[ { "id": 204780, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1964", "page_number": 83, "title": "RAS-1964", "content_text": "72 \n\nJ. W. HAYES \n\nbe shown for inspection to prove ownership at the land settlement which followed the British lease and, though opinions differ on this point, many old villagers have said that their deeds were handed in to the Government and not returned. This would, in part, account for their being in very short supply today, at any rate throughout the area with which I am familiar; that is the islands and the Sai Kung and Clear Water Bay districts. Following widespread enquiry over a number of years, I am convinced that another factor of great importance in explaining their scarcity is the Japanese occupation of the Colony in 1941-45. Many villagers say that their papers were destroyed at that time, in many cases by themselves, since they feared the questions which might result if the Japanese authorities got their hands on them. The less they knew the better, was the prevailing view, and therefore many families destroyed their papers, to our present loss.\n\nFortunately, to set against this background of loss and decay, there are the valuable records of the land settlement carried out within a few years of the lease of the New Territories to Britain in 1898. These consist of records of a ground survey, carried out mainly to a scale of thirty-two inches to the mile, in which individual lots are set down and numbered, and their ownership listed in an accompanying schedule certified as correct by an officer of the Land Court.2 These constitute a modern \"Domesday\" of all titles to land in the leased territory. Their usefulness to the historian is obvious and apart from their intrinsic value as a contemporary record they provide many clues to the past and enable detailed checks to be made on some of the persons and organisations whose names appear on commemorative tablets and others dated items such as furniture and fittings, which are to be found in the many temples which dot the countryside.\n\nThere are also the recollections of elders, particularly those over eighty years of age, who were young men at the time the territory changed hands. The memories of the oldest men are sometimes good and when this is the case they can do a great deal to fill in the bare bones of the land records and the genealogical trees. Since certain changes overtook the region within the first decade of British rule,3 their testimony is of the greatest importance to a realisation of manners and attitudes and an understanding of the system of civil and military administration which obtained", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1964.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qz20zx09r", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205553, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1968", "page_number": 95, "title": "RAS-1968", "content_text": "90\n\nARMANDO M. DA SILVA\n\nIt will suffice here to say that the exterior defence of the Chu Kong estuary consisted of a series of forts, customs-stations and guard-posts in the Lo Man Shan 老萬山, Kai Pong 鷄澎, Sam Chau Mun 三洲門, Ngoi Ling Ting 外伶仃, and the Tam Kon ## groups of the outer off-shore islands. The civil administration ruled from Nam Tau, the district city of the San On district. The military administration was centred at Tai Pang, on the western arm enclosing Tai Pang Hoi (Mirs Bay). The civil administration operated on a north-south axis, as against the east-west axis of the military coastal defence system. This is understandable when one realizes that the military could facilitate their control of the coast-line by establishing easy communications by water running the length of the coast-line from strongpoints on strategic head-lands and the offshore islands.\n\n3 For the Chinese characters of place names of some locales in the vicinity of Tai Yu Shan see map 3. For names of places within the present territory of Hong Kong see A Gazetteer of Place Names in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New Territories (Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1960).\n\n4 So far as I know there has been no published study of this fort by Hongkong's local historians, except for a brief mention in one work which states that Kai Yik Kok fort was of Ch'ing dynasty date. Lo Hsiang-lin, Hongkong and its External Communication before 1842, (Hongkong, Institute of Chinese Culture, 1963) p. 172.\n\n5 The principal ingredients of this cement are clam and oyster shells which are crushed and burnt to produce slaked lime. The lime is then mixed with fine sand to produce a holding cement. Shells and fine sand are common to many local beaches and are, apparently for this purpose, used in lime kilns.\n\n6 San On Yuen Chi, kuen 22, under section on Coastal Defence reads:\n\n看復界後海絮籹寧而設險更捻周密雖今之汎地 及設兵皆與舊制不同而大嶼山雞翼角炮臺南頭 炮臺赤濘炮蠱最為餓要\n\n7 Fan Lau is also known as Shek Sun meaning \"boulder growths\", a reference to the numerous residual boulders at Kai Yik Kok,\n\n8 Luis Gomes, Monografia de Macau (Macau, 1951), a Portuguese translation of the O Mun Kei Leuk p. 70. \"No 7° ano de long Tcheng (1730) construiram-se fortalezas nas duas montanhas, distribuiram-se as guarniçoes para a sua defensa e foram reforçadas as tropas que guarneciam Tai-U-San formando assim como que um angulo semelhante ao que e constituido pelos chifres dum boi, para servir de defensa exterior de Macau e o Boca Tigre\",\n\n9 J. J. L. Duyvendak, \"Sailing directions of Chinese voyages\" T'oung Pao, vol. 34 (1938) pp. 230-237; and \"The true dates of the Chinese maritime expeditions in the early fifteenth century\", T'oung Pao, vol. 34 (1938), pp. 341-412.\n\n10 The district of San On (新安) was formed in the sixth year of Lung Hing (隆慶) ie. 1572-73, Fourteen years later, in 1587, the San On district gazetteer was written by Yan Tai-kon (縣太君), the District Magistrate. Various editions followed. The latest edition was published in 1819. This gazetteer provides the best primary source of information on pre-British Hongkong. Chapters (kuen) XIV and XXII deal with Coastal Defence. These are chapters of special interest to historical geographers.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1968.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/66833948d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207395, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 163, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n155\n\nin my mind that the Colony could not hold out long against an attack. After France fell in June 1940 the outlook darkened further.\n\nAt this time I was a major of 22 years service but I held a lowly position in the Army List for my Corps, being near the bottom of a block of officers who had been commissioned during the First World War. I had prepared for a career in Surgery and I also had experience of administration. In theatres where the army was expanding, promotion for officers in my position was nearly certain but in Hong Kong there was no such possibility. For a time I hoped I might be posted elsewhere, and while I never thought it possible that I might get home the Middle East seemed just a possibility. The likeliest destination for me if I moved at all seemed to be Singapore where my friends told me of the huge increase of strength in the army there. I was never moved.