[ { "id": 205782, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 88, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "82\n\nKING MONGKUT OF SIAM AND HIS TREATY WITH BRITAIN\n\nROBERT BRUCE*\n\nWhen Sir John Bowring sailed up the river to Bangkok in March 1855 he was asked by King Mongkut not to fire a salute lest the citizens be alarmed. Sir John, Governor of Hong Kong and Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary in the Far East, reluctantly agreed to postpone the ceremonial explosion from the Rattler's guns until the anxious citizens had been given one day's warning.\n\nThe Siamese had cause for concern. The Burmese, their traditional enemies, had been conquered by the British; and a dozen years before the Bowring mission the great Chinese Empire had been defeated by the British navy. On their eastern frontier, the Siamese watched with alarm the French encroachment on Cochin-China and their own dominion of Cambodia. To the south of the Isthmus of Kra British power was spreading into the Malay States, including Kedah, a feudatory of Siam. But their fears were to prove unfounded. The Bowring mission to Bangkok was completely successful for both British and Siamese. On April 18th, 1855, a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed, an agreement which was to secure for Siam, alone in south-east Asia, independence from colonial rule and which set her on the long, painful road of modernisation.\n\nForce had been used to 'open' China. In the same year as Bowring's peaceful mission to Bangkok Commodore Perry's American warships were demanding commerce and navigation rights of the Japanese. Even after the Treaty of Nanking had\n\n* This article, entitled \"King Mongkut of Siam\", appeared in History Today for October 1968. The original text, slightly extended, is reprinted here by permission of the Editor. Mr. Bruce lectured to the Hong Kong Branch on this subject in February 1968.\n\nMr. Bruce is at present a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science at Eastern Kentucky University, U.S.A. He served eight years as Representative of the British Council in Thailand and later filled the same post in Hong Kong where he was a member of Council of the Hong Kong Branch, Royal Asiatic Society. Mr. Bruce was also one time Director of the Government School of Chinese Language at Kuala Lumpur, Malaya.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206007, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1970", "page_number": 87, "title": "RAS-1970", "content_text": "82\n\nA. D. BLUE\n\nmarine surveyor was appointed to enforce the provisions of this Act. This resulted in many of the emigrant ships leaving Hong Kong harbour with the prescribed number of passengers on board, and then picking up many more outside Green Island, on its western limits. Even the very modest space of 12 square feet (6 feet by 2 feet) was only provided in the few good ships, and in some sailing ships each coolie had only 8 square feet. Another step to remedy abuse was taken in 1869, when emigration of Chinese to places outside the British Empire was prohibited. A more important step outside China was the appointment of British officials as Protectors of Chinese in Singapore and Penang in 1877 and 1880 respectively, followed in 1901 by the appointment of similar Dutch officials in Indonesia. (It should be remembered in any comparison between British and Dutch colonial administrations, that slavery was not abolished in the Dutch East Indies until 1860). Perhaps the last major improvement was taken in 1914, when Britain abolished indentured labour throughout the British Empire, an act of altruism which destroyed the Penang sugar industry.\n\nBesides emigration to the Nanyang and to South America, the discovery of gold in California and Australia in 1849 and 1851 respectively, started Chinese emigration to both places; and the first official returns of emigrants from Hong Kong in 1854 showed 10,491 emigrants leaving for California and 4,341 for Australia. The Chinese called California ‘Kam Shan', Golden Mountains; and Australia San Kam Shan, 'New Golden Mountains', a name this country still retains among many Chinese to this day.\n\nMost of the emigration to California and Australia was voluntary, and as stated above, the greatest abuses in the emigrant trade involved South America and the West Indies, and in particular the Peruvian guano islands and Cuba. In 1856, for instance, the master of a British ship which had left Hong Kong with 332 emigrants for Cuba, reported losing 128 from suicide and disease during the voyage. The first suicide took place on the first day out, and there was an average of three per day until the ship passed through the Sunda Straits. The captain had received $70 in passage money for each man who boarded the ship in Hong Kong, and collected a further $400 for every one", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1970.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ww72j0241", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206364, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1971", "page_number": 181, "title": "RAS-1971", "content_text": "HISTORY OF MILITARY VOLUNTEERS IN H.K.\n\n165\n\nkam Lo (1893-1959) as a private.40 He was Oxford-educated and a prominent barrister, related through marriage to the Ho Tung family, and thus could fit in. He was no doubt persuaded to join because of the emergency created by the General Strike of 1925-26; that is, if he had not joined earlier. It would be interesting to know whether he was the first, or among the first, Hong Kong Chinese to join the Corps.41\n\nBecause of the empire-wide Volunteer Movement and because of or perhaps despite two World Wars, the British volunteers have often been ex-Regulars, ex-Militia or, mostly, ex-Volunteers either at home or in other places. A few examples will show this general tendency over the years. H. H. Read, who sent a letter and photograph of the 1882 Volunteers for the 1937 Year-book, mentions that he had come out from England in 1882 “and having served in the 2nd Norfolk Rifle Volunteers (Windsor Review 1881) I joined the Hong Kong Volunteer Artillery which was commanded by Col. Crawford, R. A.”.42 Sir John Carrington, Chief Justice of Hong Kong, who was Commandant of the Corps 1896-1901, had served with the British Guiana Militia before coming to Hong Kong.43 Arthur Chapman, Commandant from 1907, had come to Hong Kong in 1889 as Assessor of Rates and had served in his native Yorkshire for some years as a member of the 1st East Riding of Yorkshire Royal Garrison Artillery (Volunteers).44 Many other examples could be quoted, including His Excellency Sir Thomas Southorn, Colonial Secretary and Officer Administering the Government in 1935 who, in his address to the Corps printed in the 1935-36 Year Book, was described as \"a Volunteer in Ceylon for many years\".45\n\nIn the later period, because of two world wars, the amount of previous military experience met with in the Volunteers has been considerable, particularly in the period between the wars when there were many persons in the Colony who had seen much service in 1914-18. When the Volunteers got going in earnest\n\n40 Vol, 1954, p. 240.\n\n41 But see note 28 above.\n\n42 Y.B., 1937, p. 28.\n\n43 J. W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2 Vols, 1898): see index.\n\n44 Twentieth Century Impressions, p. 277.\n\n45 Y.B., 1935-36, p. 4.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1971.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/z029vt43g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206498, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "40\n\nLEIGH R. WRIGHT\n\ngoverns it so well and cheaply for them, they will do nothing for him or Sarawak.\n\nWhen first France and then the United States and Germany showed signs of intruding into Borneo, or when they came close to a potentially threatening position over the important British lines of empire north and south through the South China Sea, or when the Foreign and Colonial Offices in London felt the hot breath of imperial competition, it was then that the offshore colony of Labuan and a by now weak little consular treaty with Brunei were found to be inadequate to justify, in the international arena, Britain's position in Borneo. Sarawak along with North Borneo and Brunei were incorporated into the British empire as protected states. Still for many years Britain assumed no responsibility for the internal administration of Sarawak, and adamantly refused any expenditure of imperial grants for the privilege of colouring these areas pink on the imperial maps of the world.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206537, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 85, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "SIR JAMES HALDANE STEWART LOCKHART\n\n79\n\nrelationships between ruler and ruled, proper behaviour according to status. Lockhart was a scholar-administrator in the Confucian sense.\n\nThe profession of Colonial Civil Servant is coming to an end with the dissolution of the British empire. Lockhart, then, is a representative of a stage in the evolution of English society — the stage of imperial expansion that is now over and can never return. In contemporary Hong Kong the European official is not likely to be a Chinese scholar, for the system of language training that produced a Lockhart has been radically curtailed?. Yet if an official is of a scholarly turn of mind, he is now more likely to be found reading history, politics or economics. The scholar-administrator of Lockhart's type is not to be found. He has become a specialist or bureaucrat. There is no doubt that Lockhart would have been saddened by this consummation.\n\nNOTES\n\n1 Sir William des Voeux, My Colonial Service..... London, 1903, vol. 2, p. 211.\n\n2 George Watson's College was founded by George Watson, first accountant of the Bank of Scotland, who died in 1723. It became a day school in 1878. The Senior School has now about 890 boys.\n\n3 Sir Everard Duncan Home Fraser, K.C.M.G. (1859-1922). Educated at Aberdeen University. Passing a competitive examination, he was appointed a student interpreter in China in 1880, being promoted Acting Consul at Foochow in 1886. At the time of his death, Fraser was Senior Consul in Shanghai and, therefore, chairman of the Consular Body.\n\n4 In Britain the first chair of Chinese was created in 1838 at University College London. In 1846 Samuel Fearon, the Registrar General of Hong Kong, was appointed Professor of Chinese Language and Literature in King's College, London. The next incumbent of the chair at King's appears to have been James Summers, who was twenty-four at the time of his appointment in 1852. Summers had been for a few years a tutor at St. Paul's College, Hong Kong; but Hong Kong society was highly critical of the elevation to a chair of a mere stripling (see J. W. Norton-Kyshe, History of the Law and Courts of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1898, vol. i, p. 348). Summers resigned at the end of the 1872/73 session and apparently departed for China and Japan. He was succeeded by Robert Kennaway Douglas (1838-1913), who was also Senior Assistant in the Department of Printed Books in the British Museum. It was presumably Douglas who first introduced Lockhart to Chinese. (On Douglas see the short obituary in T'oung Pao, vol. xiv, 1913). For a long time the sole chair of Chinese in Britain was that at King's College until a chair was created in 1876 for Dr. James Legge at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Professor Douglas had few full-time students, only a Frenchman and a Pole; Legge had only one student and Sir Thomas Wade at Cambridge 'n'avait qu'un auditeur: il est vrai qu'il était Chinois'. (See Henri Cordier, 'Les Études Chinoises', T'oung Pao, 1898, p. 48).", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 206538, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1972", "page_number": 86, "title": "RAS-1972", "content_text": "80\n\nHENRY JAMES LETHBRIDGE\n\n8 E. T. C. Werner, Autumn Leaves: An Autobiography, Shanghai, 1928, pp. 487-8. Werner, a student interpreter, studied Chinese in Peking in 1884. With him were two Hong Kong cadets -- Henry Francis May and Thomas Sercombe Smith. May became Governor of Hong Kong and Smith Puisne Judge in the Straits Settlements.\n\n6 E. H. Parker, John Chinaman and a Few Others, London, 1903, p. 210.\n\n7 Ibid., p. 211.\n\n8 Lockhart's preface to A Manual of Chinese Quotations, 1st edition, 1893, p. iii. Lockhart also states: 'my attention was first called to the Ch'êng Yu Kao by my late teacher Mr. Ou-yang Hui.... I commenced to translate it under his guidance.'\n\n9 A report of Ho Kai's speech is given in one of a series of articles called Old Hong Kong by 'Colonial', published by the South China Morning Post (June 17, 1933-April 13, 1935). Mimeographed copy, University of Hong Kong Library,\n\n10 See, for example, T. O. Ranger, ‘African Reactions to the Imposition of Colonial Rule in East and Central Africa', in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Cambridge, England, 1969, vol. 1, pp. 293-324; Lord Hailey, An African Survey, 2nd edition, London, 1945, pp. 527-8; and also J. D. Legge, Britain in Fiji 1858-1880, London, 1958, especially his ch. ix, 'Native Authority Systems'.\n\n11 For a more detailed account of Lockhart's design see my article, \"The District Watch Committee: \"The Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong\", Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. xi, 1971, pp. 116-141.\n\n12 Hong Kong Sessional Papers (cited henceforth as Sessional Papers), no. 26 of 1896, pp. 425-427.\n\n13 T. H. Whitehead (1851-1933). See obituaries in the Times of 17 May, 1933, and in the South China Morning Post of 18 May, 1933. He was from 1883 to 1902 manager of the Hong Kong office of the Chartered Bank. Whitehead, a great imperialist, was a member of the Royal Empire Society, the Fellowship of the British Empire, and the China Association. The Times speaks of him as a typical Scot, of rugged energy and determination, and of great intellectual force.... In the domestic politics of Hong Kong Colony he took an active, not to say aggressive part.... In his retirement he was active in promoting emigration to the Empire, especially of boy scouts.\n\n14 Sessional Papers, no. 26 of 1896, p. 431.\n\n15 Ibid., p. 428.\n\n16 Ibid., p. 429.\n\n17 Most of the clerks in the Registrar General's Office were recruited from Queen's College. 