a proportion of the Kuomintang troops were engaged in this exercise rather than\n\n* Paper delivered to a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch on 31st May, 1977. Mr. Reynolds is head of the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Hong Kong.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208021,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 60,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "44\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nfacing the Japanese. Consequently it was part of American policy, especially from 1944 onwards, to re-create a united front against Japan and promote agreement on a form of Constitutional Government for China which would include the Communist Party. To this end Chairman Mao Tse Tung was escorted to Chungking in August 1945 by the US Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley. No real agreement was reached in some 41 days of talks and Chairman Mao returned to Yenan in October. Hurley resigned and in November the United States appointed General George Marshall as special negotiator, a truce was signed on January 10, 1946 and all-party Peoples Consultative Conference began*.\n\nHaving set the scene we may consider what this meant on the ground; specifically in terms of medical supplies to the Liberated Areas. These contained between 80-100 million people and perhaps 350,000 men under arms. Apart from supplies purchased and smuggled in from the Japanese occupied areas or captured, no UNRRA, International Red Cross, or other supplies had been allowed through from Chungking since the beginning of 1941, and the medical services were dependent on traditional medicines and drugs derived from available herbs. The situation was therefore very serious.\n\nThe UNRRA charter required that supplies be distributed to those in need regardless of race, religion, and party and UNRRA therefore applied pressure to the Chinese Government, via CNRRA, to allow supplies to go to the Liberated Areas. This pressure finally succeeded in January 1946 at the time of signing the truce and a permit for a total quantity of about eight tons of medical supplies was granted.\n\nDuring the period from the end of 1941 to 1946, the Friends Ambulance Unit, China Convoy, had been responsible for the transport of most of the civilian medical and relief supplies in the\n\n* For those desiring more detail of this period the following give different approaches:\n\nKenneth S. Chern, \"Politics of American China Policy, 1945: Roots of the Cold War in Asia\". Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 91, No. 4 Winter 1976-7.\n\nJohn S. Service, Lost Chance in China. Random House, 1974. Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50. 2 vols, Chicago, 1964.\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1977.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/np198x23n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208376,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 100,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "84\n\nEUGENE COOPER\n\n(Sowerby, 1926:2). The full blossoming of manufacture as a mode of production of carved furniture, however, did not have a chance to occur until the industry relocated to Hong Kong after the 1949 revolution.\n\nIn this setting, the traditional pattern of craft organization, which had been manifest in the existence of separate guilds for distinct craftsmen of differing native place, working in different woods, persisted in the structure of the labor force of the post-revolution art-carved furniture industry. In a period of \"manufacture\" which emerged in the 1950s, a variety of trade unions came into existence. Traditional craft boundaries between carpenter, carver, and painter, between rosewood and teak/camphorwood workers, and between craftsmen of different places of origin were all manifest in separate organizations of craft practitioners and remained strong throughout the period of \"manufacture\". Five unions thrived in this period, three among teak/camphorwood workers and two among rosewood workers. The separate crafts out of which the industry developed gave social expression to the synthetic nature of the industry in the form of separate unions.\n\nThe post-World War II development of trade unionism in the Hong Kong-based carved furniture industry is a study of how, in the context of the transformation from labor-intensive craft manufacture to capital-intensive, fully proletarianized industrial production, this traditional craft parochialism became manifest in a politically based polarization of the industry along Communist/Nationalist lines; and how, in this latter context, the Communist Hong Kong-Kowloon Woodwork Carvers' Union emerged as the dominant group in the labor force. It did so by adapting its proletarian message in various ways to the local conditions of its existence, while the conditions of that existence themselves underwent change, giving greater cogency to that message.\n\nThe first union in the carved wood furniture industry was located in the Canton-based rosewood industry in 1922, in a period when Sun Yat-sen and his Kuomintang party, still in alliance with the Chinese Communist Party, were actively engaged in organizing trade unions of a modern type among craftsmen and industrial workers on the heels of the demise of traditional guilds. The Chun Wah Rosewood Workers Union, organized in this context, is still active in contemporary Hong Kong. It followed Chiang Kai-shek",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208574,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 31,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "CHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nOstensibly for medical reasons, at the end of 1942 and early in 1943, to pass unutilized. No effort was spared to make the visitor feel welcomed and cherished. She was a guest at the White House and at President Roosevelt's home at Hyde Park. She was invited to address the Senate and the House, and was welcomed by huge gatherings at all the stops she made from the east to the west coasts.13 A further and significant gesture of American friendliness was embodied in the United States' renunciation early in 1943 of her extraterritorial rights in China,14 a subject to be further dealt with later. One last example of the American compensatory effort during the first two years of the Pacific War was the passing of an act in December 1943, by large majorities of both Houses of Congress, repealing the longstanding Chinese exclusion laws, establishing an annual Chinese immigration quota, and making legally admitted Chinese eligible for naturalization as American citizens.15\n\nIt is imperative to spell out in some detail the general American attitude vis-a-vis China, not only to serve as background to the subject under discussion, but also because such attitude unavoidably influenced Britain in her dealings with China, including those over the question of Hong Kong. Ever since Pearl Harbour, China had made no secret of her resentment of Britain for having rejected China's offer of assistance in the defence of Hong Kong and Burma, for having been so catastrophically defeated by Japan in such a short time, and for, according to Chou En-lai who was then representative of the Chinese Communist Party at Chungking, having “discriminated against and treated as inferiors the Chinese who fought with the British at Hong Kong and in Malaya.”16 Britain, on her part, was anxious to improve relations with China and to collaborate closely with the United States in relation to their Far Eastern ally. She was, not unlike the United States, \"obsessed” for the greater part of 1942 with the fear that China might \"throw up her hands.\" The Foreign Office decided that all that Britain could do was to \"adopt an apologetic and ingratiating attitude towards the Chinese.\" However, the United States, much to Britain's annoyance, stole the limelight from all the major British attempts at appeasing China. Britain's offer of a loan of £50,000,000, with stringent regulations regarding expenditure to maintain equilibrium in her post-war balance of payments, was a clear anti-climax to the Chinese after the unconditional American loan.18 Although Britain renounced her extraterritorial rights in China simultaneously",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209242,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 145,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "EDUCATION AS A BY-PRODUCT OF FISH MARKETING\n\n131\n\nIt is remarkable that the F.M.O. is not really among the agencies subjected to this lobbying. In their 1978 report, the F.M.O. (as distinct from its parent body, the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) is not mentioned. In conversation SoCO workers and F.M.O. officials appeared unaware of each others' interests in the welfare and education of Shui-sheung-yan. They were dealing, in fact, with what had become two separate populations.\n\nOther Shui-sheung-yan organisations: links between rich and poor.\n\nVery few organisations bridge the gap between the FMO-constituency and the SoCO constituency; those that do, however, are worth mentioning. This paper will look at the Hong Kong and Kowloon Fishermen's Association, Ltd. in the port of Castle Peak; the three Fishermen's Recreation Clubs of Chai Wan, Stanley and Lamma Island; and the remarkable Chan Ye-So Kaau-Ooi (True Jesus Church) in the island of Ap Chau and the border port of Sha Tau Kok.\n\nThe Hong Kong and Kowloon Fishermen's Association Ltd.\n\nThis association is a trade union in which the Chinese Communist Party plays a leading role; as the F.M.O. liaison officer at Castle Peak put it, it acts as an intermediary for such Hong Kong fishermen as require it with the Chinese authorities, and can assess and influence the politics of the fishing industry in Hong Kong. Many Castle Peak fishermen are also registered with Chinese coastal communes. In 1971 it had built a handsome floating headquarters, which is still in the harbour at Castle Peak.\n\nThe same process of mechanisation and reduction of the fishing fleet that operate throughout the territory had perforce affected its aims. By 1980, only 60 percent of its membership were still active fishermen, and their secretary stressed the achievement of better housing on land as being currently their main objective. Education could not be a priority issue for the boat-people when their living standards were so low. Because many had registered only recently, they were very low in the queue for public re-housing. The boat-people wanted to be re-housed together, and it would take less than one of the tall blocks of flats on a new housing estate to do so, but the housing authority would not allow group applications for re-housing; they would only take applications from individual families. One of the seven or eight new blocks of flats that had been built around the harbour area had had the character for fish in its name, and the boat people had thought it MUST",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209466,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 123,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "101\n\nlawyers two months training in \"New Democracy\" and placing them under Communist cadres.\n\nWhen the People's Political Consultative Conference, organized by the victorious Chinese Communist Party, issued its \"Common Programme\" formally establishing the People's Republic in September 1949, it also adopted an Organic Law of the Central People's Government, Article 5 of this document provided for a Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate, but no action was taken on the establishment of a system of lower courts until September 1951. In fact, during this period, civil and criminal courts left over from the Kuomintang period continued to function alongside military, revolutionary, and people's tribunals. Article 17 of the Common Programme had done away with the six codes of the Kuomintang, but new laws were published in rapid order, some 3,452 of them by September of 1954, including major laws dealing with land reform, marriage, the punishment of counter-revolutionaries and corruption. However, no systematic codes were issued and there were many gaps in areas which lawmakers in most societies would consider of prime importance, including such crimes as homicide. When appropriate laws and regulations were lacking, judges were supposed to use the general policies of Mao's \"New Democracy.\" Such ambiguity naturally led to great inconsistency in judgments, and judges were forced to make wide use of analogy even to the point of secretly basing their decisions on Kuomintang legal precedent.