\n\nI had no part in preparing the army's plans for increased hospital accommodation in Hong Kong in war. Some of the buildings it was sought to use were occupied by religious orders, some of which were Italian and I understood that Colonel John Simson, the Assistant Director of Medical Services, China Command found difficulty inspecting these and met a blank refusal to a request that we might be allowed to make a preliminary accumulation of medical stores in some of these buildings. The Hong Kong Government was, I believe, unwilling on grounds of policy to overrule the objections. The Indian Army Hospital which was in Kowloon and which accommodated some British patients as well, was on the outbreak of hostilities to close, cross the harbour and reopen on the Island of Hong Kong in the Chinese Hospital, Tung Wah East. With the frontier so close to the harbour this would obviously be a difficult operation and I was sorry for the A.D.M.S. who had to plan under these conditions.\n\nI have been able to obtain through the courtesy of Colonel R. H. Freeman and Brigadier John Lapper, a postwar aerial photograph of the Military Hospital buildings in Bowen Road, which I reproduce here (plate 17). The photograph shows that new buildings have been added since the war and does not show the hospital reservoir. The hospital was built in two wings each containing a ground floor and two storeys, and these wings were connected by a central block which held the administrative offices. To the north there was a magnificent view over the harbour to the mountains of the New Territories while in the rear of the building the ground rose", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207501, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 269, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "CAPTIVE SURGEON IN HONG KONG\n\n261\n\nI was straban while Ashton Rose was preparing a medical report on Sham Shui Po. At this time we were being asked by the British Military Administration to submit lists of our kit which had been taken by the Japanese but I imagine that this only added to the papers with which they had to deal at that time. The Colonial Secretary was installed in the French Mission at Battery Path and heads of government departments followed shortly afterwards. Commander Craven and Major Boxer left us for staff duties in Hong Kong and I arranged for two barbers to come and stay for a few days. Six of our Q.A. sisters arrived and another six came late at night accompanied by very necessary male escorts from Stanley. We were delighted to see them and put them all up and fed them but it was early morning before I got to bed.\n\nOn 27 August Saito came back and I pressed him again for our medical records and he excused himself by saying he had been so busy. The Indian hospital had 259 patients and 45 staff and I arranged an X-ray session for Indian patients including a number suffering from tuberculosis. Selwyn-Clarke sent us a gift of brandy and cigarettes, showing that though he did not use these comforts himself he would not deny them to others. Miss Dyson now back in her rightful position as Matron set about getting overalls for her sisters, a splendid boost to the morale not only of these ladies but of the patients and staff as well. Madame Lebon made these and our army promised payment.\n\n1\n\nWe finally closed our compradore's shop and agreed a business settlement with the compradore on the basis of him taking out cash plus goods to the total of $8831.06 yen. We had an excellent concert provided by Sham Shui Po, and some of the Hong Kong Volunteers, particularly those of mixed race, were slightly built and made up very attractively as girls. Members of the Indian camp and the Internee Camp at Ma Tau Wei attended and as usual in these days I was very late to bed. We found it necessary to control visiting hours in the hospital because of the very large numbers of people we had roaming about.\n\nOn 28 August we got smoke flares from our people for touching off by day to guide our aircraft when they were dropping supplies and the Japanese also sent in smoke cylinders for a like purpose. They also sent in 3 bottles of whisky, 4 of peppermint for the dispensary, 8 of brandy, 50 of port, 6 of gin and 20 of sherry. I at once arranged a general issue of 2 ounces of port per head, a meagre ration which I thought was wise at the time.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207719, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 107, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "A HAWAIIAN KING VISITS HONG KONG, 1881\n\nEditor\n\nTIN-YUKE CHAR*\n\nJournal of Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch\n\nSir:\n\nI am submitting a manuscript for publication in your Journal on King Kalakaua of Hawaii and his visit to Hong Kong in 1881. It gives a clear explanation why Hong Kong was chosen as the principal embarkation port for the Chinese labor recruitment to Hawaii. The strict administration of British regulations on emigration, the designation of an honorary Hawaiian consul in Hong Kong, and the reasonable contract between employer and employee signed in Hawaii, as documented in an appendix, all give a better understanding of the good treatment of our Chinese immigrants to Hawaii compared with the abuses in Peru and Cuba.\n\nThe first reigning monarch to make a trip around the world was King David Kalakaua of the Kingdom of Hawaii. The year was 1881. King Kalakaua, born November 16, 1836, reigned for twenty-three years (1874-1891) until his death in San Francisco on January 20, 1891.† He had already had his first experience travelling abroad in November 1874 when he called on President Ulysses S. Grant in Washington and addressed the United States Congress in fluent English. As a result of this visit, the Hawaiian government was\n\n* Mr. Char was born in Hawaii in 1905 and has had a colorful life combining business and education. A graduate of McKinley High School in Honolulu, he received his B.A. degree from Yenching University in Peking and his M.A. from the University of Hawaii, and pursued graduate studies at Columbia University. He then taught, both in Hawaii and in China. In 1938, Mr. Char and his family returned to Hawaii as refugees from the Japanese military invasion of Canton. He spent the next thirty years in the insurance business. In 1952, he became the first person in Hawaii to gain the national professional designation of CPCU (Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter) in the field of insurance. Always active in community affairs, Mr. Char served on the boards of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Hawaii Congress of Parents and Teachers, the Nuuanu YMCA, and the Board of Underwriters of Hawaii (insurance), among others, and is currently a member of a number of historical societies, including the Hawaii Chinese History Center. Upon retirement in 1969 as president of the Continental Insurance Agency of Hawaii, Mr. Char spent a year on the campus of Chung Chi College, a division of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, as a volunteer in student counseling and placement service. Since then, he has devoted his time to historical research and writing.