[ { "id": 214286, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 144, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "107\n\nWEAPONS OF THE CHINA WARS\n\nRICHARD J. GARRETT\n\nOne of the remarkable features of the nineteenth century China wars was the ability of a relatively small force of European soldiers and sailors to overcome a numerically superior Chinese force. Just as in the recent Gulf War, where Saddam Hussein's dream of a 'mother of all wars' was shattered by high tech. weaponry, so one of the factors which made the difference was, undoubtedly, the vast difference in the military technology available to each side. It was not the only factor, but it is necessary to understand it to arrive at a clear picture of the China wars.\n\nIt is worth dismissing any idea that the quality of the fighting men was inferior. There are many instances of troops fighting to the death and refusing to surrender.1 Indeed, to the European mind some of these heroics seemed foolish, just as they could not understand why people committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the 'barbarians.'2 Captain Loch R.N. remarks that \"I feel persuaded that, if drilled under English officers, they would prove equal, if not superior, to the Sepoys; they have greater physical power, greater obstinacy, and consequently minds that retain impressions with greater tenacity, and would be slow to lose confidence after it was once built upon the foundations of their vanity.\"3 It was not that the officers were cowards, as many of the Mandarins died bravely, but rather there was no conception of the need for the troops to be trained to act together as a whole. Mackenzie, an officer present during the first war, notes: \"As yet, I imagine that no field exercise and evolutions have been compiled for the use of the Chinese Army. Neither do the troops, as far as I observed, move in concert, nor do they make any formation in bodies.\"5 Although the Manchu armies had been an efficient fighting force at the time of the conquest, two centuries later they neglected to maintain rigorous training programmes.\n\nThe European officers, on the other hand, put a lot of effort into exercising their men. An example of this is recorded by Lord Jocelyn: \"During our stay in Singapore the seamen of the flag-ship Wellesley were exercised on shore, under the supervision of the commanding...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214290, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 148, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "111\n\nthough they also had some on their war junks. The war junks were of much smaller size than the large men of war of the British navy. Generally they only had one gun deck although they were beginning to realise that they needed to have better ships and Mackenzie1 records that a start had been made as early as 1841. The batteries of the various forts were not short in numbers of guns, and Mackenzie records that the North Wangtung fort mounted 167 guns ranging in size from 3 to 64 pounders. What they did lack was the ability to aim them efficiently. Their accuracy was not good, and Mackenzie notes: \"The carriages are also most clumsy, and owing to this they are unable to train the piece to bear on any particular object, but fire it off point blank\"17. It is, therefore, no surprise that they were no match for the European ships, or even the gun boats such as the Nemesis which only mounted a couple of 32 pounders.\n\nOne would have expected the shore batteries to have given a better account for themselves; however, even the batteries at the Bogue Forts were not well directed. Ouchterlony said of their efforts to dislodge a battery of howitzers set up in the middle of South Wangtung, an island well within range of the fort: \"...it will convey some idea of their miserable deficiency in gunnery, to remark that during all that time, although many guns in the southern horns of the half-moon batteries on Wangtung bore upon it, not a single casualty occurred amongst Captain Knowles' party.\"\n\n# 18\n\nAs regards field guns, the Chinese did not have much use for them as they were generally on the defensive. However, they did have an interesting variety that was mounted on a form of wheelbarrow, but these were only found in an arsenal and not in service. They also used gingals (also spelt gingall or jingal, from the Hindustani jangal), which is a large musket about twenty pounds in weight and when fired is supported either on a swivel mounting or by a second man. A photograph taken around 1910 by Leone Nani20 shows a large matchlock musket being supported on an assistant's shoulder, and specimens of similar dimensions, probably dating from the early twentieth century, were seen in the New Territories of Hong Kong in the 1970s by the author. Weapons of similar size (about eight feet long) but of more modern design were also in use at the time of the Boxer uprising (1900)21. The size of its shot varied. Loch22 observed gingals that required three men to operate and which fired a ball of about 2 pounds. However,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214295, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "116\n\nThere was a gap of nearly twenty years between the first and second China Wars. It would have been expected that, in this period, the Chinese would have updated their arsenals and have been able to defend themselves more effectively. Whilst, as already seen, this was done to a degree, they were not able to overcome all the problems. The biggest problem was probably the attitude of those in charge, which is so often difficult to alter in any institution, particularly the armed forces. Hence, in the second war the story was much the same, although the batteries at the Pei Ho river were able to repel the European navies and delay the end of the war by a year.\n\nIn conclusion it can be seen that not only did the Chinese suffer a great disadvantage in the technology of their weaponry, but they also were behind in training and discipline, factors which turn brave men into efficient troops. Obviously there is more than fighting to any war, and political, economic and social factors all have an influence on events. However, in order to gain a full insight into the wars between China and the Western powers, it is necessary to understand the military aspects. Fortunately the military men, like so many Victorian travellers, have left records of their experiences. This paper draws on some of those records and aims to put them in context with the development of weapon technology that was taking place at the time. The range of weapons being used by the two sides spanned centuries of development and their coming together is, in itself, a fascinating story.