\n\nIn the autumn of 1952 a National Judicial Conference was called to launch a reform of the courts. By the time the movement came to an end in April 1953, many former Kuomintang officials had been removed from the judicial system, but the problem of judicial decision making continued to persist. A Chinese Political Science and Law Association was established in the spring of 1953 which in May of the following year began publishing its national legal journal, Zhengfa yanjiu [Researches in Political Science and Law]. At the same time, a special legal publishing house was established and began producing annual collections of laws. Several law schools or institutes for training judicial cadres were also opened. Finally a second National\n\n--",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209469,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 126,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "104\n\nW. ALLYN RICKETT\n\nof presenting their opinions to the Party. The opportunity was too much for judicial workers to pass up, and the speeches which followed were often extremely vitriolic. Almost every aspect of existing judicial practice came under attack, particularly the role played by the Party. The editor of the Association's journal, Zhengfa yanjiu, demanded that high Communist cadres “get down out of their sedan chairs\". Some of the more important demands presented, as reported by the New China News Agency on May 29, 1957, included: 1) reform of law schools and the broadening of legal education to include such subjects as international law, which had been neglected under the Communists; 2) relaxation of the dictatorship and stress on the protection of democratic privileges; 3) immediate codification of the laws which were said in many fields to be entirely lacking or so vague they could not be used as a basis for sound legal judgments; 4) elimination of mass movements which usurped the function of the courts; 5) assertion of judicial independence and elimination of Party interference in judicial matters. What was even more surprising was that among the strongest critics were members of the Party, including Jia Qian, chief judge of one of the two criminal divisions of the Supreme Court. In spite of the highly emotional language used in expressing these demands, there was little questioning of the basic leadership role of the Party in society at large. Yet, when the counterattack came in the context of the well-known Anti-Rightist Movement two weeks later, it soon became clear that the Party was going to interpret these demands in that light. Extensive purges followed. Many leading judicial figures were declared “rightists” and relieved of their posts and some were sent to the countryside for reform through labour.\n\nThe attack on the \"rightists\" continued throughout the rest of the year and on into the spring of 1958. The arguments that filled the law journals during these months indicated a complete reversal of the former trend toward an independent judicial system and its attendant professionalism. The anti-rightist arguments of this period are well represented in a January 19, 1958 radio speech of Wu Defeng, Vice-President of the Chinese Political Science and Law Association. Wu presented a series of statements which he claimed represented the views of the \"rightists\" along with his replies:",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209479,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 136,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "114\n\nW. ALLYN RICKETT\n\nnew laws, can it be said that that there is any more hope now than existed in 1956 that the paper guarantees of the new legal system will prevail? I think there is. This optimism rests primarily on some major changes taking place in the society and in the thinking of the top leadership in the Communist Party. Unlike the earlier reforms, which in respect of the 1954 Constitution were more formal than real and pushed primarily by a small group of profession-oriented intellectuals, the new reforms come from the top and are based on the disastrous experience of the Cultural Revolution. Most of China's present leadership personally suffered from the arbitrary abuse of power at that time and have come to realize the need for a stable legal system. Furthermore, post-Gang of Four China is no longer the China of the past. The prestige of the Party has diminished greatly, the general population is no longer as malleable as it was in the past, and, perhaps most important of all, the rapid modernization and internationalization of the economy require a stable legal system.\n\nIndicative of some of the change taking place in China is the new Constitution adopted on December 4, 1982. In the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions, the Party is clearly recognized as having a special position of power. The 1978 Constitution begins by stating:\n\nThe People's Republic of China is a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. (Article 1)\n\nThe Communist Party of China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people. The working class exercises leadership over the state through its vanguard the Communist Party of China.\n\nThe guiding ideology of the People's Republic of China is Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought. (Article 2)\n\nAlthough Article 3 goes on to say that all power belongs to the people and is to be exercised through the National People's Congress and local people's congresses, in point of fact the first two articles clearly give that power to the Communist Party and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209480,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 137,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "115\n\nin practice the Party becomes the state. Furthermore, Article 56 states: \"Citizens must support the leadership of the Communist Party of China.\n\nTherefore any criticism of the Party or its role in the society could easily be interpreted as counter-revolutionary whatever the rest of the Constitution or other laws might say.17\n\nThe new Constitution returns to the 1954 model in that, except for the Preamble, the Communist Party is not even mentioned by name, no longer is the PRC a \"socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,\" but a \"socialist state of the people's democratic dictatorship.\" The significance of this statement is that it is at least a theoretical recognition of the rights of other classes besides the proletariat and thus a weakening of the dictatorial power of the Communist Party. Moreover, Article 5 explicitly states that all parties must abide by the Constitution and the law. Another change which may prove to be of some significance is the more moderate tone taken toward class struggle. According to the Preamble: \"The exploiting classes as such have been eliminated in our country. However, class struggle will continue to exist within certain limits for a long time to come. The Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's socialist system and try to undermine it.\"18 According to Peng Zhen, who gave the major report on the draft of the new Constitution to the members of the NPC, this means that \"class struggle is no longer the principle contradiction in Chinese society. This basic characteristic requires a substantial change in the focus of work of the state and its guiding principles.”19 One can only hope this means that at least the repression of the Anti-Rightist movement and factional violence of the Cultural Revolution are things of the past.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Under the empire the concept of individual rights was non-existent. From 1908 to 1947, China had some 12 constitutions either proposed or adopted, and even though all but one contained some formal listing of the rights of citizens, in each case these rights were carefully restricted by lists of duties and obligations or by the statement that such rights were to be enjoyed only in accordance with law. See Meredith P. Gilpatrick, \"The Status of Law and Lawmaking Procedure under the Kuomintang, 1925-46,\" The Far Eastern Quarterly, X.1 (Nov. 1950), 50.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209481,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 138,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "116\n\nW. ALLYN RICKETT\n\n' Mao Zedong, “Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baokao,” Mao Zedong xuanji (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1964), 16.\n\n* See Patricia Griffin, The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counter-Revolutionaries: 1924-1949. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.\n\nIt is interesting that in many cases involving homicide resulting from marriage or family problems, the accused was formally sentenced in accordance with the Marriage Law of June 1950, which in itself simply stated that persons guilty of such an offense would bear criminal responsibility before the law.\n\n\"The right of defense was provided for in Art. 12 of the \"Provisional Regulations of the Shanghai People's Court Governing the Disposal of Civil and Criminal Cases\" (Aug. 11, 1949) and in Art. 6 of the \"Organic Regulations of the People's Tribunals\" (July 20, 1950), but was left out of the \"Provisional Organic Regulations of the People's Courts\" (Sept. 3, 1950). I know of no case where defense was actually permitted during the pre-Constitution period. Even appeal was very rare. The first public notice of the use of lawyers that I know of involved thirteen American nationals charged with espionage who were tried and then released in November 1954 by a military tribunal.\n\n冉\n\n* According to an editorial in the Guangming Ribao (Jan. 27, 1957), by 1957 there were some 670 legal advisory offices with 2,100 professional lawyers scattered throughout the country. Fees were paid by clients to the legal advisory office according to their ability to pay. Lawyers were paid salaries by the advisory office. As a defense counsel, people's lawyers were not considered an agent of the accused. They constituted an independent party at the trial and were not bound by the will of the defendant. Their duty was to help clarify the facts and present whatever extenuating circumstances might assist the judges in rendering a fair sentence.\n\n* Codification had been called for as far back as the Yenan Period and in 1948 it was discussed by the Central Committee of the CCP. This led to the formation of a Law Codification Committee in 1950. However, nothing seems to have been done until after the passage of the Constitution. Finally in Nov. 1956 it was announced that a draft criminal code consisting of some 261 articles had been completed by the Law Section of the Standing Committee of the NPC and had been turned over to the Standing Committee's Bills Committee for discussion and amendments.\n\n* Renmin Ribao, Dec. 12, 1957 and Zhenfa yanjiu, 1958, No. 1, 18-23. * Zhengfa yanjiu, 1958, No. 1, 10-17.\n\n10 For an excellent survey of developments during the period 1978-80, see Shao-chuan Leng, \"Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Some Preliminary Observations,\" China Quarterly, 87 (Sept. 1981), 440-469.\n\n\"For an English translation of all seven laws, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: PRC, 27 and 30 July 1979. The Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Procedure have also been translated by Jerome Cohen, The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 73,1 (Spring 1982), 135-203, and by Chin Kim, The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 25 (Littleton, Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1982).\n\n12 Article 43 of the Criminal Code limits the use of the death penalty to only \"the most heinous offenses\" (homicide, rape, arson, robbery, dike-breaching, planting explosives, embezzling public property, and counter-revolutionary crimes). It also stipulates that unless immediate execution is mandatory, a two-year reprieve may be granted. If the offender shows evidence of repentance, the death penalty may be converted to a life or term sentence.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 209716,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 373,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "BOOK REVIEWS\n\n351\n\nstudy of revolts, reforms and revolutions in the South East Asian region is of particular interest and relevance for the outside world. This is because the variety of its component races, religions and political systems, before and after the colonial period, are paralleled by the diversity of situations experienced in revolution, reform and revolt. They are as diverse in kind as the very varied social, cultural, economic, historical context will allow, whether in or outside the colonial period, whether the colonial power was French, British or Dutch, whether a communist party was present or not. They are also, they claim, made the more interesting through the variety of \"models,\" outside assistance and influences available to the leaders of its governments and insurgent movements alike.\n\nThe authors state that, out of the total of twelve articles, five study revolts, three reforms and four revolutions. Five of the nine new states are represented (Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Singapore and Vietnam), with the former colonies of French Indo-china making up three quarters. Two articles concern events before 1914, three take place between 1914 and 1945 and four after the Second World War, and three span several of these periods. Neither the early period of colonial penetration nor the contemporary scene have been neglected, though by choice the authors have generally not gone back beyond 1850.\n\nGenerally speaking, the essays illustrate the theme of the Introduction, and they do cover a most diverse and interesting set of events. This is a stimulating collection of essays which will certainly be of value to serious students of South East Asia. Also, they bear out the authors' claim that they have a wider relevance than the region in which they are set.\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nChinese Festivals Joan Law and Barbara E. Ward, South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, 1982, 95pp, including Bibliography, Index. 85 Colour plates\n\nIt is surprising that no-one produced a book like this long ago. Of course, this superb volume is no less welcome for that. The book consists of a short introduction, followed by brief",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210792,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1986",