\n\nMr. Char is also the author of The Hakka Chinese: Their Origin and Folk Songs and Chinese Proverbs, both published by the Jade Mountain Press of San Francisco in 1969, and The Char Family Genealogy Book, privately published in Honolulu in 1970.\n\n† See Plate 15.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207763, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 151, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "136\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS\n\nport for the work came from American United China Relief (UCR) funds through the American Friends Service Council (AFSC); there were members from Canada, U.S.A., New Zealand, as well as China itself; and the self-sufficiency required was much greater than that of other FAU groups.\n\nThe original plan, worked out in late 1940 and early 1941, was for a group of forty men, equipped with 20 trucks, a mobile operating theatre and mobile workshop, to undertake two tasks. The first was the transport of medical supplies into China from Burma and the second provision of medical teams to work with civilian and military hospitals. The proposals had the support of the British Fund for the Relief of Distress in China under Dr. H. Gordon Thompson, the Foreign Office, the U.C.R. and the AFSC. The trucks and equipment were purchased in the US and shipped to Rangoon where they were assembled and driven up to China. Dr. R. B. McClure, a Canadian medical missionary born in China, was appointed to lead the Unit.\n\nIt will be remembered that in 1941 Japan occupied all the coast of China, transport up the railway to Kunming from Hanoi had ceased and the only land routes into the western provinces still held by the Government of the Republic of China under Marshal Chiang Kai Shek were the Burma Road and the road from the USSR via Sinkiang. When the Sino-Japanese war widened into the Pacific War on December 8, 1941, about half of the FAU group had arrived in Burma and China, the first trucks were being assembled in Rangoon and the rest of the party and equipment were on the high seas. All arrived safely and the Unit undertook a number of interesting tasks during the Burma fighting of 1942.1\n\nMedical Services and Supplies in China\n\nDespite the diversion of manpower and loss of trucks and fuel in Burma the work of transporting medical supplies in China got underway in 1942. In 1941 there were four organizations concerned with military and civilian medical services:—\n\n1) the Army Medical Administration (AMA)\n\n2) the Chinese Red Cross (CRC)\n\n3) National Health Administration (NHA) Weishengshu (衛 生 署) with its civilian hospitals and clinics.\n\n4) Over 100 mission hospitals, responsible to their own Mission Boards.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208547, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 4, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208584, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "14\n\nJULIAN F. PAS\n\nrecommendations for ultimate implementation.\" Appearing on the master list was the subject \"Treatment by United States Occupation Forces of Special Areas: Hong Kong.\"59\n\nThe Department of State was first invited to submit a paper, bearing on the political aspects of the question, to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. After considerable deliberation the department concluded that in view of the political differences between China and Great Britain regarding the future status of Hong Kong, United States forces should not participate in operations for the reconquest or occupation of Hong Kong unless absolutely necessary from a military point of view, and that the United States should make no plans to participate in military government in Hong Kong which, according to the previous agreement of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, was to be instituted by Britain.60\n\nOn receiving the department's recommendation, and after consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East submitted a draft report in mid-June. Apart from reiterating the Department of State principle of non-involvement, the report further pointed out that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to substantial United States participation in the Canton-Hong Kong operation, it was a Chinese operation under Chiang Kai-shek and not an operation conducted by United States forces under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore should not regard themselves as obligated, in so far as the Canton-Hong Kong operation was concerned, to the civil affairs agreement with the British. Moreover, China was not a signatory to this agreement, and it did not cover the situation in the case of a Japanese withdrawal from Hong Kong. The subcommittee accordingly recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff inform the British Chiefs of Staff that United States support of the operation was being furnished to attain strictly military ends, and that arrangements with regard to the civil affairs administration of Hong Kong should be worked out between Britain and China.61 This document, with some minor alterations, was accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee by the end of July. The suggestion that Chiang Kai-shek should be consulted with regard to civil affairs in Hong Kong was naturally unpalatable to Britain.62\n\nThe news that Japan would accept defeat in the near future changed the entire picture. Britain now decided to secure the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209272, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 175, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "JUAN YUAN'S MANAGEMENT OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS IN CANTON, 1817-1826 161\n\nMeanwhile, the Tao-kuang Emperor felt keenly British challenges to traditional Chinese foreign policy. Juan Yüan was summoned to Peking. One topic of their discussions was Sino-British relations at Canton. But these discussions must be interpreted in the light of another pressing development.