'In March 1900, at the Queen's College Prize Giving, the Hon. Stewart Lockhart, C.M.G., said: \"I do not know what the Government would have done if it had not had the College to turn to when it wanted a staff at work in the New Territory, and I cannot give them any higher praise than to say they are carrying on their duties in a manner worthy of the College in which they received their education.\" See Gwenneth Stokes, Queen's College, 1862-1962, Hong Kong, 1962, p. 66.\n\n18 Norton-Kyshe, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 461.\n\n+3\n\n19 See 'Extracts from a Report from Mr. Stewart Lockhart on the Extension of the Colony of Hong Kong', Sessional Papers, no. 9 of 1899.\n\n20 Ibid., p. 198.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1972.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/gm80qf99h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207351, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 119, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "# EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS IN 19TH CENTURY\n\n111\n\nIt is exceedingly difficult to assess the cultural impact of working-class Europeans on the Chinese population; there were strong, but not completely impenetrable, barriers between the two; each despised the other, the underdog European particularly so. Although the latter usually lived in Chinese quarters of the town, spoke pidgin English or a little Cantonese, and often lived with a Chinese woman, this did not make him necessarily feel less British. He was, it can be inferred, as jingoistic as his counterpart in Liverpool or London, buoyed up at times by a sense of racial and national superiority. He did not belong to Chinese society and, it can be surmised, never wished to. He was more at ease with Portuguese and Eurasians; but his social contacts with them were often touchy, prickly, and patronising; for even the déclassé European knew he was a member of a dominant race.\n\nAt the end of the century, Taipan and pong-paân were residentially segregated. A writer concluded that ‘between those who reside at the summit (of the Peak) and those who live in the peninsula of Kowloon there is as wide a gulf as that which divided Dives and Lazarus'.39 This 'gulf' was more than an expression of traditional English class attitudes: the European working class in Hong Kong was an anomaly in a colonial setting, a curious transplant from a more settled society.\n\n## NOTES\n\n1 Sir James Cantlie, 'Hong Kong' in the British Empire Series, vol. i, 1906, p. 514.\n\n2 See, for example, 'Beachcombers and castaways' in H. E. Maude's Of Islands and Men: Studies in Pacific History, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 134-177.\n\n3 China Mail, June 8, 1888.\n\n4 J. W. Norton-Kyshe, The History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, 1898, vol. i, p. 279.\n\n5 For details about John Lee consult the Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Working of 'The Contagious Diseases Ordinance, 1867', Hong Kong, 1879.\n\n6 'Report on the Public Works Department', Hong Kong Sessional Papers 1902, p. 51.\n\n7 Lt. Col. G. J. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 1860, London, 1862, p. 3.\n\n8 John Stuart Thomson, The Chinese, London (1909), p. 30.\n\n9 George Woodcock, The British in the Far East, London, 1969, p. 21.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208547, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 4, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208581, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 38, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n11\n\nBritain of Hong Kong, and the development by Great Britain of a great port which he felt had benefited the whole world. He said that it was British territory and he saw no good reason why it should cease to be such. He went on to say that perhaps some arrangement could be made with the Chinese whereby the question of sovereignty could be adjusted but the political control and administrative responsibility remain with Great Britain. He referred to public utterances of his own to the effect that he was not Prime Minister for the purpose of being a party to a liquidation of the British Empire. He said that he had convictions on that subject and that he was perfectly willing to say so frankly to anybody.\"45\n\nIt might well have been his own weak performance in London, among other things, which prompted Hornbeck early in January 1944 to urge the Secretary of State not to repeat Woodrow Wilson's mistake in being too much of a \"gentleman\". The American government must obtain from Britain agreement and cooperation in any reasonable course of action upon which the United States might choose to insist, especially in relation to colonial matters, before the defeat of Germany when Britain still depended on the Americans for their preservation.46\n\nThe Secretary's reaction to the advice is not known. But it appears from his memoirs that he was not in favour of coercion in dealing with the Anglo-American differences, and specifically with the question of Hong Kong.47 In any case, the Department of State had become less and less consulted by the President with regard to general war and foreign policies. The War and Navy Departments and the Treasury were far more important in the President's mind. On the personal level, moreover, Hull was certainly not one of Roosevelt's trusted few. Hull himself was conscious and sensitive of the truth: that FDR was his own Secretary of State.\"48 In fact, many of Roosevelt's utterances at the major Allied conferences, beginning with the Cairo Conference late in 1943, were made without prior reference to and consultation with the Department of State. Hull resigned late in 1944, frustrated and in poor health.\n\nDespite Roosevelt's well-known anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stand and his interest in Hong Kong, his behaviour regarding the future of the British colony was generally characterized by weakness and the lack of persistent and direct pressure on Britain. At the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208583, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 40, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n13\n\nTaking advantage of the changed American sentiments regarding China and the allied victory in Europe, Britain began an active propaganda programme to influence American public opinion concerning Britain's imperial and colonial attitudes and policies and the British Empire's contribution to the allied war effort. The British Information Services, an agency of the British government in New York, published numerous booklets for the purpose.$7\n\nHong Kong naturally figured prominently in these publications. In the booklet entitled \"Britain and Japan\", for instance, it is thus stated: \"When the Island of Hong Kong was ceded to Britain one hundred years ago, it was almost uninhabited. Since then Britain has built on that island the beautiful city of Victoria. By 1941 Hong Kong had a population of 1,650,000, mostly Chinese; it was a trading center and a port for commercial shipping which had enriched the communities all around it. Students from China came to the University of Hong Kong to get degrees in Medicine, Engineering, Science and Arts, which were recognized in Britain as fully reaching British standards. During the long troubles of China, the island of Hong Kong, and the city of Victoria, became a refuge for hundreds of thousands of distressed Chinese.\" The message was clear: if the British colony of Hong Kong had been beneficial to Britain, it also had been as much so, if not more, to China.\n\nMeanwhile, events were leading to the last stages of the Pacific War. In September 1944 the Americans and the British reached a clear understanding which laid down the general principle that in the British Far Eastern territories which were in the American command, the policies to be followed on the liberation of those territories should be laid down by the British government and accepted by the American force commander.58 Late in February 1945 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, instituted in December the previous year for the purpose of coordinating the Department of State and the War and Navy Departments, directed that its Subcommittee for the Far East maintain, as a general guide for its activities, a master list of Pacific-Far Eastern problems, arranged in appropriate order of priority. Also, before initiating action on any one of such problems the subcommittee should submit in each case to the main committee a detailed recommendation showing “(1) a statement of the problem (2) the agency or agencies to be charged with initiation of the basic documents involved, and (3) the method of processing and coordination thereof, including", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208991, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1980", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1980", "content_text": "SOCIAL & CULTURAL HERITAGE IN N.T.\n\n121\n\nfew places in the world where genuine social enquiry is nearly completely free and, second, that, exactly as Dr. Wang Sung-hsing has just told us, the traditional ways of South Chinese rural life have been retained longer here than elsewhere. A simple example about marriage customs will show you what this can mean: In 1950, when I arrived here first, all rural weddings included the bride being carried to her husband's home in a red sedan chair (fa k’iu ##). I well remember the astonishment of a Mainland Chinese anthropologist friend when he saw this \"relic\" of what to him was an ancient, extinct custom of the remote past that he had never seen in his life before, and he had travelled almost all over China.\n\nAn interesting paper could be written about the paradox that the preservation of the traditional has been a direct result of colonialism. It happened in rather similar ways almost everywhere in the rural parts of the British colonial empire (and most parts were rural) but there is no time to discuss it this evening. Suffice it to say here that, contrary to popular opinion today, it was not usually the intention of the British colonial administrators (District Officers and the like) to impose alien ways and force change but to leave well alone (as long as in their eyes it was well) and interfere as little as possible. (The well-known book Myself a Mandarin by Austin Coates, once a District Officer in the New Territories, is a fairly representative account of common grass-roots administrative attitudes.) The result was that at least up to the time of the Second World War British colonialism almost everywhere tended to act in one sense rather like a refrigerator, \"freezing\" the local social and cultural systems at more or less the stage they had been when the British first arrived, and to a surprisingly large extent inhibiting changes that might otherwise have happened.\n\nThat something like this was certainly the case in the New Territories is obvious. Here, though rice is no longer grown, largely traditional villages can still be found, lineage and clan organisation still exists, formal ancestor worship in ancestral halls (ch'i t'ong: **) is still observed, and people still have a strong sense of local as well as cultural identification which is expressed in temple festivals, with Cantonese opera performances and fa p’aau (JE#) and kam chue (✯*), as well as in the continuance of old local rivalries in new political and administrative forms. Here, too, we can still talk with old people who remember the still recent more", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1980.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/kh04md207", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209214, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1981", "page_number": 117, "title": "RAS-1981", "content_text": "THE CHINESE CHURCH, LABOUR AND ELITES AND THE MUI TSAI QUESTION IN THE 1920's 103\n\nto England had continued the campaign to bring the Hong Kong situation to the attention of the British public. The Haselwoods and other interested people had enlisted the support of the Anti-Slavery and the Aborigine Protection Society, the Industrial Committee of the National Council of Women of Great Britain and Ireland, the Women's Committee of the Fabian Society, the International Woman Suffrage Alliance, the League of Nations Union, as well as Members of Parliament.\n\nIn Hong Kong a team of volunteer lecturers had spoken in churches, schools, the YMCA, the YWCA, and labour unions. One of the members had paid for the services of a professional lecturer to address passengers on boats travelling between Hong Kong and Canton.\n\nLiterature was produced both in English and Chinese. All the Parliamentary questions and answers were translated and sent to the Chinese press, along with original articles and correspondence with Members of Parliament, philanthropists and societies abroad. Locally, a literary competition had been held. The winning entry, a ballad, had been published and distributed both in Hong Kong and throughout China. The cost was underwritten by two wealthy contractors, Mr. Li Ping (probably a Roman Catholic) and Mr. Lam Woo (1869–1932) a founding member of St. Paul's Anglican Church and an Executive Committee member of the Society. A magazine of some 400 pages published by the Society contained articles treating the question in various literary forms.\n\nAt the time of the meeting 1,370 members had enrolled in the Society.\n\nOn instructions from the Colonial Office the Governor of Hong Kong issued a proclamation on April 14, 1922 stating:\n\nSlavery is not allowed to exist in the British Empire, and therefore it must be understood that mui tsai are not the property of their employers. Those of them who wish to leave their employers and who have reached the age of discretion must be allowed to apply to the Secretary for Chinese Affairs who will consider their cases.\n\nGirls are warned that they must not leave their present employment until they have some employment to go to for fear they should fall into the hands of procuresses.\n\nMasters and mistresses are specially warned against any attempt", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1981.