[
    {
        "id": 207354,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 122,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "114\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\npolicymakers tended to respond to the unprecedented situation in terms of their own sophisticated tradition of \"managing\" barbarians. The theoretical foundations of this tradition have been much discussed, although usually with reference to China's external relations. Its practical application has received little systematic study apart from inquiries into the structure and operation of the well-known tributary system. Against the background of Chinese tradition in both its dimensions--theory and practice--this article examines the major features of Ch'ing policy toward foreign military employees in the T'ung-chih period (1862-1874), when Western influences first became a significant factor in China's military affairs. It argues that behind the rhetoric of the Chinese world order throughout the imperial era lay realistic, sophisticated and generally effective policies of \"barbarian management,\" which were neither inherently \"unmodern,\" nor even uniquely Chinese. Furthermore, it suggests that the Ch'ing throne was more flexible in its outlook toward Western barbarians than is generally recognized, and that its failure to go further in abandoning its Sinocentrism may be explained largely by the behavior of the barbarians themselves.\n\nThe Theoretical Foundations of Chinese Policy\n\nClassical sanction for the use of foreigners to serve Chinese purposes may be traced to the Tso-chuan (Commentary of Tso), a work written during the chaotic Warring States period, which referred to the practice of using the talents (lit., materials) of the semi-barbarian Ch'u state for the purposes of the Chin state (Ch'u-ts'ai Chin-yung). As employed by later writers, the phrase usually implied the notion that barbarians would willingly turn toward or revert to Chinese civilization (hsiang-hua or kuei-hua) and offer their allegiance. Other classical literature reinforced this view of China's cultural superiority, emphasizing the natural gravitation of foreigners to the Middle Kingdom.10 Mencius provided the neat formula, \"using [the doctrines of] China to transform the barbarian\" (yung-Hsia pien-i), a phrase which became the standard expression of Chinese ethnocentrism for the next twelve hundred years.11 The reverse theme (yung-i pien-Hsia) served as a derogatory epithet to be hurled at those who had allegedly departed from the Chinese cultural tradition.",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207373,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 141,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n133\n\n6 On this point, see John K. Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order,” in J. K. Fairbank, ed. The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass., 1968). See also L. S. Yang's article entitled \"Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order\" in ibid., 22, for a discussion of Kuo Sung-t'ao's innovative outlook.\n\n7 See Fairbank's introductory essay in The Chinese World Order; also, John K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, “On the Ch'ing Tributary System,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 6 (1941). An exception to the standard tributary view of China's foreign relations is John Wills' Pepper, Guns and Parleys (Cambridge, Mass., 1974).\n\n8 James Legge, The Chinese Classics (Hong Kong, 1961), 5:521. For the use of this phrase in various contexts, consult Li Te-yü, chüan 8: 59; Li Hung-chang, Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi [The collected works of Li Hung-chang] (Nanking, 1908), Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 11:24b; Chang Ch'i-yün, Chung-kuo chin-shih shih-lüeh (A short history of Chinese military affairs] (Taipei, 1956), 115.\n\n9 Dai Kanwa jiten [Sino-Japanese Dictionary] (Tokyo, 1955-1960), 1926, 6437. For random examples of this common usage, see Su Ch'ing-pin, 1, 2, 35; Hsin T'ang-shu, 145:14b; Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo [The management of barbarian affairs from beginning to end] (Peiping, 1930; hereafter, IWSM), TK, 72:34b, TC 4:25b; 5:51; 8:64b; 12:2b; 23:36b; etc.\n\n10 See the illuminating discussion in Mi Chu Wiens, \"Anti-Manchu Thought during the Early Ch'ing,\" Papers on China, 22A (May, 1969), especially 2-3.\n\n11 Legge, 2:253; Wiens, 2; Wu Hung-chu, \"China's Attitude towards Foreign Nations and Nationals Historically considered,\" The Chinese Social and Political Science Review, 10.1 (1926), esp. 17-19. On the reverse theme, consult Li Hung-chang, Letters to Friends, 1:9b; Lu Shih-ch'iang, Ting Jih-ch'ang yü tzu-ch'iang yün-tung [Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement] (Taipei, 1972), 241-244.