\n\nPage 162\n\nIn 1821, the Tao-kuang Emperor, newly on the throne, adopted a policy that was closer to Juan Yüan's point of view. A more stringent anti-opium policy was enforced at Canton, leading to closer monitoring of activities and movements of foreigners in port. The following year, a new situation developed in the northwest, giving further evidence that the British were challenging the Canton system by trying to open new trading frontiers in China. The combination of these factors led to toughened measures to control Westerners in Canton. That year, Wu-lung-a, assistant military governor for administration (ts'an-chan ta-ch'en) in Kashgar, reported to the Emperor the presence of two British traders near Yarkand in western Sinkiang. These traders had entered the Chinese Empire from Kashmir and Tibet, and had travelled by camel across the Sinkiang desert, but had sent the camels back when they were no longer suitable for the terrain. These traders and the remainder of their caravan had been prevented by the local chieftain of Yarkand, Akim Beg Mohamet, from buying horses, blankets and other provisions. Wu-lung-a, whose responsibilities included Yarkand, had ascertained that these traders were indeed British, and had indeed come from Kashmir. He enclosed with the memorial a letter from a British official in India which gave in considerable detail the route taken by the two traders from Kashmir to Sinkiang, as well as their intention to travel through the Chinese Northwest to Bukhara, north of Afghanistan, hence their need for horses. This letter to the Akim Beg identified the writer and the traders, then continued:\n\nThese traders and their retinue would like to go to Bukhara, taking any road that was safe for them, ... It is their understanding that the road through Yarkand is good and safe. They also heard that his Imperial Majesty is kind and fair to strangers, therefore, they have come to discuss with me the possibility of taking this road. They have asked me to certify their need to purchase horses, blankets and stockings. As it is the British practice for the chief in each city to write a letter to the chief of the next city on the traveller's route on behalf of the traveller, I am writing this letter to the Akim Beg of Yarkand. Wu-lung-a, maintaining the traditional Ch'ing policy that the only\n\nPage 163", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211000, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 62, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "37\n\nment, when attempting in April to occupy the New Territory (as the New Territories were then called), encountered much more ferocious resistance than anticipated. At this juncture, 600 men were sent into the Kowloon Walled City by the Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and the British authorities, convinced that they were there to support the resistance, demanded their withdrawal. The Colonial Office went so far as to threaten starving out the garrison at the City until troops were removed.41 The Chinese, however, claimed that the troops had been sent by special request of the Hong Kong government to preserve order, and though some of the men were withdrawn, by 4th May, 200 were still stationed in the City.42\n\nThis prompted the British to take action to attack Shumchun and Kowloon City as punishment for the Governor-General's duplicity in abetting the local resistance. On 16th May, at 3:00 p.m., a force of 300 men consisting of Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 100 Hong Kong Volunteers proceeded to Kowloon and occupied it, apparently meeting little resistance.43 All Chinese civil and military officials were ordered to depart as the British claimed that their continued presence and the retention of Kowloon Walled City in Chinese hands had proven inconsistent to British military requirement. To “legalize” the situation, an Order-in-Council was issued in December, announcing British jurisdiction over the Walled City which was to be administered in the same manner as the rest of the Colony.44 Yet this remained a unilateral revision of the Convention which the Chinese government never recognized.\n\n44\n\n45\n\n46\n\nThe Chinese naturally responded bitterly to the development. T'an Chung-lin, the Governor-General, protested vehemently to the court of the undignified manner in which the military officers and soldiers were cast out.45 At Peking, the Tsungli Yamen complained to the British Minister.46 Chinese eagerness to recover jurisdiction at Kowloon is best revealed in the letters from Lo Feng-lu****, Chinese Minister at St. James, to the Foreign Office.Yet, paradoxically, this eagerness was not accompanied by action; no attempt was made by the Chinese to reinstate an administration in the Walled City.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 40, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "16\n\nNOT SO CALM AN ADMINISTRATION:\n\nTHE ANGLO-FRENCH OCCUPATION OF CANTON,\n\n1858-1861\n\nSTEVEN A. LEIBO*\n\nOne of the more persistent myths of early Sino-European relations is the calm which is said to have prevailed during the three year long Anglo-French occupation of Canton, 1858-1861. As described by one of the best recent histories of modern China:\n\nA few years later when Canton was occupied by the British in 1857, the Cantonese showed no sign of unruliness and foreigners could walk about unmolested, without the slightest sign of resistance or animosity.\n\nThe reality, though, was far different. The Cantonese, long resistant to British demands that they allow foreigners within the walls of their city, continued for quite some time to make life very difficult for the occupying forces. In fact, very considerable resistance was carried out against the foreign military establishment and the mixed units of Sino-European police which worked with them.\n\nThe purpose of this essay is to illustrate elements of the allied occupation, the administrative structure established for the city's governance and the various issues, among them the occupation itself, and the coolie trade, which at times made Allied control of Canton considerably more precarious than we have been led to believe.\n\nThe initial occupation\n\nThe origins of the Second Opium War, or Arrow War as it is often called, are well known and need no more than adumbration here. Certainly, the allied sense that the Opium War treaties, signed more than a decade before, needed revision, as well as long running difficulties between the British and the Cantonese over the right of the former to\n\n* Associate Professor, Dept. of History, Russell Sage College, New York.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211325, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "17\n\nenter the city walls added to the general tension. More specifically Governor-General Yeh Ming-chen, perceived by local Europeans as an obstacle to peace, as they understood it, was quite unwilling to meet the British demands. As for the French, certainly their desire to establish an influence for themselves equal to that of the British by championing the rights of missionaries added impetus to French interest in a confrontation. As is well known, pretexts once desired are usually found. For the British, the Chinese boarding of the Arrow near Canton was said to be an act of lèse-majesté against the British flag (regardless of the reality of the ship's status). And for the French the convenient death of a French missionary played its role in bringing the combined flotilla before the walls of Canton in late December 1857. There several thousand British and French soldiers soon gathered to make their assault.\n\nFor those not immediately responsible for the military assault the enormity of the undertaking they were involved in must have caused considerable reflection. They were about to attack and presumably occupy an enormous city of more than a million inhabitants. There was no telling, assuming a successful assault, how long they would be required to hold it. But Canton's future administration would be a quieter challenge and one less immediate than the more pressing matter of first taking the city. The actual assault has been often discussed. It suffices here to note that the city's capture, apparently due to the Governor-General's poor planning, was a reasonably simple affair.