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ff36bt18m", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211011, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 73, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "48\n\n6\n\neral trends. More recent work, such as Clive Whitehead's, also critical of the generalisations of Carnoy, is based on an examination of the processes of policy-making, largely at the macro-level.' Whitehead seeks to use a fascinating combination of official archives and personal papers to suggest that there was no consistent and overriding policy of cultural imperialism in or for the British Colonial Empire between the two World Wars. Yet in the final analysis, Whitehead's conclusion, as convincing as it appears, is also the result of a quest for an overview.\n\nThe problem with overviews is that too much may be left out of sharp focus. The problem with a priori reasoning, based upon stipulated conceptual premises is that it may distort, in a Procrustean manner, the local reality. This article demonstrates an alternative to the macro, deductive approach in the belief that, on occasions, such an approach tends to tailor the facts to suit the concepts. This article adopts, instead, the inductive and discursive mode of an historian towards an aspect of formal and informal education in Hong Kong which has extraordinary importance and considerable emotive content — language learning. It examines neither the officially pronounced policy intentions of the Government nor the polemics of pressure groups, but a simple book and its author. This strategy is adopted on the grounds that an attempt to understand an author and his book may provide a small collection of interesting \"snapshots\" from the social history of education in Hong Kong, and that snapshots can be as valid and worthwhile a form of delineation as overviews. This opinion (or view) is advanced largely on pragmatic grounds and in the personal belief that much information can be gathered from an examination of snapshots, though Structuralist arguments in favour of synchronic analyses could also be enlisted. Neither type of argument dismisses the value of overviews completely. Both arguments depend to some extent on the existence of a series of snapshots, which can be argued to be representative. Assuming at least two, it may be possible to use the synchronic analyses for \"before/after\" or other illuminating contrasts.\"\n\nThe snapshots about to be displayed may be examined for the evidence they offer about social structures and relationships in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211177, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 238, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "213\n\na hall for a Chinese Chamber of Commerce which was eventually opened by Ho A-mei in 1896.\n\nTHE JUBILEE SQUABBLING GOES ON AND ON . . .\n\nHongkong got itself into a muddle attempting to decide on a permanent memorial to mark the celebration of Queen Victoria's golden jubilee year.\n\nA public meeting was held at the City Hall on March 2, 1887, to formulate plans for the celebration. At the meeting it was decided to create a park in the Wongneichong valley to be named after the Queen. Both before and after the meeting many objections were raised to the scheme, which was eventually abandoned.\n\nAt the meeting, the chairman, Sir George Phillippo, in his introductory remarks mentioned a number of proposals that had already been put before the public.\n\nHe referred to an institution to be located in London to display and promote the products of the Empire. A year or so before the Indian and Colonial Exposition had been held. The various possessions of Great Britain had sent examples of their natural resources and products to it.\n\nIt was such a success that plans were put forward for something more permanent. The jubilee seemed an appropriate time to promote such an undertaking.\n\nAt the time, the British people were basking in the extent and importance of their empire. Its many colonies and dominions were rich in raw materials to feed the industries of the United Kingdom.\n\nThe multitude of people of different races under its rule were regarded as an inexhaustible market for the manufactures of the home country.\n\nIn recognition of the financial importance of Britain's possessions the plan for an Imperial Institute in London was launched.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211624, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 39, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "14\n\n48\n\nto have been a more junior soldier such as a drill or colour havildar who would have been ordered to hoist the flag. At the moment it is not possible therefore to say whether Mohammed Arab hoisted the Union Jack on Hong Kong or not, but what is undeniable is that by his death in 1878 Hong Kong had prospered and grown in importance to such an extent that he and the wider community in the colony considered that whoever had hoisted the flag that day had done something of interest to posterity. If it had been Mohammed Arab, it would have been a foretaste of the multiracial legacies that colonialism would leave to the island.\n\n49\n\n50\n\nThe other candidate for the honour of hoisting the flag is a far more conventional one. In his guide to Hong Kong of 1893, William Legge wrote: 'In January [1841] . . . the British Ensign was hoisted on Possession Point . . . by midshipman Dowell (now Admiral Sir William Dowell KCB)'. William Montagu Dowell was born on 2 August 1825 and was made a lieutenant in the Royal Navy in 1847, rising to be vice-admiral in 1880 and admiral in 1885. In January 1841 he would have been fifteen, so it is possible that he could have been a midshipman at that date and could have been among the group landing on Hong Kong to hoist the flag. More important than whether Dowell raised the flag or not is the fact that the author wished to associate a famous person with the act. William Dowell had been involved in the Second China War of 1857, he was at Shimoneseki in Japan in 1864 and he returned to the Far East as commander-in-chief of the navy in China between January 1884 and September 1885; his naval career had also included spells at the Cape of Good Hope, on the West coast of Africa and on the Egyptian expedition of 1882. By claiming an admiral and a knight as the perpetrator of the deed, the author may have been expressing a desire that Hong Kong's rise in importance should be seen to be mirroring that of Dowell.\n\n51\n\n52\n\nIt is extraordinary that historians have paid so little attention to the acquisition of Hong Kong and that so little effort has been expended in trying to establish the manner in which Hong Kong came to be possessed by the British, and contemporary reactions to that possession. Such omissions might perhaps have been more understandable had Hong Kong at this stage only been thought of as a temporary possession. But by the 1870s it was clear that Hong Kong had become a permanent and financially successful part of the Empire, and certainly by the twentieth century it could have been expected that there would have been considerable interest in constructing a colonial history. That such a history", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212211, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 153, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "130\n\nto commercial goods, as it moved under the Japanese shadow. Under her conception of “incident” Japan had methods of applying pressure to foreign shipping companies, a pressure which in the existing atmosphere of appeasement it was difficult to resist.\n\nFollowing on the occupation of Canton, the Japanese mopped back towards Hongkong, but they left only a small garrison to watch the border. A heavy smuggled trade sprang up, not only over the border, but also by junk through the countless small inlets and bays of the neighbourhood. The Japanese exerted themselves to coerce the Colonial Government to suppress the trade. Their efforts met with failure: until Hongkong was itself submerged in a wider conflict, the Chinese war effort continued to benefit.\n\nHongkong is one of the world's great ports, the offspring of British administrative practice and Chinese commercial fecundity. Every year twenty-two million tons of shipping were entered and cleared. In the harbour the flags of many nations could be seen, from those of the great Western Powers to that of the little republic of Panama. The flags of the Scandinavian nations, of Norway and Denmark, were particularly in evidence, so far from home, witness to the freedom of the seas for which Britain stood sponsor. The volume of trade which passed through Hongkong was naturally restricted by the Japanese occupation of Canton. Cargo vessels called less frequently, but the great liners on fixed passenger schedules continued to go alongside the Kowloon wharves, often two or three at a time, ships of the American President line, the Canadian Pacific line, the Peninsular and Oriental, the Nord Deutscher Lloyd, the Nippon Yoshen Kaisha, the Dutch J.C.L., the Lloyd Trestino, the Blue Funnel, the City, the Messageries Maritimes and many other lines.\n\nI was due for home leave and sailed in the new P.& O. liner, the R.M.S. \"Canton\", on her maiden trip, in December 1938. The passengers lined the rails as we steamed towards the Lyeemoon passage. Did they realise what a remarkable monument to Sino-British co-operation was that lovely green hill side at which they gazed? Hongkong bears happy testimony, in a difficult future, to the benefits that flow from cordial relations between China and the British Empire.\n\nShanghai and Eastern China 1939\n\nShanghai was the splendid stronghold of foreign interests in the Far", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212332, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 274, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "251\n\nbeing until this century. In the last decade of the 20th century, however, it provides three-quarters of the electricity consumed in Hong Kong. Not long after the Company placed what was reported to be the largest ever single order with British industry, in 1980, six members of the board were made Commanders of the British Empire. There have also been two Knighthoods in the Kadoorie family.\n\nTransport\n\nMotor transport was mainly introduced into Hong Kong in the present century, and, by 1909, the Colony boasted five private cars. Steam power was, however, used at sea before it was employed on land, and by 1876 there were nine steam launches operating in the harbour, and the first regular cross-harbour ferry, employing steam launches, commenced in 1880. In 1898, the Star Ferry was incorporated and took over from Dorabjee Nowrojee the previous ferry owner.\n\nBritish firms were, nonetheless, involved with transport, and a proposal was made by Jardine's, in 1881, for a system of trams on Hong Kong Island. The same year another proposal was made for a tramway to Victoria Gap, and in 1885 the original promoters sold their rights to Phineas Ryrie and Alexander Findlay Smith (Findlay Path on the Peak is named after him) for $2,000. The latter, a merchant who arrived in Hong Kong in the 1860s and who had been an employee of Scotland's Highland Railway, was the driving force. In 1881, it was he who requested approval from Sir John Pope-Hennessy, for this innovative scheme.\n\nAccording to Mrs Maud Grant-Smith, the Governor told her late husband's uncle, Findlay Smith:\n\n\"My dear chap, you are simply throwing your money down the drain. Do you imagine anyone wants to go to the top of the Peak?\"\n\nBecause His Excellency would not help, Smith brought his own engineers from Scotland. As early as the 1840s Doctor William Morrison, the Colonial Surgeon (1847 to 1859), recommended spending the summer on the Peak. He also suggested a sanatorium be built there to alleviate the effects of heat and humidity. This was constructed but by 1868 it had fallen into disrepair, and had been rebuilt as", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212395, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 337, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "314\n\nBOOK REVIEWS\n\nPeter Hopkirk, The Great Game, On Secret Service in High Asia. (Oxford University Press 1991) 524 pp. illus., index.\n\nWhere Britain and other Western powers extended their colonial influence by the sea-routes, Russia's empire was achieved overland, first into Siberia and then east and southeast into Central Asia. Inevitably this brought Russian armies and officials nearer the frontier with British India, causing alarm in London; and throughout the nineteenth century a continuing system of intelligence-seeking and diplomatic nursing of local chiefs occupied some of the brightest and most adventurous of Russian and British officers and agents.\n\nThis was the Great Game of Hopkirk's title, a phrase popularised by Kipling but first coined by young Lt. Connolly of the 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry fifty years earlier. It was certainly not a game for the soft-hearted, the difficulty being that any Briton found making maps or gathering information in the wild kingdoms north of the Himalayas was suspected of plotting a British invasion and would certainly risk death.\n\nThe story begins after the defeat of Napoleon when the Russians were strong and confident and felt that Central Asia was their rightful sphere. Russian troops fought their way southwards through the Caucasus, then inhabited by fierce Muslim and Christian tribesmen, towards northern Persia. Then the pressure switched eastwards, and by the middle of the century, as one after another of the cities and khanates of the former Silk Road fell to Russian arms, it looked part of a grand design to bring the whole of Central Asia under Russian control. Once that was achieved, strategists in London feared, the final advance would be on India.\n\nAs the gap between the two frontiers gradually narrowed, the Great Game intensified. Despite the dangers, there was no lack of young officers ready to risk their lives, filling in the blanks on the map, reporting on Russian movements. One of the earliest in the field, in 1810, was young Lt. Henry Pottinger, who would become Hong Kong's first Governor thirty-odd years later. He was bright, brave and self-confident. And there were just as courageous operators on the Russian side.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213969, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 38, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "Africa and South-east Asia to be suspicious of the pretensions of local leaders whose personal interests were not always easily identifiable with those of the common man—or, in their new surroundings, the worker in the plastics factory and his family. They had been conditioned by British policy and practice elsewhere to accept a goal of parliamentary democracy and self-determination as the norm; and while admitting that Hong Kong was, in the other cant phrase, “unique,” they saw no reason for it to be utterly different in ethos.