[ { "id": 205752, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 58, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "52\n\nR. G. GROVES\n\nthe configuration of the country favoured cover and our casualties were few.\" But, \"had this advance not been conducted with great care the loss to our troops must have been heavy.\"69 After fierce fighting the militia withdrew from the valley, leaving it by way of the saddle which gives access to the Pat Heung district. The soldiers followed and, having lost touch with the Chinese, bivouacked for the night at Sheung Tsuen, on the foothills overlooking the Pat Heung valley.\n\nThe next afternoon a large force (subsequently estimated at 2,600 men), was seen approaching from a distance. It consisted of men from Ping Shan, Ha Tsuen, and Castle Peak and from four villages in adjacent Chinese territory, including Pan Tin. The British force took up positions and stood watching the militia, deployed in three lines, \"advance across the open in excellent skirmishing order.70 The British Officer Commanding later conceded that it was \"distinctly a determined advance for Chinamen.”71 The militia began firing at long range and their rifle and jingal fire shortly became almost continuous. When the distance had been reduced to 500 yards the British tried a few ranging shots, moved forward under cover of a dry water course, and advanced into the open toward the on-coming militia. In the face of such a determined response, which now became a general advance accompanied by heavy fire, the militia broke and ran.\n\nThis battle marked the end of organized resistance within the New Territory. The next weeks were spent in establishing the civil administration and in persuading villagers to return to their normal occupations. The Governor, in attempting to explain what had happened to a remote Colonial Office, drew upon another Celtic parallel. The resistance, he said, revealed \"a state of clan feeling and power of combination not unlike that of the Scottish Highlands two centuries ago . . .\"72\n\nThe Occupation of Sham Chun and its Aftermath-- May to September, 1899.\n\nThus far, operations had been confined to the newly leased territory. Early in May, however, reports reached the Hong Kong Government of an impending attack from across the Sham Chun river. Police informers said that 140 ‘bare-sticks' from Tung-kuan Hsien had assembled in secrecy at Sha Tau, on Deep Bay. They were to form the nucleus of a force which was to be augmented by", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205753, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 59, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "MILITIA, MARKET AND LINEAGE\n\n53\n\nlocal recruits. The venture was rumoured to be the work of the Ming Lan Tong, a literary society of Tung-kuan city. Additional credence was given to the reports when it was learned that some officers of the Tong were members of the Hsin-an Tang clan. Police on patrol in the New Territory also noted that women were leaving their villages. By 10th May the exodus had reached major proportions.\n\nIt was evident that the Sham Chun river was not a defensible frontier and that the best way to forestall attack was to occupy the area from which it was to be launched. On 16th May two columns, numbering 1500 men in all, landed from Deep Bay and Mirs Bay and marched on Sham Chun. That evening the Union Jack was hoisted over Sham Chun market, to the accompaniment of a 21-gun salute. A proclamation was issued declaring that Sham Chun was British territory and that the Viceroy had no further jurisdiction in the district. There had been no resistance and no sign of forces massing to attack the New Territory.\n\nThe occupation of Sham Chun was confined to an area within five miles of the Sham Chun river, including Sha Tau, Sham Chun, and the road between them. Neither civil nor military jurisdiction were extended further. However, in the hinterland the occupation of Sham Chun and the proclamation which accompanied it were interpreted as a prelude to the occupation of the entire district. In particular, the Tangs of Pan T'in feared a punitive expedition against themselves.\n\nMuch of the information about subsequent events comes from one source. The Rev. Martin Schaub* of the Basel Mission had a station at Li Long, near Pan T'in, in the north of the district. Rev. Schaub wrote periodically to the officer commanding at Sham Chun and his letters convey a vivid impression of the activity precipitated by the occupation. Late in May he wrote that the leaders of Pan T'in had asked the larger villages to help in resisting the British. He said money was being collected and that armed men were making their way toward Pan T'in.\n\n* The printed documents call him \"Hart\", but this must be in error for Rev. Martin Schaub of the Basel Mission. A photograph and brief biography are given at pp. 16, 438 of Marshall Broomhall, The Chinese Empire: a General and Missionary Survey, London, [1907]. Perhaps hand-writing was responsible for the wrong transcription into the printed documents, Ed.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206521, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 69, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "SIR JAMES HALDANE STEWART LOCKHART\n\n63\n\nOn 16 April Lockhart returned to Taipo and in the presence of the General Officer Commanding, Major-General W. J. Gascoigne, and about 500 men, he hoisted the British flag and then read the Order-in-Council and Convention. The territory was now formally occupied. There had been some resistance from the people and from those living in the Sham Chun area. Lockhart had been asked to return to Hong Kong to attend a meeting of the Legislative Council but in a minute to the Governor he stated: 'I have consulted the General Officer Commanding, who thinks it very desirable for many reasons that I should remain here. I am of the same opinion, so propose to remain.'22 Since the situation was still unsettled, the Governor concurred with Lockhart's proposal and Lockhart stayed behind with the troops, accompanying them on a long sweep through the New Territories to make the British presence known.