        "page_number": 143,
        "title": "RAS-1986",
        "content_text": "126\n\nD.L. MICHALK\n\nby governors and generals striving to grasp independent power, and China was plunged into bloody civil war. Guangdong Province, the birth-place of the republican movement, immediately proclaimed itself independent. Sun Yat-sen, the \"Father of the Republic\", was elected generalissimo, and in 1924 the Kuomintang (the People's Party) was formed. Upon the death of Dr. Sun in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek, backed by his modernized army, emerged as the Kuomintang (KMT) leader, and with assistance from Communist factions began campaigns against the north which culminated in the fall of Shanghai in 1927.\n\nChoosing not to expropriate the capitalist bankers in Shanghai as demanded by the Communists, the KMT and Communists became bitter rivals which re-ignited armed struggle in south China. Fuelled by Communist propaganda, there came a genuine uprising of the peasantry against the KMT for failure to deliver promised tax and land reforms throughout the southern provinces. As part of this general uprising, the first group of “freedom fighters\" appeared on Hainan in 1927 and staged guerilla warfare on the island until Liberation, twenty-three years later (Fairfax-Cholmeley, 1963).\n\nAlthough armed conflicts between Peking and southern forces had occurred previously on Hainan such as those which led to the capitulation of General Lung's army in 1918 (Moninger, 1919), fighting was confined to the soldiery. However, the Communist tactics brought the conflict to the common citizens by inciting peasants to take up arms against the oppressive gentry and greedy merchants. The effects of lightning raids caused havoc in northern Hainan: numerous villages were abandoned, others sacked and reduced to ash-strewn rubble, and large tracts of farming land were deserted (McClure, 1934b).\n\nIn fact, the revolutionary play, Red Detachment of Women, was loosely based on incidents which occurred in Hainan in 1931. At a bridge about one kilometre south of the present Xinglong Overseas Chinese State Farm, a guerilla band led by Hong Chang-qing assassinated Nan Ba-tian, a cruel landlord. In reprisal, the landlord's forces captured and executed the guerilla leader. However, a slave girl, Wu Qing-hua, took his place as commander and",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210793,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1986",
        "page_number": 144,
        "title": "RAS-1986",
        "content_text": "127\n\ncontinued the guerilla war from bases in the nearby Nanlin Hills (Paul, 1982). As a revolutionary base was established, workers' and peasants' democratic governments were formed at the county level throughout Hainan, the first being set up in Lingshui County amongst the Li community (Gao, 1981).\n\nThreatened by the possible emergence of a unified China, Japan, which already had a firm foothold in northern China, landed troops in Shanghai in 1928 in order to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's power and prolong the onset of the inevitable Sino-Japanese war. Taking advantage of the rift between the KMT and Communists, Japan strengthened her influence, first by invading Manchuria in 1931, and finally, by means of a number of orchestrated landings in 1937, secured the whole of the coast of China, effectively severing all major supply arteries to the country: China was no longer a dangerous adversary (Eberhard, 1969). As part of this offensive, Hainan was first attacked in August, 1937 (Clark, 1938), and Japanese forces quickly occupied the coastal fringe. By February, 1939, Hainan, like the mainland, was subdued (Wigmore, 1957).\n\nRemnants of the old Red Guard units, hardened by 12 years of battle with the KMT, took up positions around the island immediately behind the Japanese and used their guerilla tactics to harass the intruders, while the KMT held defensive positions in the central mountains (Fairtex-Cholmeley, 1963). It appears that a non-interference agreement was quickly ratified between the Japanese and the KMT, leaving the Communist guerillas to pose the chief threat to the invading Japanese (Paul, 1982). Although Mao Tse-tung committed the Communist Party to collaborate with the KMT, conflict continued between the two factions even in Hainan where in 1943, the Li leaders, Wang Guo-xing* and Wang Yu-jin, led 20,000 tribesmen in an armed foray against KMT troops entrenched in the Five Finger Mountains (Gao, 1981). In spite of these \"domestic\" conflicts, the combined Chinese forces tied up two Japanese divisions in Hainan (MacCrae, personal communication).\n\nDue to its strategic location, Hainan became a training and staging area for the Japanese southward thrust, with components of the XXV Japanese Army being exercised on the island during",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210984,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 46,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "21\n\nnineteenth-century sinologists had laid the foundations for modern China in studies in the West.\n\nBut this long episode of almost total neglect of China was to come to an end with the unexpected ascendancy of Communist China. French intellectuals were caught completely unprepared, all the more since there was strictly no equivalent in France to the sympathetic writings of Snow, Smedley and so many other reporters who had prepared at least some sections of British and American public opinion for the Communist takeover. The French intellectual scene was a blank page - a very Maoist feature and this was a decisive contributing factor to what has since been described as the 'love affair' between Maoist China and French intellectuals.\n\nThis love affair is a very complex story, and requires a much closer look. It had first of all to do with the rejection on the part of the French intellectuals of Soviet-styled communism, once so popular with them. China and Maoism provided ex-Communist Party members with an occasion to settle their accounts with Moscow. Chinese communism was also considered a valuable experiment in Marxist economic theory, and noted economists, such as Charles Bettelheim, always made this point. For Jean-Paul Sartre, who was in the late 1960s at the peak of his cultural and political prestige, Peking was definitely different from Moscow.\n\nChina also met a basic aspiration among French left-wing intellectuals, which I would describe as political exoticism, that is, the tendency to look for a political homeland and model of reference in distant, exotic countries. At times in Cuba, at one time in Algeria, in Vietnam, then in China; each provided a substitute for the ideal society France was unable to develop at home, especially after the failure of the May '68 movement which had been so popular with most intellectuals, and not only with students. The radical young intellectuals of the May '68 generation, such as André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy, who were later to establish themselves as trendy 'new philosophers', were among the most devoted Maoists.\n\n—\n\nBut it would be just too easy to restrict the love affair between Maoism and French intellectuals to such radical groups. At least",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 210986,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 48,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "23\n\nLa Pléiade was wide open to classical Chinese literature, which benefited from the Maoist vogue.\n\nThe Maoist mirage met nevertheless with reservations and condemnations from various quarters — from the conservative Catholic right-wing and also from the pro-Moscow French Communist Party, which was hardly surprising, but also from two more specific groups, rather influential among intellectuals. The academic sinologists, on one hand, were very critical of the pro-Maoist fashion; with very few exceptions, they were well aware of the simplistic naivety of the new sinophiles. Yet, one should wonder whether their open hostility towards the fashionable intellectuals was not, after all, a kind of defensive reaction against what sinologists considered to be trespassing on their professional estate! On the other hand, pro-Maoist intellectuals were harassed pitilessly by a radical and very vociferous group, the young situationists, whose overall attack against established cultural values of every kind had been an important contribution to the May '68 movement. Thus, an unexpected anti-Maoist alliance was formed between respectable sinologists and sniping situationists, which was to make a lasting impact in France and in which the Canberra academic scene also became involved.\n\nLooking at this strange, erratic, very emotional love affair at a distance, some fifteen or twenty years later, how should we react — including myself? The whole affair was certainly a strange combination of affectation and naivety, of misinformation and self-complacency, which deserves blame and regret and nothing else. We were definitely lacking intellectual rigour, caution, and integrity. Not only did we satisfy ourselves with a rosy picture of China, which was conveyed to us by visitors on short-term and carefully controlled tours, but we made this rosy picture an essential ingredient of our social prestige, our publishing careers, our popularity with the media. We failed completely to assess properly our responsibility towards French public opinion and especially towards those for whom China understandably meant hope, determination, the ability to shape one's own future. I am not sure that self-criticism was something George Ernest Morrison was quite familiar with. But I am pleased that the present Morrison Lecture gives me a convenient occasion for expressing such regret.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 211240,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 301,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "276\n\nA lot of work on local history is being done in Taiwan, and the only thing that I can say about it is that the local life they describe is exceedingly peculiar compared with the New Territories. What's coming out from Taiwan does not represent the same society at all; and I'm sure that the researchers in Taiwan are as eminently honest as we are. It seems you've got a divergence, but then we all know (for instance) that local Cantonese think that Chiuchaus are “barbarians” anyway, and the same goes for the Taiwanese. So almost certainly, there is a substantial cultural 'divide' between this part of Canton and Taiwan.\n\nNext speaker — Who wrote these classic works, and when?\n\nPH— Some of the classic works were written in the 20's, many of them are dated in the 30's, and some are as late as the 1940's. They were almost all by anthropologists, who were also people with a major political connection. In other words, they were senior figures in the KMT or they were people connected with the Communist party at the time; and their books were almost written in major cities of China like Shanghai, Nanking or Peking with a few in Canton. The villages that were being studied were close to, sometimes within walking distance of, those cities which themselves are situated in the most fertile parts of China. Hong Kong, as you know, is only a city by pure chance, being very mountainous and a poor and remote area. My own guess is that what you see in Hong Kong is probably more likely to be closer to the truth; in that two thirds of rural China is mountainous, poor, and far from the major cities. But whilst I wouldn't like to put my hand on my heart and say that it was true for the major areas at the doorsteps of the big cities, I think it is worth stressing that the work we are doing shows that one shouldn't try to say that all Chinese village life was this or that, because it almost certainly was not.\n\nDF— But the unity of China was not skin-deep.\n\nPH— The unity of China was not skin-deep, no, but some of the cultural and managerial practices were. At least, they differ from district to district.\n\nJH\n\nThe impression we get, if we in Hong Kong now have to",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 211684,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 99,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "74\n\nConcession\". We even opened offices on board and transacted business, which for the most part was concerned with collecting monies due against outstanding accounts. A large proportion of the foreign import trade with China was done on a basis whereby credit was allowed to the Chinese merchant, until he in his turn had time to collect the proceeds of the sale from the final customer or consumer. The foreigner thus injected into the stream of Chinese trade a stimulant, which was certainly not without advantage to the recipient.\n\nThe disturbances at Kiu Kiang and Hankow received world-wide publicity, and led to the Chen-O'Malley negotiations under which it was agreed to return these two Concessions to China. Photographs had been taken of the looted interiors of the houses in Kiu Kiang, providing evidence, which could not be refuted, of the damage; and the new Chinese government of General Chiang Kai Shek agreed to pay compensation of 40,000 dollars, Chinese currency,\n\nOn March 24th part of the Revolutionary Army under General Cheng Chien entered Nanking, and there looted and committed excesses, which included the murder of several American and British subjects, the violating of women, and the wounding of the British consul. To cover the escape of the remaining foreigners, who were being attacked in a house on Socony ridge, British and American cruisers, from the river, put down a barrage round the hill. These demonstrations of uncivilised behaviour, coming on top of the incidents at Kiu Kiang and Hankow, caused the Revolutionary Government a severe loss of face.