\n\nWithin days of occupying the city it was clear that the allies would be quite unable to govern it directly. The principal issue was that they were faced with the administration of a city of more than a million people when no more than three among the allied forces could even communicate in Chinese. Of the British only Harry Parkes, the future allied commissioner of the city, and Thomas Wade, later ambassador to Peking, knew Chinese.\n\nThe French, for their part, were without a senior officer able to communicate at all. Their only contribution in this regard was the presence of a certain Marques who was then serving the French mission as a Chinese secretary. For the French, more than for the British, the lack of Chinese linguists was to be a major impediment to their activities throughout China and for years to come. Almost ten months later Paris", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211327, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "19\n\nAgreement reached, Po-Kuei was formally installed on the ninth of January 1858. Unfortunately, he arrived a bit late for the ceremony having been somewhat tardily released from the allied stockade. For the allied commanders, the real goal now was to ensure that the new allied commission they had planned would be able to supervise Po-Kuei's administration of the city.\n\n \n\n12\n\nHaving decided, despite reservations, to rely on the local mandarins to administer Canton, the military commanders, Sir Charles van Straubenzee and M. D'Abouville, the French commander, decided to appoint a mixed commission of military and consular officials to supervise the city's Chinese administration. The proposed commission was to have three members, two of whom would be military. They were to be assisted by an English language secretary and another proficient in Chinese. Additionally, the French commissioner was expected to be aided as well by at least one, perhaps two, French language secretaries. Provisions were made to hire a treasurer as well as various coolies, cooks, and jailers. They also hoped to hire three Chinese translators, though it would actually be some months before competent linguists, men like Robert Hart, later known for his leadership of the Chinese Customs, arrived to help. Salaries were set by the occupation council made up of the military commanders as well as the expedition's political leadership, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. Moving to implement their plans, they went on to name three individuals to serve as commissioners. For the British, Harry Parkes, of the consular service, and Colonel Holloway were selected, while Captain Martineau de Chesnez was selected by the French. Parkes, although ostensibly equal in official duties, was the only one of the commissioners who actually spoke Chinese and thus had a clear advantage over his colleagues. The French, concerned as well that Captain de Chesnez's relatively low rank vis-à-vis his colleagues could be a problem, soon moved to have him promoted. The commission, as the next months would reveal, was to serve primarily as an intermediary between the local Chinese leadership and the allied military commanders who held the real power over the occupied city.\n\n \n\n15\n\nIt should not be assumed, however, as some writers have, that the Chinese served as mere puppets under the foreigners. It is obvious from", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212253, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 195, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "172\n\nritual in her paper mentioned above. Her description is as follows.\n\n+\n\n*Indeed, actors may well be especially requested to carry out similar acts of exorcism on behalf of their clients, just like priests. In 1975 at Sai Kung, in Hong Kong's New Territories, a development comprising several modern blocks of shops and high-rise flats was declared open in an official ceremony, which included the (also symbolic but hardly magical) act of cutting a red, white and blue ribbon performed by a high-ranking member of the British administration. On the preceding evening the actors already engaged to perform operas in the town in connexion with a temple festival were asked to perform The White Tiger, and they did so in exactly the same manner as in the performance of the same ritual scene two weeks before. The sole difference was that the second performance was for the purpose of exorcising evil forces from the new buildings, which stood on recently reclaimed land where people had never lived before. In other words, the players were acting here as exorcists for the community, not at all for themselves: like priests.\" (Ward 1979:32)\n\nActors and Characters in the Offering Ritual\n\nIn Cantonese opera, the White Tiger ritual requires only two actors who play the Deity of Fortune and the White Tiger respectively. In Cantonese folk religion, there are five deities which are believed to bring fortune to people. The one portrayed in the White Tiger ritual is known as Jyn Tan (literally \"abstruse altar\") whose real name is Ziu Gung-ming and who is thus often called Ziu gung jyn sey27Ah (supreme commander Ziu). To distinguish him from the other deities of fortune, Jyn Tan is often referred to as the \"military\" Deity of Fortune.\n\nAccording to legends, Jyn Tan has a black face and black beard. He wears an iron helmet, rides on a black tiger and carries an iron staff and a number of other magic weapons. Besides bringing people fortune, Jyn Tan is believed to uphold justice and eliminate disasters.\n\nThe origin of the White Tiger ritual is still unclear though the\n\nPage 195\n\nPage 196", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212604, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 158, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "138\n\nI was anxious to reach Burma, and when I arrived at Rangoon in July found that I was one of the early swallows. The garrison still only consisted of two British battalions, and some battalions of the Burma rifles. In 1937, when Burma was separated from India, the army, which had been part of the Indian army, achieved a nominal emancipation from that tutelage; but in practice, from the general downwards, the majority of the officers came from India and the dogmas peculiar to the North West Frontier prevailed.\n\nI was sent up to Maymyo, in the Shan hills, to collect the wherewithal for an establishment, later to be known as the Bush Warfare School. Maymyo was the hill resort for Burma, the summer capital of the government, and the station of one of the two British battalions. This battalion kindly provided an orderly room sergeant, a stout fellow from Yorkshire, and between us we started to get things ready for the troops who were due to arrive shortly. I made my first acquaintance with the great brotherhood of the Indian Babu, the parasitic growth that sucks energy from administration in India. The Babu's great idea in life is to find a job for his brothers, of whom there are many, and to do so he must write more and more letters. A reply, which postpones decision, invites further correspondence. The more letters, the more filing; the more filing, the more indexing; the more indexing, the more work; the more jobs for brother, until one job has been expanded into six, and promotion is created: for first-brother can then claim to be exalted to the rank of head-clerk, to supervise the other six. The promotion not only brings an increase of pay, but also creates yet another vacancy for yet another brother in the position originally held by first-brother. It is a great game, not, however, convenient for warfare.