\n\nSomeone who appreciated the subtle differences within colonies and between their officials was the last Colonial Service Governor, Sir David Clive Crosbie Trench GCMG MC. Trench had started his service in the Western Pacific, where as a District Officer in the Solomon Islands he had been a wartime \"coastwatcher\" in the mountains, reporting on Japanese activity, and had earned a military decoration during the Allies' reoccupation. He was one of the few Administrative Officers to benefit from the old Colonial Office's unspoken \"seven year rule.\" Under this, those who had spent that length of time in the supposedly enervating climate and mores of the Pacific should be sent to more politically and mentally bracing parts of the empire, the better to come back refreshed when more senior (determined Resident Commissioners in the Western Pacific, who thought seven years only just enough to train their juniors in the proper ways, usually managed to circumvent this best-laid plan.) Trench came to Hong Kong after the war, where he acquired a strong and popular reputation, notably in the Labour Department, as reorganiser of the Fire Brigade and as Deputy Colonial Secretary (DCS). It was no surprise when he went back to the Western Pacific as High Commissioner; there he presided over the creation for the egalitarian Melanesian society in the Solomon Islands of a novel democratic form of government based, via a constitution already adapted for Ceylon, on the pre-war London County Council, with committees instead of ministers (some of whose chairmen, however, inevitably assumed ministerial pretensions.) After three years, he returned to Hong Kong as Governor in 1964.\n\nBefore he had left, Trench had naturally always shown greater sympathy with and understanding of the \"interlopers,\" as the aforesaid subset was vulgarly known, than did some of his senior colleagues. Although relations with a governor were inevitably more remote than those with a senior secretariat officer had been, he contrived not to be", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214384, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 242, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "208\n\nnior Inspector of Nuisances' and the 'Instructions to Head Watchmen and Watchmen' are of importance in this current study and, since the duties of the Watchmen contained in these instructions are so different from those originally envisaged by the creators of the District Watch scheme, their relevant parts are reproduced at the end of this paper.\n\nBefore continuing with a discussion of the District Watchmen's role in sanitary inspections, some explanation of the word 'nuisance' is appropriate. In the context of Victorian Britain, the term 'nuisance' implied something much more than the modern milder meaning of 'pest' or 'irritant.' 'Nuisance' was a general term to describe anything noxious which would offend the senses, whether these were sight, sound, smell or touch. Brenda Yeoh, in her study of colonial Singapore, describes it as 'an elastic term which encompassed many possibilities from filthy premises to undesirable animals.' She further mentions the comprehensive list of nuisances in The Acts and Ordinances of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements from 1st April 1867 to 1st June 1886 compiled by Mr C.G. Garrad which extended over two pages. Given the graver meaning of the term in the nineteenth century, it can be seen that the post of Inspector of Nuisances was much more important than might be regarded today from its title. Inspectors of Nuisances were found throughout the British Empire and also in the Treaty Port of Shanghai.\n\n14\n\nReturning to the removal of the District Watchmen to undertake sanitary duties, what we have here is the appropriation by the Hong Kong Government of the whole of an existing viable private security force to be used by the Government for a completely different function. Moreover, this change would incur the Government in only minimal additional expense since the bulk of the watchmen's wages would still be met by the Chinese merchants. There can be no doubt that the plan was put into operation since, in the Blue Books for 1883-85, a total of six Head District Watchmen and thirty-seven District Watchmen appeared under the heading of Sanitary (a sub-heading under Public Works Department) at an annual cost to the Government of $24 for each Head District Watchman and $12 for each District Watchman. During these three years the Chinese merchants continued to provide these men with an annual wage of $180, in the case of a Head District Watchmen, and $72 per annum for each District Watchman. The following year there appears to have been a change in policy because, in the 1886 Blue", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214956, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 52, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "7\n\nwas still the way of the strong. Since ancient times successive empires have risen and fallen. China, too, had an imperialist past, when the Han Empire (206BC-221AD) extended its rule from Burma in the south to Korea in the north. Britain was the last to enter the stage, after the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Dutch, forging perhaps the largest empire since the Roman Empire 2,000 years before. In the spirit of the new age, Britain professed an obligation to assist the indigenous colonial peoples in economic development and prepare them afterwards for self-government within the framework of the British Empire. This was the foundation of the 'Imperialism' which dominated her colonial policy in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This mission was sometimes regarded as at best illusory and at worst hypocritical. However, there is little doubt that the spirit of commercial enterprise was the leading motive of the British colonial policy, and it was the British pursuit of trade in the East, which brought China and Britain into confrontation. Predictably, this encounter of two nations, both proud and arrogant, proved disastrous.\n\nBritish attempt to establish contact with China began early. A Captain Weddell approached Canton in 1637, was refused entry but forced a passage through the Humen Forts (Bogue Forts). After a skirmish with the Chinese war junks, in which it was claimed Weddell had the upper hand, he was finally forced to withdraw. It was an ominous start to what Britain hoped would be a peaceful penetration. No further attempts were made for some 150 years, though in the meantime the English East India Company had managed to secure, in 1664, a trading base in Macao, and, by the turn of the century, in Guangzhou. Slowly, and in spite of many difficulties, foreign trade with China had assumed a regular character by the early 18th century. The main difficulty has already been mentioned: while British traders were eager to trade and in particular secure a steady supply of much needed tea from China, the latter desired no trading intercourse with the West. Emperor Qianlong's oft-quoted announcement stated: \"The Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders, there is therefore no need to import manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our products.' The Emperor spoke for himself and his government but hardly for the common man, to whom trading and material profits mattered. While requiring little from the West, Chinese were eager to sell tea - a ‘wholesome beverage' prepared almost exclusively for the British people. The question has been often", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215276, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 53, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "# ARTICLES\n\n## INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLONIAL EMPIRE AND THE IMPERIAL ECONOMIC CONFERENCE AT OTTAWA 1932\n\n### NORMAN MINERS\n\nIt is generally agreed that the development of manufacturing industry in the colonial empire was very limited. A recent study of colonial development describes progress before independence as derisory.1 Joseph Chamberlain spoke of the colonies as a great underdeveloped estate that must be developed with imperial assistance for the sake of the local population and also for the benefit of the whole world. Similar sentiments were expressed by Lord Lugard, Lord Milner, Leopold Amery and many others. But development was seen primarily as the expanded production of foodstuffs, raw materials and minerals. Colonial governments encouraged the production of cash crops for export and built the roads, railways and harbours to transport produce to markets overseas, but they were unwilling to spend their limited tax revenues to assist the establishment of local industries.\n\nThe attitude of the British government was that the colonies were essentially agricultural and producers of primary commodities in a complementary partnership with the industrialised nations, chiefly the United Kingdom. The artificial encouragement of manufacturing was contrary to the prevailing ideology of free trade and the belief that the state should not intervene to distort the free play of economic forces. Expatriate trading firms were interested in the profits to be made from exports and imports rather than the processing of primary products or manufacturing for the local market. Indigenous businessmen were few and faced formidable obstacles such as the small size of the local market, unskilled and untrained labour, lack of access to long-term credit from foreign banks and competition from established imports from the metropolis.\n\nIt is said that the industrial development of the colonies was deliberately restrained by the British government, which was unduly deferential to commercial interests who objected to local manufacture displacing exports from Britain. It has also been claimed that colonial governors were reluctant to put forward schemes for industrial development because they believed they should act as trustees for the native peoples and avoid the disruption of traditional society by the social effects of industrialisation.3\n\nThe Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.30, No.2, May 2002, pp.53-76\n\nPUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215277, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 54, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "2\n\nThere is one exception to these generalisations, a deviant case which has never been analysed by the economists who deplore the underdevelopment of the colonial empire. The amazing economic growth of Hong Kong since its liberation from the Japanese occupation in 1945 is well known, but it is widely assumed that before the war the Hong Kong economy was almost entirely based upon the entrepôt trade transporting goods to and from China and that its transformation from a trading mart to a manufacturing centre began with the post-war arrival of industrialists from Shanghai fleeing from the chaos of China's civil war. In fact, the development of industry had begun in the nineteenth century and by 1939 Hong Kong had built up a flourishing export trade in manufactured goods to China and neighbouring Asian countries and was even successfully competing with British firms in a few items in the British home market.\n\nThe growth of Hong Kong industry was accelerated in the 1930s by decisions taken at the Imperial Economic Conference which met at Ottawa in August 1932. The conference was called to find ways of combating the worldwide economic depression by stimulating trade between the countries of the empire after the British government had decided to abandon its long-standing commitment to free trade and to impose a ten per cent tariff on foreign imports. The conference was mainly occupied with bargaining between Britain and the dominions over the terms on which agricultural products from the dominions would enter the British market and the access of British manufactured goods to the dominions.\n\nThe ministers meeting at Ottawa also decided to impose stringent restrictions by tariffs and specific duties on imports of textiles and other goods from Japan which were beginning to penetrate empire markets, displacing British and Canadian manufactures. Chinese businessmen in Hong Kong took advantage of this attempt to exclude Japanese goods from dominion and colonial markets to export large quantities of cheap footwear and textiles to the empire. This provoked indignant complaints from industrialists in Britain and Canada who demanded that restrictions should be placed on the supercompetitive Hong Kong manufactures.\n\nHong Kong's successful penetration of empire markets forced the British government for the first time to consider what its policy should be towards the industrial development of the colonial empire. Two interdepartmental committees of civil servants were set up in 1933 and 1937, but no authoritative decision was reached by the cabinet before the outbreak of war in 1939. Officials at the Colonial Office defended the right of the colonies to diversify their economies by moving into manufacturing, but the Board of Trade and the Treasury were generally unenthusiastic about such schemes where they might result in a reduction of British exports.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215278, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 55, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "3\n\nBefore 1932 a number of small factories had been established in the colonies. Cotton ginning factories, sugar cane crushing mills, fibre decorticating plants, tobacco grading and packing factories, saw mills and tin smelters had been constructed to reduce the bulk of primary products and make them more convenient for export. Other industries were started for the purpose of import substitution. In almost all the sugar producing colonies sugar refineries had been set up. Edible oil, lard and soap factories were established using local produce in Nigeria, Ceylon, Nyasaland, Trinidad, Jamaica, British Guiana, British Honduras and Fiji. Breweries had been established in the Gold Coast, Kenya, Cyprus, Malta, Jamaica and the Straits Settlements; match factories in British Guiana, Jamaica and Trinidad; a canned pineapple factory in Malaya. This is by no means an exhaustive list of industrial enterprises in the colonial empire in 1932. All these factories had been set up to serve the local market and had taken advantage of tariffs which had originally been imposed by colonial governments for revenue purposes. In some cases this level of protection was sufficient to make the factory viable. In other cases the company contemplating investment asked the governor for the tariff to be increased so as to exclude competitive imports or asked for a guarantee that no excise duty would be imposed or that any excise duty would be levied at a reduced rate.