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Keith Stewart Mackenzie, Narrative of the Second Campaign in China, London 1842, p. 92 notes \"the Tartars making a most determined resistance, standing by their guns till the sailors cut them down, hand to hand.\"\n\n2 Captain Granville G. Loch R.N., The Closing Events of the Campaign in China: The Operations in the Yang-Tze-Kiang and Treaty of Nanking, London 1843. P. 107. Loch is horrified by \"old men, women and children, cutting each other's throats, and drowning themselves by the dozen.\"\n\n3 Loch R.N., op. cit., p. 113.\n\n4 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 62 notes \"for both (Admiral) Kwan and his second in command, fell by bayonet wounds received in their breasts, whilst gallantly", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214851, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 266, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "233\n\nEssays and Notes (London, John Murray, 1865)\n\n[same] China, During the War and Since the Peace (London, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 2 vols., 1852)\n\nCaptain Arthur Cunynghame, An Aide-de-Camp's Recollections of Service in China (London, 2 vols, 1844)\n\nK.S. Mackenzie, Narrative of the Second Campaign in China (London, 1842)\n\nGranville G. Loch, The Closing Events of the Campaign in China (London, 1843)\n\nAlexander Murray [Lt. In the 18th Regt. (Royal Irish)], Doings in China (London, 1843)\n\nLord Robert Jocelyn, Six Months with the Chinese Expedition (London, 1841)\n\n“A Field Officer\", The Last Year in China (London, 1843)\n\nArmine S.H. Mountain, Memoirs and Letters (London, 1857)", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216407, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 166, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "116\n\nJapanese cruiser YAHAGI11 was due to arrive at 2200 hours that evening.\n\nIn the interim the freighter MADRAS MARU2 arrived. She attempted a rescue operation but this was not successful. Indeed the seas were so high that it was not even possible to contemplate sending the nine survivors across to her for repatriation to Japan.\n\nSince all these Japanese flag ships had appeared or were due to appear at the scene of the grounding Captain Mackinnon informed NASHI that he would sail for Hong Kong that afternoon, and take with him the nine men. Later he was to write:\n\n'Many friendly and complimentary flag signals were exchanged with all ships present, including the wreck. At 1700 I proceeded to Hong Kong leaving the Japanese destroyer NASHI in charge of the situation.'\n\nOn Saturday 7 November HERMES returned to her buoy at Hong Kong and a short while later the nine rescued seamen were landed ashore.\n\nIt is pleasant to be able to record that in due course official thanks were rendered by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Baron Kijuro Shidehara. His letter was addressed to the British ambassador to Tokyo, H.E. Sir Francis Oswald Lindley who forwarded these thanks to the Foreign Office in London from where, in turn, they were passed to the Secretary to the Admiralty.\n\nA year later, on 6th December 1932 at Hong Kong, the C. in C. came onboard our ship to present Lloyds Silver Medals to the three officers, and Bronze Medals to the six ratings who had taken part in the rescue. Also a bronze shield, mounted on a wooden base, was presented to the ship by the Committee of Lloyds.\n\nIn December 1931 an epidemic of diphtheria struck Hong Kong. Amongst those taken ill was Captain Mackinnon. Commander Baxter temporarily assumed command until the arrival of the ship's new commanding officer, Captain W.B. Mackenzie, on 25th February 1932.\n\nCaptain Mackinnon duly returned home and on 21 January 1933", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216408, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 167, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "117\n\nretired as a Rear Admiral. At the outbreak of World War II he was to rejoin but sadly, as a Convoy Commodore, was to die at sea on 17th September 1940 when his ship, S.S. CITY OF BENARES steaming 470 miles to the south of Iceland on passage to Montreal, was torpedoed and sunk by 'U-48' (Heinrich Bleichrodt).\n\nCaptain Mackenzie was to have a more normal, less exciting period of command for the remainder of the commission.\n\nTrue, while at Wei-Hai-Wei during the summer of 1932 he experienced the passage of three typhoons in close succession and fairly close by. During one, on 12th June, S.S. SHENKING was driven ashore on Chimeng Island just up the coast. As Senior Naval Officer Captain Mackenzie was closely involved, not only in arranging for a guard to be maintained over the ship as protection against pirates, but also in the subsequent successful efforts to refloat her. First her passengers were rescued, fortunately without injury or loss. To facilitate her salvage next she had to be lightened. Over the next few days her cargo was discharged into lighters, also into another company ship, S.S. FENGTIEN.\n\nSubsequently Captain Mackenzie was able to report that:\n\n'No difficulty was experienced in selling her cargo of flour well in Wei-Hai-Wei.'\n\n925\n\nThe Chinese Naval Commodore on the spot greatly assisted by providing a gunboat guardship at the scene of the grounding.\n\nS.S. SHENKING was refloated on 17th June. She was brought to Wei-Hai-Wei where further temporary repairs were carried out by the use of cofferdams and the pouring of cement between various of her frames. Finally on Wednesday, 22nd June she departed under her own steam for Shanghai and full repair. Subsequently she re-entered service, in fact following World War II service with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, was to remain with China Navigation until 1955.\n\nThe remainder of the commission was to pass without great incident.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]