\n\nI was later to meet the Indian Canteen Contractor, whose profits are so great; and the Indian Controller of Military Accounts, who also multiplies himself exceedingly, and travels round with a whole shelf-full of Army Regulations, without reference to which he cannot place one foot before the other. In India, even in the banks, every entry, receipt, payment, or other transaction is checked and counter-checked by three people, as a control on corruption, a control, to judge by all one hears, that is not superlatively successful. In this welter of procrastination time ceases to have value: amidst this accumulation of paper, decision is bogged down. It is a bureaucrat's paradise.\n\nIn Burma too I first came across the great game of discards. It was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212824, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 133, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "118\n\nassistance which it might be possible to provide, and, soon after, the Myosa left to return to his country.\n\nIn August 1943 British troops were poised on the Assam border at Imphal, Tamu, and Tiddim, awaiting sufficient replenishment of equipment and the cessation of the rains to undertake the return advance into Burma; and there was activity down in the Arakan: while General Stilwell's Chinese divisions, retrained, reinforced, and re-equipped in India after their withdrawal from Burma, were just beginning to feel their way forward from Ledo, away up at the northern end of Assam, down the road which later was to become famous as the Ledo road. General Wingate's first expedition into Burma had just been completed, with heavy loss on our side, but with much success in confusing the enemy and disorganising his effort to consolidate his positions. The shape of future operations depended on the enemy's dispositions, so that any information which could be collected in eastern Burma would be useful: and in Kokang it might also be possible to organise patriot parties to assail his communications.\n\nIt was not an easy matter to obtain the consent of our allies for the passage of a British party to Kokang. The Chinese have unfortunately imitated the Japanese in a predilection for red tape; formalities are extended ad infinitum. It was fair enough that any British officer who entered China should require a pass issued by the Chinese authorities - though no such restriction attached to the presence of Chinese officers in India - but was it really necessary that the power to issue the pass should be retained by the highest authority in the land, the Military Affairs Council which would correspond with our Committee of Imperial Defence and that it should have to carry the personal chop of the Generalissimo? It did not make for speed in administration. It should also be remembered that the Chinese refused to serve in Burma under British command: that is how General Stilwell first came on the scene; and I think it is fair to say that our American allies had come to look on the Far East, and perhaps more particularly China, as their own special sphere of operations, where there was no room for any British.\n\nMy appointment was from the Army in India, which in those days, before the South East Asia Command had been established, was responsible for the operations in Burma. The proposal for assistance to the Myosa was submitted by the British representatives in Chungking to the Chinese government with a request that the necessary passes be", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212878, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 187, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "172\n\nThis letter is both a classic of its kind and rather special—in its content warranting translation in full. It was composed in the literary style, and the writer's calligraphy is of a high standard. It is altogether a superior production, and of a kind now seldom seen. The writer was either an old village scholar or a retired schoolmaster, since the younger generation no longer has these literary skills or is trained in them. The letter was accompanied by a copy of the grave tablet erected in 1962 by the four branches descended from Ancestor Shui-tai, and by a list of all male descendants in the after generations, including mention of those who had gone abroad. It is beyond doubt that the clan took the government's notice to remove the grave very seriously indeed.\n\nAccidental Damage to Graves and Urns\n\nSuch statements by those concerned—and they can be many times multiplied since they were the rule—indicate how very concerned villagers became if an old grave, and especially a founding ancestor's grave, was likely to be interfered with by the authorities. Sometimes the files record damage by accident or even by intent. Where accidental damage to graves occurred in the early postwar years, when a large military garrison engaged in frequent exercises across the countryside, the British Army was sometimes the culprit. In 1963, the District Office received a letter from the Tangs of Kam Tin about one of their ancestral graves on the slopes of Tai Mo Shan. 'It has recently been discovered that this ancestral grave has been damaged by military trucks... We are anxious to have it repaired; and as we cannot afford to do so, shall be much obliged if you will sympathize with us and provide the cost of building materials, so that we may proceed to repair the grave as possible in order to pacify the souls of our ancestors and calm ourselves.'8\n\nOn another such occasion, the then District Commissioner, New Territories, upon learning that an ancestral grave had been damaged during a military exercise, arranged for a ceremonial visit to be paid to the village by the brigade commander, the command land agent, the district officer concerned and himself. This was done to show respect to the family and to acknowledge its concern, as well as to show the authorities' desire to make speedy reparation for the damage caused.9 The villagers no doubt appreciated this gesture.\n\nSuch actions could be two-way. Meritorious actions by officers of the District Administration were also recognized. I once received a", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213253, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 75, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "54 \n\nThere is little doubt they spread rumours and not unnaturally do what they can to incite the Chinese and Indians against us. The proximity of Macao, Canton and Coast ports make it easy for them to get information out of the Colony and home to Germany. Money remittances can be made with very little arrangement from Shanghai and Manila. They go on taking the trade which the present war gives an opportunity of British firms to take hold of. Their presence renders it necessary to take more elaborate precautions in guarding all important places.