[
    {
        "id": 204466,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1962",
        "page_number": 98,
        "title": "RAS-1962",
        "content_text": "LIFE IN THE NEW TERRITORIES\n\n87\n\nHeaven. In Canton itself there was a serious plot to seize the city in October 1894, which led Consul Fraser to write in his next report\n\nThere is little doubt that dissatisfaction with the administration of their native country is growing among the Southern Chinese, and if no attempt at reform is made, may result in a serious insurrection\". He mentioned the plot but remarked that its failure was due more to the ineptitude of its organisers than to the vigour of the local authorities.33 His colleague at Pakhoi, in the south-east of the province, was more critical.\n\nSuch as is Chinese civilisation, Pakhoi is of its outskirt only and shows a lower level than I have seen anywhere else in this country. Piracy is in the blood of the race. A glance through the year's diary shows a monotonous record of petty coast raids, hoverings of pirate junks (which still terrorise the neighbouring coastline) and robberies of every degree of dignity from the sacking of the larger pawnshops to the plunder of a returned emigrant from the Straits or Sumatra. Of Chinese local authorities at Pakhoi itself there are practically none, the highest native Civilian within 20 miles being an officer of the rank of sub-district deputy magistrate armed with an amount of authority that barely enables him to call in question the theft of a matchbox. It would be invidious to say this much of the Pakhoi neighbourhood without adding that most of the adjacent areas are worse.34\n\nWhilst these reports were confined to individual districts there can be little doubt that the general unrest was known and felt in the New Territory. It will be recalled that SUN Yat Sen was a Cantonese and some of his followers are credited with swelling the ranks of the village bands which offered resistance to the British troops who entered the New Territory in 1899.35 This tale of unrest and lawlessness, and weakness on the part of the civil authorities, provides a background to the unsuccessful reform movement of 1898, sponsored by the southern party at Peking, whose sequel was the incarceration of the emperor by his formidable aunt, the Empress Dowager, the stringent capital measures against the reform party and their dispersal overseas or in foreign concessions in China. The leader of the movement and adviser to the emperor was KANG Yue Wei, a prominent scholar and mandarin, and himself a Cantonese.",
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    {
        "id": 204613,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1963",
        "page_number": 94,
        "title": "RAS-1963",
        "content_text": "BRITISH LEGATION AT PEKING\n\n81\n\nthe death of Sir Robert Hart during the siege, and on July 21st it carried a long letter from the President of Queen's College, Belfast, which served as a somewhat premature obituary notice for Hart, who, in fact, lived until 1911.**\n\nThe relieving troops finally entered the British Legation on August 14th, when a Company of mounted Sikhs rode in at about 3 p.m. accompanying General Gaselee and his staff. So ended the siege which had lasted from June 20th until August 14th, a total of 55 days. Fortunately no overwhelming damage had been done to the British Legation, though many of the roofs were badly smashed about and bullets and shells had gone through most of the buildings. One last ironic touch; immediately after the raising of the siege the commissariat functioned so inefficiently that the besieged had to forage for themselves and for some days got less to eat than during the fighting. Meanwhile those who had 'enjoyed' the hospitality of the British Legation during the siege departed and the work of clearing up and repairing the damage began.\n\nThe actual damage suffered by the British Legation buildings was slight in comparison with the damage done to the other foreign Legations. The outer walls were badly damaged and had to be rebuilt, but one small section on the north-east corner facing the Imperial Canal was sufficiently unharmed to be left intact, and on its surface someone painted in black nine-inch letters the words \"LEST WE FORGET”. Most of the buildings in the compound were soon repaired and the Legation again looked substantially the same as before the siege. However, as part of the settlement after the Boxer troubles and the siege of the Legation Quarter Britain acquired considerable ground on the northern and western sides of the old Legation. This consisted of land formerly occupied by the Mongol market, by the Imperial Carriage Park and by the Hanlin Academy, which was burnt out during the fighting. This newly acquired land was later used for\n\n28 Born in 1835 Hart came out to China in the Consular Service in 1854 and spent his first three months as an interpreter at Hong Kong. After various consular appointments he was permitted by the British Government to resign from the consular service in 1859 and to join the newly formed Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs service as Deputy-Commissioner of Customs at Canton. In 1863, at the age of twenty-eight, he was appointed Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs, a post which he held until his resignation in 1908.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1963.txt",
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    {
        "id": 204641,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1963",
        "page_number": 122,
        "title": "RAS-1963",
        "content_text": "NAVIGATION ON THE YANGTSE\n\n109\n\nThe Imperial forces had very little success against the Taipings in the next two years, and although it had been stipulated that the three ports on the river were not to be opened until they were defeated, a second naval expedition left Shanghai early in 1861 to establish consular posts at Chinkiang, Kiukiang, and Hankow. This expedition went up 158 miles beyond Hankow before turning back. Shortly after the return of this expedition the river was opened to foreign trade.\n\nThere is some ambiguity about Western policy during the Taiping Rebellion. It seems to have been regarded with sympathy in the early stages, when it was looked on as a reforming movement with Christian affiliations; and many foreigners welcomed the prospect of a change from the corrupt and reactionary Manchu régime. The British, American, and French governments, therefore, adopted a policy of neutrality in the early stages of the conflict. Later on, however, a marked change took place, which was not entirely due to the excesses committed by the rebels. Commercial considerations undoubtedly played some part. The Treaty of Tientsin had legalised the opium trade, but the Taipings were against opium and alcohol, and banned this trade in the territory under their control. They also made it clear that under their rule foreign trade would not be carried on in the one-sided manner so favourable to the foreign merchants. The Treaty of Tientsin again had stipulated that foreign ships could not navigate the Yangtse until peace was restored. Because of these and other reasons, the Western Powers abandoned their policy of neutrality. The rebels were looked on and referred to as firebrands and extremists, and the Manchu government as a peaceful and stabilising element, and steps were taken to help the latter. These included supplying the government forces with arms and ammunition — including the new Lee Enfield rifle, not yet used in Europe — allowing foreign steamers to transport government troops, and supplying officers to train and lead them.* As a result Nanking was captured in 1864, and the last vestiges of the rebellion were stamped out by 1866.\n\nIn 1862 the Scotland, a steamer belonging to Lindsay and Company of Shanghai was the first ocean-going merchant ship to go to Hankow, and thus opened the interior of China to direct\n\n* Gordon was the most famous of these officers.",
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    },
    {
        "id": 204716,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1964",
        "page_number": 19,
        "title": "RAS-1964",
        "content_text": "W. C. HUNTER \n\nengaged in the lucrative trade drew out of the country large amounts of silver. Lin Tse-hsu, Governor General of Hupeh and Hunan wholeheartedly threw his support to those who memorialized the throne requesting stringent measures to prevent the use of opium within the country, and to cure addicts. Moreover, Lin took direct action and seized caches of opium, 12,000 ounces and 5,000 pipes. As a result of his success in combating opium addiction and forceful condemnation of the sale of the drug he was called to Peking by Emperor Tao-kuang and appointed Imperial Commissioner to examine the opium traffic at Canton. He arrived at the provincial capital in early March, 1839. For several years prior to 1839 nearly 30,000 chests had been imported annually there.\n\nFateful events immediately took form. Lin warned the western merchants of dire results if the iniquitous trade did not cease. His threat was followed by the demand that within three days they offer a bond that no opium would be imported. A counter proposal was made to turn over to Commissioner Lin about 1000 chests of the drug which he summarily rejected. On March 22, he demanded that Lancelot Dent, one of the principal importers be given to Chinese officials as a hostage until all opium was given up. The western merchants insisted that Dent could be surrendered only on condition that his personal safety was guaranteed. The Chinese merchants doing business with foreigners were frightened by the action of their own government. Some of them were deprived of their buttons of rank and two appeared in public with chains around their necks. Under these circumstances the Hong (the association of Chinese merchants trading with the western merchants at Canton) pressed the foreign community to comply with the ultimatum of Lin and deliver up Dent.\n\nIn the midst of this seething situation, on March 24, Captain Charles Elliot, British naval officer and Chief Superintendent and Plenipotentiary of the China Commission arrived from Macao. He entered the foreign compound with great difficulty inasmuch as the river had been blockaded and the streets leading to the foreign section had been barricaded. The predicament of approximately 300 western people seemed most serious since food and water were in short supply and a large encampment of Chinese troops was close at hand. Canton was cut off from formal communications from Macao which was nearly sixty miles distant",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1964.txt",
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    {
        "id": 205123,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1966",
        "page_number": 79,
        "title": "RAS-1966",
        "content_text": "74\n\nHOLMES WELCH\n\nIn 1873 the first Japanese missionary arrived in the Middle Kingdom. His name was Ogurusu Kocho and he had been sent to look over the situation in Shanghai by the Higashi Honganji sub-sect of Jodo Shinshu (the larger of the two main Pure Land sects). The following year he paid another visit to Shanghai and also went to Peking.\n\nIn 1876 the Higashi Honganji drew up a new creed that could be interpreted as a bid for collaboration with the state. Among other things, it emphasized that glorious death in military service would be rewarded by rebirth in the Western Paradise. It spoke of brotherhood with the Chinese in face of the unfilial barbarians. In May that year Count Otani, the hereditary patriarch of the subsect went to Tokyo accompanied by Ogurusu Kocho, and consulted Terashima Munenori in the Foreign Ministry on the problem of missionary work in China. We are not told the substance of their conversation, but in August a branch temple opened its doors in Shanghai, staffed by six priests, including Ogurusu. It was \"the first Japanese religious organization in China.\"2\n\nAfter China's defeat by Japan in 1895 a trade agreement was signed that gave the Japanese the right to construct temples in all the Treaty Ports. In 1896 Nanking had a Honganji temple.3 Shanghai got a Nichiren temple in 1899 and a second Honganji temple in 1906. According to one source special efforts were made to build temples in Fukien province, where the Japanese were trying to create a sphere of influence across the straits from their newly acquired colony of Formosa. Their missions were often able to attract parishioners because they could offer the same protection as their Christian counterparts, but did not require anyone to give up ancestor worship. The aim, however, was not merely parish-building, but use of the missions in the same way as the European powers. Thus in the autumn of 1900 a Japanese temple in Amoy was mysteriously destroyed by fire. A few hours later Japanese marines landed from a warship that had been waiting in the harbor and occupied the city. Only the strongest British representations induced Japan to withdraw her troops and bring her first \"missions case\" to a close.\n\nA more subtle approach was already on its way. In 1899 the East Asian Cultural Alliance had been established to create an",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/bz60k0811",
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    },
    {
        "id": 205731,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 37,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "31\n\nMILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE:\n\nCHINESE RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION OF HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES IN 18991\n\nR. G. GROVES*\n\nIntroduction\n\nViolence, or the very real possibility of violence, was endemic in southeastern China during the nineteenth century. The provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, and Fukien were notorious to imperial official and foreign observer alike for their varieties of armed conflict. Brine, a British naval officer with contemporary experience of the coastal provinces, described the mid-nineteenth century situation as follows: \"the whole history of the period is little else than a continual series of local insurrections, bursting out in all directions. The coast was infested with pirates, who not only caused great injury to the coasting trade, but frequently landed and sacked the villages lying adjacent to the sea. In the two Kwang provinces armed bodies of men moved from town to town, and committed large robberies in open day... the Pekin Gazettes were full of reports from the provincial governors acquainting the emperor with the disorganized state of the country, and complaining of the inadequacy of their troops to quell the interminable revolts.\" To this catalogue of ills may be added the Opium and Arrow Wars, inter-lineage and clan warfare, ethnic conflict, and major and minor rebellions.\n\nThe prevalence of violence was by no means new. Writing of the Hsin-an District of Kwangtung Province, just over a century ago, the German missionary Krone noted: \"Hung-mo the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1399 A.D.), found it necessary... to appoint an officer with the title ‘Shou-yu-sho'... Protector of the region, in order to protect the population, which was rapidly increasing, against the bands of robbers and vagabonds which infested the district.\"3 More recently Professor Maurice Freedman, surveying a mass of evidence and arguing that organized violence\n\n* Mr. Groves is a Lecturer in Sociology at the University of East Anglia. He conducted field research in the New Territories between 1963-65. His article \"The Origins of Two Market Towns in the New Territories\" appeared in Aspects of Social Organization in the New Territories (ed. M. Topley) published by the Hong Kong Branch, R.A.S. in 1965.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d",
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    {
        "id": 205754,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 60,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "54 \n\nR. G. GROVES \n\nOn 2nd June Rev. Schaub wrote that the \"literati of Pan T'in had a meeting with the headmen of the six large market places in their neighbourhood.\" He continued, \"most of the collected elders of the various villages were very reluctantly promising some help, but after all they came to an agreement that they would send 500 men from each market place when the Indian troops should really come to Pan Tin.\"3 Meanwhile, the villagers of Pan T'in were constructing trenches between their village and Li Long. \n\nOn 5th June Rev. Schaub reported that fortification work was still in progress. He had heard that \"members of the rich and prosperous clan Tang in the city of Tung Kun ... are behind the scenes, that soldiers and weapons are coming up from there.\" Rev. Schaub continued, \"last Saturday a messenger came from one of our out-stations, 15 miles from here... to bring us the news that the various market places in that region had also a gathering to discuss their plans.\"74 \n\nRev. Schaub enclosed his own translation of a gentry placard posted in a nearby market town. It begins with a denunciation of the barbarians, and continues: \n\n44 \n\nTo fight the barbarians, I propose in a rough way: (1) to get the funds. It is the best plan that the six confederations (six market places) keep together. But the outlay for the soldiers should not be collected by an extraordinary field tax. It is also not right that the various confederations should pay the costs. Some of these places have a large population, and many fields... but for instance Thonglak (alias market of peace) could not do this. It is a small place and there is not a large population... We should use the usual field tax. Let first the six confederations come together to ask our Government for help \n\n**75 \n\nBy the end of June it was clear that the British did not intend an expedition against the villages of the interior. The occupation had, however, become involved in larger diplomatic issues between Britain and China. It dragged on throughout the summer until 13th September, when the last of the British forces withdrew behind the frontiers of the Colony. In the interim much of the Sham Chun valley was left without any form of Chinese government. On the day the British forces finally quitted the valley \n\nPage 60\nPage 61",
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    {
        "id": 205872,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1969",
        "page_number": 178,
        "title": "RAS-1969",
        "content_text": "172\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\nterm “militia” to translate tuan lien (). Wakeman uses this term and, to my mind, strays further from its real meaning when he differentiates between tuan lien and \"genuine tuan lien\". I would prefer to use Siang-tseh Chiang's term \"local corps\" for all \"tuan lien”, whether \"genuine\" or not. In English this is a more accurate, because more loose-fitting, term, and it does not abuse the word \"militia” which in Britain at least has a precise meaning. Militia were auxiliary troops not on full-time service except when embodied in time of war for home or overseas service. These forces were totally under government control, and indeed were an integral part of the military forces of the English Crown and as such subject to considerable constitutional constraint. This led Cardwell, the 19th-century Army reformer, to describe the militia as \"the constitutional force of England.. a force ever dear to the people of England from constitutional antecedents\".* Thus the circumstances of the existence and mode of use of the British militia after the establishment of the Standing Army in 1660 were quite different from those obtaining in China during the Ching dynasty; which surely strengthens the case for selecting another term to describe \"local forces\" that were not financed by government and might never have had official blessing.\n\nThat the appearance of tuan lien might be deceptive is, however, certain. The Kwangtung Viceroy commented as follows on Hong Kong Governor Sir Henry Blake's theory that Chinese regular troops might have taken part in the disturbances that followed the occupation of the New Territories of Hong Kong in 1899:\n\nThe Governor of Hong Kong suspected that they were regular troops from the fact that they had guns, cannon, and uniforms. He was not aware that the villagers of Kwangtung, in their constant fights with each other, are always erecting forts, and use guns and cannon, and wear uniforms. This is a matter of common notoriety.\n\nThis quotation is borrowed from Mr. Groves' article, printed elsewhere in this number of the Journal, in which he uses Wakeman's book to put together an interesting essay on the interaction of market, lineage and militia (local forces) during the opposition to the British occupation of the New Territories in 1899.\n\nSecondly, this reviewer found the discussion of \"local schools\"\n\n* Quoted in The Spectator, 14th March, 1969, p. 331.",
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    {
        "id": 206217,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1971",
        "page_number": 34,
        "title": "RAS-1971",
        "content_text": "28\n\nSTEPHEN UHALLEY, JR.\n\nand justify their active support of the attack on the city. This then is what happened on the morning of May 10th. According to the Ch'ing official, Hsü Yao-kuang, the provocative shots were fired at a foreign vessel and actually killed two foreigners.36 Dew jumped to the conclusion or feigned to believe that it was the Taipings who had done the firing, and immediately joined in the fight. Dew's own account is nonchalant, noting merely that the Taiping guns were silenced and that he then went to dinner at noon. At 2 p.m. storming parties mounted the walls, and at 5 p.m., after all opposition had ceased, the \"Governor” (probably the tao-t'ai) and Ch'ing soldiers landed from their junks. Dew turned the city over to the Manchu official and withdrew his men.37 The disposition of the Ch'ing troops during this attack is implicit in this report, but another unofficial source was more explicit, reporting that the Chinese allies could not be made to move toward the walls, so that in the end, even the actual breaching of them had to be undertaken by foreign troops.38 Obviously, under the circumstances of such an attack by Ch'ing forces, the Taipings had little alternative but to return fire toward foreign vessels which were interspersed among or in close proximity to the pirate fleet, both as the action began and as it continued.\n\nAfter a determined resistance, and after both of their generals, Huang and Fan, had been badly wounded, the Taipings retired from the city. The contrast between what happened during the retaking of the city at this point and the record of the Taiping seizure of the city several months earlier is interesting. It will be recalled how universal had been the favorable comments regarding the bloodless Taiping takeover. As for this latest occupation, the report of the correspondent for the China Mail speaks eloquently: \"The rebels retreated through the west gate; the pirates then entered the city and began the work of destruction, and in a few hours did more damage than the rebels did in the whole of the five months that they had possession.\" The same account goes on to speak of the executions and the tortures that were perpetrated over the next couple of days, and notes specifically that the British Consul's Chinese servant was \"one of the principal murderers and torturers of the poor fellows found in the city.\"39 Cheng A-fu was subsequently given the status of a petty official in Ningpo, as a reward for his service.40",
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    {
        "id": 206525,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1972",
        "page_number": 73,
        "title": "RAS-1972",