\n\n12 Chinese policy toward the \"sinicization\" of foreigners was not consistent, however. See Schafer, 22, 49, 291 note 75; also Ch'ien Hsing-hai and L. C. Goodrich, trans., Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols, by Ch'en Yuan (Los Angeles, 1966), 6ff.\n\n13 Cited in Ch'ien and Goodrich, 9. I have modified the translation slightly after consulting the Chinese original. For a view contrary to Ch'en Yuan's, see Legge, 5: 355: \"If he is not of our kin, he is certain to have a different mind”—an oft-cited passage from the Tso-chuan. These two conflicting views suggest a central question: What constituted a barbarian? Unfortunately, no clear answer can be given. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao noted in the late nineteenth century that the implications of the term had changed over time (see Wiens, 1); but even his comparatively sophisticated analysis oversimplifies an enormously complex problem. Lacking an objective standard by which to judge barbarian-ness, one is perhaps best served by deferring to the Chinese chronicler. If, for whatever reason, an individual appears in the record as a barbarian, then that is what he is. Such an arbitrary classification is in many respects unsatisfactory, but it reflects accurately the Chinese viewpoint at a given time, and underscores the uncertain status of even the most \"sinicized\" barbarian. An argument against writing about China's relations with foreign peoples \"in the Chinese idiom and from the Chinese point of view\" may be found in Timothy Connor, \"Translating the 'Barbarians': A New Book in an Old Tradition,\" Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies (hereafter, HJAS), 32 (1972).\n\n14 Cited in Benjamin Schwartz, \"The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,\" in Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, 280.",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
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    {
        "id": 209255,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1981",
        "page_number": 158,
        "title": "RAS-1981",
        "content_text": "# JUAN YÜAN'S MANAGEMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS IN CANTON\n\n## 1817-1826\n\n## WEI PEH T'I\n\nIn November 1817, Juan Yuan (1764-1849) was appointed Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. He had formerly served as Governor of Chekiang and of Kiangsi. The Governor-General at Canton was the highest Chinese authority dealing with foreign trade and relations in China on a day-to-day basis and on specific issues. During his tenure at Canton, for almost a decade, with the Governor of Kwangtung and the Superintendent of Canton Customs, he handled foreigners in accordance with rules set out under the Canton system.\n\nAt the end of 1817, there were several potentially explosive problems involving Sino-British relations and trade. The failure of the Amherst mission the year before had left certain controversies unresolved. The fact that the five ships carrying the mission to Taku had managed to evade Chinese surveillance after being provisioned, and had surveyed the China coast from Taku to Canton, had left the Chia-ch'ing Emperor and the court more sensitive than ever to the issue of British naval presence in Chinese waters. Jurisdiction over foreign nationals in port was also a source of serious disagreement between the Chinese authorities and foreigners in Canton. The importation of opium and exportation of sycee silver, both prohibited by imperial decree, were to become a major area of controversy in time. Diplomacy as an art of managing foreign relations was outside the Chinese experience. As Westerners at Canton were neither tribute bearers nor alien conquerors, Juan Yüan chose to manage his dealings with foreigners as a matter of security and control.\n\nThe Canton system governed all foreign (except Russian and tributary) trade in China, which had been confined to this port since 1760. Essentially, under this system, foreigners carried on their buying and selling through franchised hong merchants. As time went on, these hong merchants performed an increasing number of functions. By the time Juan Yuan came to Canton, they \"not only settled prices, sold goods, guaranteed duties, restrained the foreigners, negotiated with them, controlled smuggling, and leased the factories to them, they also had to manage all the aspects of a banking business, act as interpreting agencies, ...",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m",
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