\n\nPersonally, I should not be sorry to see all fit for service made prisoners of war” (CO129/413, Kelly to May 5 Oct 1914)\n\nHe had not long to wait for an order for internment was issued the last week of October. This action was taken when Germany issued a call-up of their military and naval reserves.\n\nAll Germans in Hong Kong on the reserve list were sent to Stonecutters Island. Soon after they were moved to Hung Hom Bay.\n\nThis move was made before the Hung Hom site was fully ready to receive the internees. The mat huts had dirt floors and were open to the elements. The presence of mosquitoes posed the threat of malaria. The internees were put to work sweeping streets and performing other manual tasks. Word seeped back to Germany that the internees were being treated badly. Through official channels the Germans contacted the Americans, the American Consul in turn contacted the British to ask if the representations made by the Germans were accurate. The Consul was taken to the Camp for an escorted inspection and found conditions satisfactory. One can appreciate the situation of the internees, mostly well-fed, well-cared-for, comfortably-situated merchants before they were caught up in the tides of global politics and swept into the crude conditions of a hastily-built camp for enemy aliens. The contrast between their large well-staffed homes and abundant meals prepared for their individual tastes and the primitive shelters and an institutional British-style mess must have been difficult to adapt to overnight. After two years the internees were moved to Australia.\n\nThose above military service age, wives and children were deported to Shanghai or Manila, the former under international control, the latter under American administration.\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214063, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 131, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "98\n\nprovince.\n\nIn 1941, construction of a 457m-long tarmac-surfaced runway at Kai Tak for military use on an approximate south-east/north-west orientation, which had already necessitated the dismantling of the RAF hangar, was due to start on 8th December 1941, the precise day on which the Japanese invaded the New Territories and attacked Kai Tak airport.\n\nMilitary/Defence Works\n\nPrior to the British administration, there were several forts in the New Territories going back to the early years (17th century) of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the oldest existing fort (1717) probably being that on Tung Lung Chau overlooking the narrow Fat Tong Mun passage in the eastern approaches to the harbour, and the largest still remaining at Tung Chung (60m by 80m) on the northern coast of Lantau, which was completed in 1832. Little remains of the old 4m-high walled Kowloon City, a garrison fort (120m by 230m) with its sturdy granite parapet wall complete with embrasures and watchtowers, which was finished in 1847 soon after the British established themselves on Hong Kong Island.\n\nSubsequently, the British military have been involved in a considerable amount of civil engineering. The Royal Engineers were first involved in 1841 in the early construction of Queen's Road in Victoria. Perhaps their most impressive roadworks over the years, constructed before the Pacific war, have been Jat's Incline, which provides access to the upper levels of the steep hills overlooking Kowloon. Nevertheless, the main military engineering effort was expended on providing defences and back-up facilities (for example, naval dockyards, aviation needs, storage depots, barracks, and hospitals), principally against possible seaborne attack by Russia last century and later against the increasingly land/sea invasion threat by Japan in the 1930s. Novel defence measures included excavation of a cavern at Lei Yue Mun towards the end of the nineteenth century to house the sophisticated Brennan torpedo, which, after launching down a ramp, was controlled from the shore with a wire attached to the rudder.\n\nRegarding defence facilities, at the outbreak of the Pacific war in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214742, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 157, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "121\n\nThe reality is that the British had been able to retain Hong Kong as a Colony for another 52 years after August 1945, notwithstanding the promise of Britain to the Chinese Government in 1943 that she would return all her possessions in China after the end of the war. In this light, Churchill's decision was not irrational, and the garrison's sacrifice was a contribution to the way of life and system of government in Hong Kong today.\n\nIn terms of duty and moral responsibility, Churchill's decision was also reasonable, given the constraints confronting his administration. For the sake of argument, what other options were available to Churchill in December 1941, assuming that \"the British Far Eastern Strategy\" (Bell, 1996), for which he was not responsible, with respect to Hong Kong had been wrong? Should he have handed over the Colony to the invading Japanese forces without a fight? Should he have \"returned\" the Colony to the Chinese Government, which had lost control of Canton and a meagre military presence in or near Hong Kong? Or should he have made efforts to evacuate the Governor and the Hong Kong garrison by sea or air and left the rest of the population of Hong Kong in a state of anarchy?11 Bell suggests that demilitarisation and evacuation were feasible options and that the ruling out of these options by the British Government was not justified (Bell, 1996). I do not think that these options were politically sensible or morally responsible. Therefore, I dispute the view that the efforts of the Hong Kong garrison, though militarily probably doomed to fail, were unnecessary or pointless. The complaint by some authors, such as (Blackburn, 1989) about looting by the \"Chinese\" during and after the fighting testified the need for British military presence in Hong Kong to avoid a state of anarchy amongst the population. I further dispute the view of some recent authors that the British administration was humiliated in the eyes of the local population when the small Hong Kong garrison surrendered. That would have been the case had they fled or surrendered Hong Kong without a shot being fired. The majority of the law-abiding Chinese population, irrespective of their views towards colonialism in Chinese territories, had always been supportive of measures to defend their liberty, lives and property against Japanese invaders. At the time the Japanese troops marched on Hong Kong, they had already plundered Chinese soil for more than a decade. There is no doubt that the Chinese population of Hong Kong were not, as represented by some authors, apathetic about the invasion.