        "content_text": "SIR JAMES HALDANE STEWART LOCKHART\n\n67\n\nthe charge of the North Division magistrate, who was also Secretary to Government. The Secretary held a dormant commission to administer the affairs of the Territory in the Commissioner's absence. The South Division contained all the rest of the leased Territory, i.e., seventeen out of the twenty-six districts, and it was presided over by the South Division Magistrate, who also acted as District Officer. This gentleman controlled a diminutive police force of a sergeant and seven men, all Chinese; all his other staff were Chinese. Apart from the District Officer, there was only one other European official resident in the South Division, which contained 231 out of the 315 villages of the Territory.\n\nUntil 1906, however, Lockhart as Commissioner could call upon the services of the Chinese Regiment in any emergency which the police were unable to cope with. This Regiment was raised in early 1899 and owed its origin to a suggestion made by Field-Marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, that Chinese troops could be organised at Weihaiwei for use in other places. According to R.F. Johnston: 'They did good service in promptly suppressing an attempted rising in the leased Territory, and on being sent to the front to take part in the operations against the Boxers in 1900, they behaved exceedingly well, both during the attack on Tientsin, and on the march to Peking.' Johnston, it seems, over-praised their contribution for between 1899 and 1901 over 800 deserted and many of them moved straight into Chinese service after having passed through what came to be known as \"the Wei Hai Wei Military School\". As the India Office pointed out, Great Britain was in effect furnishing a \"steady annual supply of trained soldiers\" to China. At its greatest strength the Chinese Regiment numbered 1,300 officers and men but in 1906, the year the Regiment was disbanded, their numbers had fallen to about 600. A few picked men were retained as a permanent police force, and three European non-commissioned officers were provided with appointments on the civil establishment as police inspectors. In 1910, therefore, the entire Territory was policed by only fifty-six Chinese constables and three inspectors. There was no permanent garrison of British troops.\n\nWeihaiwei was officially designated not as a Colony but as a Territory, which meant that Lockhart as Commissioner was head of the local government and subject only to the control of His Majesty exercised through the Secretary of State for the Colonies in",
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    {
        "id": 207334,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 102,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "94 \n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE \n\nemployment; but few stayed with the department. Most took to their gypsy life again, once they had accumulated a few dollars, and left for either Shanghai or Singapore, or simply went to earth in Tai Ping Shan or Wan Chai until disinterred by the police, always on the look out for European destitutes. \n\nThere were always some troops on garrison duty in the colony or manning the various fortifications designed to repel a seaborne invasion. The garrison normally was small and numbered usually less than 1,500 men. But numbers fluctuated markedly at times. In March 1860, for example, over 14,000 troops (10,000 British and 4,000 French) were being drilled in a vast tented camp on two square miles of the Kowloon peninsula, leased from the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and awaiting transportation to the theatre of operations in the north. A witness of these events wrote that 'the streets of Victoria were thronged by soldiers and sailors; commissaries and staff officers were to be seen everywhere; all as busy as mortals could be'.7 \n\nIt was a policy of the government and the military to keep troops if possible out of European Victoria—the central commercial district—and to confine their debaucheries to special areas of the colony. Thus five brothels were specially opened at Wan Chai in the 1850s when soldiers at that time were prohibited by their officers from entering the central districts of the city. For soldiers on outpost duties access to Victoria was difficult in any case: \n\nGarrison life at these outposts is usually melancholy; society is impossible, as the fortifications are eight miles by water from the city, and communication over the mountains is arduous. It is not a question of which is the better of the two, but which the worse, to be of the British Garrison Artillery or the Chinese Lighthouse Service.& \n\nThere were usually more sailors than soldiers ashore in Hong Kong, or afloat in the harbour, at certain times of the year. During the three winter months, the British China squadron was stationed in Hong Kong; in summer most naval vessels left Hong Kong for the north and other stations. The large number of sailors, who at times outnumbered the civilian European population, was supplemented by merchant seamen of many nationalities; for by the 1890s Hong Kong had become, after London, Liverpool, and Port Said, the fourth largest port in the world in terms of seagoing tonnage",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207342,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 110,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "102\n\nH. J. LETHBRIDGE\n\nRow in Tai Ping Shan was then known as 'Samshu Corner' because many Europeans resorted to it for cheap topping. The commissioners ascertained that much drinking went on in barracks, troops sending Chinese 'boys' out to buy bottles of samshu or whisky for them. Drunkenness was a direct consequence of boredom and idleness.\n\nThe problem of venereal disease was related to that of drinking, for bars and brothels clustered together. From 1867 to 1887, the Contagious Diseases Ordinance, patterned on the English act of 1866, was in force in the colony to protect the health of British servicemen. Briefly, the 1867 ordinance made all prostitutes working in licensed brothels for Europeans only (Chinese brothels for Chinese only were exempted) subject to compulsory medical inspection at the Lock Hospital. European prostitutes, on the other hand, could undergo examination at home. It was claimed that the repeal of the Hong Kong ordinance in 1889, following the repeal of the English act in 1886, led to an upsurge in the rates for venereal disease. In 1895, admissions into hospital for venereal infection in the home army were 173.8 per 1,000; in India, 522.3; in Hong Kong, about the same figure.\n\nIt follows, then, that the chance of a male member of the European lower orders becoming infected with venereal disease was always high during the period under review here, 1842-1900. The police, for example, were so prone to catching this social disease, almost an occupational disease for them, that at one time they were also subject to compulsory medical inspection. The practice was stopped in 1873, but before that date, there was a monthly examination of all foreign members of the force.\n\nMiddle-class Europeans did not escape entirely from all these afflictions from alcoholism, syphilis, boredom, and loneliness. Both classes Taipans and pong-paan — also fell victim at times to a variety of diseases, such as malaria, typhus, cholera, and bubonic plague, as the Colonial Cemetery at Happy Valley amply testifies. But the well-to-do could at least escape to the Peak from Hong Kong's enervating summer, or recuperate in cooler latitudes, in Japan or northern China; and since many of the prosperous were respectably married and lived a normal family life, cosseted by a houseful of servants, they were protected to some degree by domestic circumstances from the temptations that soldiers, sailors, seamen, and their kind, had to face day and night in the city.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207394,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 162,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "154\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nconflict. I came to regret my thoroughness, for there was never time to use the equipment thus accumulated and this must have been splendid booty for the Japanese. There was also a full social life; many British women had enrolled for nursing and other essential duties and had not been evacuated. The Hong Kong Hotel was a gay place indeed, particularly on a Saturday night.\n\nIn October 1938, 35,000 Japanese troops had landed in Bias Bay on the China coast 35 miles from Hong Kong, and had then occupied Canton and had cut all communications between Hong Kong and mainland China. Patrolling Japanese ships thereafter made sailing from the Colony outside a circumscribed area very hazardous. In February 1939 the Japanese occupied the island of Hainan, 300 miles to the south of Hong Kong thus controlling the sea communications with Singapore. Curiously, after my arrival I do not remember taking part in any serious discussions with my friends about the prospects of a successful defence of Hong Kong. There were however plenty of rumours to fill the air. It was generally known that the strategic plan required Hong Kong to resist an attack for 90 days before a relief could arrive, a decision taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in 1937. In February 1940 the home authorities decided that food reserves should be accumulated for 130 days, while in August 1940 the Chiefs of Staff reached a further decision that in case of war with Japan, Hong Kong should be regarded as an outpost to be held as long as possible. After the war I learned from Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, that in February 1940 the Chiefs of Staff concluded that the troops should be withdrawn from Hong Kong. Nothing was done to give effect to this decision. I have no doubt that the decision taken in February 1940 was the correct one which could with advantage have been taken much earlier. Ever since my arrival in Hong Kong in 1939 I believed that the Colony could not be defended successfully. The frontier, beyond which lay a strong Japanese army, was some 20 miles from Hong Kong harbour, the line to be defended, the so-called Gin Drinkers line was less than 5 miles from the harbour, the Japanese navy controlled the coast, our airport was tiny and the Air Force planes were few in number and no match in performance for their potential opponents. One and a half million Chinese civilians were crowded into Kowloon and Victoria. Roads suitable for wheeled traffic were few and open to close observation at many points. The whole picture left no doubt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207397,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 165,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n157\n\nIn the Colony trade went on and there was much talk of the value of Hong Kong to Great Britain as a provider of foreign currency through its commerce. The fine young men in civil life in Hong Kong, prevented from travelling to join the forces at home, like many others, found it hard to reconcile the argument in favour of acquiring foreign currency with their knowledge that a large proportion of the goods exported found its way to Japan. They were all keen members of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps. It may be claimed that our trading policy delayed Japan's entry into the war, but to many it seemed that economic and strategic considerations were at cross purposes.\n\nI came in contact with Indian troops in the Colony mainly in an individual professional capacity when my surgical services were needed, but I imagine they were subject to the same effects of garrison duty as were the British troops. Garrison duty has never in any army provided a satisfactory training for active service, and Hong Kong provided yet another example of the truth of this. Once the arrangements for manning the defences were mastered the Island and the New Territories gave little scope for the most ingenious commander or space in which he could exercise and retain the interest of his troops. This left sports to absorb, by no means completely, the youthful energies of strong young men. Many of these had been received as friends in families in Hong Kong, some had contracted stable relationships with women but many had little to occupy themselves when off duty. I well remember seeing men flushed from their games trying to get into the China Fleet Club on the Victoria waterfront. They were obliged to shoulder their way physically through the crowd of Chinese and Eurasian women seeking them as companions. Not all of these were attractive, but girls of these races are among the most beautifully shaped that, in a wide experience, I have ever met. Co-habitation with a high proportion of these girls led to venereal infection and some men sought satisfaction in their own sex. Alas, this did not safeguard them from infection. Another hazard was malaria. About October 1941 the army manned the defences in an exercise and following this a substantial number of soldiers contracted malaria and needed treatment in hospital. Before many had regained strength after the fever, the army was deployed during the phase which led to open war. I pay high tribute to the spirit and the readiness with which these men met the call. Everyone who was\n\nPage 165\n\nPage 166",
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    {
        "id": 207436,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 204,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "196\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nnames in this account I shall spell them as they sounded to me. I was old enough to be aware of the fighting qualities of their troops in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and Japan was acclaimed as our ally in the First War. The reputation of the people for courtesy in their own country was high. The situation changed drastically in the nineteen thirties.\n\nThe conduct of their troops in Manchuria and in China, the truculence of their government and the xenophobia of their nationals in Japan itself gave the nation a sinister reputation, and those of us who had followed these developments had few illusions about what would happen to people conquered by their armies if war came. This reputation was entirely self-made. I never hated the Japanese as such though I came to distrust individual members of their army. I try here to record our dealings with those in charge in the British Military Hospital in Hong Kong. The name of our hospital changed from time to time. In April 1942 I was writing reports and requests from the British Military Hospital. By September 1942 our name had become \"Dai Ichi Bun In, Kirishima Dori\". By October 1943 we were \"Dai Ichi Bun Ken Sho\", but I don't know what our name was in Kowloon.\n\nThe commander of P.O.W. camps in Hong Kong was one Colonel Tokunaga, and our hospital came under his authority. He was a thick-set man of a little over average Japanese height. His age was not easy to guess but I judged him to be well over fifty and he gave me the impression of having been recalled to active service from the reserve. He was nicknamed 'the pig' by our troops. I do not know if he could speak English but I suspect that he understood our language a little. I never had experience of conversation with him, and on his inspections and visits he seemed utterly withdrawn from any human contact with staff or patients though his orders, transmitted to me after inspections, showed that he had been observant and had noted arrangements which he considered should be changed. These referred only to such matters as the lay-out of beds, notices in wards, conditions in the hospital grounds and so on. He never gave me orders at the time of his visits; these were transmitted later. When the representative of the Red Cross came, Tokunaga always preceded him wherever they went and he obviously dictated the route to be followed. I never knew him speak to a patient. Tokunaga seemed to me to be a Japanese officer of the old school showing by his demeanour the rigidity of his training.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207505,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 273,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n265\n\nAt this time I took part in some discussions on any action to be taken to report on the conduct of individuals while prisoners and I took the view that adverse reports should only be made in cases of the grossest neglect of duty and I made no report of this kind. Our staff and patients, apart from an occasional minor misdemeanour by one or two, conducted themselves splendidly.\n\nOn 4 September the large Empress of Australia arrived. I took two R.A.F. doctors to the Central British School where they saw something of the population of bugs and very understandably wanted to occupy apartments in nearby flats. By now the R.A.F. had brought 3000 troops into the Colony and they needed hospital services for their sick. There was, as might be expected, some confusion in the various administrations. Some people were moving too fast with too little thought, while others thought too long before moving.\n\nOn 5 September I went off to the Empress of Australia early and later found that Surgeon-Captain George Abercrombie was now Fleet P.M.O. in the battleship H.M.S. Anson. Abercrombie was later to be a founder member and in due course a distinguished President of the College of General Practitioners (later a Royal College), and I had the pleasure of meeting him quite frequently in London later. He kindly invited me to lunch in the Anson one day. Long voyages in warships in wartime conditions had left him looking rather pale, while of course I was pretty thin by that time. The main dish at lunch was a mutton stew in which the mutton was extremely fat and the watery part of the stew was laden with fat globules. I well remember the look of horror on his face as he watched me dispose of what to him must have been a repulsive dish.\n\nAt this time I learned that Colonel Lindsay Ride was replacing Field as senior officer in the army in Hong Kong. Ride had commanded our Field Ambulance during the fighting in Hong Kong. He was a professor in the University and his Chinese students helped him to escape as soon as we surrendered to Mainland China, where he set up an organisation to keep in touch with events in Hong Kong and which helped people to escape from the Colony. I believe that it was through his thoughtfulness that my wife learned that I was still alive after hostilities ended but none of the messages I sent off from Hong Kong after our release ever arrived. Ride was later Vice-Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, and knighted for his services to the Colony.\n\nThe R.A.F. hospital moved into the Central British School",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207514,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 282,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "274\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nand I doubted very seriously whether any prisoners would get out of Hong Kong. Having reached this conclusion it seems strange that one just carried on. I do not recall discussing the situation as I saw it with any other person in the hospital, for it was my job to try to keep people cheerful rather than inspire feelings of gloom. I suppose the truth of the matter is that with the blessing of work to be done it became possible to shut one's mind to the dark thoughts that crowded in.\n\nIn 1944 the effects of the blockade on the Japanese began to become evident to us, though after April 1945 when the hospital reopened in Kowloon our conditions were improved and my own depression and I believe that of others lifted very considerably.\n\nThe military situation was such that in April 1945 the Japanese expeditionary force in China which had recently been reinforced numbered about one million men, though by this time neither the training of the troops nor their equipment were good and their efficiency was not high. Responsibility for the Canton area was laid upon the Japanese 23rd Army which consisted of six divisions, two independent mixed brigades, two independent infantry brigades and the defence force allocated to Hong Kong. In May 1945 the 23rd Army was reduced from six to three divisions, but its task was still to hold Liuchow Peninsula, the Hong Kong-Canton area and Swatow in order to repel an American invasion.\n\nWhatever plans may have been made or even considered, our Official History contain no suggestion that an American or British attack on Hong Kong was contemplated in 1945. Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, the American Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek and commander of the American forces in China, hoped to have a force of 13 Chinese armies, each of three divisions for operations in the Hong Kong-Canton area. Wedemeyer's plan was to attack the Hong Kong-Canton area in the last quarter of 1945, and the assault on Canton was to be made on 1 November. Sixteen out of Wedemeyer's 39 divisions had American training and were fully equipped. None of the other 23 was either fully equipped or trained. At the time of the Japanese surrender 20,000 troops and civilians laid down their arms in Hong Kong. It would seem therefore that the battle for the relief of Hong Kong would have been fought between Japanese and Chinese troops. All operations of course were halted after the atom bombs were dropped.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207530,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 298,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "290\n\nEditor's Footnotes\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\n1. Dr. Bowie's own career and achievements, before and after the historic events of which he writes, will be of interest to readers of this Journal. They are as follows:\n\nM.B. 1918. University of Glasgow.\n\nF.R.C.S. Royal College of Surgeons, Edinburgh 1929.\n\nHonorary F.R.C.G.P. (Royal College of General Practitioners) 1969.\n\nSir Arthur Keith Medallist, Royal College of Surgeons, England, 1969.\n\nMain Appointments, Army.\n\nCommissioned R.A.M.C. 1918.\n\nServed in U.K., France, Germany, Turkey.\n\nSeconded to Egyptian Army 1923-25.\n\nShanghai Defence Force 1927.\n\nTerritorial Adjutant, 54th East Anglian Division T.A. 1928-30,\n\nSurgical Specialist, British Troops in Egypt 1930-35.\n\nSurgical Specialist, Queen Alexandra Military Hospital, London 1936-39,\n\nSurgical Specialist, British Troops in China, Hong Kong, 1939.\n\nPrisoner of War, 1941-45.\n\nReader in Military Surgery, Royal Army Medical College, London 1946-48. Consulting Surgeon, Middle East Land Forces 1948-50.\n\nRetired 1950. (voluntarily)\n\nCivil.\n\nRegional Postgraduate Dean, British Postgraduate Medical Federation, University of London in North West, South West Metropolitan and Wessex Hospital Regions, 1950-70.\n\nNow Retired.\n\nDr. Bowie was awarded the O.B.E. (Military) in 1946.\n\n2. Dr. Bowie's account of Japanese attitudes and behaviour can usefully be set beside the comments of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke and Dr. Li Shu-fan, the eminent Hong Kong surgeon, who both experienced them at first hand. Sir Selwyn writes (pp. 71-72 of his autobiography referred to at p. 178 above):\n\nNobody can deny that man's potential for cruelty was exhibited on an appalling scale by the Japanese in the stress of war. It was predictable in the circumstances that I should suffer my share of ill-treatment at their hands, and this is what presently came about. Yet the feature of their character that stood out from that whole experience was in fact their unpredictability. They would be acquiescent, even humane, when least expected, vicious with sudden fury after a phase almost of apathy. They could respect, sometimes, a principled stand or an unflinching argument, and yet visit a meaningless rage upon the helpless. To attempt to understand them was the plain duty of anyone seeking to protect a community that was at their mercy, and the first lesson to be learned was that surrender violated their military code, making a prisoner a non-person. But this too was a generalization, and as such to be guarded against as one guarded against racial prejudice. For men are not cast in one mould, even by war, even by a code or an ideology.\n\nDr. Li's account of Hong Kong under Japanese rule is given in chapters 6-9 of his autobiography, Hong Kong Surgeon (London, Victor Gollancz, 1964) in which his comments at pp. 159-160 are relevant here.",
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    {