\n\nColonial governors showed no reluctance to grant these concessions in order to encourage the establishment of local industries in spite of the loss of customs revenue and the increased prices paid by the consumer for goods previously imported. Often governors neglected to seek specific permission from the Colonial Office to make such changes to the schedules of their customs ordinances. In a number of cases the Colonial Office heard of the new protective duties only when British manufacturers complained that they were being excluded from the colonial market. When an industrial project was referred to London governors used various arguments to support the protection of infant industries in their colonies: that the proposal was a legitimate development of local resources; that it would relieve unemployment; that a pledge of protection had already been given by government to the promoters; or that the proposals had the support of the unofficial members of the executive and legislative councils.\n\nNormally the Colonial Office did not refuse to sanction the grant of assistance to the new local enterprise. For example, in 1927 the legislative council of Jamaica passed an ordinance to increase the tariff on biscuits, soap, edible oils, cordage and matches and to remove the excise duty on soap, edible oils and matches in order to protect local industries. The Colonial Office sanctioned this ordinance without any adverse comment. Once an ordinance had been passed by a colony's legislature and had received the governor's assent it", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215281, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 58, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "6\n\nStraits Settlements, but not to Hong Kong. The governor protested to the Colonial Office at Hong Kong's exclusion in 1907, 1910 and 1912 but the Canadian government refused to include Hong Kong within its preferential tariff on the grounds that goods from China might be shipped through Hong Kong's open port and fraudulently obtain the benefit of Canada's preferential tariff.\" So Hong Kong's exports of cement and refined sugar were taxed at the highest rate and soon lost their market in Canada. In 1912 a trade agreement was negotiated between Canada and the West Indian colonies whereby Canadian exports were granted preferential tariffs in return for Canadian preferences on Caribbean cane sugar, cocoa beans and lime juice. The West Indian colonies negotiated this trade agreement directly with Canada and the secretary of state for the colonies raised no objection. These preferences were increased by a new trade agreement in 1920 and were generalised to benefit goods from all empire sources.20 The Colonial Office invited all colonies and protectorates to consider the practicability of introducing preferential rates of duty for goods of imperial origin. But most of the colonial empire was prevented by international treaties from imposing discriminatory tariffs. Northern Rhodesia, Kenya and Uganda, being part of the Congo Basin, were forbidden to discriminate by the Convention of St. Germain (1919); Nigeria and the Gold Coast by the Anglo-French treaty of 1898; and Tanganyika, Togoland, Cameroons and Palestine were mandated territories of the League of Nations which prohibited discrimination. By 1932 the only colonies which were free to adopt imperial preference but had not done so were Somaliland, Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, Hong Kong and certain islands in the Pacific.\" Canada and New Zealand were the only dominions which granted any preferences to the colonial empire before 1932. Australia, South Africa, Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and India granted none.\n\nThe world trade depression which began in 1929 convinced British politicians that the liberal principles of free trade which had been followed for the past 70 years must be abandoned. The National government elected in 1931 quickly passed the Import Duties Act which imposed a general duty of 10 per cent ad valorem on all imports. Section 5 of the act granted an entire exemption from the general duty to imports from all colonies, protectorates and mandated territories, provided that at least 25 per cent of the value was derived from materials grown or produced or from work done within a part of the empire.\" Imports from the dominions and India were exempted from duty only until November pending the outcome of an Imperial Economic Conference.\" A circular despatch was sent by the Colonial Office to all colonies and protectorates drawing attention to the great advantages extended to the colonies by the Import Duties Act and inviting them to give similar preferences to United Kingdom manufactures", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215282, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 59, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "where the territory was not debarred from doing so by treaty. In preparation for the negotiations at Ottawa the colonies were also asked to consider what preferences might be accorded them by the dominions and what preferences they might give to the dominions in return on the lines of the Canada-West Indies agreement.”\n\n34\n\nThe governor, Sir William Peel, discussed Hong Kong's position while visiting the Colonial Office in June 1932. Officials agreed with him that Hong Kong's status as a free port made it impossible to impose anything like a general tariff. Any such tariff would ruin the entrepôt trade which was vital to Hong Kong's existence and no practicable means could be devised of landing goods in bond for re-export without involving so much inconvenience as to drive the entrepôt trade to other neighbouring ports. Peel was prepared as a gesture to give a preference to empire products on articles such as spirits and tobacco which were subject to excise duty and to impose a higher rate of first registration tax on foreign motor cars than on cars imported from Britain and Canada. He did not ask for any preference from the dominions in return since in his view the bulk of Hong Kong exports consists of foreign goods the proportion of the cost of which, due to treatment in Hong Kong, was not large enough to secure a preference...” This showed a surprising ignorance of Hong Kong's growing trade in domestic manufactures which were largely exported to neighbouring Asian countries.\n\nThe Ottawa conference convened in July 1932. The British delegation was led by Stanley Baldwin, the former prime minister, and four other cabinet ministers. Canada, Southern Rhodesia and Newfoundland were represented by their prime ministers; Australia and New Zealand by former prime ministers; South Africa and the Irish Free State by their finance and trade ministers. India, which had been given the freedom to establish protective duties in 1923, was represented by Sir Atul Chatterjee and other members of the Viceroy's Council. The interests of the colonial empire were safeguarded by the secretary of state for the colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and one civil servant from the Colonial Office, G.L.M. Clauson.\n\nThe conclusions of the conference were embodied in agreements between the United Kingdom government and the governments of the dominions and India. Britain consented to continue the free entry of goods grown, produced or manufactured in any part of the empire, and to impose additional duties on specified foreign goods which would give empire produce a preferential margin higher than the 10 per cent tariff already imposed by the Import Duties Act. Britain also agreed to 'invite' the non-self-governing colonies and protectorates to extend to all the dominions any preference at present extended to any part of the empire, and to increase the margin of preference or impose specific duties on a long list of items requested by the dominions. In return the dominions confirmed the existing", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215283, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 60, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "preferences granted to British goods, to increase the margin of preference on a few specific items and to review the level of existing tariffs which protected dominion manufactures against British goods. The dominions approved tariff preferences on specified colonial goods, mostly tropical agricultural products, asphalt, rum and cigars. Each dominion offered a different list of concessions to the colonies and not all were equally generous. South Africa granted preferences only on raw coffee and asphalt. Canada gave little more than the preferences already embodied in the 1920 trade agreement with the West Indian colonies.\" New Zealand was the only dominion which agreed to grant preferences at the same rates as were accorded to Britain to all the colonies and protectorates. The agreements with the dominions provided that the preferences accorded to British goods might be extended to the colonies, protectorates and mandated territories ‘if His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom so request'. All these preferences were for British manufactured goods. The development of manufacturing industry in the colonies was not anticipated by the governments represented at Ottawa. If it had been foreseen it is probable that the dominion governments would have raised strong objections to admitting goods manufactured under oriental conditions to their markets under a tariff designed to benefit British manufacturers.28\n\nAfter the Ottawa conference a circular despatch was sent to all colonies and dependent territories setting out the tariff preferences which would be granted by the dominions to colonial exports of foodstuffs and raw materials.\" These preferences would give the dependencies a reasonable prospect of replacing foreign imports by imports from empire sources in the dominion markets concerned. In return the dependent territories were 'invited' to grant to the dominions the preferences which the colonial secretary had negotiated at Ottawa. Cunliffe-Lister made clear that it was a matter of the highest importance that the Ottawa settlement should be put into effect as an integral whole.\n\nI should feel that I had been guilty of a breach of faith if the legislature concerned refused to grant the preference in question, unless I could put to the dominion government concerned clear evidence that there were really substantial reasons for not granting the proposed preference. It would not be an adequate ground of objection to say that the desired preference might increase the local cost of living, so long as the increase was only moderate and did not cause hardship to a particularly poor class of the community.\n\nGovernors prepared the necessary legislation for introduction into the colonial legislatures, but a number warned the Colonial Office that they\n\nPage 60\n\nPage 61", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215285, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 62, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "Singapore were being exported to the West Indian colonies. In November 1932 a Canadian manufacturer of rubber shoes complained to the Canadian minister of trade and commerce that in the last two months 15,000 pairs of rubber shoes had been imported into Barbados from Singapore at prices far below that of shoes produced in Canada. The Canadian minister wrote directly to Cunliffe-Lister asking for his help. He expressed the fear that unless something was done additional factories would be erected in Singapore and Hong Kong to take advantage of the new tariff and cheap Asiatic labour. The colonial secretary replied that it would be impossible to introduce in any colony legislation discriminating against goods produced in another colony; this would cut across the principle of solidarity between various parts of the empire which had been accepted at Ottawa and would inevitably cause a serious revulsion of feeling in these colonies.35\n\nExports of rubber boots and shoes to the West Indian colonies continued to increase at an alarming rate throughout 1933. They even penetrated the Canadian home market. Factories in Hong Kong which had previously exported their boots and shoes to China and the Philippines found themselves priced out of these markets by new protective tariffs and turned to export their products to the West Indies and Britain. Canadian and British footwear manufacturers faced with the loss of markets which they had formerly monopolised claimed that the Singapore factory was owned by Japanese interests who were seeking to evade heavy duties by setting up factories within the empire. In fact all the factories in Singapore and Hong Kong were owned and managed by Chinese businessmen. The empire content of the shoes was over 90 per cent since they were made from Malayan rubber and British canvas by British subjects working in a British colony and carried to Britain in British ships. There were no grounds for denying imperial preference to Hong Kong products in accordance with the Ottawa agreements. The Canadian prime minister, R.B. Bennett, complained to Cunliffe-Lister that the importation of rubber shoes was utterly demoralising the Canadian industry; thousands of workers would lose their jobs unless action was taken to prevent the continuation of this destructive and unfair competition.\" The colonial secretary replied that it would obviously not be politically possible to invite the legislative council of the Straits Settlements to pass legislation prohibiting the manufacture of rubber shoes in Singapore or their export to markets overseas.