\n\nA few days after, a split occurred between the conservative wing of the Kuo Min Tang party, led by Chiang Kai Shek, and the Russian influenced Communist elements. In Shanghai some thousands of Communists, who had provided the spearhead for the almost bloodless occupation of the Chinese city, were executed or murdered through the agency of two powerful secret societies, the Green \"tong\" and the Red \"tong\", with whom Chiang Kai Shek appears to have had a close affiliation.\n\nOther members of the Kuo Min Tang, who had remained with the seat of government at Hankow, where Russian influence was strongest, declared their wing of the Kuo Min Tang to be the only legitimate one, and they proceeded to expel Chiang Kai Shek from its ranks. They were, however, unable to carry the army with them, and by July the situation",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 211685,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 100,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "75\n\nhad developed to a point where Borodin and the other Russian advisers found it expedient to depart hurriedly overland for Russia.\n\nIn Kiu Kiang, though situated in between these centres of disturbance, the local tension eased and we returned to the shore in April; it was not, however, until the end of the year that the British authorities considered conditions sufficiently stable to justify the return of the women and children who had been evacuated.\n\nKiu Kiang is a small, relatively unimportant place: the interest in the change of the status of the Concession lay rather in the new precedents set than in the local readjustments. A Chinese Commissioner was appointed to supervise the various municipal services, and if the change resulted in the removal of a long-felt grievance in the alleged loss of sovereignty, the advantage outbalanced such small inconveniences as the fact that the drains smelt a bit more, the police force was a little less efficient, and the number of clerks in the municipal office increased five-fold.\n\nThe political disputes in the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang party before the end of the year brought about no less than three changes of the official appointed to administer the Kiu Kiang Concession; and each change also involved a complete displacement of the municipal staff and police, as the new man always had his own henchmen to provide for. In one instance the departing official went in such fear of his life that he applied for a safe-conduct on a British gunboat and hurriedly left for Shanghai.\n\nIn August revolt broke out in the Revolutionary Army in Nanchang, a hundred miles south of Kiu Kiang. Two divisions under Generals Yeh Ting and Ho Lung mutinied and marched south to establish a communist state on the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan provinces. These communist forces, while guilty of the grossest cruelty to any rich Chinese \"capitalists\" they might catch, were able to attract the support of the poor, and more particularly of the landless peasantry to whom the communist policy of agrarian reform greatly appealed.\n\nConsequences of importance to the future of China flowed from these events. In the first place Chiang Kai Shek looked more and more for his support to the wealthy Chinese merchants and bankers of Shanghai.\n\nIn the second place, the seeds were then planted of the irreconcilable",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212392,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 334,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "311\n\nspite of his deep love for his motherland.\n\nNaturally, his pictures take pride of place in the 'Overseas Chinese Museum' which has over 6,000 exhibits portraying the Ming and Qing diaspora. The building was completed in 1956, endowed by Tan and other overseas donors. Like most similar establishments in China, information is available in Chinese only. If the People's Republic really wishes to attract overseas visitors, is it too much to ask that literature and captions be printed in English as well?\n\nThe Group also made a visit to Huli Shan Fortress, completed in 1823, which protected the entrance to the fine, deep-sea port in the lead-up to the First Opium War. The island of Quemoy, from which the Nationalist Government relayed propaganda with loudspeakers during the 'cold war', lies only 2.4 kilometres off the Communist China Mainland near this fortress.\n\nThe RAS Party later went to the Nanputuo Temple, under the towering 'Five Old Men Peak', which is an architectural masterpiece and crammed with Buddhist statuary. Renovations were in progress. It was encouraging, too, to see the local People's Patriotic Church had recently been given a facelift by the provincial government.\n\nBut impressions lie in the senses of the beholder. Some RAS Members may especially remember Xiamen for its reasonably priced seafood available, with over 600 varieties of fish compared to Hong Kong, or the edible frogs or fine noodles. There was even champagne available with the buffet breakfast!\n\n―\n\nNevertheless, for the author, the most treasured recollections are of banyans and buildings. Some of the former, with labyrinths of contorting, twisting roots, were probably growing a century-and-a-half ago, before the island became a Treaty port. The town is also a 'museum' of vernacular and colonial architecture.\n\nWhether the vantage point is Bill Job's workshop or the hotel window, a vista of old, mellowed, orange, Chinese 'roll and trough' roof tiles, with some roofs of interlocking tiles, blend in reasonably well with new structures erected often from overseas remittances. Although the more ornate, gently sloping, swallow-tail roofs were traditionally reserved for temples, official buildings, and residences",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212419,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 361,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "338\n\nconsiders the scale of the task that he set himself. The Search for Modern China is a landmark in China scholarship. Spence's talent as a raconteur and his immensely readable style enable him to succeed in making history interesting to the nonspecialist.\n\nOn the present succession crisis in China, Spence points out the eerie parallel between Deng Xiaoping's behavior today and that of Mao Zedong in his last years, with each man anointing, then purging, one hand-picked successor after another. Even greater perspective is provided by his relating the present situation to that of the early Qing dynasty, when the emperor Kangxi was brought, as Spence put it, \"to the edge of despair\" by the succession question (p. 245), not being able to decide which of his many sons to name as his heir.\n\nThe author provides a rare perspective on China's centuries-old struggle to come to terms with the rest of the world,\n\nHe recalls that the reformers of 1898 had sought to resolve this tension by developing the concept of ti, or \"essence,\" and yong, or \"practical use.\" This formulation, Spence says, \"affirmed that there was indeed a fundamental structure of Chinese moral and philosophical values that gave continuity and meaning to the civilization. Holding on to that belief, China could then afford to adopt quickly and dramatically all sorts of Western practices, and to hire Western advisers\" (p. 225).\n\nSpence sees Deng and the other Chinese leaders today falling victim to the nineteenth-century fallacy that China could join the modern world entirely on its own terms, sacrificing nothing of its prevailing ideological purity\" (p. 746).\n\nHe feels this effort is doomed to failure. \"The task was even more hopeless in the late 1980s than it had been in the 1880s”, Spence concludes. \"What was left of Chinese Communist doctrine after the rejection of many of Mao's ideas and the emergence of the enterprise system was a thinner gruel even than the overformalized Confucianism that had guided the reformers of the late Qing. The party elders flailing out at Zhao Ziyang and his noisy supporters were reacting in an oddly similar way to the Empress Dowager Cixi as she struck back at Emperor Guangxu for attempting his Hundred Days' Reforms\" (p. 746).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212422,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 364,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "341\n\ndegradation and contempt. Questions of reform or revolution, democracy or proletarian dictatorship were deeply exercising the minds of those bent on national salvation, personal power, or both.\n\nMen seized on new ideas and later changed their attitudes under the influence of both local pressures and growing familiarity with western political theories. The moves of the major actors rarely seem to have been clear-cut or consistent.\n\nThe aim of the author here, Michael Y.L. Luk (a Senior History Lecturer at the University of Hong Kong) is to trace the thinking of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party and their attempts to develop an agreed ideology. He is also concerned to show how the outcome of these attempts would in time affect the party's whole political destiny.\n\nThis is a book for scholars and students, a dissertation not aimed at the general reader. The interplay of ideas on the part of the activists and theoreticians has its own dense vocabulary, and the writing and presentation are uncompromisingly academic.\n\nHowever Luk fully achieves his purpose. The book records the varying convictions of visionaries and men of action at a crucial time in the history of China and gives a penetrating view of the way men thought and the policies they accepted in those years of warlords, Sun Yat-sen republicanism, and struggling political parties.\n\nTwo influences emerge clearly first, that of the Russian Revolution echoing round the world, and the writings of Lenin on colonialism. Secondly the indigenous thinking of left-wing Chinese intellectuals, notably Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. Why did the Chinese avant-garde listen to the voice of the Russians and brush aside the teaching of a Dewey or Hu-shih? Almost until the official founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 it was the Americans who had exercised a major influence. But new universities and hospitals and the YMCA seem to have provided an insufficient answer to the frustrations of Chinese life. Revolution was in the air and it was the Russian experts who moved in to show the Chinese enthusiasts how to organise it.\n\nYet although Marxism-Leninism entered China as a brand-new",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212423,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 365,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "342\n\nview of the world, its acceptance had been prepared by anarchist and socialist ideas already current since the nineties. Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu were the progenitors of the Chinese Communist movement. Both were university intellectuals. And, as Luk points out, although Chen Duxiu has been portrayed as a determinist who favoured bourgeois leadership and a bourgeois dominated period after national revolution, this view of him is unfounded. He believed in revolution by the masses and saw, early on, the importance of the peasants as a means of achieving it.\n\nLuk awards a relatively minor role to Mao Zedong in the development of party ideology and buries, once and for all, the simplistic idea propagated by some popular writers that Mao's was the first lone voice that revolution was possible only through the countryside. Mao brought the weight of personal knowledge and experience to bear on the question, but there were others, more influential, who thought as he did.\n\nThe greatest difficulty experienced by the Communist party-founders in China was in applying Russian Bolshevik doctrine to a Chinese situation. What did Lenin mean by \"feudal conditions\"? How important was the Chinese proletariat, numbering only a few millions, even though for the Russians its role was crucial? There were many more such questions giving rise to internal contradictions and differences.\n\nThe Communists in China, as we know, joined the Guomindang as a \"bloc-within\" and in 1927 Chiang Kaishek turned on his unwelcome allies and nearly destroyed them. But despite this catastrophic set back the ideologies already developed in the party were largely maintained. According to Luk, Mao Zedong was later to take over all the main ingredients of the revolutionary model of the 1920s. The major difference now was that the CCP, after 1927, was on the one hand more determined to establish itself as an independent political and military force and on the other hand, was by now well aware of the limits of class struggle and willing to adjust its policies accordingly. It is said that, to carry out revolution successfully, both ideology and organisation are indispensable. By the late nineteen-thirties the CCP had developed both these weapons to a formidable degree.