        "id": 207641,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 29,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "14\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nforeign military aid reaped few long-term gains. Western officers from \"Chinese\" Gordon to Constantin von Hanneken introduced a measure of modernity to at least a few armies in the late Ch'ing period, but none of these individuals was able to promote more basic institutional reform.10 The effects of Japan's success and China's failure in this regard were far-reaching.\n\nGenerally speaking, China's approach to military reform in the years from 1860 to 1895 may be compared with that of Japan in the years from 1853 to 1868. In each instance, foreign assistance was acquired piecemeal by both the central government and local governments, with no real coordination between the two. Similar rationales were offered, and similar results obtained, although in the case of China the new knowledge and technology acquired was used to bolster rather than to undermine the existing central government.11\n\nA high priority for both pre-Meiji Japan and late Ch'ing China was the training of troops and officers in Western techniques. In each country, the use of foreign military assistance followed similar lines. The training program established for the Bakufu by the French Minister, Leon Roches, at Yokohama during the mid-1860's, for example, may be compared with the central government training program set up by the British Minister, Frederick Bruce, at Tientsin in the early 1860's.12 Similarly, the various foreign-training efforts begun in Chōshu and other han during the 1860's bear a basic resemblance to the post-Taiping training camps established at Shanghai, Canton, Foochow and elsewhere.13 The Japanese even had their own rough equivalent of China's famous Ever-Victorious Army.14 Common problems in these early military improvement programs included language difficulties, foreign rivalries, financial limitations, lack of standardization in arms and training, and foreign meddling.15\n\nChina never overcame these problems. From the 1860's to the early 1890's, a handful of foresighted individuals, most notably Li Hung-chang, undertook a variety of modernizing enterprises aimed at building up China's “wealth and power.” Their efforts succeeded in a limited way, but were severely hindered by obscurantism, official opposition, bureaucratic inertia, and the deliberate policies of the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, who carefully manipulated political factions in order to maintain and enhance her own power.16",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207795,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 183,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "168\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nMeanwhile exploration continued from the south. Between 1866 and 1868 the French under Doudart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier made their famous expedition from Saigon by the Mekong River through Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos to Talifu and Kunming in Yunnan. The Panthay Rebellion was then at its height, and the Chinese authorities refused them permission to proceed further up the Mekong. Garnier, who had succeeded to the leadership after Lagrée's death, had to abandon his plan to explore the sources of the Mekong, and turned east across Yunnan to the Upper Yangtze at Iping. Here boats were obtained to take them on the four weeks journey to Hankow. Garnier saw enough of the Mekong to realise that it could never rival the Irawaddy, let alone the Yangtze, as a trade route to West China, and French interest shifted to the Red River route from Haiphong through Tongking. During an enforced delay on the Siamese border, Garnier made the first thorough survey of the ruins of Angkor, and his expedition is important in that it encouraged French ambitions for an Indo-Chinese Empire.\n\nThere was no clear policy on the part of the various British parties concerned with developing trade with West China, nor over the best way to reach this region of supposed inexhaustible wealth. Lack of accurate information is also a constant theme in the history of British relations with West China. However, penetration and exploitation from the West, that is from India and Burma, attracted greater public and official support in Britain than that from the Yangtze by the China traders, though by 1874, a combination of circumstances led to a co-operative effort being made from both East and West, the aforementioned Dual Mission of 1874-75, which I shall now describe.\n\nThe Panthay Rebellion finally came to an end in May 1873 when the Imperial troops captured Momein, this completing the reconquest of Yunnan after eighteen years of civil war. During the ensuing period of rehabilitation the provincial authorities tried to revive the Burma-Yunnan overland route, and caravans reappeared after nearly twenty years' absence, undeterred by disbanded soldiers and lawless hillmen. By May 1874 the British Political Agent at Bhamo reported that more caravans were passing between Burma and Yunnan than for many years, and that British and Chinese merchants were sending such large consignments of goods",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 207797,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 185,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "170 \n\nA. D. BLUE \n\ndays later rumours of an ambush by Chinese and Shan tribesmen led to Margary deciding to go in advance as scout, and he left the main party on 19th February with five Chinese companions. Three days later word came back that he had been murdered at Manwyne, with rumours that 4,000 Chinese troops were on their way to annihilate the whole expedition. Before Browne had time to recover from this blow, the camp was attacked by an advance guard of the Chinese force, but was beaten off by the Sikh and Burmese soldiers. Next day confirmation of Margary's murder came from the King of Burma's commercial agent at Bhamo, and on 20th February Browne's whole expedition retraced its steps to Mandalay and Rangoon.\n\nMargary's murder, and deteriorating relations between the British and the King of Burma, prevented further expeditions from Burma; but ironically led to further progress on the Yangtze,\n\nSir Thomas Wade, British Minister at Peking, took advantage of the Chinese government's failure to protect Margary to press for further trade relaxations, and the result was the Chefoo Convention of 1876 between Wade and Viceroy Li Hung-chang. This provided for the opening of five more ports to foreign trade, and of the 400 miles of the Middle Yangtze to foreign shipping. Among the new treaty ports was Ichang, located at the upper end of the Middle Yangtze and 400 miles below Chungking, the main port of Szechwan. When the Convention was ratified in 1885, a supplementary clause provided for Chungking to become a treaty port; but not for free navigation on the 400 miles of the Upper Yangtze between Ichang and Chungking. This was granted after the Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and Japan on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.\n\nMore than ten years before this, however, the remarkable Archibald Little had appeared on the Yangtze scene. Little began his career as a tea taster in Kiukiang in 1859, but soon started up business on his own. He was attracted to the possibilities of trade in Szechwan and West China, and fascinated by the problems posed by steam navigation through the famous gorges of the Upper Yangtze. He made a trip by junk from Ichang to Chungking in 1883 to investigate trade and navigational prospects, and in 1887 attempted to run a steamer service between Ichang and Chungking, by the Kuling. This was a Clyde built stern-wheeler of 450 tons",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
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    {
        "id": 207802,
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        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 190,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "LAND AND RIVER ROUTES TO WEST CHINA\n\n175\n\nthe Upper Yangtze-eight British, seven American, three Chinese, six French, five Italian, and three Japanese.\n\nPolitical troubles, however, had forced the pioneering Szechwan Steamship Company out of business in 1920. During the previous few years its Shutung and Shuhun had so often been forced to carry troops for the different war lords as to make their operations uneconomic. After 1920 the Chinese flag was flown by the China Merchants Steam Navigation and the Ming Steamship Company, both of whom seemed more able to accommodate themselves to the political changes. Captain Plant, however, was still active on the Upper Yangtze, but in a different capacity. He had left the Szechwan Steam Navigation Company in 1913 to become River Inspector in the Chinese Maritime Customs, and his work was one of the factors contributing to the development of steam navigation on the Upper Yangtze in the early 1920s.\n\nThere was a period during the brief heyday of the Kuomintang government between 1927 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when shipping on the Upper Yangtze almost settled into a regular pattern. Probably 1928 was the peak year, when there were seventy small steamers in regular service between Ichang and Chungking; the smallest about thirty tons and the largest just over 1,000 tons. The average time between Ichang and Chungking was three days, as against an average of a month by junk. Britain had fifteen ships of 5,357 tons; China twenty-six of 3,672 tons; and America eleven of 2,934 tons.\n\nLosses, however, were heavy. Several of the smaller companies were forced out of business, some selling their ships to the China Navigation Company. In this manner, the latter acquired the famous Loong Mow in 1923, which was renamed Wanliu I, and the Alice Dollar in 1926, which was renamed Wantung. This company also built six ships at Yarrows on the Clyde between 1922 and 1926. These included the Wanhsien, 210 feet long with a loaded draft of eight feet and reciprocating engines of 3,000 indicated horsepower, the most powerful ship on the Upper Yangtze; two turbine steamers of less than half this tonnage, the Kiating and the Kintang, for the low water season; and two small motor ships, the Siushan and Suiting, of 296 gross tons for the Top River above Chungking. British shipping was supreme on the Upper Yangtze for the last few years of the treaty port era, since political troubles hampered",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208311,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 35,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n19\n\naltogether. But fears over tampering with inherited institutions and respect for ancestral precedent (tsu-tsung ch'eng-fa) prevented the tests from being either transformed or abandoned. Subsequent attempts to reform or abolish the system of military examinations, such as Shen Pao-chen's famous memorial of 1878, came to nothing.19 As late as 1898, we still find the throne ordering officials to determine what the policy of the imperial ancestors had been regarding military reform before taking concrete steps.20 Small wonder the prestigious civil service examinations also remained essentially unaltered throughout the nineteenth century.\n\nThere was, however, room for the reform of military education outside the examination system - particularly during the Taiping period. Not only did the Rebellion allow for the emergence of new civil and military leadership in China; it also resulted in the establishment of new-style military forces which placed comparatively heavy emphasis on military education. The yung-ying armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and others, for example, employed the highly effective training methods of the famous Ming general Ch'i Chi-kuang - techniques that had long since fallen into disuse. In addition to Confucian moral instruction, yung-ying armies received daily drill, which was all but unheard of in Banner and Green Standard forces. They practiced regularly with firearms, swords, knives, spears and other weapons, and were taught tactical formations such as Ch'i Chi-kuang's \"mandarin duck\" (yuan-yang) and the \"three powers\" (san-ts'ai).\n\nIt is true, of course, that officers received very little, if any, formal military training, since it was deemed sufficient that they be upright gentlemen (chün-tzu) who led by moral example. Moreover, we know that active involvement by officers in troop training was generally considered demeaning. But at least some lower level personnel in yung-ying staff organizations (ying-wu ch'u), and perhaps some high-level officers as well, were more knowledgeable about key aspects of military affairs - planning, command, field maneuvers, discipline, supply, communication and so forth - than the vast majority of their Banner or Green Standard counterparts.25\n\nAfter 1860, Western influences began to penetrate Chinese military forces. In the latter stages of the Ch'ing-Taiping War, the British and French took an active role in supporting the introduction of foreign-training to Chinese troops. Foreign-officered con-",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208312,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 36,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "20 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\ntingents such as the Ever-Victorious Army (Ch'ang-sheng chün) brought Western drill and tactics to literally thousands of Chinese soldiers. Officers from these forces not only instructed their own men, but also trained large numbers of troops for Chinese officials, most notably Li Hung-chang.23 At about the same time, foreign-training programs arose in several port areas, including Tientsin, Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow and Canton. A number of Green Standard forces at the capital (and eventually elsewhere) were transformed into Western-armed \"retrained armies\" (lien-chün) on the yung-ying model, and several thousand Bannermen were molded into the famous Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying), established by Wen-hsiang and others.24 \n\nThe Peking Field Force was an especially interesting experiment. Until the late 1860's, selected members of the force were drilled by foreign instructors using English words of command but thereafter, Western-trained Bannermen carried on instruction independently in Manchu. Nominally 20,000 strong throughout most of the late nineteenth century, the Peking Field Force usually numbered closer to half that amount. According to Major A. E. J. Cavendish, a British military attaché in China, the force as late as 1894 was considered to be an elite organization with \"higher pay and quicker promotion\" than in any other Banner units at the capital. Officers in the force were described as \"the pick of the Banners,\" and posts in it were \"eagerly sought after.\" Yet Cavendish formed a decidedly negative opinion of the force, which he described as poorly armed and superficially trained, with emphasis on form rather than content. One can imagine the shape of the rest of the traditional Ch'ing military establishment.25 \n\nA major deficiency in all of the early foreign-training efforts was lack of centralized direction and support. In the absence of adequate central government guidelines, drill procedures, arms, and even the language of instruction varied widely from force to force and area to area. There was virtually no effort on the part of the Ch'ing government to co-ordinate its military programs, or to expand foreign-training in a systematic way.26 In fact, the Manchus seem to have been intent on compartmentalizing Western military knowledge as much as possible—presumably for reasons of internal control. In 1863, for example, the Tsungli Yamen stated explicitly that in the provinces only Bannermen should learn to make",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208320,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 44,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "28\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nagainst a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battlefield, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or outlandishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.\n\nAnother serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since \"it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers.\"88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90\n\nAt sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208586,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 43,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "16\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nAmerican and British representatives would be invited to participate. After the surrender he would authorize the British to land troops for the reoccupation of Hong Kong.37 In a private letter in reply to Chiang, Truman reiterated that his decision was in no way related to the question of British sovereignty in Hong Kong.68\n\nChiang Kai-shek remained reluctant to concede the main point. However, he realized that he needed American aid in getting his forces to Hong Kong. Consequently, he communicated a further compromise to Truman on 23 August: he had notified the British that, as supreme commander of the China theatre, he agreed to delegate his authority to a British commander to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Hong Kong.69 Although Truman regarded Chiang's concession as \"quite reasonable\" and hoped that it would settle the matter,70 it was not acceptable to Britain. While he deplored the Sino-British friction, Truman clearly did not contemplate taking further action.71 It was therefore a relief both to Britain and the United States that Chiang eventually accepted Britain's revised offer that Harcourt accept Japan's surrender on behalf of both Britain and Chiang as supreme commander of the China theatre.72\n\nHong Kong was thus reverted to British rule, much as the Americans, both in official and unofficial circles, had clamoured against during the Pacific War. Such clamouring, especially during the first half of the war, no doubt troubled the British and encouraged the Chinese. But, in the main, American wartime policy, if one can at all speak of a conscious and consistent policy, regarding the postwar status of Hong Kong had been characterized by much talk and little action. \"Hopes\", \"wishes\", \"opinions\", \"views\" were abundantly expressed to Britain, but little can be said of direct and persistent American pressure on the subject.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Author's article, \"The Question of Hong Kong during the Pacific War, (1941-45)”, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, II, no. 1 (October 1973), pp. 56-78.\n\n2 C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind (London, 1978), p. 156.\n\n3 Thorne, ibid., pp. 172-3, referring to opinions cited in the New York Times, the Chicago Daily News, and the Christian Science Monitor.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 208802,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1979",
        "page_number": 259,
        "title": "RAS-1979",
        "content_text": "232\n\nbut at page 349, read,\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\n\"Indeed, the Chinese garrison troops fled their strongholds en masse, before the assault forces reached the shore.\"\n\n\"... the Chinese defenses simply folded up....\"\n\n- and later, page 350,\n\n\"Once they (Chinese) had recovered their astonishment of seeing ships moving against wind and tide, they ranged along the banks, some performing kowtows as the gunboats passed.\"\n\nAnd see also numerous instances in Chapter II.\n\nBut the lapses do not greatly detract from the sound scholarship which this study represents. It is well documented and well articulated; it is written in a most elegant style; and this reader was greatly absorbed in the moving narrative. In more than one place one seems to hear strong echoes of Somerset Maugham relating the piques and barbs and jealousies and smoldering antipathies among colonial officials and merchants in the field. Certainly Napier and Pottinger were not universally loved; and Elgin and Admiral Seymour must have disliked each other intensely.\n\nThe book must be one of the most readable scholarly works on the period, and it makes excellent use of many specialist studies of some narrower issues and individual episodes, such as Peter W. Fay's The Opium War, 1840-42 (University of North Carolina Press, 1975), and Jack Gerson's excellent Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British Relations, 1854-60 (Cambridge, 1972), as well as all the now standard works on the nineteenth century opening of China.\n\nUniversity of Hong Kong, May 1980.\n\nLEIGH WRIGHT\n\nTHE IMPACT OF CHINESE SECRET SOCIETIES IN MALAYA--A HISTORICAL STUDY. Wilfred Blythe, pp. XIV, 566, maps, ill, app. Oxford University Press, 1969.\n\nAs befits the complicated, extensive and important nature of the subject, this is a long book (566 pages). It carries an introduction by the Right Hon. Malcolm Macdonald who, rightly in my",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208927,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1980",
        "page_number": 89,
        "title": "RAS-1980",
        "content_text": "HONG KONG RIOTS OF OCTOBER 1884\n\n57\n\nWhat happened in Hong Kong in the fall of 1884 to make this study necessary? According to the local newspaper and official reports of the colonial administration, the boatmen engaged in the servicing of ships in Hong Kong harbor refused to provide their services to ships flying the French flag. When the boatmen were taken to court and fined for refusing to work, they claimed that they were being coerced by the Chinese authorities at Canton who threatened their relatives with harm if the boatmen did not boycott the French. France and China were engaged in an undeclared war, and the Cantonese authorities were using the Hong Kong Chinese to put pressure on the French—or so the boatmen were reported to have claimed in court.\n\nWhen at last the boatmen were prepared to return to work, they could hardly have been able to afford to remain out forever—they were prevented from doing so by local Chinese mobs. Attempts by the police to break up those mobs led to serious street violence in which at least one Chinese rioter was killed and a number of Sikh police injured. Troops had to be called out, and for several days, the situation was serious enough for the authorities in London to wonder if an Indian regiment might be needed to keep order in the Colony. Fortunately, the disturbances ended before this extra measure became necessary.\n\nAs matters turned out, though no troops were needed, the colonial administration felt that a new peace preservation ordinance was necessary. It was hurriedly passed and required the collection of all arms from the Chinese population. Large quantities were collected, and a number of people believed to be agitators were ordered banished from the Colony. The belief that one of those banished, seventy-year-old Yau Poot-in, had been sent to Hong Kong with three thousand dollars to stir up trouble against the French eventually led to official protests to the Imperial Government by the British Legation in Peking.3\n\nYet, in spite of its many implications, the incident is comparatively unknown. Its underlying causes, as well as the truth about its origins, remain obscure. Was it, as the colonial administrators and the press believed, merely the result of intimidation and agitation from Canton with the support of anti-foreign and criminal elements within the Colony? Or was it an example of the growing sense of nationalism among the Chinese, which is more clearly seen...",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207",
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    },
    {
        "id": 209965,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1983",
        "page_number": 224,
        "title": "RAS-1983",
        "content_text": "202\n\nAN IMPERIAL CHINESE BANNER PRESERVED IN KENDAL, ENGLAND\n\nP. BRUCE\n\nA unique memento of the First China War is slowly disintegrating in an English parish church due to lack of money to restore it.*\n\nThe war led to the establishment of Hong Kong and one of the British regiments which took part was the 55th (Westmoreland). At the second taking of Chusan, on October 1, 1841, the regiment seized an Imperial Chinese banner. Today it hangs, alongside the disbanded regiment's colours, in a glass case to the left side of the altar of Kendal Parish Church. This banner was the only Imperial Chinese banner seized by British troops during the First China War.\n\nThe vicar of Kendal, and the Border Regiment, which includes the old 55th in its genealogy, are well aware of the urgent need for the banner to receive conservation treatment. The problem is, as ever, money. Estimates of the cost of restoring the banner range somewhere around £2,000 and neither the church nor the regiment can offer any immediate hope of it being raised.\n\nThe episode in which the flag was taken is described in a verse history of the campaign prepared some years afterwards for the 55th. After 20 years service a soldier named Duell had gained a commission. He was given the honour of bearing the regimental colours that autumn day:\n\n\"Ensign Duell holds up our Colour, then falls, shot through the breast.\n\nThat morn had seen the ambition of a life fulfilled.\n\nAn honour borne but for a day, the day that he was killed. For twenty years or more he had well and faithful served, Winning his way, step by step, to a Commission well deserved. And when his name appeared in the previous night's Gazette, All wished him, health, long life, success, to wear his epaulette;\n\n* See plate 11.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v",
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    },
    {