\n\nLockhart and the troops led by Lieutenant-Colonel The O'Gorman pushed on from Taipo on 18 April to Shek Kong; from that village they passed through Kam Tin, Yuen Long, Ping Shan, Sheung Shui, Fanling, and arrived back in Taipo on 27 April. The O'Gorman reported: \"To the Honourable J.H. Stewart Lockhart, C.M.G., Colonial Secretary, is due the admirable results that have been attained in the Civil Administration of this Territory during this brief state of turmoil; his measures have been taken with great energy and ability and in a manner that, long experience has shown him, were suitable to the occasion. The result has been a most complete success. Only those on the spot can realise the amount of labour and care he has devoted from early morning to late at night to the discharge of these trying duties. A most hearty co-operation has existed throughout between us and no difference of opinion on any one point has arisen.'23 The Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, in a despatch to the Governor, commented: 'without wishing to undervalue in any way the services rendered by others, it is evident to me that much has been due to the energy of Mr. Lockhart, and to his local knowledge.\"24 Lockhart remained in the New Territories until July 1899 in order to start the civil administration. The headquarters of the new administration were fixed at Taipo. He was assisted in his task by C.M. Messer, a cadet officer, Ts'oi Yeuk-shan, First Chinese Clerk, and two Chinese assistants. The problems he had to face were at first formidable.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207456, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 224, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "216\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nhospital. As a result our wards were crowded to a greater extent than ever before.\n\nEarlier all in hospital were required to sign a statement undertaking not to escape. Few of us, patients or staff, felt any compunction about signing such a document under duress and only two officer patients refused their signatures. Early in November, Colonel Tokunaga, no less, came himself and saw both officers. One thereupon signed while the other was removed and kept overnight in a small cupboard-like room in a building in Kowloon. I understood that he was not ill-treated, and it was explained to him that our British General Officer Commanding had ordered officers to sign. He then signed and was returned as a patient to our hospital.\n\nMost of our patients had lost all their kit and many did not possess even a drinking mug at this time. They were using tins which had contained tinned food, but the rims of these tins were jagged and caused much pain especially to patients whose lips and tongue were raw from deficiency diseases. Our engineers set to work and fitted empty tins with handles and smoothed out the rims and acceptable drinking mugs were soon issued to all patients. The engineers also turned out badly needed fly-swatters in large numbers.\n\nIn November we received 198 books from the Red Cross for our library, and in December another 400 library books arrived. Also in December a number of musical instruments, indoor games, packs of cards etc. were received through the Red Cross from the Pope. In November we had a stock of 270 gramophone records and these were listed and we were even able to provide requested programmes of music. From time to time we received a number of copies of the Japan-produced English language Japan Times in one of which an indignant account was given of the torpedoing by an American submarine of the \"Lisbon Maru\" which was carrying British prisoners to Japan. In this disaster when the torpedo struck, many of our men were battened down in the holds and prevented from trying to save themselves. Some were fired upon while swimming. The Japanese indignation should properly have been directed against the guards.\n\nNormally we had two check parades daily, one about eight a.m. and the other about five p.m. and about once a month on average", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212185, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 127, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "104\n\nPetroleum Co., and a timber ship of the Import and Export Lumber Co. Together with the large \"Ewo\" hulk we were all anchored a few miles above Nanking in a stretch of the river, designated as a \"Safe Harbour\" of which the Japanese authorities had been duly notified. The American gunboat \"Panay\" was anchored two miles lower down off the creek at the top end of Nanking, whence communication with the few foreigners in the city could still be maintained through a 'phone situated in a godown on the bank.\n\n\"The Flag Captain, Commanding Officer, and Ward Room officers of H.M.S. \"Scarab\" request the pleasure of the company of the British community, now afloat in the \"safe\" anchorage, on board H.M.S. \"Scarab\" at 11.30 tomorrow, Saturday, 11th December, on the occasion of the anniversary of His Majesty's accession.