\n\nANTHONY LAWRENCE",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212426,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 368,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "345\n\nCollar, Hugh, CAPTIVE IN SHANGHAI: A STORY OF INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1990. xvi + 160 pp. Index. Hugh Collar, unofficial head of the British in Shanghai after the Sino-Japanese War became a part of World War II, wrote an account of the international community under Japanese internment. This is a rambling but often interesting account, edited by Pauline Woodroffe.\n\nAN\n\nLiu Binyan, CHINA'S CRISIS: ESSAYS FROM INTELLECTUAL IN EXILE, translated from the Chinese into English by Howard Goldblatt, Cambridge (Mass): Harvard University Press, 1990. xxv + 50 pp. Index. This volume comprises a series of five lectures given at Harvard in 1988-89 by one of China's most eminent dissidents. Liu, who had suffered for his intellectual principles during the 1950s as well as during the Cultural Revolution a decade later, was expelled from the Communist Party and was banned from publishing. There is a Foreword written by Professor Merle Goldman.\n\nMehrotra, Santosh K., INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION: TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, Notes. Bibliography. Index. As the title indicates, this work is about the economic relationship between the Soviet Union and India (an industrialized planned economy and a developing market economy). The period covered is between 1955 and just before the book went to press.\n\nASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 1992, 1992. 313 pp. This study of economic development in the Asian countries containing a large amount of information with useful statistics, was published by the Asian Development Bank and Oxford University Press.\n\nDardess, John W, CONFUCIANISM AND AUTOCRACY: PROFESSIONAL ELITES IN THE FOUNDING OF THE MING DYNASTY, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983. 358 pp. with 1 map. Glossary. Bibliography. Index. Professor Dardess argues that, far from being a 'socially indeterminate category', the body of elitist professional Confucian public servants consciously created a highly centralized state at the beginning of the Ming dynasty, leading to five hundred years of autocracy in China.\n\ndeBary, William Theodore, FIRST ASIAN CIVILIZATIONS: A",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212533,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 87,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "67\n\non a year by year basis, with events mainly related to performing arts and art exhibitions. In 1980, five performing arts groups visited the United States and two art exhibitions were launched. After a slight decline in activity in 1981, the number rose to eight events in both 1982 and 1983, taking performing arts and art exhibitions together. In the following two years, the numbers of Chinese cultural events continued to rise, though not drastically.\n\nLooking at these statistics, though not complete it is easy to see that there have been up and downs in the 15 years of Sino-American arts exchanges between 1972 and 1986, reflecting domestic political developments in both countries. In China, the years 1972-1978 were politically uncertain. The death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 and the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping led to new political disorder. After the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, the country began to concentrate on modernization. Eventually this programme led to a loosening of the controls of Chinese political life.\n\nThe relaxation of political control started in late 1978, which was regarded both by the leadership and by a national consensus as a prerequisite to modernization, was followed by the appearance of many posters, unauthorized journals, mimeographed sheets and demonstrations, some of which expressed demands for radical changes and some of which even questioned the authority of the party leadership. This soon caused a political reassessment. Between 1978 and 1988 there were three swings from loosening political control back to more restricted policies, which were marked by reassessments beginning respectively in 1981, 1983 and 1986. Though these reassessments were politically oriented, some of them did centre on cultural issues and all of them affected China's cultural life.\n\nMeanwhile, the Sino-American intimacy of 1979 was cooled by Ronald Reagan's campaign promises to re-establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. A strong anti-Communist, Reagan introduced into his foreign policy deep ideological prejudices in his initial years in office.\n\nBy the second half of 1983, the atmosphere of Sino-American relations began to improve, leading to Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States in January and President Reagan's tour to China in April of 1984. However, the affinity that existed around 1979 was not regained.\n\nIn this paper, I shall try to establish a framework of analysis which",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212673,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 227,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "208\n\nthe photographs on the period between 1956 and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution (Rihoud was again there in 1964 and 1965, and also Rene Rurri) may serve as an example that will encourage purchasing, or at any rate borrowing, this fine book. Of and about these in the context of their time, Professor Spence has commented as follows (pp. 12-13):\n\nThis was truly a time in which revolutionary changes were being attempted by China's leaders, and with the Communist party already close to twenty million people in numbers one would expect dramatic evidence of the new society, or at least of its emerging foundations.\n\nBut as we scan the photographs, we realize how hard such evidence is to capture. Without deep and intimate knowledge of the past realities, how can we truly gauge the depth, the nature or the meaning of the attempted change from the visual record? What we do get here, and often brilliantly or poignantly, is the sense of a country and a people with very little to rely on, where everything is scarce so everything is valued.\n\nThe word poverty seems the wrong one, in the context, for to China's leaders and surely to many of the people themselves after what they had gone through it was survival that was the first priority. Yet the paradox here was that the Great Leap Forward brought not survival but death to millions.\n\nAt other levels, the images speak to us of ordinary things, of children and their games, of the quiet affections of age, of eating as shared relaxation. They speak also, insistently, of organization, of people in lines, of people listed, people marched to orders, people drilled. This the state was proud of, this the state allowed to be filmed, along with the work, the heavy manual work, whether of intellectuals or peasants, backing endlessly at the heavy soil of China with mattocks and hoes, hauling barrows and sacks, pitting muscle against the land. So have farmers the world over laboured, but here the Chinese seem assembled in larger numbers than ever before, and their labour is in a context that is politically orchestrated.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212956,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 24,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "In the economic sphere, the concept of face also prevails. A Japanese who worked in China for quite some time thought that a strong sense of nationalistic pride among Chinese was at work. Chinese thought that being a great nation with a great history, they could achieve whatever the foreigners had accomplished. While it had been clearly stated that the country could not lose in the competition with other developing nations such as India, Taiwan, etc., China chose to spend much more time modernising her own model than learning from the developed industrial nations whose colonial spirit she refuted (Funadashi, 1985: 224-228).\n\nRegardless of the excuse of colonial spirit, Chinese people could not learn from foreigners because they thought they belonged to a superior race. To follow foreigners' steps would mean depreciation of face (Hsu, 1981: 469; Bo, 1987: 199). Even when a Chinese praises Western culture and civilization, he is bound to be called by his fellow countrymen a worshipper of the West (Bo, 1987: 69).\n\nSome Recent Observations\n\nIt is the question of face at work, the importance of it, which pervades the whole country, her culture and her people. Now, in the 1980s, face still seems to be at work. Sun Longji (1983: 60) has cited Yu Luoji's (44) and Li Shuang's (*) cases. Had they not been publicised, they would not have encountered such great reaction from the authorities. It was the revelation of these cases which put the Communist leadership into an embarrassing situation. It could not help putting heavy sentences on these two persons who openly acted against what it preached, otherwise its reputation and power as the outright governing body of China would be hampered.\n\nIn the political sphere, in the 13th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (the most recent session of the All-China Representatives Meeting), a new Central Committee was elected and a once powerful man, Deng Liqun, believed to have lost power in the recent shuffle, was given membership in the Central Advisory Commission. Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary having resigned in disgrace, remained in the Politburo. Hua Guofeng, the former chairman, deposed in the third comeback of Deng Xiaoping, continued his party member status. Aside from the recognition of these men's contributions as a reason for their retention of some participation in the party, it might just be evidence of Pye's postulation - avoidance of putting someone in a totally defeated",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212979,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 47,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "26\n\nFace Behaviour And Verbal Mass Media Contents\n\nIt can also be seen that many of the strategies mentioned in the previous section can be verbal ones (the entire list of Modigliani's facework index and Strategy Nos. One to Five, and Eight in Berk's case). This point seems specially pertinent in the case of China. The view that Chinese people are particularly concerned with face may be attributed to the Chinese language. There are numerous expressions that apply the figurative meanings of the characters \"mian\" and \"lian\" (see Note 5). As such, it may be 'a rich source of verbal data for the study of face behaviour' (Ho, 1980: 30), and there is also high hope in spotting some face strategies being in use. This unique feature of the Chinese language and the nature of contemporary Chinese Communist mass media suggest that the concept of face may be examined as well by delving into the verbal content of mass communication.\" And this is precisely the reasoning behind the present study.\n\nIn the events reported in the mass media, we may analyse face behaviour, if any, of the incumbents through the depicted actions they undertake and through the words and reasoning they apply as quoted by media workers. More so, media workers, as a class in themselves, may have face behaviour in their own right. This may be shown in their treatment of news. If the homogeneity among media workers is high, there is strong ground to treat them as a collectivity, and as a collective mouthpiece or scribe for their boss(es). This seems to be the case in the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC).\n\nIn Communist China, the mass media can be regarded as the verbal instruments of the ruling regime. The media as \"mouthpieces\" of the Party, the country and the people have been reiterated time and again but the concern of this pronouncement is still centre upon the Party or the Party Government. In order for the media to serve as mouthpieces of the Party and the Government, structurally, the Party Government has devised a comprehensive and encompassing system of communications strictly under its control.\n\nNationwide media are under the supervision of the Department of Propaganda which is directly controlled by the Party's Central Committee. Provincial media, on the other hand, are monitored through the Party's provincial committees. The newspaper industry, for example, is said to have developed into a multi-layer, multifarious and multi-lingual socialist",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212981,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 49,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "28\n\nFinancially, because the Chinese Communist press is not organized on a market economy basis, it cannot support itself by advertising revenue or financial sponsorships.\" Its tenure has to depend on the will of the leadership. Shue (1981) found that such was the case where some local papers remained alive while others closed down.\n\nThese factors maintain the media as mere mouthpieces of the Party and the government. As instruments of the leadership, what the media present would be the materials that the government or the mainstream leaders intend to; what the media present would be vital to the politics of governance.