        "id": 210997,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "34\n\nAt the head of the pier was the Lung-chin Pavilion which provided shelter for travellers. It was also known as the “Mandarin-Greeting Pavilion” (ying-kuan t’ing), for it was presumably here that officials landing at Kowloon were officially greeted before they proceeded to the Walled City.21\n\nIronically, the first invaders of the Walled City were not British, but Chinese. In 1854, certain anti-Dynastic elements in Hong Kong, taking advantage of the general disturbance caused by the T'ai-p'ing uprising, attacked the Walled City across the harbour and occupied it. According to British officials, they were mainly Hakka stone workers and Triad members. Though the rebels had promised the inhabitants protection if they withdrew their support from the Imperial forces, as soon as they took possession of the City, they ransacked the houses and seized pigs, poultry and dogs for food.\n\nThe Kowloon officials fled to Hong Kong Island. At one point, nine war junks carrying 2,000 Imperial soldiers were ready to confront an equal number of rebel naval forces. The British in fact held the ring by ordering all warships to leave Hong Kong waters and so averted a major naval battle. The Imperial troops finally prevailed.22 However, the hsun-chien's official residence in the Walled City was so damaged by fire that for a while, he was obliged to move to Ch'ih-wei on the Shumchun river.23\n\nChinese officials at Kowloon and British officials in Hong Kong kept in close touch and generally co-operated in maintaining law and order in the vicinity. In 1867 for instance, when conflict broke out between villagers from either side of the border, Governor Macdonnell made a special trip to Kowloon, met the Chinese official on his steamer and agreed to co-operate in keeping peace.24 In 1884, Kowloon officials warned the Hong Kong authorities of a possible rising of the Triad Society.25\n\n24\n\n26\n\nUnder Ordinance 2 of 1850, Chinese fugitives in Hong Kong were handed over to Kowloon officials, but the provision was not reciprocal — China had no obligation to extradite criminals to Hong Kong. Chinese authorities, however, did arrest and convict them. The Namoa case was the most dramatic example. In 1890,",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211086,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1987",
        "page_number": 147,
        "title": "RAS-1987",
        "content_text": "122\n\norder the suspension of the ordinance. When the crisis passed the measures it provided to control the Chinese population would no longer be needed, however, they would remain on the statute books to be reintroduced by the Governor in Council if a future situation warranted it. Once enacted, however, they were never officially suspended. Instead they came to be regarded as a way of reducing crime at night, though for long periods there was great laxity over its enforcement.\n\nThe introduction of the rule that the Chinese must carry lights and passes at night was the result of the outbreak of the Sino-British conflict, sometimes referred to as the Second Opium War.\n\nThe spark which set fire to the smouldering tensions created by the frustration of the foreigner in his desire to force open China to unrestricted trade was the seizure at Canton in October 1856 of the crew of a Hongkong-registered vessel, the Arrow.\n\nThe Chinese authorities claimed the crew members were pirates. Their detention and the alleged hauling down of the British flag provoked an escalating series of demands, threats and incidents between the British and Chinese. These eventually climaxed in the looting and burning of the Imperial Summer Palace at Peking in 1860.\n\nThe Chinese would not meet the demands for an apology for \"the insult to the British flag\" nor the return of the crew in a manner satisfactory to the English. To force the issue, the British breached the walls of Canton, penetrated to the Viceroy's stronghold and then withdrew. They met no resistance. Then boats were seized, forts were shelled, troops marched back and forth.\n\nFor the British it all seemed like a military lark, with their superior power meeting no resistance from the Chinese, but only threatening proclamations issued by the Viceroy urging the destruction of the barbarians, with a price set upon the heads of certain prominent foreigners.\n\nAffairs took a more serious turn when the area along the river at Canton, where the foreigners lived and did their business, was",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211621,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 36,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "1} \n\nAmerican missionary, the Reverend Elijah Bridgman,1 merely noted the formal possession of the island in its journal of occurrences; it gave no precise date nor any details.24 Another reference in the same journal in a historical review of events in China was only marginally fuller.25 The Canton Press, published at this point from Macao, expressed itself slightly puzzled by the lack of information about the event: 'On Tuesday last, the 26th January, the Island of Hongkong, the new settlement ceded by the Chinese to the English, was taken possession of in the name of Her Majesty, Queen Victoria. The English colours were hoisted, and saluted from the ships; we have not yet heard any further particulars of the ceremony.' Two weeks later the incident was mentioned again, but no further details were forthcoming.26 The Canton Register made no mention of the possession of Hong Kong except in the context of Elliot's treaty with Ch'i-shan; it seemed unimpressed by the terms and referred to 'the paltry island of Hong Kong'.\n\n› 28\n\nThe two groups with the most immediate interest in the acquisition of Hong Kong for the British were the merchants and missionaries. Unlike the troops, for whom the possession of the island was just one part of a long and arduous expedition in a foreign and unhealthy part of the world, the merchants and missionaries were already operating from the area and found Chinese restrictions on their movements irksome. And unlike the British government and its officials, the traders and propagators of salvation were most cognizant of the advantages that a piece of British territory in South China would afford them. They were not politically or ideologically committed to punishing China for the 'disrespect' it had shown to Britain. It is not known whether any missionaries attended the ceremony on 26 January, but some merchants who were late to have their fortunes inextricably bound up with the colony turned up to witness its official birth. According to a study of the Indian community of Hong Kong, at least four Indian merchants were present in Hong Kong at the flag-hoisting: Cawasjee Pallanjee, the representative of Cursetjee Bomanjee and Co. of Bombay; F. M. Talati; Albert Sassoon;29 and Rustomjee Dhunjee Shaw of P. F. Cama and Co. of Bombay. James Matheson of Jardine Matheson and Co.30 went from Macao to Hong Kong precisely in order to witness the hoisting of the British flag, and afterwards, as he wrote to William Jardine in a postscript to a letter of 30 January, he circumnavigated the island.32 Thus the future character of the colony can be gauged from the type of person with most to gain from its possession by the British.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h",
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    },
    {
        "id": 211623,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "13\n\nThe first was a Muslim who had been with the British army, and who may have been one of those who deserted in large numbers after the founding of the colony and who later formed the basis of an Indian community in Kowloon,\" The China Mail of 28 March 1878 printed: 'The man, known by the name of Mohammed Arab, died here yesterday. We understand that his residence in the Colony dates with the cession of the Island to Her Majesty, and it was he who planted the British standard on the Island, being with the expeditionary Force. He was a very charitably disposed person, and always stretched a helping hand to the needy and poor irrespective of nationality. He was well-known to many of the foreign community, and held in no little estimation for his uprightness and charities. His funeral, which took place yesterday, was largely attended by persons of various nationalities'.\n\n43\n\n44\n\nIf indeed Mohammed Arab had been in the British army, he must have been in either the Bengal Volunteers or the Madras 37th Native Infantry which were two of the regiments serving in the Chinese expedition.\" Both of these regiments contained Muslims and so Mohammed Arab could have been in either of them. The first Bengal Volunteers were raised in 1799 and in time the Volunteers became the 36th, 37th, 38th and 39th regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry.42 The usual sepoys of the Bengal army were mainly high-caste Hindus who because of dietary restrictions could not travel overseas, and so the Bengal Volunteers raised in the spring of 1840 were low-caste Hindus and Muslims lured from regular regiments by the promise of extra money. As for the Madras Native Infantry, it is known that some Muslim Lascars from Madras deserted during or after the Chinese expedition.\" This war was the first in which Indian troops were deployed in a non-Indian operation.\" Unfortunately the only members of the Bengal Volunteers named in official records of the Chinese expedition are firstly those who died, and secondly the officers,\" and no more information is yet forthcoming about the members of the Madras Native Infantry. The question whether Mohammed Arab may or may not have hoisted the flag on Hong Kong on 26 January 1841 hinges on whether a contingent of the Bengal Volunteers or of the Madras Native Infantry was landed for the ceremony - the only regiment which was definitely ashore at the time was that of the Marines and on which rank would have been called upon to perform the task. The senior native officer in the regiment was the Subadar-Major upon whom the duty could have devolved (in January 1841 this position in the Bengal Volunteers was held by Shaick Hedait Alie) but it would have been more likely",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt",
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    {
        "id": 211769,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1989",
        "page_number": 184,
        "title": "RAS-1989",
        "content_text": "159\n\nstill more because of the unsettled conditions in China during the 1850s and 1860s. Internal dissent manifested itself through the Taiping rebellion, in which Shanghai was threatened. The native city was occupied by insurgents during 1853-1855 and in order to prevent Imperial troops from threatening the neutrality of the Settlement, the recently formed Shanghai Volunteer Corps (which later, in the 1860s, gave some amateur dramatic performances) fought the Battle of Muddy Flat on April 4, 1854, a skirmish about which some Shanghailanders still spoke with unreserved pride fifty years later, but for which a performance of the dramatic corps had to be postponed for more than a month.\n\n―\n\nIn the early sixties, tension heightened again; in August 1860, the Taipings threatened the Settlement; 1861 was relatively calm, but in January and August 1862, the town was once more the target of the rebels. Foreign, mainly British, troops, however, had been brought down to Shanghai from North China, where they had been fighting another war, and with the aid of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, as well as mercenaries, all attacks could be staved off. Early in 1864, the Taiping insurrection was definitely quelled,\n\nAll this was not without its consequences, of which only those pertaining to theatrical life need detain us here. It was not to be wondered that, as long as the Settlement was under the threat of attack, its foreign population had other matters to attend to than mere amusement, so in these years (1861-1862), there is an almost total eclipse of entertainment. Yet, no sooner had tensions eased somewhat than \"nightlife\" again appeared in full swing. The thousands of soldiers and marines had swelled the originally small population; as a result, this led, on the one hand, to amateur dramatics by the garrison forces; on the other, to an increased audience for travelling companies, which gave, for the first time in Shanghai's history, rather lengthy seasons.\n\nAs was mentioned above, the resident foreign population was fairly small, and this should not be forgotten during any discussion of cultural life in the Settlement. In 1846, the total number of foreigners was given as 120; five years later, the British census showed 256, of whom 38 were females; in December 1859, there were 495 male and 74 female westerners, whereas the census of March 1865, which incorporated the results of events in recent years, showed a total of about 2100 resident foreigners, increased by 1850 military (a number which had no doubt been still higher in 1863 and 1864) --- 160 women again formed a tiny",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212186,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 128,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "105\n\ntimed with their fuses set to burst just a few feet above water level. But the gunners evidently found the moving targets difficult to follow, because the aim grew wilder and eventually the shelling ceased. As the sun set in the west, the British ships came to anchor off the Three Hills, where I had my last pheasant shoot, while the American ships anchored in a group a few miles lower down.\n\nNext morning broke clear and sunny, one of those late autumn days in China, when there is not a ripple on the river, and the smoke hangs low in a thin pall over the country villages. Gun fire could be heard in the distance, both above and below the concentration of neutral vessels; and by-and-by the three American ships, escorted by the U.S.S. \"Panay\", got under way and steamed upriver. As she went by, the \"Panay\" stopped to pass back one of our wounded men, who had been kindly accommodated in her sick bay, and the Commander explained that he was taking his ships further up towards **Pidgeon Island** as the Japanese had been dropping some \"bricks\" in the river just below them. Not for the first, or the last, time in China, the Americans elected to play a lone hand.\n\nMeanwhile the refugees on the British vessels whiled away the time counting up the splinter holes in their ships, attending to the wounded, and in mutual visits for gossip over the events of the previous day. Every one thought it was all a mistake, although some concern was caused at about 10 o'clock, when a number of Japanese military landing craft were seen upriver pulling in to the north bank, on to which they ran a small gun which was openly trained at the ships. But the feeling of security was confirmed when the Japanese craft, one after the other, steamed out towards the British gunboats, circled round them, waved a salute or two, and then went on their way down river. There appeared to be no Chinese troops in the neighbourhood, and the Japanese sailed down the Yangtze unmolested, stopping to burn an occasional junk.\n\nIt was without an after-thought that we all sat down to lunch on that lovely Sunday morning on the Yangtze. We were anchored off the reed beds which grow round Rosina Beacon, and through the porthole I could see across the river the clumps out of which not so many months before we had driven our last pheasant. Imagine our astonishment and indignation when suddenly we heard the approaching noise of planes, the roar of power dives, and bombs",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
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    {
        "id": 212199,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 141,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "118\n\n1 left by steamer for Canton, the great southern Chinese town, which sprawls along the shore of the Pearl River; and spent a few days on the Shameen mud-bank, just off the city, where the small British and French Concessions are. The Concessions were untouched; but, across the narrow creek that separates them from the shore, the city had suffered heavily from bombing, and from the fires which raged furiously in the congested native districts after each raid. One morning I crossed to the South bank and took the branch line to Samshui on the West river, where I caught the steamer for Wuchow in Kwangsi province.\n\nAlthough owned by a Chinese company, the small river steamer flew the British flag. That was a phenomenon common enough on the inland waters of China. The foreign flag protected the ship from being commandeered by the local war lord. Sometimes for months on end steam traffic, on this water-way or that, would be completely disorganised. The Chinese ships would be impressed to carry the troops of the various armies contending for power. It was only under a foreign flag that they could find the security which would justify their remaining in operation at all. The British government did not welcome this use of the British flag, and introduced regulations to control abuse of the privilege. In order to qualify for British registry a ship must at least carry a British captain and a British chief engineer, and must comply with the Board of Trade regulations in regard to safety measures. But even so, the Chinese owners would make every effort to obtain British registry for their ships, thus in one direction taking advantage of the treaties between Britain and China while, in the other, probably contributing to the Kuo Min Tang party funds, which were used to denounce the iniquities of those very same treaties. In order to comply with the letter of the regulations, the particular ship I now found myself on carried three British officers, whose aggregate age exceeded 200 years. They were, of course, mere figure-heads, the actual work being done by the Chinese officers and crew. These river-boats kept communications open and provided a measure of security for travellers - owing to the presence of British gunboats these small ships moving on inland waters were seldom attacked by bandits which otherwise would have been lacking.\n\n―\n\nIn Kwangsi the road system had been extended to connect Wuchow with the other large towns of the province and I left by car for Kweilin, the capital. An American aviator, who had been down to Hongkong on a shopping expedition, travelled with me as far as",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt",
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    {
        "id": 212215,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1990",
        "page_number": 157,
        "title": "RAS-1990",
        "content_text": "134\n\nphone. It was a friend of mine, a former N.O., to let me know he had just heard from the British gunboat that the Luftwaffe was bombing Warsaw. I went over to a party at another table to tell them that the launch picnic we had arranged for the following Sunday would be off. The news spread from table to table. No emotion registered on the faces of the stolid English people sitting on the verandah of that exclusive club. A stranger coming in just then would have noticed nothing out of the ordinary except, perhaps, that it was later than usual when the members scattered from their tables to go home to dinner. I do not think that this display of composure was entirely due to British phlegm; it sprang in part from an unimaginative failure to realise what the news meant. Warsaw was very far from Shanghai. My Sunday picnic need not have been cancelled for all the difference the war made in its early stages. The chief problem seemed to be whether those with children in England should move them elsewhere, to the States or to China. There was no encouragement to join up; in fact, young men were informed officially that it was their duty to stick to their jobs to keep British trade going.\n\nSince the outbreak of the war between China and Japan, there had been a succession of political murders and outrages in the foreign areas of Shanghai. I think probably that the Chinese government started it. They considered any \"puppet\" fair prey and, I daresay, those Green and Red tongs came in useful. Then the Japanese retaliated by organising terrorist gangs of their own, and attacking Chinese with prominent government connections, or such as refused to collaborate. It almost amounted to a reign of terror, under cover of which ordinary crime, too, increased. The police found great difficulty in coping with the situation. They themselves were sniped at by both sides. The police, in both foreign areas, were remarkably efficient, but unpopular with the official Chinese, because so often involved in suppressing illegitimate political activities, which had a long history in Shanghai.\n\nMy wife and I were living in a small flat in the French town, and several of us, in preference to joining the Shanghai Volunteers, decided to join the French Special Police. We were issued with a blue uniform, with a thin red line down the trouser, a police kepi, and a French tin hat; also a large Mauser automatic, one of numbers collected from time to time at the Concession entrances from disbanded Chinese troops seeking admission to the safety of the foreign area. In this accoutrement we paraded several evenings a week at the Central",
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    {
        "id": 212607,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 161,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "141\n\nThe Mongols conquered Burma in 1287, but the conquest did not last long; and a later invasion was repulsed in 1769. The British came in the nineteenth century to occupy Lower Burma. The French established themselves in Indo-China, whence they intrigued into Upper Burma, producing a situation not unlike that which, ten years later, led to the Fashoda incident on the Nile. The British, who had been having trouble with King Thibaw, decided to forestall French projects, and march on Mandalay. Upper Burma was annexed and the Court of Ava sent into exile. The British are not Burma's real problem: they have, as usual, provided stability and security. The danger lies to the West and to the East, where 400 millions in India and 450 millions in China, hem in a small country. It is not as if Burma is densely populated; the density is only 64 to the square mile, as against 295 in India and 145 in China.\n\nBurmese intercourse, facilitated by easy sea communications, has been greater with India than with China. In 1936 the overland trade with China amounted barely to a paltry 1,000,000 rupees. The subsequent increase brought about by the opening of the Burma road was quite artificial, the result of the blockade of the China coast by the Japanese. When the artificial conditions cease, the trade will revert to its normal channels, round by sea, and over the Indo-China railway or up the Yangtze.\n\nOwing to the relative short range of Indian pressure, overwhelming Indian penetration was what the Burmese had to fear most in the past, but signs are not lacking that the psychological effect of the building of the Burma road, and subsequently the behaviour of the Chinese troops, who retreated through Burma in 1942, may have changed the emphasis. Time will show.\n\nAlready in 1941 the most virulent whispering campaigns flourished, aimed at the Chinese, and directed more especially at the alleged graft and incompetence on the Burma road. That the Japanese were behind these campaigns is as probable as the plausibility which these rumours derived from the actual state of affairs on the road. Later, there were mixed feelings, when the Chinese troops entered Burma to take part in the defence; it would not be too strong to say that in many native quarters their entry was viewed with suspicion.\n\nAs is known, part of the Chinese troops retreated in 1942 into India, where they were reorganised and trained by American officers, but paid and equipped by the British taxpayer, under reverse lease-lend. It may be news, even to General Stilwell, that the idea of training and equipping\n\n!",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    {