\" \n\nMeanwhile another industry long established in Hong Kong was causing embarrassment to the Colonial Office. The governor sent a telegram to London complaining that the Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Company had tendered to build a 500 ton coaster for Australia but had discovered that it was liable to a 15 per cent duty and could not claim exemption since imperial preference was granted only to ships built in Britain. The governor", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215286, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 63, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "II\n\nasked that Britain should approach Australia to secure for Hong Kong the same tariff preference as Britain enjoyed, in accordance with article 15 of the Ottawa agreement. He pointed out that Hong Kong had granted Australian brandy a preference in the excise duty of three dollars a gallon and had received nothing in return. Cunliffe-Lister refused to take any action minuting that he was not prepared to press for equal treatment in the dominions for British and colonial industries like shipbuilding in which owing to different standards of living the levels of cost were necessarily different. This attitude shocked the civil servants in the Colonial Office. One senior official minuted, 'I have always assumed that the Secretary of State would be the advocate of colonial interests.' The matter was not allowed to rest there in spite of the views expressed by Cunliffe-Lister. Officials consulted the Board of Trade and when that department raised no objection a letter was sent to the Australian High Commission asking for the grant of preference. The Australian government was most unwilling to extend preference to a territory with oriental wages even though it was part of the empire, but eventually granted all the colonies preference at the same rate as Britain in respect of vessels over 500 tons only.\n\nIn 1933 Hong Kong manufacturers followed the lead of the Singapore factory in vigorously expanding their exports. Sales to Britain grew from HK$16,190 in 1930 to HK$454,252 in 1933 and to HK$1,823,874 in 1934. British manufacturers protested to the Board of Trade about this competition in their home market and the Board of Trade passed on their complaints to the Colonial Office. Cunliffe-Lister suggested that Britain should confine its preference to primary products and that entry free of duty should be refused to colonial manufactured goods which could compete with an efficient British industry. This proposal did not find favour with the civil service. Instead officials proposed that an interdepartmental committee should be set up to consider the whole question of the industrial development of the colonial empire. The committee was composed of officials from the Board of Trade, the Department of Overseas Trade, the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office. The first meeting was held in January 1934. R.V. Vernon of the Colonial Office was the chairman and was said to have been largely instrumental in drafting the committee's report.\n\nThe committee concluded that industrial development in the colonial empire was an inevitable contingency which could not be prohibited or indefinitely retarded; but the committee saw no reason why a conscious policy of the artificial encouragement of industry should be undertaken by the institution of a tariff high enough to protect the products of local industry from imports from Britain or elsewhere. The interests of British manufacturers and of colonial consumers who would have to pay a higher price for products previously imported should also be considered. So the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215287, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 64, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "creation of protected local industries could be justified only where the colony had natural advantages for the development of an industry and where it was likely eventually to be profitable without protection. However, regard should also be paid to the principle of trusteeship and where the commercial interests of Britain and the general economic well-being of the colony were in conflict, colonial interests should prevail. These ambiguous recommendations gave the Colonial Office a considerable area of discretion to determine whether or not a colony should be allowed to institute a protective tariff or provide other assistance to a proposed new industry.\n\nThese recommendations did not affect the situation in Hong Kong and Singapore, where Chinese entrepreneurs were successfully exporting shoes and other goods manufactured from imported raw materials without the assistance of any protective tariff. Their home market was small compared to their export markets and they could easily undercut any foreign competitors. The committee regarded the invasion of the British and dominion markets by cheap rubber shoes produced by oriental labour as an evil, but it opposed the imposition of import duties on colonial manufactures since the Ottawa agreements had granted entry free of tariffs to all imports from the dominions and India; discrimination against colonial products would undermine the principle of free trade within the empire and call into question the preferences and privileges which the colonies had extended to imports from Britain. Instead of tariffs on colonial manufactures the committee recommended that efforts should be pursued to assimilate conditions of employment and factory and workshop regulations to those in force in Britain by the adoption of the International Labour Conventions by the colonies. The committee also suggested the encouragement of negotiations between manufacturers in Britain and in the colonies to divide the market by the assignment of quotas between them.\n\nCunliffe-Lister welcomed the report in spite of the rejection of his idea of protection for British manufactures against colonial competition. The report was circulated to the cabinet for the information of ministers but objections were unexpectedly raised by the secretary of state for India and the chancellor of the exchequer. The main doubt was whether the report went far enough in recommending the discouragement of new industries in the colonies. So the report was remitted for further consideration by another committee, but nothing was done for three years. In the meantime the Colonial Office proceeded to act on the principles recommended in the report. Instructions were sent to all colonies that any proposal to protect a local industry must be referred to London at the earliest possible stage and no bill to impose or increase a protective tariff should be introduced into the legislative council without prior authorisation by the colonial secretary. Telegrams were sent to the governors of Singapore and Hong Kong asking\n\nPage 46", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215289, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 66, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "14\n\nCanadian products. To counter this competition the British government in 1934 instructed the colonies to institute a system of quotas for 'piece goods containing 50 per cent or more of cotton or of artificial silk, or of cotton and artificial silk combined'. The annual quota allowed in any colony should be the average imports over the years 1927 to 1931.\" This covered the period before Japanese textiles began to flood into colonial markets. British textiles and empire textiles were excluded from quota, provided that they had 50 per cent imperial content. This measure aroused considerable opposition in many colonies since the poorest customers would be deprived of their only source of cheap clothing for the benefit of the British textile industry. The official majority was used to carry the bill through the colonial legislatures in the face of opposition from the unofficial members. In Ceylon, where elected unofficials had a majority in the legislative council, quotas were imposed by an Order in Council issued by the British government. In spite of its long history as a free port Singapore agreed to impose quotas on imports retained in the colony. Hong Kong refused because of possible damage to its entrepôt trade, much to the annoyance of the colonial secretary, Cunliffe-Lister.52\n\nIn 1936 the Colonial Office asked for reports from all colonies on the effects of the quotas imposed two years earlier. The replies from governors indicated that quotas had been generally successful in excluding Japanese and foreign textiles, but this had had very little effect in increasing the trade of Britain and Canada. As happened when discriminatory duties were imposed on rubber shoes the chief beneficiary was Hong Kong. Imports of shirts, singlets and hosiery from Hong Kong had made their appearance for the first time and were now the dominant supplier at the cheaper end of the market.\" The governor of Jamaica complained that imports of ready-made apparel were driving the local garment industry out of business and suggested specific duties or quotas on Hong Kong textiles on the same lines as the restrictions against Japan.\n\n34\n\nAfter the Ottawa conference other Hong Kong goods besides rubber footwear began to appear in the British market. The Import Duties Act 1932 had allowed free entry into Britain to imports provided that at least 25 per cent of their value was derived from materials grown or produced or from work done within a part of the empire. This provision enabled a number of small manufacturers in Hong Kong who had previously exported their products to China and Asian countries to turn their attention to the British market. Exports of wearing apparel to Britain increased from HK$2,000 in 1932 to HK$498,000 in 1933, and HK$1,169,000 in 1935. Exports of electric torches went up from none in 1932 to HK$30,000 in 1933, HK$128,000 in 1934, and HK$131,000 in 1935.\" The Board of Trade feared that foreign manufacturers such as Japan were shipping goods substantially", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215290, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 67, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "15\n\nmanufactured in foreign countries to factories situated in the empire for the completion of the manufacturing process in order to become eligible for imperial preference. So in 1933 new regulations were issued which required most manufactured goods to show 50 per cent empire content of materials and labour in order to qualify for preference. A circular despatch was sent to all colonies requiring them to do the same and a model ordinance to effect this was enclosed. The 15 torch factories in Hong Kong used foreign brass to make the torch casing since it was cheaper than brass exported from Britain. The British Customs and Excise Department ruled that since brass constituted at least 40 per cent of the value of the finished product, unless British brass was used, torches should be classed as foreign and so be ineligible for admission to Britain free of duty. In 1935 the British Customs imposed a specific duty of 14 pence per pound on flashlight torches. This roughly doubled the cost of Hong Kong torches making it difficult for them to compete in the British market. Protests were made, but the British Customs refused to trust the costings supplied by Hong Kong showing a 50 per cent empire content and suggested that the factories should use empire brass exclusively for certain months of the year; if this was satisfactorily authenticated by an accountant's certificate Customs were prepared to allow Hong Kong torches to enter free of duty. Such arrangements were too complicated and expensive for most of the Chinese workshops involved, so they decided to do without imperial preference. Exports to Britain constituted less than 6 per cent of their total production.\n\n58\n\nThese and other moves to limit Hong Kong's manufacturing exports provoked the governor to make a strong plea in unusually forthright terms to the Colonial Office for favourable treatment on the ground of Britain's imperial interests.\n\nWe are a tiny place and have no sufficient home market to support industrialization on any large scale. Between us and China there is a customs barrier and I do not see (with the rising tide of Chinese nationalism) any chance of their lowering the barrier for Hong Kong products. So if there is to be future for industrialization in Hong Kong its market must be a cheap and distant one, a protected market within our colonial empire. From an imperial point of view the question boils down to this. Is Hong Kong to be left just as a fortress port with a dwindling entrepot business or is it to be allowed to make up for what it loses on the entrepot swings by its takings on the industrial roundabout? Hong Kong has (except in the case of rubber) no near or cheap source of empire raw material, and so the empire content of its products will generally not greatly exceed the percentage which the cost of manufacture bears to the cost of material. If this is not", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215291, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 68, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "16\n\nsufficient to qualify for preference in colonial 'native' markets then it is a very bad outlook for us as I cannot see how the growing population of Victoria and Kowloon are going to find employment without industrial development,\n\nI therefore consider it as politically important as it is, from our point of view, economically advantageous to give the Hong Kong Chinese a commercial attachment to the empire. Our military and naval defences are designed against external aggression, but if relations with China ever became antagonistic there would be an enemy totalling over one million within the fortress gates, unless their bread is liberally spread with Empire butter.\n\nThe governor's plea for Hong Kong's manufacturing industry was warmly supported by all the Colonial Office officials who wrote minutes on this despatch. It was quickly passed up to the colonial secretary, W. Ormsby-Gore, who endorsed it as 'an admirable letter' and gave instructions for copies to be sent to the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade.\" Officials made frequent use of Caldecott's argument of imperial interests when attempting to repulse proposals from the Board of Trade and other departments to place further restrictions on Hong Kong's manufactures in the years that followed.