[
    {
        "id": 215934,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 233,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "167\n\nsocieties in the Japanese Army, though in his memoirs he downplayed this role. When Mrs Bush, a Japanese, was later forced to work as a Kempeitai interpreter, she talked to a prisoner who was in American Naval Intelligence about their mutual friend Charles Boxer. Bill Kendall, of whom more below, was told by Boxer that the Japanese were on the move: when he saw the zeros flying overhead, and knew that the attack had finally started.\n\nBeyond military intelligence\n\nFW Kendall was a Canadian from Vancouver who had lived in Hong Kong since childhood, and spoke not only fluent Cantonese but other dialects as well. He had had a mining business in China, but after the Japanese occupied east Guangdong and Chekiang his business was cut off. He then moved back to Hong Kong and worked for the Government organising refugee relief, building and running the main large camp at Kam Tin. Early in 1940 Kendall was approached by Col LA Newnham, in his capacity in charge of Military Intelligence, and asked to set up a small unit of civilians and volunteers. Being non-military personnel, they could undertake training in the use of sabotage and \"ungentlemanly warfare,\" which the official armed services could not legitimately carry out. The unit was given the cover name Z Force. Allocating £1,500 for this 'unit for independent action behind enemy lines' had to be done outside normal accounting channels, GOC Hong Kong told the War Office in September 1941, because of the need for absolute secrecy in a small place like Hong Kong.\n\nThe Special Operations Executive, under the Ministry for Economic Warfare, had been established in Europe for some years to assist resistance. They trained agents for the specific purpose of operating behind enemy lines using espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare. Specialist SOE units created miniature code machines, wireless facilities and concealed weapons, known by the cheerful name of 'toys.' Where strategically useful, SOE created facilities for specialised sabotage. The whole point of SOE was to facilitate war in situations such as in occupied countries where traditional warfare was impractical. Its methods were ideally suited to the situation in China, where the front was so large and diverse that Japanese supply lines were stretched to vulnerability. The populace was strongly motivated for resistance, and the Japanese, whose control was weak beyond urban areas, were",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215935,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 234,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "168\n\nparticularly vulnerable to guerrilla harassment. SOE targeted China in its plans, but had to hold them in abeyance pending the outright declaration of war, since Britain was supposed to be neutral.\n\nKendall and his friend Eddie Teesdale were trained at the SOE base at Singapore. Kendall also had explosives experience from his days as a mining engineer. Kendall organised a group of hand-picked volunteers, who included the talented Administrative Cadet Ronald Holmes, a Russian-born businessman named Monia Talan, a PE instructor Colin McEwan, Dr Harry Talbot, Bobby Thompson, Hugh Williamson, all to play a role later in underground services. In addition, two police officers trained with them to learn SOE techniques. Intriguingly, with the group was also at least one Chinese, a man recorded only as ‘Brigadier Lee of North China.'\n\nKendall's men met secretly at a camp near Kam Tin, each weekend, usually trained by Teesdale, as Kendall was often in China. They received training in cipher and intelligence work, weapons, wireless and explosives. They also spent much time literally walking through the scrubland, often in the dark, getting to know the trails and terrain at first hand, in preparation for the day that they would have to work behind Japanese lines. Weapons were stored in Kendall's bungalow near Shing Mun, where Holmes and Teesdale lived for extended periods. They also set up five hidden stores, for supply in the event of a prolonged campaign behind Japanese lines. In the event, the Japanese found the main store, in a cave on Tai Mo Shan about 1,800 feet up on the south-east slope. Another was in an old lead mine at Lin Ma Hang, near the border at Sha Tau Kok. It was later raided by villagers, who would have seen troops of Indian soldiers carrying supplies there on mules. On the outbreak of battle, Col Newnham ordered Kendall and Talan out of the New Territories and into Lyemun Pass, to fix limpet mines to scuttle a ship being used by the Japanese as an observation post.\n\nThe remaining SOE men in the New Territories, led by Holmes and Teesdale, spent a month behind Japanese lines, crossing back and forth across the border, collecting information, setting up contacts and reconnoitring.\n\nZ Force was by no means the only undercover agency operating in Hong Kong: there are hints and rumours of a much wider, high-level series of groups, but firm proof is hard to substantiate. By definition such work would be secret. For security reasons networks had to operate",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215947,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 246,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "180\n\nthemselves and slip outside into town, claiming neutral or non-combatant status. Many Europeans were able to stay out of internment or leave if they could: Professor Gordon King escaped with sufficient materials to try and restart a medical school in Free China. There were even escapes from Stanley Internment Camp, including of women civilians. Within the Prisoner of War Camps, there were very strong feelings that, while individuals might choose to escape, it was the duty of senior officers to remain with their men at a time of crisis. Escapes were of extremely limited military or strategic value. Even men like Col Newnham, Major Boxer, Lt Bush (who was a MTB officer) and others, whose sensitive work gave them more reason than most to need to get away, remained as prisoners. It was no failure of courage to choose to remain behind and help others. Newnham was later executed [Hon. Ed. - I think I prefer the term murdered.] and both Boxer and Bush imprisoned. Senior officers in camp expressed grave offence at the tone of the messages sent into camp. Nonetheless, the need to escape is a human trait, and the right of an individual to decide whether he was more useful in or out of camp was acknowledged. At least four parties of European servicemen escaped from POW camps in the first few weeks of internment.\n\nPerhaps the most publicised escape occurred on 9th January 1942 when three university officials left Sham Shui Po camp. Lindsay Ride, a physiologist, said he had planned the escape very early on and realised he needed a Chinese to facilitate it. Fortunately in camp he found Francis Lee Yan Piu, a resourceful clerk who had worked for him as a clerk. Lee arranged for the three Europeans to get Chinese clothing and to cross into the New Territories, where they laid low during the day, planning to explain to any Chinese who found them that they were Germans, as they feared the Chinese might be hostile. How being German made a difference is unclear. To their surprise, when they did encounter Chinese, the Chinese were not only delighted to help but appeared to know exactly what to do. These were guerrillas who had previously been in contact with someone with British connections, for they knew just where to bring the strangers. When the party arrived in Shaukwan (Kukong) over the border in China, they were met by MacEwan and Talan, members of ‘a mysterious Hong Kong organisation known colloquially as the Cloak and Dagger Boys, who had received what appeared to be some sort of guerrilla training formerly in Hong Kong,’xxiii",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]