        "id": 212608,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 162,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "142\n\nChinese troops in India was no new one. Sir Henry Wade, who was British Minister to the Imperial Court at Peking in the 1870's had the same idea, frequently pressed, but without success.\n\nSun Yat Sen, if one is to judge from what he writes in the \"Three Principles\", claimed that Burma should belong to China. For several centuries, it is true, though maybe spasmodically, the Court of Ava sent a decennial tribute mission to Peking, and this continued even after the British occupation, until 1896, in much the same way as Siam, for instance, sent a mission every four years; but there seems little doubt that the Burmese considered the mission more in the nature of a cultural courtesy than as a token of submission. Any reassertion by China to a claim to tribute would undoubtedly be resented.\n\nThe Burmese, like the Indians, take religion seriously. Every Burmese young man spends a period, even if only a few days, in a Buddhist temple. The monks, or pongyis, as they are called, number about 1% of the Buddhist population. Their shaven heads and yellow robes are a common sight, particularly in the morning hours when they go around with the wooden bowl, begging for the day's share of rice. In recent years they have taken an active part in politics, and there was some evidence that the Japanese were using them as a fifth column. The Chinese troops, during the fighting, were so convinced of this that they shot any they caught. The political activities of the pongyis are not approved of by many true Buddhists, and opinion should be reserved on this aspect, until more is known about the facts.\n\nThe Burmese enjoyed a large measure of self-government. Unfortunately the sense of responsibility in their politicians was insufficient to overcome the native propensity for intrigue and corruption. The graft in the administration stank to high heaven: it was a situation in which Japanese money could talk. The Prime Minister himself, U Saw, slipped up and had to be arrested for high treason; as it happened, while passing through Honolulu, only a few weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbour.\n\nMeanwhile, Germany had invaded Russia, the British entered Syria, the Japanese entered Indo-China, General Tojo formed a new government, the U.S.A. decided to arm her merchant ships, and the Bush Warfare School staged a demonstration for Mr. Duff Cooper and the Governor of Burma. On the edge of the jungle a small fort had been",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212622,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 176,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "156\n\non the door panels drew attention wherever they passed, the Allies were arriving. Alas, the advance party was the only party we were to receive: the attack on Burma was developing very quickly and all supplies and reinforcements were diverted there. Then the Burma road was cut, and as time advanced we found we had to get along with what we had. It was not as if we had even a first claim on such supplies as had already reached China for the British Military Mission. Our particular activity was not the main interest of the Mission, and we were not on any priority list.\n\nHowever, the future was concealed from us. We started off, full of enthusiasm, for Chin Ya in our four lorries accompanied by the General Commanding the Engineer Troops of the 3rd War Zone, a particular friend of ours, and reached our destination without incident. Mac's arrangements had all been completed and we were able to enter immediately into the quarters prepared for us.\n\nI was a little uneasy about the magazine, a flimsy outbuilding, used as a temple and distant a hundred yards from the village. We removed the idols from the shelf at the back, stacked our explosives there and on wooden racks built for the purpose, so as to keep them off the damp floor; and locking the door posted a sentry over it, hoping for the best. There were several tons of explosive; had they gone up they would have taken the village with them.\n\nA row of houses had been taken over for the students; in a small wood at the back three open thatched sheds had been erected as lecture rooms; and the top floor of the largest house in the village, owned by a widow, was occupied by our Chinese assistants. The widow lived on the bottom floor; she was old-fashioned and had strong objections to our installing windows in the walls of her house to admit light to the rooms. There was a local superstition that windows let the money fly out, thus impoverishing the occupants; all the houses in the district had only little slits, inadequate to relieve the gloom inside. With Michael's assistance we persuaded her to allow us to put in roughly made window-frames, fitted with wooden shutters for use if it rained; we, of course, had no glass.\n\nTwo temples had been reserved for our own quarters: the one, at a little remove from the village, I used as my office and living quarters: the other contained a large hall facing a small yard, open to the sky.\n\nI\n\nI",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    {
        "id": 212625,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 179,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "159\n\nunaccustomed and which they might not like; it is, of course, a good deal more difficult to provide foreign fare in China than Chinese fare. So we decided to have one Chinese mess and one British mess. We found a very good cook for the Chinese mess, but were less successful, until later Lao Teng joined us, with a cook for our own food. It seemed the obvious solution, but the young Chinese interpreters from Shanghai took it in ill part and claimed that we were giving them \"unequal treatment”. The Hongkong boys were only too pleased with the arrangement, as were the accountant and storekeeper I had engaged; they had previously worked in a foreign firm and were not influenced by the same inferiority complex. It was unfortunate, and it was a dilemma which we never quite got over.\n\nOn April 1st we held the opening ceremony and our training commenced. We were extraordinarily encouraged by the quality of the students sent to us. I should explain that we were accredited to the Chinese Regular Army, not to the guerillas; but I had heard such favourable reports of the work the guerillas were doing, that I had asked especially that some guerilla teams should be sent to us. There appeared to be reluctance in agreeing to this request; possibly because, as we were to discover later, the guerillas only owed a nominal allegiance to the 3rd War Zone; they were really directly under Chungking. However, we did get guerillas, and also some men from special front-line organisations, who appeared to be a cross between guerillas and regular troops.\n\nAs the success of our type of work depended so much on team spirit, I was determined from the start only to teach in teams, and so far as possible we tried to arrange that the teams sent to us for training should remain as teams when they returned to the field. We had some difficulty in putting this idea over, and I am afraid that our teams, only too often, after leaving us were shuffled. Each team had a leader, and we had insisted that only men who could read and write should be sent to us. In practice that meant that our students were mainly drawn from the ranks of the junior officers or non-commissioned officers. The students proved extremely keen; they were intelligent, good with their hands, and developed a fine team spirit. In the first course, we had a good many students from the engineers, though I was not too anxious to receive these, because I feared our object might be misunderstood and that our ideas would be confused with the work of defensive military engineering, where the deliberate methods of laying explosives on your own ground before the arrival of the enemy were quite different to the type of hasty attack demolition calling for expert team work in which we were",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212627,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 181,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "161\n\nwhich could talk sceptical generals into agreeing to his suggestions. Not that the generals were not most co-operative: they usually went out of their way to meet us. In fact, we found it was true here, as it is always true of all wars, that the best elements of the nation were up at the front.\n\nIn May, the party of two Americans and one Englishman, already mentioned as having escaped from Shanghai, came through our camp, and I decided to proceed with them, in the lorry by which our two officer reinforcements had arrived, to the headquarters of the British Military Mission in Hunan. There were so many things of which we were in urgent need, and the replies to our signals were so vague, this seemed the best course. We covered the 1500 kilometres to Hengyang in six days. After a night spent with American missionary friends, we were turned out at dawn by an alert, and we were picking our way in the lorry through the crowds making for the countryside, when I saw an officer in British uniform moving with the crowd. I stopped to speak to him and discovered he was a Russian doctor, who had been recruited in China the year before for work with the British Army in Burma. He had been granted leave to proceed to Eastern China to try and get into touch with his wife to get her out of occupied territory. He was making his own way as best he could, had arrived by train that morning, as the alert sounded, and so found himself moving into the country with the crowd. His hope of reaching Eastern China without adequate credentials was vain. I suggested he should jump into our lorry and go back to Headquarters, to return with me to Chin Ya, as I felt sure his best hope of getting into touch with his wife would be through our guerilla connections. That was a great stroke of luck because one of our most pressing needs was a doctor and medical supplies, and Dr. Petro was to remain with us for half a year and do much very useful work. The Mission had no other doctor they could spare for us.\n\nAt Headquarters there was a good deal of confusion as the British troops were on the move, and then received counterorders. I was disappointed in my hope of receiving any further officer reinforcements, and all that could be spared in the explosive line was mostly ammonal. Ammonal is an explosive with a slower rate of detonation, so that it has more of a pushing or lifting effect. It is used for cratering roads and destroying buildings, and though that type of demolition was not likely to be of much use to us, it was better than nothing. It comes packed in 25 lb tins, about the size of 5-gallon kerosene tins. Two tins of",
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    {
        "id": 212628,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 182,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "162\n\nammonal, 50 lbs, if properly placed under the track will lift a locomotive ten feet into the air and throw it far enough off the track will lift a locomotive ten feet into the air and throw it far enough off the track, to make it difficult for the usual type of railway repair-crane to reach it to lift it back.\n\nWhile in Hunan, information came through that the Japanese had started to advance from Hangchow in the direction of Kinhwa and it looked as if they might cut off our part of the front. I made hurried arrangements to return; but before we left I was disconcerted to learn from the Chinese general, X....., under whom the British contingent in Hunan worked, that I was to come under his orders. General Ku had placed us under an Army Group Commander, whose headquarters were in the village next to ours; and I could not understand the advantage of now being placed under a General whose headquarters were 1600 kilometres away and, moreover, in another war zone. It looked as if the work we had commenced in Eastern China was to be wrecked; I saw General X...... and he assured me the change was a mere formality and would make no difference to the work we were doing. Later events, however, were to show that my uneasiness was fully justified and that we had become a pawn in high level politics.\n\nThe news of the Japanese advance on Kinhwa got worse. I loaded the lorry with all the stores we could beg or borrow, and we set out on a return journey which was to prove exciting. In addition to Michael and Doctor Petro, and the driver and a mechanic, I had been able to collect two Chinese medical orderlies, who had escaped from a detention camp in Hongkong, and a Hongkong wireless operator. I still hoped I might one day have a wireless set. The lorry was grossly overloaded and we nearly lost it next day when crossing on the Siang river ferry. We had to collect volunteers to help us to unload it hurriedly, as the ferry arrived on the far side with such a heavy list that we could not drive the lorry off. Further on a tyre blew out; we also received news not only that the Japanese were on the point of occupying Kinhwa, but that they had commenced a push from Nanchang to the east along the Kiangsu-Chekiang railway to meet their troops who were advancing from Hangchow. It became a race to see if we could reach Yingtan before the Japanese, and as we had no more spare tyres, we could not risk continuing with an overloaded lorry; we had to dump some of our previous cargo. We were not to see it again for six months.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212639,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 193,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "173\n\nactivity of the British Military Mission in Hunan and to withdraw the British troops to India. It looked as if our party would be all that remained, and I hoped that now at last we should be given a medical officer - Dr. Petro had in the meantime left us - and our full complement of officers. We had been much handicapped by the shortage of officers which prevented our manning the forward dumps properly and maintaining our contacts with the forward generals, while the school courses were in progress.\n\nReports continued to come in of successful operations by our teams at the front. We were particularly pleased with the report of one military train, the engine of which was blown up by a specially laid pressure-switch mine with considerable casualties to the passengers. We also had some failures. The members of one of our best guerilla teams were laying a pipe mine in the road at night, when they suddenly found themselves surrounded by Japanese. The leader promptly trod on the mine and the report we received stated that in addition to killing the team the explosion had killed some of the enemy.\n\nIt would be wrong if I gave the impression that there was a positive state of activity along all the fronts round us. At the time the Japanese were advancing on Shangjao the front was more active than usual; but on the whole the warfare was passive rather than active. I think a passive state of war accords more with the Chinese genius. The Chinese have had few foreign wars; their wars for the most part have been amongst their own people, where cunning and silver bullets counted for more than actual fighting. Life, God knows, is held cheaply enough in China and it cannot have been from any desire to save life that the preference for manoeuvre and deception arose; I would judge it derived more from an appreciation of the intellectual concomitants of warfare, as is well exemplified in the teachings of Sun Tze.\n\nIt was by denying facilities, rather than by fighting, that the Chinese resisted the Japanese. Not by any positive activity was a large Japanese garrison, supported by a still larger puppet army, held in the Yangtze delta; it was the negative pressure of a potential activity, which had not to assert itself to make itself felt. In the same way I argued that if the Japanese knew there were fifty well-trained demolition teams in the delta country astride their communications - and I had little doubt the Japanese knew just how many teams we trained - then they would feel compelled to increase their defensive arrangements by that much, in case all fifty",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212641,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1991",
        "page_number": 195,
        "title": "RAS-1991",
        "content_text": "175\n\nramie, wood oil, porcelain, and so on, while in the reverse direction salt, cotton yarn, torch batteries, piece goods, and other supplies came in. The interior of China was mainly dependent for salt on supplies from the Coast and the Coast was in Japanese control. Had the Japanese strictly prevented the entry of salt they could have compelled the Chinese Government to sue for peace. As it was the commerce helped the Chinese to maintain their economy and so continue their resistance. Moreover, the middlemen in this trade were the guerillas and it was from the profits of the trade that they were able to finance their expenses.\n\nThe postal service between occupied and unoccupied China, too, continued to function almost as if there were no war. By a special arrangement the post bags were allowed to pass through the lines. A letter written from our place would reach Shanghai in about ten days; one could even send registered mail, or remit small sums of money. The Japanese maintained a censorship service, but their staff were too few to cope efficiently with the volume of mail. Thus Chinese who escaped to free China were able to keep in touch with friends and relations, who had remained behind in occupied China.\n\nAlthough the bases of the guerillas were in the mountains to which the Japanese had not penetrated, their field of operation was in the plain of the delta, one of the most thickly populated areas of the world. You could find guerilla troops in uniform in the delta, but as a rule they wore plain clothes. Should they be caught in one of the frequent sweeps made by Japanese troops they could pass off as local coolies or farmers. The Japanese went to great pains to tabulate the population and to check movement; their troops would be relieved from time to time by fresh troops, but they left a cadre of permanent intelligence personnel, who thoroughly understood the local dialects and could fix a man's district by his speech. They used Alsatian dogs and bloodhounds to track suspects. To exist in the delta a guerilla needed to keep his wits about him; it was a game at which the Chinese were much the superior. Owing to the presence of numerous informers in enemy pay, the Chinese were very reluctant to accept the responsibility of allowing British officers to accompany the guerillas on operations; to conceal and protect the British increased their difficulties. However, it had finally been agreed that British officers would accompany certain parties on special operations, unfortunately we were withdrawn before these plans were put into effect.\n\nPolitics were strictly not our concern, but I ought to explain that the\n\nPage 195\n\nPage 196",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212772,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 81,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "66\n\nof An-shun Fu until, by 1867, the Imperial troops, who had first fought to suppress the major threat from the Taipings, were able to raise sufficient forces to recover the 'lost' lands. The two Kueichou campaigns dragged on for five or more years with, so some claimed, possibly only one tenth of the Miao population surviving. Mesny only describes the first campaign.\n\nThe story of the first campaign which took place in the northern part of the remote and mountainous province of Kueichou during the four years from 1868 as described by Mesny consists of episodes, incidents and background in a day by day or month by month description of one or two of the major skirmishes and assaults, victories and defeats of the one particular Chinese Imperial force, raised and funded by the province of Szechuan. Two other forces were involved, the armies of Hunan province and the internal force of Kueichou province whose army was combined with a force from Yunnan province [northern Kueichou being flanked by the provinces of Szechuan, Hunan and Yunnan]. Mesny's descriptions of the problems of military re-supply, funding, rewarding merit, the punishment of criminals both military and civilian, the treatment of prisoners and medical problems, as well as his descriptions of camp life and inter-officer relations, make the narrative a most interesting story.\n\nThe campaign has been hardly mentioned in histories of China and was probably of little interest in Peking at the time. However, here we had three Chinese Imperial forces operating far from supply bases, some with little incentive to do much more than draw their pay and keep their heads down, and a foreigner with a glorified opinion of his own importance, based in the heart of the Szechuan Force alongside the general in charge of the Central Army and not too far from the Commander-in-Chief [C-in-C]. Mesny's role, so he told us, was to advise his C-in-C and his general on modern foreign arms and their maintenance. We should however bear in mind that Mesny was but 26 at the start of the campaign, and had had no official military training other than having been a seaman and having learned something about the handling of artillery from British ex-servicemen whilst he had been a Customs Officer with the Chinese Imperial Customs on the Yangtze. Amongst his numerous claims to military fame one of the lesser ones was his successful organisation and training of a company of artificers for use at headquarters during the first Kueichou campaign.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212820,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 129,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "114\n\nits population. With the fall of Tengyueh, soon after, the rebellion was finally suppressed. Survivors of Sultan Suleiman's family took refuge with King Mindon at the Court of Ava in Mandalay. Two years later a British consular official, Margary, who had been appointed with the consent of the Chinese government to accompany a British expedition, which was to leave Bhamo to explore a commercial route to Tengyueh - now called Tengchung - was murdered under treacherous circumstances near the latter town. It was thought at the time, but not proven, that a Chinese official, named Li Su Tai, whose mother was Burmese, was implicated: the incident led to negotiations between the Chinese and British governments and was settled by the Chefoo Convention.\n\nAfter the British occupied Mandalay and Upper Burma in 1885 they sought to define the boundary between Burma and China. The question was not found to be easy because the Chinese advanced claims to large sections of territory which had obviously been part of the Kingdom of Ava. However, a considerable length of boundary was agreed upon and marked by enormous stones: they are the size of a small cottage, I suppose to discourage easy removal, and each stone is numbered and its position is marked on the quarter-inch map. The length of border left undefined made for an unsatisfactory situation, not unlike that between the United States and Mexico before that boundary was fixed, or like the situation which now exists on the border between China and Tibet. Various attempts were subsequently made to agree the undelimitated part of the boundary, and by 1942 only a stretch of the frontier from just N.W. of Tengchung up to Tilset remained undemarcated.\n\nThe railway from Haiphong, through Indo-China, reached Kun-ming in the early years of this century and so opened the province to French influence; whether, however, owing to strong local conservatism or a lack of enterprise on the part of the French, their influence appears to have left little mark. It was only with the opening of the Burma road in 1939 that Yunnan for the first time felt the full impact of the modern world.\n\nI had had no previous experience of western China. I knew that Lung Yun, the Old Dragon, as the Governor of Yunnan was generally called, had for long been almost independent of the National Government. It was only with the transfer of Government troops to Burma through Yunnan in 1942, and their subsequent retreat to Yunnan, where they remained, that the Chungking government had established a partial",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212822,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 131,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "116\n\nAmerican air forces based in China and to the extensive establishments supplied to train and equip the Chinese Expeditionary Force, as the army which had been built up in Yunnan by the Chungking government to assist in driving the Japanese out of Burma was called.\n\nI was sent to Kun-ming to see about giving assistance to the Myosa of Kokang, prince of a small Burmese border state. The longest unnavigable river in the world, the Salween, rises in Tibet, flows through China, and enters Burma at about the level of Bhamo. For a stretch the river flows from east to west; to the north of it the territory is still China, to the south lies Kokang. The river then leaves China altogether, bends south, and lower down at Kunlong receives the Nam Ting flowing in from the east. The Nam Ting forms the southern boundary of Kokang, while the mountain-tops that divide the Salween watershed from the next river to the east form the state's eastern boundary. The stones marking this boundary were set up in 1898 as a result of the agreements made at that time. Kokang also spreads across the Salween to the territories of the large Shan state of North Shenwi, of which Kokang is actually a sub-state. The greater part of Kokang though is sandwiched between the Salween and China. Kunlong is the site of one of the most frequented of the Salween ferries, and it is down the valley of the Nam Ting that the projected railway from Kun-ming to Lashio, connecting China with Burma, will run. The embankments to carry the line had been nearly completed before the Japanese advance into Burma put an end to the work. To the south of the Nam Ting are situated the Wa states, inhabited by wild head-hunting tribes.