\n\nBritish textile manufacturers continued to protest that they were suffering from unfair competition in the British and colonial markets and demanded that Hong Kong exports should be excluded by tariffs or quantitative restrictions. In order to fend off these pressures the Colonial Office suggested to the governor of Hong Kong that all cotton and artificial silk piece goods exported to Britain and the colonies should be accompanied by a certificate that they had been made from cloth which had been spun, woven and finished within the empire. This proposal posed difficulties for Hong Kong. There were no spinning mills in the colony and more than half the cotton yarn used in the production of piece goods and hosiery was imported from Japan and Shanghai. In order to continue to enjoy the benefits of imperial preference, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce secured the manufacturers' agreement to switch their purchases of yarn from China and Japan to cotton mills in India which were within the empire. But the manufacturers of goods made from artificial silk protested strongly that the only alternative to yarn from Japan was British yarn which was double the price ($1.70 a pound compared to 85c). This would destroy their competitiveness with Japanese products in British Malaya, the African colonies and the West Indies and drive them to bankruptcy. The Colonial Office put its case to the Board of Trade which refused to compromise, asserting that if Hong Kong was to continue to enjoy the advantages of the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215292, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 69, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "quota system which kept out their Japanese competitors they must pay the same price as British textile manufacturers and use British-made rayon yarn.\" So from June 1937 the 'spun, woven and finished within the empire' requirement was enforced for all cotton and artificial silk garments if they wished to qualify for preference as empire products.\"\n\nApart from boots and shoes, forches, cotton and artificial silk clothing and hosiery there were many other Hong Kong manufactured products exported to the colonial empire which were able to claim the benefits of the imperial preferential tariff. They included hats, umbrellas, leather bags and purses, suitcases, furniture, mats, lamps, rope, firecrackers, paper, books, cigarettes, perfumes, medicines, condiments, sauces, biscuits, preserved foods and refined sugar.\" Complaints of the abuse of this privilege continued. In June 1938 the Colonial Office issued instructions that Hong Kong goods should be admitted to preference only if the suppliers' declaration that the article had a 50 per cent empire content was supported by a detailed statement of costings certified by a chartered accountant and countersigned by an officer of the Hong Kong government.\" It cannot have been easy for a workshop in the back streets of Kowloon to afford the fees of a chartered accountant and get all the paperwork in order. Many justifiable claims to imperial preference must have gone by default. The Colonial Office was under pressure from the Board of Trade active on behalf of British manufacturers who found their trade threatened by Hong Kong's success. It sought to defend the principle that all parts of the empire should be treated equally. It could not stop the self-governing dominions from discriminating against Hong Kong, but it prevented the colonial territories from doing the same. The price it had to pay was the elaborate documentation required to prove that Hong Kong goods were genuinely made in the colony and were not products transhipped from China or Japan.\n\nIn 1937 manufacturing industry in Hong Kong received an unexpected stimulus from the Japanese invasion of China. Industrialists transferred production from Shanghai to Hong Kong when their factories were attacked by the Japanese. When Japan blockaded the Yangtse river and seized all the coastal ports in East China, Hong Kong became a vital entry point for military supplies. Factories were quickly established to provide clothing and equipment to the Nationalist forces. Factories were set up to produce steel helmets, gas masks, mess tins, webbing and military uniforms. Parts for lorries, trucks and even aircraft were imported and assembled in Hong Kong. The Commercial Press moved from Shanghai and began printing currency notes for the Chinese government. The number of factories employing more than 20 workers went up from 642 in 1936 to 864 in 1938, 925 in 1939 and 1,143 in 1940. Domestic exports of manufactured goods in 1938 totalled at least HK$91,610,000 (about £6,000,000).**", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215294, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 71, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "19\n\nvery useful in the depression, and the factory would provide employment for 100 Africans.\" Hong Kong was also seen as a special case where the decline of the entrepôt trade with China justified the policy of fostering industrial development. After much discussion the only specific recommendation made by the committee was that when a protective tariff was granted an excise duty equivalent to the import duty should always be imposed. The final report of the committee was never published and apparently was never considered by the cabinet.\n\nSo the Colonial Office continued to vet proposals for new industries according to the guidelines laid down in the 1934 Report, that manufacturing should not be 'artificially encouraged'. Officials were concerned to safeguard colonial revenues at a time when most colonies were in financial difficulties as a result of the world depression. The Colonial Office insisted that budgets must be balanced, to avoid the need for a grant from the British government and the consequent Treasury control of the colony's finances. The Colonial Office had no money available in its own account to subsidise ingenious schemes, such as a project put forward by an entrepreneur from Trinidad to produce newsprint paper from bagasse and to power the factory with anhydrous alcohol distilled from sugar cane juice.70 Governors could apply for funds from the Colonial Development Advisory Committee which provided £36,500,000 for development assistance from 1929 to 1939. But this fund was originally set up to alleviate unemployment in Britain and no application for industrial development would be entertained which would be likely to compete with British industry.? Officials believed that by discouraging uneconomic industrial development they were acting in the best interests of the native inhabitants. An assistant secretary minuted, 'Manufacturing industry, which can be established in a colony only at the price of a monopoly protected by a high tariff, ends in producing a locally manufactured article which is too expensive for the primary agricultural producers to buy.' Governors were more suspicious of the motives of Colonial Office officials. The governor of Sierra Leone complained that any industrial project was approached from the standpoint that British trade interests must rank first, dominions' interests second and those of the colonies last. Perhaps the fairest summary of Colonial Office policy was made by a junior official: 'Generally speaking we do not want to encourage industrial development in the colonial empire, but we are reluctant to go so far as actually to prohibit it.'\"\n\nWhy then was it that Hong Kong was able to develop a flourishing export-oriented industry without any subsidy or assistance from the colonial government whatsoever when in all the other dependent territories the development of manufacturing industry was derisory, and the few factories that were established were heavily dependent on protective tariffs, special", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215295, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 72, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "20\n\ntax incentives and other government assistance? Apart from its superb harbour Hong Kong had no natural advantages. Almost all the raw materials for industry had to be imported. The population (840,000 at the 1931 census) was wretchedly poor and could not provide the purchasing power to support large-scale industry. But Hong Kong was well-placed to export cheap manufactured goods to the vast market of China and the neighbouring countries of Asia where until the 1930s tariffs on imports were low. The world depression led China and other Asian countries to erect high tariff barriers which threatened to cripple Hong Kong's burgeoning industry. The colony was saved by the decisions taken at the Ottawa conference to adopt the policy of imperial preference. This handicapped its main competitor, Japan, by imposing high tariffs and later quotas designed to exclude Japanese manufactures from markets in the British empire. This created a vast imperial free trade area embracing Britain, its colonial territories and New Zealand. Traders and businessmen in the African or Caribbean colonies could have seized the opportunity to exploit it, but it was only the energetic and adaptable Chinese entrepreneurs of Hong Kong who did so. The decisions taken at Ottawa which were designed to help industry in the dominions gave an unintended boost to Chinese factory owners in the back streets of Kowloon.\n\nUniversity of Hong Kong\n\nNOTES\n\n1. M. Havinden and D. Meredith, Colonialism and Development: Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (London, 1993), 1. D.K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism 1870-1945: An Introduction (London, 1981), 51–108. David Meredith, \"The British Government and Colonial Economic Policy 1919-1939', Economic History Review, 28 (1975), 484-99. Louis Nthenda, 'From Trade to Manufacture: Britain's Dilemma in the Face of Colonial Industrialization 1931-1938', Journal of Social Sciences, 1 (1972, University of Malawi), 95-112.\n\n2. Leo Amery in 1926, quoted by Meredith, 495.\n\n3. Meredith, 494. The only supporting evidence for this theory in the Colonial Office files is a letter from the governor of Uganda, 22 Dec. 1934, who warned that any large-scale industrial development which caused rural depopulation would result in a serious increase in sleeping sickness. CO323/1298/10, Public Record Office, London (PRO).\n\n4. See for example J. Riedel, The Industrialization of Hong Kong (Tubingen, 1974), 5-6; F. Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London, 1993), 451; D. Lethbridge, The Business Environment in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1980), 1–2. A contrary view is given by Frank Leeming, \"The Earlier Industrialization of Hong Kong', Modern Asian Studies, 9 (1956), 337-42, who cites evidence from Hong Kong and Macao Business Classified Directory (1940, in Chinese).\n\n5. Minute by G.L.M. Clauson, 7 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/8. Memoranda and Draft Report of Interdepartmental Committee 1937, CO852/164/6 and T160/763/F14811/1 and 2, PRO.\n\n6. According to D.J. Morgan, The Origins of British Aid Policy 1924-1945 (New Jersey, 1979), 9, the proportion of general revenue in the colonies derived from customs duties in 1933 was:", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215297, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 74, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "22\n\n22. The requirement of an empire content of 25 per cent to qualify for preference was set in consultation with the Board of Trade, which pointed out that some British manufacturers using foreign sources of raw material would not qualify for preference if the empire content was set at 50 per cent. CO323/1192/11.\n\n23. L.M. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919–1939 (London, 1972), 92; Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Industrial Development of the Colonial Empire, Colonial Office Confidential Print 445, CO885/40.\n\n24. Secretary of State to all colonies and protectorates, 4 Feb. 1932, DO35/242/4, PRO.\n\n25. Minutes of a conference at the Colonial Office, 27 June 1932, CO323/1193/2.\n\n26. The texts of the agreements are in Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa Cmd4175 (London, 1932), 19–76.\n\n27. Canada agreed to extend to the colonies and protectorates the preferences accorded to Britain, but in practice raised objections when requested to do so by the British government. See for example CO323/1099/16, CO852/51/9 and CO852/251/10. Cunliffe-Lister minute, 22 Oct 1933, CO323/1232/8, 'Canada has done less than nothing to implement the most essential part of the Ottawa accords.'\n\n28. See the comments in paragraphs 18 and 30 of the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee.\n\n29. Confidential Circular Despatch, 29 Sept. 1932, CO854/174. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister is better known by his later title, Viscount Swinton.\n\n30. Secretary of State to Governor of Ceylon, 27 Sept. 1932; S. of S. to High Commissioner, Federated Malay States, 30 Sept. 1932; S. of S. to Barbados, 24 Oct. 1932; S. of S. to Jamaica, 10 Oct. 1932; S. of S. to Windward Islands, 24 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5. A clause was drafted for inclusion in the 1933 Finance Bill to allow Britain to withdraw preferences from any colony if it did not grant the Ottawa preferences to empire products, CO323/1230/3.\n\n31. Officer Administering Government, Leeward Islands to Secretary of State, 19 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.\n\n32. Governor Barbados to Secretary of State, 17 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.\n\n33. Governor Windward Islands to Secretary of State, 21 Oct. 1932, CO323/1188/5.\n\n34. Stevens to Cunliffe-Lister, 17 Nov. 1932, CO323/1193/11.\n\n35. Cunliffe-Lister to Stevens, 8 Dec. 1932, CO323/1193/11.\n\n36. Hong Kong Trade Returns show exports of rubber shoes to the British West Indies as follows: 1932 - HK$4,894; 1933 - 116,670; 1934 - 643,337; 1935 - 574,376; 1936 - 1,071,932; 1937 - 1,427,634.\n\n37. High Commissioner for Canada to Cunliffe-Lister, 15 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/8.\n\n38. Cunliffe-Lister to High Commissioner, 27 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/8. Canada later succeeded in excluding Singapore shoes by setting a fictitious high rate of exchange for the Singapore dollar. See minute by Calder, 8 June 1933, CO323/1232/8.\n\n39. Peel to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 Nov. 1933, CO323/1231/16.