\"\n\nIt was a lively party. As you may imagine there was plenty to talk about, and the bountiful hospitality dispensed by the Navy - I naturally do not refer merely to its liquid aspect - set all in a pleasant frame of mind for a latish lunch when the gathering broke up and the participants returned to their respective ships. I have no doubt that the ensuing sense of somnolence was fairly general when, with a crash, a shell burst on the river bank not 100 yards from the nearest ship. The noise disturbed the lethargy of that Saturday afternoon. Ears pricked to discover whether there was more to come. The doubt whether that first shell was a stray or not was soon settled as two more straddled the nearest ship. Captains leapt to their bridges and called for steam. Clouds of smoke belched from the assembled funnels, marking well the whereabouts of the target. Shells began to fall regularly in the anchorage, but it was not more than fifteen minutes before the merchant flotilla, festooned with attendant small craft, was underway heading upriver. The two gunboats remained to stand-by the hulk, which was full of foreign and Chinese refugees and, having slipped its anchors, endeavoured to tow it in the wake of the other vessels. By good luck there were no direct hits on any of the ships, though some vessels were holed by splinters, and two unfortunate Chinese boatmen were killed and some others wounded.\n\nThe shelling resumed when the ships were under way a mile or two above the \"safe harbour\", the guns then appearing to be of heavier calibre. The shells came over in pairs and were very well", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212827, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 136, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "121\n\nWe were in the meantime collecting personnel and stores for Kokang. The trip in the 15 cwt. lorry in and out of Kun-ming each day required a gallon and a half of petrol; we could only replace our small stock by purchases in the black market, at a cost of around £2 per gallon. Opportunely we found accommodation in the city; for myself I shared a house with the officer who was stationed in Kun-ming to distribute the supplies received by the R.A.F. 'plane which flew over the Hump once a week.\n\nThese few supplies had to be stretched to meet the needs of all the British establishments in China, the Embassy, the various Consulates, the British Military Mission in that far-away place, their Headquarters in Chungking, and various odd parties, such as the one to which I was attached. The R.A.F. officer in question was Australian; J.K. was one of the most unselfish persons I have ever met, was most helpful to all the different parties he had to try to please, and had an extraordinary talent for making friends, a talent of which I unblushingly took advantage. He had not been long in Kun-ming before he had more friends amongst the Chinese and Americans than any other British officer in the place.\n\nMeanwhile time continued to pass; a couple of months flew by, the end of the rains approached in Burma, and the British tried to make their plans. Then suddenly one morning I received information from the Headquarters of the Chinese Expeditionary Force that a mob of Kokang rebels, dissatisfied with the Myosa, had attacked him. He managed to escape with a broken leg, but his fourth son and a number of his followers were killed; he succeeded in making his way to Tetang in China, where he took refuge at the headquarters of the Chinese general commanding the division in that area. The report added that the Chinese had instructed the Myosa's brother, who happened to be at Tetang at the time, to proceed to Kokang to re-establish order, and sometime later we received news that Chinese troops had captured the ring-leaders of the rebels and executed them. It was all very sudden.\n\nAt the end of October we at last received the long-awaited reply from the Chinese government. It was a refusal to issue passes on the grounds that the present time was not considered suitable for the despatch of a small party of British officers to the Sino-Burmese border. Soon after I returned to India and new plans were prepared. In the absence of Chinese co-operation, it was proposed to drop a party by parachute into Kokang, and to obviate the necessity of maintaining them entirely by ...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213252, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1994", "page_number": 74, "title": "RAS-1994", "content_text": "53\n\nGerman Firms and Insurance Agents\n\nNine German firms subscribed to the Ross Testimonial Fund in 1880. Mr. William Ross was the head of the Volunteer Fire Brigade and had suffered severe injuries in December 1879 in fighting a fire. Upon his release from hospital some ten months later the insurance companies of Hong Kong raised a fund for him to show their appreciation. Among the subscribers were Arnhold, Karberg and Co., agents for Lancashire Insurance Co.; Garlowitz and Co. agents for Hamburg Bremen Fire Co.; Melchers and Co. agents for North German Fire Insurance Co. and Royal Insurance Co.; Meyer and Co. agents for Prussian National Insurance Co. in Stettin; Pustau and Co. agents for Fire Insurance Co. of 1887 of Hamburg and the General Life and Fire Assurance Co.; Sander and Co., agents for Hamburg-Magdeburg Fire Insurance Co.; Scheele and Co. agent for Lubeck Fire Insurance Co.; Eduard Schellhass and Co. agents for Hanseatic Fire Insurance Co.; and Siemssen and Co. agent for Transatlantic Fire Insurance Co. (HKT 3 Oct. 1880)\n\nSteamship Lines\n\nWilliam Pustau and Co. was appointed in 1848 an agent of the Austrian Lloyd Steam Navigation Co. The route was from Trieste to Alexandria, then by land to Aden on the Red Sea where the traveller could connect with the P. and O. Line to Galle in Ceylon (FC 5 Dec. 1848). In 1886 the German Lloyd Steamship Co. opened an office in Hong Kong. In 1914 it and the Hamburg Amerika Line had Hong Kong offices.