\n\nThe Myosa of Kokang was a most loyal subject of the British crown, and because of that loyalty he was to suffer great injuries. When the Japanese advanced up the length of Burma in 1942, the British troops, who were covering the western flank, that is the flank towards India, withdrew into India. The civil administrative staff of the Shan States also withdrew to the west, while the Chinese armies, on the eastern flank,\n\n\"One British administrative officer, Evans, withdrew from Kengtung, away to the south of Kokang, into south-west Yunnan. He had established cordial relations with the Chinese troops there, and with their assistance organised local levies, drawn from the dispersed ranks of the Burma Rifle regiments; he used these to wage a small campaign of his own against the enemy until he was killed during an assault on a position manned by Siamese troops. He died unknown, unsupported, unrewarded, but not unsung, because at a time when throughout the East the British star was thought to have set for all time, this lonely man left a record of British pluck which will long be remembered on the border.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212823,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 132,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "117\n\nwithdrew partly into India and partly back into Yunnan. Kokang was left high and dry. Undaunted the Myosa from his own funds purchased what weapons he could from the retreating Chinese troops and the disbanded men of the Burma Rifles, who had been instructed to disperse to their villages with their weapons, which were to be retained for local protection until the British returned. He acquired several hundred rifles, a small stock of ammunition, and a few Bren guns, and organised his own force, the Kokang Defence Force. Fortunately the prowess of the force, which could scarcely have proved high in the face of the battle-trained troops of Japan, was not put to the test. The Japanese advance stopped at the Salween, a convenient barrier on which to consolidate their East Wall in Burma.\n\nThe Myosa, left thus in a most dangerous situation, in the front line, as it were, of the Allied positions, applied to the nearby ally, China, for assistance. The Chinese who were themselves receiving equipment from America for their forces in this part of the world, could spare him no equipment, but undertook to train officers for his force. The quality of the training so provided will grow evident as this story unfolds.\n\nIn 1943 the Myosa made the journey to Kun-ming to apply to the British authorities for assistance and it was at the British Consul General's* house in Kun-ming that I met him. I saw an alert slight figure, young looking and brisk for his 45 years, dressed in a western suit of Palm Beach cloth. He looked Chinese, but I believe there is also an admixture of tribal blood, possibly Shan; there is, of course, a good deal of intermingling throughout all that border country. The prince spoke Burmese and Chinese, but very little English: though his schooling on the border had probably been rough and ready, he possessed in a strong degree that charm, which goes with a courtesy so cultivated that it becomes natural and can conceal the aptitude for decision based on a habit of command. The prince was accompanied by his son, a capable young man in his early twenties, who had been educated at the Princes' School in Taungyi and spoke excellent English. The Myosa explained to us, his son serving as interpreter, the difficulties of his position, the trouble he was having with Chinese troops, a battalion of whom had been stationed in Southern Kokang, and the hope that we might be able to come to his support. We discussed the situation and the nature of the\n\n*Strangely, he had been the Consul at Kiu Kiang in 1927, from whose house we retired to the warships",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212824,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 133,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "118\n\nassistance which it might be possible to provide, and, soon after, the Myosa left to return to his country.\n\nIn August 1943 British troops were poised on the Assam border at Imphal, Tamu, and Tiddim, awaiting sufficient replenishment of equipment and the cessation of the rains to undertake the return advance into Burma; and there was activity down in the Arakan: while General Stilwell's Chinese divisions, retrained, reinforced, and re-equipped in India after their withdrawal from Burma, were just beginning to feel their way forward from Ledo, away up at the northern end of Assam, down the road which later was to become famous as the Ledo road. General Wingate's first expedition into Burma had just been completed, with heavy loss on our side, but with much success in confusing the enemy and disorganising his effort to consolidate his positions. The shape of future operations depended on the enemy's dispositions, so that any information which could be collected in eastern Burma would be useful: and in Kokang it might also be possible to organise patriot parties to assail his communications.\n\nIt was not an easy matter to obtain the consent of our allies for the passage of a British party to Kokang. The Chinese have unfortunately imitated the Japanese in a predilection for red tape; formalities are extended ad infinitum. It was fair enough that any British officer who entered China should require a pass issued by the Chinese authorities - though no such restriction attached to the presence of Chinese officers in India - but was it really necessary that the power to issue the pass should be retained by the highest authority in the land, the Military Affairs Council which would correspond with our Committee of Imperial Defence and that it should have to carry the personal chop of the Generalissimo? It did not make for speed in administration. It should also be remembered that the Chinese refused to serve in Burma under British command: that is how General Stilwell first came on the scene; and I think it is fair to say that our American allies had come to look on the Far East, and perhaps more particularly China, as their own special sphere of operations, where there was no room for any British.\n\nMy appointment was from the Army in India, which in those days, before the South East Asia Command had been established, was responsible for the operations in Burma. The proposal for assistance to the Myosa was submitted by the British representatives in Chungking to the Chinese government with a request that the necessary passes be",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212827,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 136,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "121\n\nWe were in the meantime collecting personnel and stores for Kokang. The trip in the 15 cwt. lorry in and out of Kun-ming each day required a gallon and a half of petrol; we could only replace our small stock by purchases in the black market, at a cost of around £2 per gallon. Opportunely we found accommodation in the city; for myself I shared a house with the officer who was stationed in Kun-ming to distribute the supplies received by the R.A.F. 'plane which flew over the Hump once a week.\n\nThese few supplies had to be stretched to meet the needs of all the British establishments in China, the Embassy, the various Consulates, the British Military Mission in that far-away place, their Headquarters in Chungking, and various odd parties, such as the one to which I was attached. The R.A.F. officer in question was Australian; J.K. was one of the most unselfish persons I have ever met, was most helpful to all the different parties he had to try to please, and had an extraordinary talent for making friends, a talent of which I unblushingly took advantage. He had not been long in Kun-ming before he had more friends amongst the Chinese and Americans than any other British officer in the place.\n\nMeanwhile time continued to pass; a couple of months flew by, the end of the rains approached in Burma, and the British tried to make their plans. Then suddenly one morning I received information from the Headquarters of the Chinese Expeditionary Force that a mob of Kokang rebels, dissatisfied with the Myosa, had attacked him. He managed to escape with a broken leg, but his fourth son and a number of his followers were killed; he succeeded in making his way to Tetang in China, where he took refuge at the headquarters of the Chinese general commanding the division in that area. The report added that the Chinese had instructed the Myosa's brother, who happened to be at Tetang at the time, to proceed to Kokang to re-establish order, and sometime later we received news that Chinese troops had captured the ring-leaders of the rebels and executed them. It was all very sudden.\n\nAt the end of October we at last received the long-awaited reply from the Chinese government. It was a refusal to issue passes on the grounds that the present time was not considered suitable for the despatch of a small party of British officers to the Sino-Burmese border. Soon after I returned to India and new plans were prepared. In the absence of Chinese co-operation, it was proposed to drop a party by parachute into Kokang, and to obviate the necessity of maintaining them entirely by ...",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212830,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 139,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "124\n\nsupport refugees from Hongkong until positions could be found for them. I had obtained them through the recommendation of that organisation, as also the two wireless operators. Although they had volunteered for active service, in the interests of security, I had been unable to explain to them the exact nature of our work and they were already beginning to show symptoms of uneasiness the nearer we approached to the front. Rogue, whose real name was a long Portuguese word ending in Rogue, too difficult to spell or pronounce, had also escaped from Hongkong. He was originally a Portuguese subject from Timor, half Chinese and half Portuguese by blood. At one period of his life he had served in the Chinese Army, and at another he had commanded a small Portuguese vessel sailing out of Macao. He was very tough, always cheerful, always ready to do what was asked of him, and brave as a lion. Wherever he is I hope the British government will look after him for the excellent service he gave while with our party. Lao Teng was the cook-boy who had joined me in eastern China and who continued to look after me, until I left China. He was not only an excellent cook, well able to accommodate himself to all the food and fuel crises to which troops are exposed, but he was a personal friend, usually singing and laughing, and always ready to turn to and prepare a meal after a day's march, however long. He looked after me like a mother; I hope we may meet again one day.\n\nOwing to the limitation imposed by the numerous demands on the single R.A.F. 'plane received each week at Kun-ming, our clothing and equipment was peculiar and modest. We hoped to have further supplies dropped to us in due course, but in the meantime the party was dressed in a mixture of uniforms which would have given occasion for comment had they appeared on the square at Wellington Barracks; as Stan said, watching the men jump out of our lorry on arrival at Paoshan, he wondered what the heck was going to jump out next. What our American friends thought of us Heaven only knows; they were too polite to tell us.\n\nAs far as Paoshan we had moved by lorry; we were now to take to our feet, with pack animals to carry the baggage. The Chinese would not allow us to proceed directly to Kokang, but insisted that we should go via Shunning; it meant covering two sides of a triangle. The instruction was not unreasonable because it was at Shunning that the headquarters of the army, covering the portion of the front which included Kokang, lay.\n\nThe Chinese system of providing coolies, in areas where coolies carried the baggage, or pack animals, where such were available, was",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212834,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 143,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "128\n\nthat serve as leaves in this plant threw a new light on the perils of parachuting. The weather was propitious and the sortie a success. The supplies included a small proportion of gifts with which we were able to show our appreciation to the battalion commander, whose troops had provided most welcome assistance. On completion of the sortie I despatched Stan up the valley to enter Kokang further south towards Sincheng, where the Myosa's brother had his headquarters, and more especially to search for a suitable dropping zone inside Kokang, and not too near the Salween. Jack had already gone on into Kokang to Nancha, the place where the parachute party had stayed, and shortly after I broke camp to join him.\n\nMany paths over the mountains connect China and Burma throughout the length of the border; passage is unrestricted and along these paths the Chinese people are gradually infiltrating, circulating as hawkers, establishing their little shops, or cultivating a small plot of land. In Kok-ang the population was very mixed as it is all along the border country. Over half the population was now of Chinese blood; up on the mountains were many Lihsaw and Palaung villages. The Chinese distinguish between ‘Land' Shans and 'Water' Shans, Han Payee and Shui Payee; one meets them all through Western Yunnan and Eastern Burma, and Kokang had a proportion. There were also occasional Was and Kachins. The best description of all this country is to be found in Maurice Collis' Lords of the Sunset; and Where China meets Burma, a book written by a government official's wife, Beatrix Metford.\n\nOver a third of Burma is occupied by the hill people; they number three-and-a-half millions, and are governed by their chieftains and princes on the British principle of indirect rule; the princes come directly under the Governor of Burma and not under the corrupt clique of professional politicians, who have formed the core of the Burmese legislative assemblies during the past few years. The unit of control under the chief is the circle, which contains more or fewer villages, each under its own headman. The system has many feudal features well adapted to these conservative and primitive people. Nancha, where we stayed for a time, contained the residence of the circle headman of that district, a dear old gentleman, who could neither read nor write, but employed a Chinese writer for the purpose. The writer had married one of his daughters, as often happens, and lived in one wing of the house. The better houses are built round the four sides of an inner courtyard; the pack animals, the cows, and the pigs, may be housed on the lower",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 212839,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 148,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "133\n\nif we did not stay. They were not merely glad to see us because we were British; they hoped we would be able to arrange reimbursement to them for the cost of feeding the Chinese troops. At Nancha I had been most embarrassed by my large escort, which even after the subtraction of the men who were sent to accompany Stan on his reconnaissance, still numbered twenty; they ate at the headman's table and, when I offered to pay, the situation became difficult because it set a precedent inconvenient to the Chinese. Percy refused to allow me to pay, and I had to get around it by making a gift to the headman of some packets of needles that I had brought from India. Needles were very scarce and correspondingly valuable, and these particular packets had got wet when a truculent bullock had kicked off my box into a river, the day before we reached Nancha.\n\nAt the moment the Chinese troops in Kokang did not number many. The battalion had long since been withdrawn from the south, where the Japanese had established a bridgehead across the Salween at Kunlong. Of the fifteen other ferries in Kokang, six faced north across to Chinese territory. Over there the Chinese maintained guerilla forces behind the Japanese lines, and they had small guards on this side at the ferries, perhaps a hundred men in all. These troops sometimes brought in their own rice, of which Kokang was short, but they relied on the headmen to produce the rest of their supplies, cooking oil, vegetables, salt, and pork. In Kokang they fed better than in China, a small advantage which no one could begrudge them in view of the terrible hardships the Chinese troops had to endure, but it came hard on the Kokang villages. I was glad to learn that nominal prices had been fixed by the Chinese, after our arrival, though at much below current market costs, and that at any rate sometimes these were actually paid. The Chinese also called for free transport from the villages, and at Nancha the headman frequently had to produce plain clothes, taken off the backs of the all too scantily clothed people, for the use of Chinese troops crossing the river to join the guerillas on the far side. There, as in Eastern China, most of the guerillas were disguised as local inhabitants. There was nothing I could do about all this, except to suggest to the headmen that they carefully keep any receipts issued to them by the Chinese officers for supplies taken.\n\nIn Burma before the war paper rupees had largely displaced silver coins; but in these conservative border districts paper was not welcome, and silver coins were preferred. Of course, the paper money of the Burma",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 212842,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 151,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "136\n\nme whether I was afraid I would be arrested and carried off in the same way! It was because of the Lopez incident that for a long time some of the most useful men in Kokang, intimidated by Chinese threats, did not dare to work for us.\n\nAt Hsintang we occupied the thatched wooden building which the people of the village had erected for Lopez and in which he had been surrounded and arrested. It had two stories, with three small rooms on each floor, and packed into these rooms were no less than twenty beds, in layers. Though small, the building could thus house the whole of our party. All the furniture was made of bamboo, the beds, the steps leading to the upper storey, the stools on which we sat, and the table off which we ate. In the centre room below, Lopez had installed a mud fireplace, where of an evening we lit a fire, because here we must have been somewhere about 7,000 or 8,000 feet up and the nights were bitterly cold. The chimney, a hollowed bamboo over which we had to throw water every now and then, was unsatisfactory and the smoke hung about the top floor to the discomfort of those trying to sleep above.\n\nOur wireless was a great asset; it made such a contrast to the isolation which had been our lot when in eastern China. We could send and receive signals, and by laying the headphones in a tin basin, we could make a near-enough imitation of a loud-speaker to sit by and listen when the news came in. It was about this time that the Japanese made their desperate attack on the British at Imphal in an attempt to cut the railway, which supplied General Stilwell's Chinese divisions; in this attempt they were to exhaust themselves, and open Burma to reoccupation by the Allies. A little later General Wingate's second l.r.p.g. - long range penetration group - operations were launched. We were later to discover that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from all along the Salween to meet Wingate's threat offered an explanation of why they failed to raid across the river to disperse us.\n\nStan rejoined us, reporting that there was no flat territory in central Kokang, but that he found a hill slope which would do well enough as a dropping zone. The slope was near the large village of Lunghtang, two days march south, and we prepared to move there. The country became more open; the jungle on the mountain slopes was replaced by long grass. We passed herds of brood mares, with their young. The Myosa in the past had been the contractor for the supply of mules to the Burma Government; we were passing the breeding centres. A lonely",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213137,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1993",
        "page_number": 205,
        "title": "RAS-1993",
        "content_text": "Year \n\nEvent \n\nSource \n\n1919 \n\n8 serious cross-border armed robberies. The Customs Stations closed in 1918 re-opened (August). \n\nAR JLHG \n\n1920 \n\nRefugees flee to New Territories from communal fighting in border area. Assisted cross-border crimes increase. Sha Yue Chung Customs Station sacked by bandits. \n\nAR \n\n1921 \n\nIncrease in smuggling native tobacco from China. 4 piracies (including of the Sha Yue Chung Ferry). Further armed cross-border banditry. \n\nAR \n\n1922 \n\n2 piracies on the Sha Yue Chung Ferry. Fighting between pirate bands in Mirs Bay. \n\nAR \n\n1923 \n\nLarge increase in smuggling, due to disturbances in the border area. Serious cross-border armed raids, an execution in China as a result. \n\nAR \n\n1924 \n\nUnsettled conditions, due to continuous fighting between Sun and Chen Faction armies for control of district. Upsurge in cross-border crime, including 8 armed raids, some mounted by Chinese irregular soldiers. \n\nAR \n\n1925 \n\nBoycott causes considerable trouble in Sha Tau Kok. Huge crime wave of cross-border crime. \"Quite 90% of crimes committed in the New Territories could be traced to persons coming from over the border\". Sinkers enter and terrorise New Territories villages. British troops sent to Sha Tau Kok to restore order. Hoi Luk Fung Soviet rebellion affects Mirs Bay area. \n\nJLHG \n\n1926 \n\nConditions better, but disturbed conditions across the border lead to boom in New Territories because of the number of refugees seeking houses. Many matsheds erected for refugees. Heavier border policing needed. Mirs Bay fishermen unable to fish except close inshore because of \"disturbed conditions\". \n\nAR \n\n1927 \n\nConditions better, but still troubled near border. Attempted piracy of Tolo Harbour ferry junk. Heavier policing of Sha Tau Kok border area reduces cross-border crime. Border patrol constructed in New Territories. \n\nAR \n\n1928 \n\nIncrease in smuggling. Violence against recent refugee arrivals in New Territories. Chinese irregulars replaced by regulars and disciplined at Sha Tau Kok – Major piracy in Mirs Bay (\"Fean\" case). Hoi Luk Fung Soviet rebellion affects Mirs Bay area. \n\nASR \n\n1929 \n\nCustoms seek major increase in staff because of increased smuggling (every year until late 1910s). Much better conditions on border because of better policing on Chinese side of border. \n\nAR \n\n1930 \n\nIncrease in smuggling. Kai Miu Customs Station sacked by bandits. \n\nAR, JLHG \n\n1931 \n\nIncrease in smuggling, especially sugar. Sha Tau Customs Station sacked by bandits. 2 Battles with smugglers off entrance to Pearl River (\"Loser Maru\" case). Inadequate customs staff members leads to problems. \n\nAR JLHG \n\n1932 \n\nIncrease in smuggling, especially sugar and cloth. Smuggling on Railway a growing problem. Smuggling through Lok Ma Chau and Sheung Shui a growing problem. Smuggling on Shan Chun River a growing problem. Kai Chung Customs Station sacked by bandits. Gun battles with smugglers at Law Fong (twice), Chek Mei, Man Kam To. \n\nAR, JLHG \n\n187",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1993.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833t302",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213871,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 223,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "197\n\n3) Politics, like other business investments, is risky but potentially profitable. It is very much the case in financing a government while trying to satisfy vested interests.\n\nMarket for Political Investments\n\nThis raises the question of under what circumstances financing a regional government is possible? A convenient starting point is to look into the mentality of the time. In a despatch to the Colonial Office, C. Clementi, the Governor of Hong Kong and a famous sinologist who graduated from Oxford, diagnosed a decade of unsuccessful British policy toward China by saying:\n\nA China united under a central Government is not applicable to the facts... China is a civilization, not a state\n\nHis contemporary also commented that\n\nIf Italy was but a geographical expression, China until very recent times has been but a social expression. China has been a society, not a state; and a Chinese, a familial not a political animal.\n\nIn a polity as large as China, regional distinctions are enormous, but these contemporaries believed that the split was between Canton and Beijing. In the book, “Oriental Trade Methods” one finds the following passage:\n\nI observed that the Cantonese have been called the Irish of China. They are traditionally and by temperament against the government, against the constituted authority of Peking [Beijing]...\n\nThe Beijing government was first under Yuan Shikai and his followers who were recruited from his Beiyang Military Academy. After Yuan's death, his followers divided into several camps such as Anhui and Zhili. They were named the \"Beiyang militarists\". The Canton government, nominally, was under Sun Yat-sen. Without an army of its own, until 1924 when the Huangpu Military Academy was established with Soviet aid, Sun and his Canton government had to rely on the \"guest armies\" from neighboring provinces - the Yunnan and the Guangxi troops, all of whom proved to be ungovernable.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 213886,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1996",