\n\n40. Minute by Vernon, 21 Dec. 1933, CO323/1231/16. R.V. Vernon was an Assistant Secretary who joined the Colonial Office in 1900. He had previously expressed his disapproval when Cunliffe-Lister refused to approach India and South Africa to ask for imperial preference for Hong Kong's rubber shoes: 'The Secretary of State is placed practically in the position of a trustee who is bound to act with the sole regard to the interests of the colonies and is not at liberty to abstain from any claim on the account of the interests of U.K. industry or the susceptibilities of dominion industrial interests.' Minute, 9 Nov. 1933, CO323/1232/3. The attitude of Cunliffe-Lister may be contrasted with that of Alan Lennox-Boyd (Colonial Secretary 1954-59) who threatened to resign if Hong Kong was forced to accept a limitation on its textile exports to Britain. Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1954–1959 (London, 1971), 739-43.\n\n41. CO323/1294/3.\n\n42. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1932, 1933, 1934.\n\n43. Minute by Cunliffe-Lister, 7 June 1933, CO323/1232/8.\n\n44. Edgcumbe (Department of Overseas Trade) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 18 April 1936, CO323/1298/10.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215298, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 75, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "23\n\n45. Cabinet Minutes, 6 June 1934, 23(34)6, 13 June 1934, 24(34)6, 3 Oct. 1934, 33(34)5, CAB23/79, PRO.\n\n46. Confidential Circular Despatch, June 1934, CO323/1298/10 and CO854/175.\n\n47. Colonial Office to Governor Hong Kong, 6 April 1934, CO323/1298/11.\n\n48. Information from R.R. Todd, an administrative officer in Hong Kong 1924-56, interviewed in 1986.\n\n49. CO323/1298/11. CO852/16/10.\n\n50. CO852/219/13.\n\n51. Circular Despatches, 13 April 1934, and 15 May 1934, CO854/175.\n\n52. Havinden and Meredith, 188-90. Governor Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 2 May 1934, CO323/1290/6.\n\n53. Circular Despatch, 19 Sept. 1936, CO854/170.\n\n54. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 6 July 1936 and 11 Aug, 1936, CO852/51/9. Governor Jamaica to Colonial Office, 3 June 1937, CO852/106/19.\n\n55. An Economic Survey of the Colonial Empire, HMSO Colonial No 95 (London, 1934), 137. Economic Survey Col. 109, 170; Economic Survey Col. 126, 170. Hong Kong Trade Statistics 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935.\n\n56. Circular Despatch, 13 March 1933, CO323/1230/11.\n\n57. Letters and Memorandum from Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce in Caldecott to Colonial Office, 25 July and 4 Aug. 1936, CO852/51/9. McKenzie (Custom House) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 18 Sept 1936. Rydderch (Custom House) to Colonial Office, 26 Feb. 1937, CO852/107/1.\n\n58. In 1936 exports of electric flashlight torches totalled HK$2,930,000, including India HK$595,000, Netherlands East Indies HK$379,000, and Britain HK$167,000. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1936.\n\n59. Minutes on Caldecott to Clauson, 15 Oct. 1936, CO852/51/9. Clauson commented: 'It is all too seldom we get from a colonial governor so thoughtful and comprehensive a review of the future of the colony he governs.'\n\n60. Officer Administering Government, Hong Kong to Colonial Office, 30 Sept. 1937, with enclosures, CO853/109/5. King (Board of Trade) to Eastwood (Colonial Office), 13 Nov, 1937, CO852/109/5.\n\n61. Circular Despatch, 2 June 1937, CO854/176.\n\n62. Memorandum by Hamilton (Superintendent of Imports and Exports Hong Kong), 22 April 1937 CO852/106/19. Hong Kong Trade Returns 1937.\n\n63. Circular Despatch, 24 Feb. 1938, CO854/177.\n\n64. Minute by Caine (Financial Secretary Hong Kong 1937-39), 24 Jan. 1940, CO852/215/3. Gas masks, CO129/580/9. Aircraft assembly, CO129/571/15 and CO129/580/4.\n\n65. Hong Kong Blue Book 1936, 1938, 1939, 1940.\n\n66. Calculations made as in note 5 from Hong Kong Trade Returns 1938 omitting all raw materials, unprocessed agricultural products and exports of banknotes (valued at HK$36,000,000).\n\n67. Clausen described the policy of the Colonial Office in these words when speaking at a meeting of the Overseas Trade Development Council, 31 July 1935, CO852/16/7.\n\n68. Colonial Office to Neville Chamberlain, 15 Jan. 1936. Federation of British Industries to Warren Fisher, 14 Feb. 1936. Minutes in Treasury file T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n69. Minutes of the second meeting of the committee, 23 April 1937, T160/763/F14811/1.\n\n70. CO852/16/13, The inventor approached the Colonial Office directly and officials referred the project to the governor of Trinidad. The governor appointed a committee which doubted if the project was feasible. The Colonial Office received a number of similar proposals in the 1930s. Often the entrepreneur was eager to set up a factory provided that he was granted a high protective tariff, an exclusive license, part of the capital costs, subsidised freight rates and other financial privileges. In effect the businessman was asking the colonial government to bear all the risks while he would enjoy the profits if the project was successful. See for example CO852/16/9, a proposal to set up a factory in Nyasaland to process sisal into binder twine. An official commented that this was a last desperate attempt by a bankrupt farmer to keep his own sisal estates going.\n\nPage 75\n\nPage 76", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215793, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 92, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "25\n\n225\n\nCady, John F, 1964, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development, McGraw Hill, New York\n\nCameron, J. (1865) 1965, Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India, Kuala Lumpur\n\nCampbell, Persia Cranford, 1923, Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire, PS King & Son, London\n\nCavenagh, O, 1844, Reminiscences of an Indian Official, London\n\nCavenagh, O, 1867, Report on the Progress of the Straits Settlements from 1859 - 60 to 1866 - 67, Singapore\n\nChan, Helena H M, 1986, An Introduction to the Singapore Legal System, Malayan Law Journal Pte Ltd, Singapore\n\nChiang Hai Ding, 1966, 'The Origins of the Malayan Currency System', JMBRAS, xxxix, no 1, 1-18\n\nCollis, Maurice, 1966, Raffles, Faber and Faber, London\n\nComber, Leon, 1961, The Traditional Mysteries of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, Eastern Universities Press, Singapore\n\nCoupland, Sir Reginald, 1946, Raffles of Singapore, Collins, London\n\nCowan, 1950, 'Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore 1805 - 1832', JMBRAS, xxiii\n\nCoyajee, JC, 1930, The Indian Currency System, Madras\n\nCrawfurd, J, 1967, History of the Indian Archipelago, Cass, London\n\nDavidson, G F, 1846, Trade and Travel in the Far East, London\n\nDesai, Tripta, 1984, The East India Company, A Brief Survey from 1599 to 1857, Kanak Publications, New Delhi\n\nDe Vere Allen, J, 1968, \"The Colonial Office and the Malay States, 1867 - 73', JMBRAS, xxxvi, no 1, 1 – 36", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215928, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 227, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "161\n\nTHE MYTH OF UNPREPAREDNESS: THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-JAPANESE RESISTANCE IN PREWAR HONG KONG\n\nANNE OZORIO\n\n[Hon. Ed. - I was initially hesitant to sanction this article because it seemed to me to be significantly under-referenced, even to the extent of \"personal communications.\" It draws significantly upon Hong Kong Eclipse (Endacott and Birch, 1978), which is not acknowledged. Ms Ozorio contends that the referencing is adequate and assures me that, to the best of her knowledge and belief, the article is an accurate resumé of events. In accordance with the general principles of free expression I have left untouched Ms Ozorio's editorial comments on 'colonials,' 'the British,' colonial administration and society, and (Sir) Lindsay Ride.]\n\nHong Kong fell to the Japanese in eighteen days: the wonder was that it took so long. [Hon. Ed. - The doggedness of the resistance and the bravery of the defenders, perhaps? See Lawrence Lai's article in Vol. 39 of the Journal, pp.115-136.] In the cosy, cocooned world of colonial society, the invincibility of Empire was taken for granted. Despite all that was happening in China, many Europeans in Hong Kong just couldn't conceive that any Asiatic might challenge their superiority. There were anecdotes that the Japanese planes bombing China were secretly manned by Germans, since Japanese were night blind. As the colonials sat comfortably mocking them, Japanese waiters, barbers, and menials were listening. Many would appear later, no longer servile, in full dress uniform, revealing their true status as high-ranking intelligence agents. The overwhelming Japanese victory was a shock to those who believed that Empire was unassailable. They assumed automatically, that if they had been caught off balance, then the authorities too must have been unprepared. This, however, is a myth.\n\ni\n\nIn January, 1941, General Ismay declared that there was 'not the slightest chance of holding Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of augmenting the garrison it should be reduced to a symbolic scale.' Defending a city crowded with a million civilians, little air cover, long supply lines and nowhere to retreat but the sea was a logistics nightmare. What may have been unimaginable for the average colonial civilian was clear", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215942, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 241, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "175\n\nHong Kong shipyards to do marine engineering could also be used to make armour cladding for ships and vehicles. Hong Kong was also the base from which British aircraft manufacturers wanted to penetrate the Chinese market - the Far East Flying School wanted to train Chinese to fly so they would buy British rather than American or German planes. Hong Kong was also a centre for financial transactions both within and outside the banking system, a source for remittances and money transfers, more secure than Shanghai after the Japanese conquest. A large KMT community operated out of and lived in Hong Kong: almost a parallel government. While there was sympathy for the Nationalists, the colonial administration was uncertain how to maintain a balance between the Japanese and the Chinese Government. Riots against Japanese living in Hong Kong had been suppressed, and no protests made against Japanese attacks on the junk fleet. When the St Johns Ambulance wanted to send an ambulance to bombed Canton, the Colonial Office refused permission. Groups of Chinese 'terrorists' were arrested and deported from time to time. As late as May 1941 the colony's police force raided premises at 98 Robinson Road and destroyed a wireless transmitting station which had been operating for three years. The leader of this group was Chan So, an agent of General Wu Te Ching. When Governor Northcote sought guidance, the Colonial Office was advised by the Foreign Office that British policy had to vary according to circumstances, and support for China should be rendered 'compatible with the safety of Empire and avoidance of actual hostilities with the Japanese.'xix Nonetheless, there was a significant understanding between the Goumindang and the British when it came to matters of mutual benefit. When war officially broke out, their clandestine relationship could come out into the open. When Phyllis Harrop,\n\na civilian consultant working with the police reported for duty right after the outbreak of hostilities, she was assigned to work with the KMT who had already started to occupy offices with the police.\n\nThe Japanese were all too aware of the importance of Hong Kong to the KMT. The Japanese Foreign Minister had softly but firmly reminded the British Ambassador to keep the KMT under control. Even before their push to the south, the Japanese had identified KMT activists and targeted educated, articulate overseas Chinese as a threat and source of resistance. In Malaya and Singapore, they were to massacre thousands of Chinese in the wake of their advance, a fact obscured by the emphasis on the sufferings of Europeans interned in camps. In Hong Kong, on", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216091, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 390, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "324\n\nold Colonial Office in Great Smith Street. Sir Christopher Cox, who headed the interview panel, said: 'Waters, you would be more suitable teaching building subjects in Hong Kong than in Trinidad. Go away and think about it!'\n\nRose, Rose I Love You was the first song originating in the People's Republic of China to become popular in Britain. Yet the composers never received royalties. They could not afford to be seen drawing money from a capitalist country. And as I listened to the refrain in Merry England, it all tied in. Serving in the Colonial Service in Hong Kong seemed terribly exciting and romantic. It made me think of Camp Coffee, Zam Buk ointment and other similar branded goods with scenes of Empire on bottles and tins which I grew up with as a child.\n\n'You're not going to the Far East?!' an acquaintance exclaimed. 'The Communists have just acquired half Korea. There's fighting in Vietnam and Malaya. Hong Kong will be the next to fall!”\n\nIn spite of adverse comments I accepted the offer from the Colonial Office which was shortly to become Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service. After all a considerable amount of a map of the world was still coloured red. Hadn't Winston Churchill proclaimed: 'I have not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire'? At the time I could have been posted to any one of something like 55 different colonies or dependent territories within the British Commonwealth. For me, 'Go East young man!' was the watchword. Nevertheless, some said that the Hong Kong Royal Naval Dockyard was shortly to be closed down.\n\nSo, in spite of discouraging remarks, I \"burned my boats,” sold the family business as a going concern, and went shopping. I spotted cabin trunks made of sheet metal. 'Oh no,\" the shop assistant exclaimed, 'you only need those, Sir, if you are going to some humid place like Hong Kong!' 'I'll have two!' I replied.\n\nShipboard\n\nIn the early 1950s, if one flew to Hong Kong, one normally went by seaplane, landed on water and slept the night in a hotel. The journey took five days. But up until 1959 most of us travelled by sea. The\n\nPage 390\n\nPage 391", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]