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214836, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 251, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "218\n\nof personal behaviour. One such was Brigadier Colin Campbell of the 98th Regiment, afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Clyde. He had been present at the capture of Chin-Kiang-Foo in 1842, but as he explained in a letter sent to a female enquirer had not taken any loot - the Indian word for plunder - \"so that I have nothing of that kind, to which so many in the expedition helped themselves so bountifully at Chin-Kiang-Foo and near Nanking.”27\n\n27 Admitting to an equally strong desire, he said he had foreseen what he called \"the certainty of having to punish others for it if the War had continued,\" and this had dissuaded him from helping himself to private property. However, he added, he would have had no such scruples were he been able to loot an imperial palace.\n\n28\n\nCampbell had military and civil charge of Chusan during the final years of its occupation after the Peace, and the Chinese Commissioners who came to take it back from the British in 1846 lauded his administration of the island. Their words, in Gutzlaff's translation, are worthy of repetition here, as showing the calibre of the man and his lofty spirit:\n\nWhilst observing and maintaining the treaty, you behaved with the utmost kindness and the greatest liberality towards our own people, and restrained by laws and regulations the military of your honourable country. The sepoys, to the number of several hundreds, who were quartered in the city and mixed with the Chinese, lived with them on the best understanding, and no instance of insult or aggression ever received. The European soldiers stayed with you, the Honourable Brigadier, outside the walls; and you, the Honourable Brigadier, kept them under such strict control, that they never ill-treated or annoyed the inhabitants.29\n\nCampbell's biographer writes: \"His principle was to leave the inhabitants as much as possible to themselves. He never interfered with their concerns or customs, unless called upon to arbitrate in matters which the headmen of the district were unable to settle.\" Campbell was equally zealous in keeping away the Chinese mandarins from the mainland who sometimes sought to exercise their authority there and were arrested when they crossed over.\n\n30", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215041, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 137, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "93\n\nWaters, D. D: The Chinese labour Corps in the First World War : Labourers buried in France : Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society: Vol. 35 : 1995\n\nThe Commonwealth War Graves Commission,\n\n2 Marlow Road, Maidenhead, Berkshire, SL6 7DX\n\nUnited Kingdom\n\nTel: 44-1628 634221 Fax: 44-1628 771208\n\nImperial War Museum\n\nNOTES\n\n1\n\n3\n\nLambeth Road, London, SE1 6HZ Tel. 020 7416 5000\n\nLiang Shiyi (1869-1933). Chinese government official and financier. Under the Qing government, amongst his financial dealings, he helped found the Bank of Communications (1907). He was President of the Board of Communications (1912), Chief Secretary in the Presidential Office and General Manager of the Bank of Communications, acting Finance Minister (1913-1915); Director-General of the National Revenue Administration and Director-General of the Domestic Loans Office. He was linked with Yuan Shikai and in 1916 fled to Hong Kong. He formed the Wei Min Corporation for the recruitment of Chinese labourers to serve in France, as a proponent of China's entry into the war. Returning to Beijing in 1918, he was made Chairman of the Board of the Bank of Communications; Speaker of the National Assembly; Director of the Domestic Loan Bureau (1920); and Prime Minister (1921-1922). After exile (1922-1925) he again served in the Beijing Government under both Duan Jirui and Zhang Zuolin. He retired to Hong Kong in 1928 after the Northern Expedition reached Beijing.\n\nThis was usually referred to by “real” soldiers as the Crosse and Blackwells, as this British provision company had a very similar crest.\n\nLt Col. Bryan Charles Fairfax, a Yorkshireman, was born on 12th September 1873, the second son of Col. T.F. (or L?) Fairfax of the Grenadier Guards and passed through the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, being commissioned on 8th March 1893 into the Durham Light Infantry (DLI). He was posted to the 2nd Battalion, then serving in India. In 1898 he volunteered for service with the newly raised 1 Battalion, The Chinese Regiment of Infantry, stationed in Weihai", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215777, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 76, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "were pledged to protect and three over whose external relations they had a right of control.\"55 Hall strongly claims that, 'the Malay States were in a state of chronic unrest, external and internal,56 and had become completely incapable of putting their house in order. Intervention, therefore, could not be avoided. There was indeed constant intervention, notwithstanding all the rules to the contrary and all the thunders of Calcutta and the East India House, '57\n\nHowever, in spite of Thio's and Hall's assertions, the truth of the merchants' complaint is not invalidated, because between 1824 and 1873, British rule in Malaya was indeed ‘inactive,258 as their official policy was still in accordance with Pitt's India Act. In several cases, the actions of the Straits Settlements government implied some form of intervention, or at least limited interference in the affairs of the Malay States, when they violated the policy of non-intervention; but even then, nothing more elaborate was undertaken than the occasional punitive expedition, which was not enough, in 'the interests of British commerce.'60 Insofar as this was concerned, it would appear that the Straits merchants did have a legitimate complaint to the House of Lords, because their statement would appear to have been bona fide and to hold a substantial amount of evidential truth. The influence of Pitt's India Act (that is, EIC non-intervention) remained until 1874, when a new law was passed, and the British took on an active, intervening role in the Malay states.\n\n59\n\nJudicial system!\n\nThe main complaints of the merchants were that the Law was administered by unprofessional persons, that is, the administration of justice was in the hands of local officers of government, civil or military servants of the EIC, and the 'impractical schemes [that] were propounded' (for example, the Currency Act, port dues and stamp duties). LA Mills renders a counter attack to this point; he argues that 'although there were delays in dealing with problems which caused the Straits Settlements to suffer at times, on the whole the results were not serious. Of the problems which arose between 1826 and 1867, very few were of importance, so that injury caused in the delay in settling them was not great. The population was small and generally law-abiding. The Straits Settlements had practically no foreign relations (the main task of the government was to watch Siam and Holland,\n\n63\n\n262", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]