        "page_number": 238,
        "title": "RAS-1996",
        "content_text": "212\n\nthe return of Chen Jiongming from the neighbouring province of Fujian. Chen was the Governor-General of Guangdong in 1912 and 1913. After the failed \"Second Revolution\" in 1913 against Yuan, he escaped to Malaysia (while Sun to Japan) and developed his own anti-Yuan organization independent of Sun's party in Japan. When the Canton Government was established in 1917, nominally under Sun Yat-sen, he returned to Canton only to find that the guest armies had real control over the province. As a result, he gathered a small troop of soldiers made up of native Cantonese and moved to Fujian in early 1918, where he strengthened its fighting potential. Chen Jiongming's return was financially supported by a group of Chinese bankers, who were affiliated with Liu Zhubo, in Hong Kong. They advanced to Chen Jiongming an amount of $200,000 and promised to pay the Guangxi troops a “give-way fee”, if the armies retreated to their home provinces. The fighting could not wait for bargains, as in late October Chen Jiongming's army had forced its way into Canton. The Guangxi guest armies obtained the \"overdue army expenditure\" through a different means. The guest armies retreated westward to Guangxi, looting all the way home.\n\nThe return of the Cantonese troops under Chen Jiongming was welcomed by the Cantonese. The atmosphere in Canton, as reviewed in the newspapers, was that Chen Jiongming should be the Provincial Governor. Funds for a new government were promised by the merchants.\n\nAt this juncture, on November 25, Sun Yat-sen and his key supporters left Shanghai and triumphantly returned to Canton. He prepared to assume power again. After all, Chen was Sun's subordinate in 1913 and 1917. The situation Sun found on his return to Canton was not to his liking. Sun was made Director and Minister of the Interior in the restored government. Wu Tingfang was made Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Chen Jiongming had been planning for the future in Canton, and his list of titles was impressive. Chen was the Minister of War, Governor of Guangdong, Commander in Chief of the Guangdong Army, and High Inspecting Commissioner of Guangdong and Guangxi. In January of 1921, Sun summoned all available parliamentarians to a meeting in Canton. There was no quorum, but they voted anyway. At the end, the Parliament elected Dr. Sun Provisional President of China. Chen Jiongming was in no hurry to act, nor was he ready to listen to Sun. In an interview with the British Consul, Sun described his",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1996.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/3n209j641",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214293,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 151,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "114\n\nMarines and it was not until an action at Amoy on 26th August 1841 that the British Army (Her Majesty's 55th Regiment of Foot) used them in anger.\n\nApart from the musket itself, the soldier was also equipped with a bayonet which extended the musket into a thrusting weapon equivalent to a short pike. It had an overall length of about six feet, and time and again proved itself to be a formidable weapon. This was used both defensively, as in a formed square fending off cavalry, and offensively as in the charge. Its offensive use was considered by some commanders to be more effective than firing the muskets, and it was common to describe the number of troops by the number of bayonets.29 Officers would carry a sword and perhaps one or two single shot pistols. Swords (cutlasses) and pistols were also the weapons of marines when boarding opposing ships, and some may have been carried by those operating on land; however, they were more likely to have been equipped with muskets.\n\nOn the Chinese side, there were a wider variety of arms. Lord Jocelyn describes a display put on by the Manchu Tartars, who were the elite of the troops in China, where the: \"Tartars were dressed in white cotton garb and black cap, and their weapons were swords and matchlocks, or bow and arrows.\"30 Ouchterlony31 illustrates a Chinese swordsman brandishing a sword, but also holding in his left hand a matchlock and with a powder horn slung from his waist. Hence, it can be seen that the projectile arms were matchlocks and bow and arrows. The matchlock musket uses a form of ignition even earlier than a flintlock. It derives its name from the match, which is a hemp cord impregnated with saltpetre and spirits of wine such that it burns steadily without going out. The mechanism is simple in that the match is held in an arm which, on pressing the trigger, descends onto the priming charge and, hence, ignites the main charge. At this time, it was archaic, and it was also a danger to its user, as the burning match could set fire to clothes or, more seriously, to the powder pouch which the user carried round his waist. Also, when wounded, the danger was compounded, and there are reports of troops being burned to death after falling with otherwise non-lethal wounds.32 Perhaps this had helped to preserve the use of the bow, although it continued in use well beyond the adoption of more modern firearms. Photographs33 of the Taku forts taken after their fall in 1860 show crossbows34 amongst the debris. Also Arch-",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214296,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 154,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "117\n\nleading their men to an attack.\n\n5 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 138.\n\n6 Lord Jocelyn. Six Months with the Chinese Expedition. London, 1841, p. 41.\n\n7\n\nAlthough the benefits of rifling to give more consistent trajectories were known, no one had yet been able to come up with a practical means of taking advantage of it in a cannon.\n\n8 Lieutenant John Ouchterlony, The Chinese War: An Account of all the Operations of the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty of Nanking, London 1844, p. 98 notes that at Tycocktow the Gunboat Nemesis \"threw shells into the upper fort.\"\n\nD. Bonner-Smith & E.W.R.Lumby. The Second China War 1856-1860. London, 1965, p.53 records that Rear Admiral Seymour reports that \"The Barracuta at the same time also shelled the troops in the hills at the back of the city, from a position at the head of Sulphur Creek.\"\n\n19 D. Bonner-Smith, op. cit., p. 173 records that Commander Forsyth of the Hornet reports \"..commenced firing grape and shrapnel, with ricochet shot,into the whole mass of junks, which must have done dreadful execution, as they were crowded with men to excess.\"\n\nOuchterlony, op. cit., p. 239.\n\n12 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 23 reports \"a Congreve rocket, which was fired at the Admiral's junk, went through the deck into the magazine, upon which she immediately blew up.\"\n\n13 Loch, op. cit., p. 40.\n\n14 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 149 notes \"In artillery they are very backward, their guns being of enormous weight in proportion to their calibre; some of the pieces of ordinance which we captured weighing seven ton, although only 42 pdrs; yet notwithstanding the immense thickness of metal in many cases the guns burst.\"\n\n15 Mackenzie, op. cit., p. 157 notes \"in the great arsenal at Amoy, a large two-decked junk was found nearly ready for sea with guns, as well as something bearing a resemblance to gun-carriages.\"",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214305,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 163,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "127\n\nMongolia during the next few years, the last being in 1915 and then wrote his book Fur and Feather in North China. In the autumn of 1915 he went over to meet his brother and sister, both missionaries in Sian, and took the opportunity to seek more specimens in the Ch'ingling range to the south of the city.\n\nDuring this period President Yuan Shih-kai's soldiers mutinied in Peking, and there was talk of Chinese troops in the Chinese city of Tientsin being in an ugly mood. Sowerby, having learned of the potential for trouble, went to discuss the matter with the Military Intelligence Officer of the British Garrison in Tientsin who then ensured that the Garrison was alert and properly guarded. Although expatriates were safe in the European quarters of the city the Chinese city of Tientsin suffered that night from mutineers on the rampage. The rioting was brought under control by the police together with the soldiers who did not mutiny and Sowerby, who had gone with a friend to see what was going on, watched something, he later wrote, that he could never forget.\n\nRR Sowerby [possibly a relative] explained in his short biography of Arthur Sowerby that Arthur travelled back to England during the first World War with the intention of joining the forces. He had already been told while still in China that his chronic arthritis, caused by exposure during expeditions to Manchuria, gave him no chance of success but despite this he went and \"to his disgust he was immediately posted to the Chinese Labour Corps [CLC] as there was urgent need of officers who could speak the language.\" As this Corps was not formed until 1917 and did not reach France until late that year it would seem that Arthur did not make his way to England until 1917 or even 1918. It would also appear from correspondence that he had already been involved with the Corps before, in Shantung, again from R R Sowerby: \"He had been anxious to avoid the CLC, having already had all he wanted of it, recruiting coolies in Shantung...\" He was posted to the Staff of the CLC base at Noyelles near Abbeville where he was involved in court-martial, criminal investigations and other similar duties but was soon struck down by another attack of arthritis and sent to hospital where he met up with his brother, now a major with the Royal Army Medical Corps. Some time later Sowerby heard that his brother had been gassed at Passchendaele and unlikely to live. In the event he recovered but his lungs were permanently damaged. Arthur was demobilised in 1919 and for one whole year settled down in England.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214325,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 183,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "147\n\nPLUM PUDDINGS AND SHARP BOYS “ONE TOUCH OF NATURE MAKES THE WHOLE WORLD KIN”\n\nAN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINA COVERAGE IN THE ILLUSTRATED LONDON NEWS,1\n\n5 JANUARY TO 23 SEPTEMBER 18612\n\nGILLIAN B. BICKLEY3\n\nWhether or not the British public had a particular interest in China before 1861, it is impossible that their interest can not have been heightened by the stirring diplomatic news coming out from China in the last days of 1860 and the early days of 1861. This raised interest was further fuelled by the human interest touches written into features appearing over the next several months, and by the media's developing focus on a desire for a better understanding between the British and Chinese peoples.\n\nWhat British readers could have known previously about events in China was briefly as follows. After the signing of the Treaty of Tientsin on 26 June 1858, the Allied land force of Britain and France had evacuated Tientsin on 6 July without any force having been sent – even as a token – to the Chinese capital, Peking. It was generally considered, however, that the retirement of the troops was premature and that eventually a force would have to be sent to Peking to prove that the allies had established their positions in China.\n\nThe expected peace demanded under the Treaty did not materialise. Small attacks continued to be made by armed parties on British occupied positions. On 8 January 1859, correspondence was found which confirmed that the Emperor had no intention of keeping the Treaty, and had in fact issued orders that the British were to be prevented from entering the Pei-ho River and trading on the Yangtse, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.\n\nIn June 1859, the British fleet escorting Lord Elgin, the first British Minister, to Peking, to exchange the ratifications, was brought up sharp by the forts at Takoo, at the entrance to the Peiho River. Men and material were lost, and there was grave damage to prestige.",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214326,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 184,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "148\n\nMore than a year later, on 25 July 1860, French and British forces combined prior to proceeding to Peking to enforce the treaty of Tientsin. On 18 September, a small group of diplomats, civilians and soldiers, led by Mr (later Sir) Harry Parkes, of the British Consular Service in China, left the main body of troops to make certain arrangements with the Chinese Commissioners. They were taken captive on their way back to rejoin the troops. Given the nature of their mission at the time of their capture, great indignation was felt.\n\nMr Harry Parkes was held for ransom. Other prisoners were treated with great cruelty. This again caused great indignation.\n\nBy way of reprisal and on Lord Elgin's deliberated orders, the Imperial summer palace at Peking was razed to the ground. On 24 October 1860, the Treaty of Tientsin was finally ratified and the Convention of Peking was annexed to it as a make-weight.\n\n6\n\nThe arrival of full news on these and related events gave rise in Britain to several months of heavy press coverage on China and the Chinese in early 1861. The London Illustrated News, with its combination of illustrations and narrative, is a useful case study to illustrate both the extent and the variety of this coverage.\n\nThe Illustrated London News\n\n8\n\nOn 5 January 1861, The Illustrated London News was full of news from China. It carried three illustrations \"by our special artist\": two double-spread half-page illustrations of \"Street Scene in Pekin: A Crowd of Celestials Contemplating the Barbarians\" and \"An-tin Mun, the Gate of Pekin in Our Possession\"; and one full-page double-spread illustration, showing \"The Earl of Elgin's Entrance into Pekin on the 24th of October Last to sign the Treaty of Peace Between Great Britain and China\". The Illustrated London News also gave the text of the Convention and a description of the ceremony of the signing of the Convention.\n\n11\n\nThe same issue also contained part of Mr Harry Parkes's detailed and circumstantial narrative of his own imprisonment, and an account by the Daily News correspondent of the fate of the whole number...",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214332,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 190,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "154\n\nMany of the illustrations tended now to concentrate on showing the human side of the Chinese, and the related narratives discuss their subjects in terms which would have been particularly welcome to the British reader, who would for example have approved the love of animals spoken of in relation to the illustration, \"Peking Cab.\" \"It is astonishing how the Chinese manage their animals by kindness. Refractory mules which could not be persuaded to go into the shafts by threats from Indians are as obedient as dogs at a word from a Chinese carter, a stranger to them. The Pekinites are very fond of horses.\n\n>> 31\n\nThere is further evidence of rapprochement in the fact that there is now a degree of westernisation in the delineation of Chinese features, particularly in \"A Group of Chinese.\"52\n\nAs a whole, the illustrations and related narratives now seek to create a sense of fellow-feeling, and to win a recognition by the British Public that the Chinese people as a whole are fellow-dwellers on Planet Earth. The description of Chinese boys on the ice is a good example of this. \"The Peiho ... is frozen over, and the ponds from Pekin to Taku are solid blocks of ice, on which numerous boys disport themselves much in the same way that small boys do in other parts of the world. There is, however, one dodge I never saw before. A kind of skates, made of Indian corn stalks, are placed, not fixed, under the feet, and the boys, grasping poles, shove themselves along at a glorious pace. Of course, now and then they meet with a fall but up they get again, laughing heartily at their little accidents, and begin life afresh. Nothing can be more glorious than this steady frost, with the cloudless, clear skies, the sun shining all day, the moon all night, making the ice sparkle like diamonds, and producing a most exhilarating effect in the human frame.\"53\n\nComparatively few of the illustrations, now, return to the topics of domination, retribution and punishment. Those there are may be represented by a spirited portrait of Lord Elgin on horseback,54 and by illustrations entitled, \"Weighing the Compensation Money Exacted from the Chinese for the Released British Prisoners and for the Families of those who were Murdered,\" \"Arrival at Tien-Tsin of a portion of the Chinese Indemnity Money, Escorted by Chinese Troops,\"55 and \"French Spoils From China Recently Exhibited at the Palace of the Tuileries.\"57 In keeping with this, the focus here returns briefly to those who had suffered at Chinese hands. The Editor glances at the financial generos-\n\n56",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214558,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 416,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "385\n\nRev. Wright provided the text for Allom's China and wrote a short piece entitled The Fortress of Terror, Dinghai. He claimed that 'during the British descent upon the coast of China, nowhere was the destruction of life and property greater than at Dinghai. Every hill on the coast in the vicinity of Dinghai was crowned with a battery of apparent strength; some of them too elevated to be effective. At the entrance of a defile, watered by a rivulet flowing from the valley of Chae-hu [sic], and on an eminence about two hundred feet above the level of the bay, stood one of those deceptive structures, misnamed \"The Fortress of Terror,\" in which the Chinese so lucklessly reposed entire confidence, when the British fleet cast anchor in the roads beneath. No troops, however armed or disciplined, could have acted with more eminent personal gallantry, than the Tatar garrison of the fort of Terror, yet none ever encountered a more signal overthrow.\n\nWright described Zhoushan as an agreeable scene, with every hill cultivated to its summit, every valley, from the mountain's foot to the river's margin with industry and fertility, producing a large surplus for the enrichment of the labourers. These productions, including rice, cotton, seed potatoes, coarse tea and candles made from the seeds of the tallow tree, were conveyed along canals in barges. The roads of Zhoushan were not constructed for the convenience of visitors, the gratification of travellers, or the mere objects of pleasure.\n\nIn describing the city of Dinghai, Wright noted that it did not stand upon the marshy ground but on the sloping side of the Yongdong Valley. It was surrounded by a brick wall twenty-six feet in height, sixteen in thickness, and six miles in circuit, with four entrance gates corresponding exactly with the four cardinal points. The city was intersected by open sewer canals, the streets were narrow and paved, and intersected by canals along the middle.\n\nBetween 1841 and 1844 the Westmoreland Regiment served with the British force during the campaign to capture and hold the Island of Zhoushan. The assault on and occupation of Zhoushan during the First China War was one of many along the coast of Southern and Eastern China. It culminated in the Treaty of Nanjing [Nanking] in August 1842 under terms by which occupation forces held on to several places until the treaty was fully implemented, Zhoushan being one. There was a school of British opinion at the time which strongly believed that we",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214742,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 157,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "121\n\nThe reality is that the British had been able to retain Hong Kong as a Colony for another 52 years after August 1945, notwithstanding the promise of Britain to the Chinese Government in 1943 that she would return all her possessions in China after the end of the war. In this light, Churchill's decision was not irrational, and the garrison's sacrifice was a contribution to the way of life and system of government in Hong Kong today.\n\nIn terms of duty and moral responsibility, Churchill's decision was also reasonable, given the constraints confronting his administration. For the sake of argument, what other options were available to Churchill in December 1941, assuming that \"the British Far Eastern Strategy\" (Bell, 1996), for which he was not responsible, with respect to Hong Kong had been wrong? Should he have handed over the Colony to the invading Japanese forces without a fight? Should he have \"returned\" the Colony to the Chinese Government, which had lost control of Canton and a meagre military presence in or near Hong Kong? Or should he have made efforts to evacuate the Governor and the Hong Kong garrison by sea or air and left the rest of the population of Hong Kong in a state of anarchy?11 Bell suggests that demilitarisation and evacuation were feasible options and that the ruling out of these options by the British Government was not justified (Bell, 1996). I do not think that these options were politically sensible or morally responsible. Therefore, I dispute the view that the efforts of the Hong Kong garrison, though militarily probably doomed to fail, were unnecessary or pointless. The complaint by some authors, such as (Blackburn, 1989) about looting by the \"Chinese\" during and after the fighting testified the need for British military presence in Hong Kong to avoid a state of anarchy amongst the population. I further dispute the view of some recent authors that the British administration was humiliated in the eyes of the local population when the small Hong Kong garrison surrendered. That would have been the case had they fled or surrendered Hong Kong without a shot being fired. The majority of the law-abiding Chinese population, irrespective of their views towards colonialism in Chinese territories, had always been supportive of measures to defend their liberty, lives and property against Japanese invaders. At the time the Japanese troops marched on Hong Kong, they had already plundered Chinese soil for more than a decade. There is no doubt that the Chinese population of Hong Kong were not, as represented by some authors, apathetic about the invasion.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214829,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 244,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "211\n\n\"THAT SINGULAR AND HITHERTO ALMOST UNKNOWN COUNTRY\"; OPINIONS ON CHINA, THE CHINESE, AND THE \"OPIUM WAR” AMONG BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OFFICERS WHO SERVED DURING HOSTILITIES THERE.