\n\nUnder tight control of the Communist Party Government, Chinese mass media have a high degree of homogeneity; in the outlook of their workers, in the events and the comments they present. As a result, they can be taken as a collective unit, they can be taken as the mouthpiece, it makes sense to postulate that the things the mass media say would be what the Government tries to convey. If face behaviour is detected in the verbal contents of the mass media, then it can be attributed as belonging to the Government in the interest of the Government's face. It is this aspect of face behaviour which the present paper attempts to focus on. To illustrate the place of mass media in this context, we may use the optical theory again.\n\nReferring back to the diagram as presented in Figure 3, the work of the mass media can be seen as the implementation of face strategies (note that \"mass media\" is bracketed under face strategy). They are the weapons to realize the tentative effects of face behaviour in the interest of their owners. Some strategies may be directed to enhance face. Some others to save and the rest to lose the face of others in order to bring positive effects to the face of the owners.\n\nAs shown in the diagram, an analysis of mass media contents would be an analysis of the depictions and strategies, instead of the effects. It is the image(s) between the lens and the mirror that such an analysis could be studied (c.f. Figure 3). It is the external, the manifest aspects and presentations, which are visible in the mass media, not so much the effects of them which are external to the contents of the mass media.\n\nA final remark is that the Party and the Government in the PRC could hardly be discerned from one another under the present political system.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213014,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 82,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "61\n\nBesides, these victories would be far from memorable ones. Korolev's set of floor exercise was devoid of any new moves (11 July, 1987). The introduction of a third party disproval was also evident in downplaying these foreign victories. The Korean success in badminton found little coverage in the Korean papers; the People's Daily said. The article suggested that the press might be too ashamed to report it due to the conspiracy of the linesmen and the service judges which promoted the Korean upset against Chinese.\n\nMoral behaviour of these foreign winners was often of a negative mode. The Korean archer was arrogant (20 September, 1986); the Korean soccer team \"blamed\" the weather for poor performance (24 September, 1986); Russian coaches tried to conceal their strength in women's basketball (17 July, 1987); and the Korean reporters were too confident that their country could come first in the final overall standing in the Asian Games.\n\nWhile crowd applause of Chinese and overseas Chinese cheers for Chinese were all positively reported, fans of other countries did not receive the same treatment in the Chinese press. Elsewhere, the American fans produced nothing but noise, affecting the performance of athletes, especially Chinese athletes. The Korean table-tennis spectators were so noisy that the stadium was shaken to the ground (26 September, 1986). Although the American and Korean crowds showed their support to their compatriots and boosted the performance of them, they were viewed as deteriorating the competition environment for fair play. This was in direct contrast to the press's reactions to Chinese fans.\n\nThere were three obvious cases in which the press kept a low key position towards unfavourable conditions presented to athletes of other countries. In the women's basketball tournament in 1985, China played N. Korea in one of the matches. Chinese players were continuously fouled by their opponents, but this was only mentioned indirectly in a few words (27 August, 1985). East Germany lost in a women's volleyball match to China. The press did not say that the team lost because of poor performance but just excused her for not being the first team and suggested that she might reserve strength for the final (17 July, 1987). In another article in 1987, it was reported that the PRC's women volleyball team defeated Taipei. The focus of the article, however, was not on the loss of Taipei nor the victory of the Communist side, but rather, on the friendship and skills exchanged between the two teams.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213016,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 84,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "63\n\nMore so, the relation between factors of face that belong to individuals or teams with attributes of face that belong to people, nation or government is affirmed in the study. This seems to agree with the proposition posed by King and Myers (1977). These two authors argued that due to the breakdown of the traditional social networks, such as the village, the family and so on, individuals would seek to identify more with the nation, the government or other Chinese as a whole. This identification serves to connect them with a source of face too. That is to say, when an individual gains face, he may extend it to the nation, and in turn, he could also share the face of the nation, her status, honour and so on.\n\nSuch an interflow seems to have roots in the traditional Chinese character of mutual dependence (Hsu, 1981: 114). In the past, this spirit of mutual dependence was found within the family system. The social tie of parents and sons allowed the interchange of status and authority between them. In the light of piety prevalent under Confucian teachings in traditional China, the father is the one to have the upper hand in case the two come into conflict. More so, the father can enjoy the authority derived from the son even after retirement. Likewise, he could enjoy the influence, the honour, the status, the economic resources etc. obtained by the son through his own efforts. This was what happened to the concept of face in the past as has been pointed out in previous studies reviewed earlier in this paper.\n\nBut the communists advocated the party as the vanguard, preached a revolution of the feudal system, the family, and the old social networks etc. After the breakdown of the family and this strong social bond, the father-son relationship needed to be replaced, the family system required a substitute. The era then saw the creation of self-reliant rather than mutually dependent individuals, \"isolated, insecure, purposeless, and therefore perpetually in search of something to which he can belong and for which he can fight\" (Hsu, 1981, 471). In short, the individual under the Communist rule needed to position himself in a new setting.\n\nThe answer to this would be the introduction of another collectivity in which an individual could feel at home with. In the findings of the present study, the fact that face exhibits some collective character seems to signify the existence of such a new collective environment, a new set of relationships in which it works. The interflow of status, honour, influence, power etc. is now being placed in a new social network. Exchange between fathers and sons may still be present, it is hard to prove not, but what is more prominent in the press is an exchange in a new",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213017,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 85,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "64\n\nframework.\n\nIt is between an individual Chinese with other Chinese people, with other Chinese collectivities beside people under the same roof or within the vicinity. The identification with the face of the nation, the honour of the government, the influence of the party, the sense of achievement for this new master, new source of belongingness, is now seen to substitute the old social tie and provide an answer to the search for a position in the surrounding world. This position is chaptered by the Chinese nation, and given evidence in the findings.\n\nThe Concern Of A Nation's Face Is Present In The Press\n\nEarlier, it has been pointed out that among the collective levels, \"people\", \"nation/country\", and \"party/government\", the category of \"nation/country\" stands out as the strongest one. Except in Table 8 where other's reactions at collective level are found to be more directed to people, the rest of the cross-tabulations show that when the collective level of face was concerned, whether it be the basic factor or an attribute of face, the prominent unit was the nation or the country. As it has been discussed that nation, country, party, and government got all mixed up under the Communist regime, the figures for the party/government level could also be considered together with nation/country, hence further strengthening this level. The concern of the nation's face in the press could thus be said as significant, taking up some 25% of the total sentences that report on face attributes (Table 6).\n\nThe concern of the nation's face is particularly outstanding when the theme of the face situations is considered. It is found that when the situation is face-enhancing to China, the factors and attributes of face are of a national flavour, i.e. more sentences proportionately speaking, were on the nation/country and party/government level. In contrast, if the situation is found to be face-threatening to China, the factors and attributes of face are scarcely at the collective levels, not to say of a national flavour (Table 10), but at the individual or group level.\n\nAnother reason for the category of nation being the strongest among the collective levels is the nature of the Chinese press and particularly the People's Daily. It is a central party paper. Employees there are mostly party cadres. They are bound to be mouthpieces of the party, \"servants\" of the country, of the Chinese nation as they are ideologically instructed.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213020,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 88,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "67\n\nChinese athletes work for the country. They live under the guidance of coaches, the sports hierarchy which in turn are fed by the government and are supervised by the government. Coaches are government employees, and so are the athletes. If these athletes and coaches were found to fare poorly, the government might be unfavourably associated. But if these poor performances were excused, the losses were presented in diminished forms, then not only the athletes, but also the coaches, government officials, or even the whole bureaucracy could be saved from severe criticisms or challenges from other forces in the country. Not being totally defeated socially, albeit the physical defeat would mean the possibility of a revival of status and the possibility of a comeback, both in the sports arena, and in the socio-political area for the government employees.\n\nAs such, when Chinese athletes or teams encountered face-threatening situations, the unfavourableness would be alleviated or even overturned by a matter of presentation skills. Whether these skills could produce the desired results is beyond the scope of the present analysis. But for sure, if these strategies to forestall the face-threatening situations are clearly evident, then it could be said that the press did some facework for the athletes and the country of the government. And there were reasons to believe that it did facework for the sake of politics since whom it protected from the loss of face or the threats to face were government employees or those who were closely identified with the country.\n\nAnother relationship between the concept of face with politics can be viewed from a more macroscopic and positive perspective: nation-building. Alan Liu, in his Communication and National Integration in Communist China, quoted Inkeles' initiation of the study of mass media and social systems in the process of nation-building. The roles of mass media in the context of nation-building is to serve as a tool of identification with the country under a specific leadership, and to help to convey a new set of norms, values and symbols across the country so as to achieve national integration. Both added together reflected polity and society (Liu, 1975: 2-3). This seems especially important in a new nation like the People's Republic of China. It was promulgated in 1949. It advocated an ideology which sounded exotic to the general masses. A convenient means would be to use familiar terms with new relationships to construct a new society. Face offers an age-old concept to manipulate with. The new relationships are up to the party leaders' wishes.\n\nXIX",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213025,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 93,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "72\n\nThe Role Of The Press\n\nHaving said that the concept of face stands midway between the alien spheres of activities (sports and politics) and the masses, the place of the press is at another level between the two. It is a means by which the concept of face could be transmitted to the masses. It is the medium by which the alien spheres of activities are presented in forms comprehensible and identifiable by the masses. The functions of the Chinese media have been studied by many scholars before. Those proposed by Godwin Chu included mobilization, information, power struggle, and ideological reform (G. Chu, 1979). Others have later added education, entertainment and so on (Robinson, 1981; Terrell, 1984).\n\nIt may be difficult to position the role of the press in relation to the concept of face in terms of the above functions listed. But through the present study and the findings, the press could be seen as performing at least two of the above functions: information and mobilization. First, it provided information about the performance of athletes in the Games, it provided information on the Games in general, it provided presentations of the face of Chinese, China and her counterparts in the Games.