\n\nInternment of Germans in 1914\n\nWar declared between Britain and Germany on 5 August 1914. A few days later the Hong Kong Government placed enemy aliens under parole. They were restricted to certain areas and had to report to the police at stated times. This arrangement was not sufficiently tight to satisfy Major George F.H. Kelly, the Officer Commanding British Forces in Hong Kong. He saw the German residents of Hong Kong as a distinct threat to the speedy end to the war. He conveyed this opinion to the Governor of Hong Kong.\n\n\"I look upon every German, man or woman, at large in the Colony, as a potential factor for evil, and possibly for prolonging the war", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1994.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zk522640g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214738, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "117 \n\nA Review of the Literature? \n\nStrategy \n\nIn terms of the strategic and historical aspects of the Battle, the best known works from the British points of view are those of Winston Churchill (Churchill 1950), the Minister who led Britain to final victory, and Liddell Hart (Liddell Hart 1970), the strategist renowned for his theory on the use of tanks in modern warfare and \"indirect approach” (Liddell Hart 1991) as a general war strategy. There are few recent works in English that make reference to Hong Kong at this level of analysis. The common tenor of Churchill and Liddell Hart was that Hong Kong could not be defended. The former, however, held that Hong Kong should be nominally defended to deter the Japanese. In early 1941, Churchill told General Sir Hastings, his Chief of Staff: \n\n\"There is not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of augmenting the garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolic scale.... Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice.” \n\nIt was true that Churchill's Chiefs of Staff favoured reinforcing the Hong Kong garrison so that it could maintain a \"more worthy” defence or even a degree of deterrence, and Major-General A.E. Grasett, the former General Officer Commanding in Hong Kong, made a contribution to the strength of the defence by arranging for two Canadian battalions to arrive in the Colony in October 1941. Yet, under the dominant influence of Churchill's strategic concept, the Hong Kong garrison was outnumbered three to one by the Japanese when the invasion occurred. \n\nChurchill's position and decision apparently attracted universal criticism after the war. Liddell Hart thought that this was a patent mistake, which was exacerbated by Grasett's contribution, which cost many lives of the garrison. In other words, Liddell Hart considered that as Hong Kong could not be defended, it should not have been defended. In his History of the Second World War, Liddell Hart recalled what he said to General Dill in March 1935 about Hong Kong", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215948, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 247, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "181\n\nSignificantly, this party was the only escape group without a regular military officer in their midst, and to have a Chinese to organise their escape and travel with them. All three Europeans were academics, without experience of up-to-date, modern military thinking. Moreover, given the nature of colonial society, they were used to being treated with deference. It would not have occurred to them to question why the Chinese along their escape route had been so helpful, or why they were met by Europeans in this very remote area, still bandit country, where few ventured, who were not only expecting them, but 'who were quite conversant with the route back to Kowloon and were assistants to FW Kendall, another member of the same organisation whose address... was c/o Col Chauvin, British Embassy, Chung King.'\n\nLt DF Davies, formerly a Lecturer in Physics, solemnly advised that he understood 'Col LT Ride of our party was to attempt some sort of underground railroad back to the Camp...(and) if they could be persuaded and/or allowed to carry out this work, I would suggest that the Cloak and Dagger Group be approached.' Since the Cloak and Dagger Boys they met were Z Force, this was in fact one of the jobs they had long been trained for.\n\nThe trip from Hong Kong had been stressful, not least because a commanding officer had told Ride in no uncertain terms before departure that he should be court-martialled on arrival in Chongqing for deserting his troops. From Lt Davies' report, we know that the group had talked with Z Force members about their organisation. Grimsdale was later to refer to Ride blaming Kendall as a 'complete failure' for delaying his departure from Kukong, then a safe town with Chinese Army presence. Ride himself makes no mention, describing the men later as mere escapees with the Chan Chak group.\n\nWhile still in Kukong, after meeting MacEwan and Talan, the group met Col Chauvin and Dr Wan Wan Yik Shin, a doctor who had served both in the Chinese Army and in the British RAMC. It was at this stage that Ride appears to have outlined his proposals to set up an elaborate escape and evasion organisation. By the time he arrived in Chongqing a few days later, he had formulated an elaborate proposal. Operational details were sketchy, to be left to others to sort out, naming Dr Wan and General Yu Mo Han, commander of Chinese forces in the area. On one point he was unequivocally adamant: that 'the section should be under the command of Lt Col Ride.' It was an absolutely essential prerequisite that the British authorities provide him with a letter confirming his", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]