\n\nJAMES HAYES\n\nIntroduction\n\nIn February 1840, the British Government advised the Qing authorities of the dispatch of an expeditionary force of troops and warships to the China Coast. Its purpose was to force the Chinese authorities to cease their harassment of British traders and officials resident in China, and to make reparation for goods and property taken from them. A blockade of China's principal ports was to be established, and one or two islands demanded as a place of residence and commerce for British subjects. A piece of Chinese territory was to be occupied, to be restored only when matters were settled to the British Government's satisfaction. Hostilities continued on and off until August 1842 when three specially appointed Chinese commissioners signed the treaty of Nanking on board a British warship in the Yangtse River.\n\nThis much is, of course, common knowledge. However, the subject matter of this paper is perhaps less well known. Among the by-products of the China Expedition were the books written by British naval and military officers about the War and their experiences in China. Some of the letters sent to family and friends at home have also found their way into print. Such books and letters, together with official papers, are used here to illustrate the sentiments, opinions and attitudes of the day towards China and the War, and I have occasionally quoted from them at length, in order to provide greater realism.\n\nScant Knowledge of China and the Chinese\n\nThis was the first time that British forces had fought in China. Consequently, there was no one with experience of conducting operations there on land or sea. Moreover, the higher levels of society to which the British officer corps mostly belonged - the aristocracy, the landed gentry and the professions - had little or no knowledge of China.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214833,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 248,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "215\n\n \nquarrel with China was always stated to be with the Chinese Government, and not with the Chinese people. The British plenipotentiaries and commanders on land and sea always made this distinction, and tried to make it clear in proclamations and public notices addressed to the people of the various parts of China in which they were conducting their operations. The most striking example was probably at the Bogue, where the war steamer Nemesis had flown a banner with large Chinese characters, declaring that Britain was making war only on the Imperial government. Such attempts were repeated throughout the War. Before the army left Shanghai in 1842, Sir Henry Pottinger had issued a proclamation of this kind, once more reminding the inhabitants that the British were in fact fighting not the Chinese people but the Imperial government.\n\n \n13\n\n \nBesides taking this general approach to their operations, the naval and military officers of the Expedition were motivated by the traditions of their branch of the armed services, and by the laws, customs and usages of war as recognized in Western Europe of the day. They expected to apply these in China, embracing such considerations as recognition of flags of truce, humanity towards a defeated enemy, the fair treatment of prisoners, and the protection of the civilian population.\n\n \nBritish officers were quick to note acts of courage by Chinese or Tartar soldiers during engagements, and they accorded posthumous honours to brave commanders. They tried to curb looting and rapine by their soldiers and camp followers, and were particularly anxious to spare women and children. They regretted the suicide of Chinese and Manchu commanders in defeat and were dismayed by the self-destruction of many families who took their own lives at Chapu and Chinkiang, rather than fall into their hands. Many examples of their chivalrous outlook can be cited from their accounts of the War, and some will be noted below.\n\n \nProblems of Control\n\n \nBut war is war. Despite the best efforts of their commanders and their officers, British troops behaved badly at times. Drink was responsible for some of the excesses. Wyndham Baker is very implicit on this point. After the capture of Amoy, he wrote:",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214834,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 249,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "216\n\nTH\n\nI am sorry to say the following day the troops were plundering in every direction and nothing could restrain them. The fact was that the old town which had first been attacked - in fact all the towns - abounded in a spirit very common in China called Shumshoo.... This could not be kept out of the reach of the men and its effect on them was of the most dreadful nature and very different from that of the spirits we are used to in England. A man no sooner took a small quantity than he was bereft of his senses, and men were lying about in all directions in a most dreadful state and committing the most horrible atrocities, which I am sorry to say are but too common in War.\n\nHe added, \"Since then we have been destroying every drop we can get hold of, and I think in one day I must have destroyed some 20 hogshead of this pernicious liquor.\"18\n\nNor could all soldiers be controlled. During the attack on North Wangtong, one of the Bogue Forts taken in 1841, Captain Belcher was very critical of the Indian sepoys, whom he accused of firing into the Chinese soldiers who were cramming the trenches and wished to surrender, begging for mercy. His account is both vivid and graphic:\n\nWishing to rescue some of them, I went into the trench and drew three out, motioning them to come amongst our troops, and they would be safe. Two were shot down while holding by my skirts; and one of my gig's crew, perceiving my danger, dragged me away, exclaiming, \"They will shoot you next, sir.\" Thus much for employing troops who cannot understand English, and will only be commanded by their own officers!\"19\n\nAt a later stage in the War, after kidnapping of their fellows had embittered them, the soldiers could be harsh with the enemy, and might wish for retribution. Wyndham Baker recounts this situation at Ningpo, where \"the greatest difficulty was experienced in preventing the soldiers from firing on the Chinese after they had laid down their arms and were supplicating for mercy.\"\n\nThe British Military Commander\n\nSir Hugh Gough, the British military commander for much of the",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214835,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 250,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "217\n\n \nwar, did his best to maintain control of his forces and to restrain the troops. Indeed, the more I read about Gough and his conduct, the more I admire the way in which he sought to conduct his operations. A few indications of his undoubted humanity may be given here:\n\n \nAt Amoy, Sir Hugh had published an Order of the Day, that \"private property was to be held inviolable, and that which in England obtains the name of robbery deserves no better name in China.” Camp followers who did try their hand at looting in Amoy were condemned to death on the spot.\" Such condign punishment is confirmed by an account from the Chinese side. The poet Chu Shih-yun of Chinkiang area mentions that the British executed two sepoys and put up a placard warning against rape and looting.22 Sir Hugh was equally solicitous in smaller matters. After the capture of Chenhai, he had stopped sailors who were hacking off Chinese prisoners' pigtails with their jack knives.23 In a more serious intervention, and with the Admiral in full support, he sharply opposed Sir Henry Pottinger's wish to plunder Ningpo “as a reprisal for the maltreatment there of British prisoners.”24\n\n \nSir Hugh's behaviour at Ningpo must indeed be regarded as exemplary. Anxious to save the place from the looting from which Amoy had suffered (from the Chinese rabble as much if not more than from his own force) as soon as the city was occupied he had called together some of the principal inhabitants and enlisted their cooperation in organizing a corps of Chinese police to protect private property. He was especially insistent that the troops should take good care of the buildings in which they were given sleeping quarters. \"When the Royal Irish and a company of the Westmorelands were stationed in a temple, he gave orders that they must not use the painted and gilded central hall, where examinations were held, for fear it might be spoilt.\"\n\n \n925\n\n \nUnfortunately, Gough's hopes for the city were dashed. Following the unsuccessful Chinese counter-attack on Ningpo, Chinese looters had taken advantage of the confused situation to loot the city with disastrous results. Sir Hugh wrote home, \"When I look at this place, I am sick of war.”26\n\n \nBrigadier Colin Campbell\n\n \nOther senior British officers also had scruples and set high standards",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214841,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 256,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "223\n\ndid the spirit of the British and native troops falter. No such weakness characterized the leadership in the China Expedition.\n\nThe General Orders\n\nThe \"General Orders - No.I\" for the Force assembled in the Canton River for the capture of Canton, issued on behalf of Sir Hugh Gough and dated 24 May 1841, set the general tone for the operations and the expectations of its General.\n\nThey speak of \"proving what can be done by discipline and bravery,\" of \"the assurance that every man will do his duty,\" and of \"devotedness to our country's honour and our professional character.\" They refer to \"the cunning and artifice\" of the Chinese military system, which is \"not one to which the British soldier is accustomed\" but \"which must fail before the steady advance of disciplined soldiers.\"\n\nIn conclusion, the Orders state that \"Britain having gained as much of fame by her mercy and forbearance, as by the gallantry of her troops\" and reminds the Force that whilst \"an enemy in arms is always a legitimate foe...the unarmed or suppliant for mercy, of whatever country or colour, a true British soldier will always spare.\n\nSuccess Moderated by Respect\n\n48\n\n**47\n\nBritain's victories in China may be attributed to its well-trained, disciplined troops and seamen, superior weaponry, good leadership and a high morale. British officers were proud of their successes, achieved in the face of high sickness rates due to disease and unfamiliarity with the country.\"\n\nHowever, they were well aware that success in imposing Britain's demands on the Chinese Court was also due to another important factor, recognizing that China's outmoded military techniques and equipment did not allow her commanders and their men, however brave and resourceful they might be, to match their Western foes.\n\nYet British officers were not dismissive of China's ancient civilization and attainments, and their superiors were punctilious in paying formal respects where due. British naval ships were ever prompt, and",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214846,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 261,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "228\n\n26 But war is war, as I have said. Captain Henry Keppel, RN, recently arrived at the war, went ashore at Woosung after its capture in June 1842. \"18 June 1842. Waterloo Day. General Sir Hugh Gough landed in my gig, when I witnessed the horrors of war. Mutilated carcasses of men and horses by hundreds. Houses burning, villages deserted, etc. Struck by the prevalent feeling so strong for destruction\". Sir Henry Keppel, A Sailor's Life under Four Sovereigns (London, 3 vols., 1899), Vol.I, p.\n\n27\n\nWyndham Baker wrote from Amoy, \"The troops in the city have picked up a considerable quantity of plunder and some quantity of silver, but of course it would not really do for officers to set them an example, though I have seen the most splendid and elegant satin dresses in possession of some of them.\" Blackwood's 1964, p.86.\n\nLaurence Shadwell, Life and Campaigns of Lord Clyde (London, 1881), p.120-1.\n\n29 Shadwell, p. 138.\n\n30 Shadwell, p.132. See also Sir John Francis Davis, Chinese Miscellanies: A Collection of Essays and Notes (London, John Murray, 1865), p.161n.\n\nBingham, Vol.II, p.86.\n\nBelcher, Vol II, pp.213-4. Sir Hugh Gough was particularly angry on this occasion. “You have placed me in a most critical situation,\" he wrote to Elliot, \"My men of all arms are dreadfully harassed, my communications with the rear constantly threatened and escorts attacked. My men must suffer dreadfully from the necessity of continued watchfulness; for however you may put confidence in the Chinese I do not, nor should be justified in relaxing in the least.” Cited in Holt, pp.128-9.\n\n33 Holt, p.112.\n\n34 Holt, p. 108. This step was apparently taken on the advice of the British interpreters to the expedition, who thought it was better to let the town be stripped and deserted than to coerce the civilian population.\n\n35 Ouchterlony, p.225.\n\n36 \"Oh for the Joys of England! Lt Orlando Bridgeman's Letters From China and",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214985,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2000",
        "page_number": 81,
        "title": "RAS-2000",
        "content_text": "37\n\nThe labourer gave such details as age, address, knowledge of English, previous occupations and also details of the person, in China, to whom he wanted the Chinese portion of his pay to be sent. He then \"signed\" his contract and his identity card with his thumb-prints, so agreeing to the terms of service. Even though recruited as civilians, all were subject to martial law, including field punishments and courts-martial, conviction sometimes including the death penalty. They were considered as mercenaries.\n\nGroups of fifteen were invited to elect leaders, called Under-gangers. These men usually were more literate or had other qualities of leadership. It was necessary for the British officers and NCOs to treat them with respect at all times, otherwise they \"lost face,\" and their compatriots would then treat them with disdain and not obey their commands.\n\nEquipment and Pay\n\nBeing non-combatants, no Army-type uniform was issued to the labourers. They were issued with summer and winter \"native-style\" clothing. They were also issued with a fur-lined cap made of brown felt, with ear-flaps of grey fur, commonly called the \"Shandong hat\". These hats were modelled on similar hats worn by British troops in the North China garrisons prior to World War I. On arrival in France, labourers managed to acquire other types of headgear, namely civilian cloth caps, Australian bush hats, French Army kepis and even steel helmets. Pictures, whether stills or movies, show labourers of the CLC with a variety of clothing and headgear. European officers and NCOs wore regulation British Army uniforms and insignia, either with an Army General Service Corps badge2 or the insignia of their parent units during prior service.\n\nA cap badge of sorts was issued. Made of copper, it was oval, one inch by one and a half inches, and had the initials \"C.L.C.\" stamped thereon. Gangers wore chevrons on their uniform sleeves. The Chinese were proud of their contribution to the war effort and were ultimately awarded with an official motto Labor Vincit Omnia. [Labour Conquers all].\n\nIn addition to being clothed, fed and accommodated, the labourers",
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        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n",
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    },
    {
        "id": 214995,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2000",
        "page_number": 91,
        "title": "RAS-2000",
        "content_text": "47\n\ntherefore separated into their own camps, for their own protection and also so that they could not mix with the British troops in general. They were supervised by their own British officers and NCOs. In death Chinese members of the CLC were buried in separate cemeteries or, if buried in cemeteries with Commonwealth dead, in separate areas apart from them. However, deceased British officers and NCOs serving with or transferred to the CLC were buried amongst other Commonwealth fallen. In life and in death the Chinese were isolated [reflecting the attitude of Europeans towards Asians in general and non-Christians in particular]\n\nIn mid-September 1917, Alec Paton, stationed at Zillebeke, Ypres, and serving with the Royal Garrison Artillery, obtained permission to visit Reninghelst to meet Claude Betts, a friend who had been promoted to company commander in the CLC. Before leaving Paton was in conversation with one of his officers who commented that he thought 'it would be a good idea to use Chinese as infantry, there being so many of them.' Adding that he wondered what the Germans would do if they saw ten thousand Chinamen coming over the top? In reply a wag said 'Run and bring their washing, I should think.'\n\nClaud Betts had learnt a few Chinese phrases as his labourers could speak no English and they were cunning enough to pretend they could not understand sign language if such meant work. As Alec Paton was passing through Reninghelst he noticed a sign, erected by HQ for the troops, which read ‘DO NOT SPEAK TO THE CHINESE.' Underneath, also in large letters, a wit had written, 'WHO THE HELL CAN?’.\n\nOnce again, to quote from the Directorate of Labour's Notes:\n\nComplaints. The Chinese, in China, are accustomed to seek redress of grievances by means of written petitions: locked petition boxes should be provided.\n\nThe Notes also included the following facts regarding the Chinese:\n\na] The Chinese coolie has an inherent contempt for foreigners\n\nb] He comes here purely and simply for money, with no interest in the war.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215974,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 273,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "207\n\nCh'ea was also in the \"habit of going about with a board on his back,\" announcing by this means certain \"striking sentences of the New Testament\" written in large Chinese characters. One can imagine that if these \"striking sentences\" were considered offensive by neighbours and acquaintances, a complaint would also travel back quickly to the civil leadership.\n\nLegge himself recorded numbers of comments about Ch'ëa's evangelistic zeal and preaching as they travelled together in the Poklo district in May, 1861. Since several weeks were spent together on boats travelling up and down the East River, there was much time to reflect on their shared missionary project, pray over problems, and work together during various periods of literature distribution and preaching. Overall, Legge was impressed with Ch'ea's consistency in character and genuine interest in others. In addition, Ch'ëa acted as their interpreter before the Poklo magistrate, Wang Shouren, causing \"astonishment and exaltation among the people,\" because the \"gauntlet of scorn\" he had often passed through in other settings was now surprisingly forgotten, even to the point that he was given a position of relative honour.67\n\n66\n\nOften Ch'ea and Leung Man-shing (Liáng Wenchéng), one of the Chinese colporteur-evangelists, went into a new town first to present the cards and map-sized travel documents of the foreign missionaries to the local mandarin, facing any threats that might come their way for associating with British citizens. This was a very sensitive problem because, although new treaty provisions promised free and safe travel for all foreigners entering China, there were still at this time British and French troops bivouacked in the city of Canton. In fact, they had remained in Canton for more than three years, maintaining their military posts since taking the city after a major offensive move in 1857. In addition, the British attack on the emperor's Summer Palace in Beijing during the summer of 1860 only heightened fears and resentment, even though it squashed Qing opposition and brought about their compliance at the treaty table. Undoubtedly all of this was common knowledge among the Cantonese citizens, a warrant for making any attacks on foreigners or their associates in spite of the treaty conditions.68 Besides, these signs of",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216088,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 387,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "West Gala of Cheng Keng Tri\n\nBrandi Count de Burgthong The\n\nStery Min\n\nBritish troops storming the West Gate of Chinkiang Fu (Zhenjiang) in 1842 Print from China-The Scenery, Architecture, and Social Habits T.Allom: Fisher, Son & Co London 1856\n\n321",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216172,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 471,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "405\n\nMORE ON THE CHINESE LABOUR CORPS IN FRANCE, 1917-1921: A NEW DISCOVERY\n\nDAVID MAHONEY\n\nA recent discovery throws some light on the army of skilled and unskilled men from Shandong and surrounding provinces that comprised the Chinese Labour Corps during and after World War One.\n\nThe medals\n\nSeveral medals were awarded to British troops for service in the First World War: 1914 Star, 1914/15 Star, Territorial War Medal, British War Medal (BWM), and the Allied Victory Medal. All troops in \"war zones\" would have received the latter two, the BWM in silver.\n\nSupporting the fighting troops was a huge army of non-combatants from Africa, the Middle East, Malta, etc., and from China, nationals of whom were formed into the Chinese Labour Corps (CLC). In addition to Indian labourers, recruited from the sub-continent, were Chinese labourers resident in Calcutta, which comprised the 62nd Chinese Indian Labour Company. All these non-combatants in war zones were awarded the BWM in bronze, but not the Victory Medal.\n\nBritish officers and Other Ranks with the CLC received the BWM in silver as well as the Victory Medal.\n\nUnlike all other BWMs, which were impressed around the edge with the recipient's number and name, the bronze medals awarded to members of the CLC were numbered but not named. The appropriate medal roll (WO329/2374-2383) held by the Public Records Office at Kew in West London reveals the identity of the 134,353 Chinese members of the CLC who were awarded the bronze medal. However, as many of the recipients could not be located once they had returned to China, a large number of these medals were undelivered and were returned to the Royal Mint for destruction.\n\nThe discovery\n\nSome years ago, there came to light the pocketbook of Labourer",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 216437,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2003",
        "page_number": 196,
        "title": "RAS-2003",
        "content_text": "146\n\nA contemporary comment in a western journal explained that ‘the Concert of Powers, that powerful instrument which Lord Salisbury compared to a steamroller, gravely assented to the theory of China's neutrality in principle, and did nothing else in practice. Japan's reply to the Russian charges was to cite a number of flagrant breaches of neutrality which the Russians themselves had committed. Japan, too, gravely warned China, and entered various solemn protests. These were not without effect, for by this stage of the war the Chinese were beginning, perhaps more alertly than most western nations, to be awake to the fact that the Japanese were the coming race.\"\n\nOne of Japan's protests to China was that ammunition for the Russian Army at Mukden was being transported there by way of Tientsin (Tianjin), and in one instance as many as three and a half million rounds were seized by Tientsin Customs while awaiting shipment. Peking took the only course open to it in telegraphing to local Chinese authorities that they must end these practices.\n\nA Russian breach of neutrality\n\nOn 4th October 1904 a body of Russian infantry of the 3rd Regiment of Sharpshooters, all wearing Chinese uniforms, attacked the Japanese on the road to Mukden. 'There had been a number of reports of Russian soldiers dressed in Chinese uniforms having approached Japanese troops and even attempted surprise attacks. It was also reported that the Russian Army was continuing to purchase an enormous number of Chinese uniforms. This was not only contrary to the rules of war but exposed innocent Chinese to danger owing to the impossibility of distinguishing at a distance between Russian soldiers and the real Chinese. As the Hague Convention stipulated that unlawful use of uniforms of the enemy, and the Chinese were not the enemy, the Russians deemed it a legal stratagem xüli\n\nAnother major breach of China's neutrality occurred in early January 1905 when Russian General Mistchenko determined to violate Chinese neutrality to get his army to Newchwang without danger to himself. A British correspondent’s description reads:\n\nThe Russians had no intention of playing the game fairly; the rules had been made for the Japanese and not for their own observance.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390",
        "rank": 0
    }
]