\n\nSecond, it mobilized people to work for the four modernizations by convincing them that they could be as successful as the athletes under the guidance of the communists. The strength of the argument and the mobilization power lies in the magnitude of face as presented in the press. Bigger face, better face of course would increase the convincing power the press in this respect. And it is very obvious from the findings that the press has created an enhancing image of the face of Chinese and the country under the Communist regime, and thereby the convincing power of the press in other related affairs.\n\nAlso against what has been discussed earlier, there seems to be ‘a resurgence of the importance of particularistic ties, distinguishing us from them (... “a difference between inner and outer”)’ (Gold, 1985: 664). This runs counter to the preachings of the party government and to the nationwide reforms in the four modernizations which emphasize collective efforts for the country. The press, in this respect, may need to project a big face of the country in order that this resurgence of attitude unfavourable to the four modernizations be forestalled.\n\nAt another level, the press could be said as performing the function of\n\n---",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213895,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 247,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "221\n\nThus, a new political language, clustered around the ideas of labour and trade unions soon overshadowed the existing political language, which was introduced in the late Qing and clustered around the ideas of merchants and chambers of commerce. To curb the political power of merchants, the Canton government dissolved all the existing merchant associations in Canton. The directorship of the Canton General Chamber of Commerce was abolished and the Canton government appointed their own supporters to the Chamber. Liao Zhongkai even went to the extreme of making legislation in 1925 to prohibit \"compradore merchants” from taking up government posts.\n\nPolitical regulations were changing fast during these years. Trade unions continued to expand and were politically active in Canton. This eventually led to the 1925 General Strike which in Hong Kong involved a total of 300,000 labourers. It was known as the greatest and largest strike which had ever occurred in China, and retrospectively, the Chinese Communist Party would time and time again herald its success.\n\nAs for the Cantonese merchants and the Communication Clique, they retreated from Canton to Hong Kong after 1924. I have tracked down a very beautiful piece of information from 1941 - on a Julao Hui (九老會), or the Nine Elders Club. The club was formed by the retired leaders of the regional Chambers of Commerce. These retreated Cantonese, despite their previous competition, joined together as a social club to celebrate the abundance of their offspring and their own longevity. These nine gentlemen enjoyed a total age amounting to 676 by 1941. On this occasion, Liang Shiyi sent them a couplet. It read:\n\nThe three of us in person congratulating the nine elders, altogether in one hall we celebrate our thousand years.\n\nAs far as this small circle is concerned, it sounds like a happy ending.\n\nBeyond this circle, all we can see is a Hong Kong society with its members, for a long period of time, showing little interest in the issue of constitutional reform, representative or self-government, as their Indian, African, or Malay counterparts did. Even during those noisy years after the Second World War while the issue of decolonization was very much talked about and the British Empire actually collapsed,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213971,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1997",
        "page_number": 40,
        "title": "RAS-1997",
        "content_text": "course, think about The Little Man; it can't think about little men.\" This is not to decry what individual officers could, and usually did, do for personal complainants in specific cases.\n\nSir David Trench had his own ideas; thoughts from on high are less easily smothered than unsolicited disturbances from below. The received wisdom, which equally impressed most of the interlopers, was that since most of the population might want to return home across the border at some time, the electoral roll would be far too fluid to embrace a stable, identifiable and representable society; and that in any event direct elections to Legislative Council (Legco) were unthinkable, because they would be hi-jacked by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) from Taiwan; the fundamental Chinese political battle would then be fought out in the streets and on any hustings of Hong Kong, which the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) would never be willing to stand idly by and watch being conceivably won by Hong Kong Chinese Nationalist sympathisers. However Trench recognised that Legco was not the only possible forum for expression of popular feeling.\n\nTrench had no problems with sharing some of the lifestyle of the taipans and Chinese millionaires who were so noticeable among those traditionally appointed by governors to Exco and Legco, and whose nature he did little to change; despite the familiar jibe that he ranked third, after the taipan of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chairman of the Royal Hong Kong Jockey Club, all knew that in the last resort he recommended the names of Executive Councillors to the Secretary of State. In his earlier days, however, he had preferred the raffish and disrespectful ambience of the multi-racial Foreign Correspondents' Club to that of the Hong Kong Club, Fanling [the Governor's official residence in the New Territories Hon. Editor] and the Jockey Club; while he enjoyed the actual sports of golf and racing for their own sakes; he never lost touch with his humbler post-war acquaintances in the Chinese community, such as his language teacher. He insisted that the introductory review chapter of one year's colonial annual report should spell out the wide sweep and valued authority of the great number of statutory, non-statutory and ad hoc committees which he believed to be a valid response to critics who would not understand why the people had no democratically elected voice in his councils. Yet his broad sympathies told him that, even so,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214206,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 64,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "27\n\nOf course obscene jokes and a preoccupation with excrement and body functions are common in many societies and have raised smiles, like other familiar jokes, for centuries. For example, instead of saying a Chinese laughed, one can say: 'Saw teeth but did not see eyes.' Because of physiognomy, one is hardly able to use this expression about Europeans.\n\nIn most countries satire survives partly because it tweaks the authorities. In England, there is the Yes, Minister series, which has stood the test of time, just as there is an assortment of tales about party leaders in China where jokes go back decades. Over the last half century many certainly do not conform with Communist Party intentions. For example, with a play on words, the late elder statesman, Deng Xiaoping, was sometimes ‘insulted' by calling him 'Little Bottle,' which the sound of his given names suggests. Certainly it is not the done thing in China to insult the leaders and humour, like most things, is expected to serve the state.\n\nTwo other anti-establishment jokes, which went the rounds not too long after the Communist government took over in China in 1949, run as follows:\n\nA parrot said, 'I'm smart, I listen to people and mimic what they say.'\n\nA government official replied, ‘I'm smarter, I only copy what our leaders say!'\n\nThe second joke runs:\n\nTwo men had a fight and one contestant bit off the other's nose. The case went to court. The man being tried insisted his opponent bit off his own nose. 'But how could he possibly do that?,' enquired the magistrate, 'His nose is situated above his mouth.' 'Simple' came the reply. 'He stood on a chair to get at it!' This joke seems to fall rather flat on most Westerners (and indeed on many Hong Kong Chinese) for whom it is not sufficiently subtle.\n\nAlthough not considered good taste today, as mentioned before, just as there are English jokes about the Welsh, the Irish and the Scots,",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215610,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2001",
        "page_number": 387,
        "title": "RAS-2001",
        "content_text": "337\n\nThe paper began as a collection of notes squirreled from all sorts of sources, and as other information arose it grew almost on its own. For example, when I was in New Zealand for some months teaching at the University of Canterbury in 2001, a postgraduate student popped a just-published newspaper article on my desk about a shipload of Chinese coffins that had foundered on its way to China in 1902. Maori villagers had buried some beached remains with due respect.\n\nThe house where I'd lived in Dunedin for ten years had been close to a big cemetery, but I'd lived there in ignorance of the fact that there were Chinese graves there. By 2001 I had met Les Wong, a Kiwi Chinese who has made it his business to restore those graves and other Chinese graves in cemeteries close to the old gold-mining centres of Central Otago. Dunedin's Dr James Ng, who came to Otago as a child from Guangdong Province, sent me in late 2001 a copy of an autobiographical article which vividly brought to life the familial links (and breaks in links between 1949 and 1979) between Chinese family members in New Zealand and their home villages in Guangdong. I have appreciated the encouragement of both Les and James.\n\nTeather, E.K. (2001). The case of the disorderly graves: contemporary deathscapes in Guangzhou, Journal of Social and Cultural Geography 2(2): 185-202.\n\nThis paper describes three agendas that are shaping contemporary deathscapes in Guangzhou: the modernist planning agenda, the market economy, and the Chinese Communist Party ideology and resistance to it. It develops the concept of deathscapes into deathspace, \"a symbolic system that represents a stage in the ongoing process of conflict and compromise involving the traditional and the modern, the personal and political, and the sacred and the secular'.\n\nPreparing for this research was quite a challenge and I can't imagine how I ever thought I'd find out what I wanted to know. An introduction from James Hayes led to my meeting Dr. May Bo Chan, from the Department of History at Zhongshan University. This department generously hosted my second week in Guangzhou and invited me to give a seminar. Existing links between Hong Kong Baptist University and Zhongshan University were invaluable.\n\nAn enormous stroke of luck was finding a superb and energetic",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215937,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 236,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "170\n\nto villagers, making personal and individual contacts. He told Endacott how he met farmers and fishermen, Hoklo and Hakka speakers, and gradually won acceptance: at one stage, he had to undergo a “blood ceremony” with some pirate families in the Mirs Bay and Bias Bay area. Trained in SOE tactics, he realised that these close-knit communities, with their tradition of secret societies and their sometimes justified tradition of being outlaws, alienated from established government, were an ideal ready-made resistance underground. Strategically, the hinterland behind Hong Kong was a critical buffer zone in the event of Hong Kong being occupied. It would be the area through which information, personnel, and material would enter and exit. Hence the extreme importance placed on developing relationships with all the local people, whatever their politics, and channelling their interests in support of the British cause.\n\nShortly after the fall of Canton in 1938, a guerrilla unit was formed, nominally under national government influence, to assist in carrying out resistance against the Japanese in the East River Area, just north of Hong Kong, and along the lines of the Kowloon-Canton railway from Sumchun to Sheklung. This unit was commanded by the charismatic ex-seaman Tsang Sheng, whose vision of social change was far closer to communist values than to the increasingly right-wing KMT. Because his power base was the region behind Hong Kong, not especially loyal to the central government, he was able to break free and declare his communist sympathies. He consolidated his influence over the area by earning the support of the local populace and by controlling the worst excesses of bandits, many of whom at this period were KMT supporters. Tsang’s army of guerrillas, known as the Guangdong People’s Anti-Japanese Resistance Unit, or the East River Column, formed the strongest, best-organised, and most aggressive Chinese military formation in the vicinity of Hong Kong. Kendall noted that these men were well-armed with Mausers and decent equipment, funded either by the Communist Party or by the relatively prosperous villagers who had overseas remittances from men working abroad. He knew that many in the KMT were as violently opposed to the Communists as they were to the Japanese, and that working with the Communists would be a high-risk strategy, but it was essential in a region so crucial to Hong Kong. It is known that Kendall was involved in negotiations with the Communists. Ronald Holmes, a SOE agent seconded to the BAAG, was to refer to this in July 1944 when he prepared a report of",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215938,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 237,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "171\n\nCommunists and the China coast for Major Egerton Mott of the SOE. * Holmes referred to guerrillas who would be known to Kendall. He was convinced that the expansion of the Communists into British territory in the New Territories 'was planned in some detail before the Japanese attack on the Colony,' so working with this group required uncommon discretion and diplomacy on the part of any Britisher trying to win their support. Holmes, working with Kendall before the war and with the guerrillas later, would have been unusually well informed. He identified the Communist leader in the Hong Kong area as Tsoi Kwok Leung, a man ‘formerly connected with minor Chinese industrial enterprises in Hong Kong and Amoy and...consumptive.'\n\nSome form of SOE organisation was clearly in place in China, covertly, awaiting the Japanese attack before becoming fully activated. Col Chauvin had been removed from Hong Kong on 18th December, on the very day that the Japanese landed on Hong Kong Island, and sent to the British Military Mission in Chongqing. As the battle raged around them, Kendall, Talan and McEwan were stood by for special orders. Col. Harry Owen Hughes who had ostensibly been seconded to liaise with Chinese Armies in the 7 War zone, moved back to the Hong Kong area to await the arrival of something important. This was the arrival, in deep secrecy, of perhaps the most important escape party to ever leave occupied Hong Kong.\n\n[\n\nAt the very moment that Hong Kong surrendered to the Japanese, a car was hurrying towards Aberdeen harbour. Inside sat Admiral Chan Chak, the Chinese Nationalist government's chief representative in Hong Kong, and a number of his KMT assistants. The group was led by DM MacDougall, an official seconded to Hong Kong from London to work on political affairs. He had been assigned to look after the Admiral personally, and maintained twenty-four-hour contact with the Admiral's party during the hostilities. They were to rendezvous with five boats of the 2nd Motor Boat Flotilla, who had been held back in battle. Reaching the pier an hour after the surrender, they found the boats gone. The only functioning vessel they could find was a fifteen-foot launch but the party piled in, knowing that the Japanese would be on them at any moment. Hardly had they gone 500 yards when they were fired on by Japanese occupying a post on Brick Hill, opposite, on the southern side of Hong Kong Island. The boat's engine disintegrated under the heavy fire, killing several men and wounding others, including",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215944,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 243,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "177\n\n3 xii\n\nThe whole plan was discussed with RAC North, Secretary for Chinese Affairs and JA Fraser, Defence Secretary who agreed. When Harrop went to Chongqing the first person she contacted was her old friend from pre-war, Madame Soong Ching Ling.\n\nMadame Soong was the widow of Dr Sun Yat Sen, founder of the Chinese Republic and a former Hong Kong resident himself, and graduate of the Hong Kong Medical School which predated Hong Kong University. When Chiang Kai Shek and his extreme rightist faction won the power struggle for control of the National Government, Madame Soong moved to Hong Kong where she and other supporters of the left wing principles Sun had espoused were able to operate with more latitude. She headed an organisation known as the China Defence League which raised funds in support of the anti-Japanese war effort in China, and had connections with many left wing liberal groups, both within China and among the western intelligentsia in Hong Kong and China. This organisation was effectively a form of interface between the KMT Old Guard and more progressive groups. Agnes Smedley, Rewi Alley, Anna Louise Strong and other westerners with strong contacts with the Communist Party under Mao Ze Dong mixed in the same circles as Madame Soong and her supporters, which included Sun Fo, Dr Sun's son by a previous marriage. Sun Fo himself, though he lived in Hong Kong, frequently travelled to Moscow, ostensibly for 'medical treatment,' often staying for long periods. The league did humanitarian work, organising aid for the millions of refugees in Guangdong and in Hong Kong. Percy Chen, son of Dr Eugene Chen, Dr Sun's Foreign minister and close friend worked closely with this aspect of the League's activities. Chen was a socialist and would later declare for the Communist Party. Significantly, FW Kendall had worked with the league in organising programmes to cope with refugees. He himself was something of a refugee, having lost his livelihood in the same Japanese push in Guangdong. Contacts between this left faction of the Guomindang and British people in Hong Kong of a progressive frame of mind were also significant. Hilda Selwyn-Clarke, known as 'Red Hilda' not only for the colour of her hair, but for her politics, was part of this group, rather than a member of the conventional, highly stratified world of colonial society. Her husband may have been a member of the government administration but she did not subscribe to colonial or establishment values. Kendall also worked with Selwyn-Clarke, as did his Chinese wife, who was to be one of the Selwyn",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216077,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 376,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "310\n\nBuddhist temple. The party ended the day at the sunset service at which, in the twilight, before three huge statues of the Buddha, stood the abbot surrounded by serried ranks of robed monks. The whole service was beautifully done with only one incongruity—a small boy walked past with a basket of bean curd wrapped up in a copy of the Los Angeles Daily Herald. The Inspection party continued their journey on to Nanjing that evening.\n\nA typical announcement in the China Inland Mission journal, China's Millions, noted that \"In August 1932 Communist activity in North Anhui had prevented four lady workers of the CIM appointed to that part of the field. They had continued their language training in Chinkiang through the summer\". The policy of the then central government of Chiang Kai-shek placed blame for any banditry on the shoulders of the Communists who were then based in Jiangxi province.\n\nZhenjiang was one of the cities overrun during the Japanese advance on Nanjing in the December of 1937 when the former Concession was largely destroyed in the hostilities between China and Japan. However, Zhenjiang appeared on the international scene at least once more during the run up to the Second World War. In their drive south in April 1938 the Japanese 5th Division crossed the Yangzi at several places including Zhenjiang and pushed on forcing the KMT [Chinese Nationalist] divisions along the River Huai defence line to the south to crumble.\n\nTo frustrate Japanese use of the Yangzi as a route by which to advance into central China the KMT forces sank a number of ships at strategic points including a number near Zhenjiang. To ensure that freight got through Butterfield and Swire transhipped cargo brought down from up-river on to a dedicated boat they kept moored between Zhenjiang city and the entrance to the southern part of the Grand Canal, and then once more transhipped it on to junks which carried the cargo down the Canal south to Shanghai. Parts of Zhenjiang, including the B & S office, were destroyed during the comparatively short period of heavy Japanese bombing preceding the eventual capture of the city and their advance up the River. The small British B & S staff simply moved to the APC installation outside the city.\n\n \n43",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216311,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 70,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "19\n\nestablished to restore order within the temple's community of resident monks. In 1944 this committee restored the Da Xiong Bao Dian, and the next year, 1945, the Bao Ta. Once the Sino-Japanese War had ended, in 1946 life in the temple returned to a resemblance of its pre-war normalcy. However, the tranquility which existed within the temple for the next three years was suddenly disrupted when the Communist's captured Shanghai in May 1949 and proclaimed the People's Republic in October 1949. With all the disasters the temple had survived over the previous 900 years, the worst was yet to come.\n\nPeople's Republic, 1949-2003\n\nIn June 1949, one month after their capture of Shanghai, the new Communist government took over the temple, and on October 1, 1949, the day celebrating the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the Red flag of the P.R.C. was flown from the top of the pagoda. This unprecedented disrespect shown by the new regime to the temple by flying its flag from the pagoda was only the first in a series of incidents which illustrated the temple's now endangered status. The temple grounds were drastically reduced in size by at least two-thirds when their garden area was seized by the state and converted into Longhua Park in 1954. The temple's halls were temporarily appropriated by the government in January 1956 for a series of meetings held between local government officials and Chinese businessmen to explain and then celebrate the new policy of abolishing private enterprise in favor of a new system of joint private-state companies. The celebration involved a party for 2,000 people which undoubtedly included activities such as smoking cigarettes and drinking alcohol which are contrary to the Buddhist faith. This temporary appropriation of the temple by the government for non-religious purposes was herald of worse things to come during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).\n\nIn the summer of 1966 Longhua Temple suffered a devastating series of events over a one month period which destroyed nearly all vestiges of its centuries old heritage. On August 24, 1966 a mob of more than 1,000 Red Guards (Hong Wei Bing) rushed into the temple and in one day destroyed all of the temple's Buddha statues, library of books, treasures, and art work. The next day, August 25, the Red Guards returned with the intention of destroying the Longhua Pagoda (Bao Ta), which we've seen had probably been built in the Northern Song",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216317,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 76,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "25\n\nYin. While Guanyin has compassionate mercy for those in need, it is Da Shi Zhi who possesses the power to actually carry out her acts of kindness. The San Sheng Dian houses by far the oldest of Longhua's three bronze bells, this one supposedly dating from 1132, which would also make it the oldest historic relic the temple possesses today. The hall itself dates from an 1884 reconstruction, when it was rebuilt to replace an earlier structure destroyed during the Taiping rebel attacks on Shanghai in 1860-1862. The hall was last restored in 1986.\n\nImmediately behind the San Sheng Dian is a walled garden with trees which unfortunately is closed to the public. Inside this walled garden is a fifth main hall, the Abbot's Quarters (Fang Zhang Shi), which is for the private use of the resident monks and their master, the Fang Zhang. It was the only hall which the monks maintained control of during the Cultural Revolution. Normally it is kept off limits to the public and cannot be visited. However, the author was able to steal a glimpse and found that the hall was furnished with rows of large armchairs, and lacked any large statues. Possibly it is a modern day form of the Meditation Hall (Chan Tang). At the far left end of the hall is a small office decorated with framed color photos of the temple's Buddhist leaders posing with Communist Party leaders such as Jiang Zemin.\n\nBehind the Abbot's Quarters is the sixth and final courtyard, and the sixth hall on the central axis, the newly built two-story Scripture Hall (Cang Jing Lou). This modern building holds most of the temple's few genuine relics, including a library of 7,000 Qing Dynasty volumes; a Ming Dynasty gold seal given to the temple in 1598 by the emperor Wanli (1573-1620); a Ming Dynasty gold-plated bronze Buddha statue; Tang Dynasty scriptures; and a copy of the Heart Sutra dating from the year 1098, the fifth year of the Zhe Zong reign (1085-1100) of Emperor Zhao Xu of the Northern Song Dynasty (960-1126). Exactly how these relics survived the destruction of the Taiping Rebellion, the lengthy military occupation of the Min Guo era, and the Cultural Revolution is unclear. Possibly they were donated to the temple sometime later. Unfortunately the public is not welcomed to visit this sixth hall, and the relics are kept hidden from view, although photographs of them appear in a recent pamphlet sold at the temple's bookstore.\n\nHidden in a seldom visited corner of the temple grounds on the east side of the Fang Zhang Shi's walled garden is a smaller garden",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390",
        "rank": 0
    }
]