[ { "id": 204298, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1961", "page_number": 66, "title": "RAS-1961", "content_text": "Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch\n\nRASHKB and author\n\n62\n\n11\n\nVol. 1 (1961)\n\nISSN 1991-7295\n\n\"(Ching-Hai Fen-Chi) History of the Pirates who infested the China Sea, from 1807 to 1810\"; \"The Cathechism of the Shamans; or, The Laws and Regulations of The Priesthood of Buddha, in China\" and \"Vahram's Chronicle of The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia, During The Time of The Crusades\". C. F. Neumann was a German sinologue who visited Canton in 1830 to buy Chinese books for the Royal Library, Berlin. He had a letter of introduction to Morrison from Sir George Staunton and enjoyed much hospitality from the British residents during his visit. It is recorded in the Memoirs that he deplored the attacks that von Klaproth and Rémusat were making on Morrison.\n\nSir George Staunton was a staunch friend to Morrison during long years in China and helped him in every way he could. Morrison had taken over the duties as Senior official translator to the East India Company (a post in which he had been assisting) when Staunton had to retire through ill-health in 1812. Two of Staunton's own contributions to translations from Chinese are in the Library, Narrative of the Chinese Embassy to the Khan of the Tourgouth Tartars, in the years 1712, 13, 14 & 15. By The Chinese Ambassador, and published By the Emperor's Authority, at Pekin, 1821 and Miscellaneous Notices Relating to China, and our Commercial Intercourse with that Country, printed for private circulation only in 1828. A letter from Staunton to Morrison telling him that he has sent him four copies of his work is printed in the Memoirs.\n\nThere are two translations from the Chinese by another French sinologue, Stanilas Julien (1799-1873), Le Livre des Récompenses Et Des Peines, En Chinois Et En Français: Accompagné De Quatre Cents Legendes, Anecdotes Et Histoires, Qui Font Connaitre Les Doctrines, Les Croyances Et Les Moeurs De La Secte Des Tao-Ssé and Lao Tseu Tao Te King, Le Livre de la voie et la Vertu, Paris, 1842.\n\nOne more French sinologue Jean Pierre Guillaume Pauthier (1801-1873), is represented by one of two books originally listed in the catalogue, Le Tao-Te-King ou Le Livre révéré de la Raison Suprême et de la Vertu, par Lao-Tseu, Paris, 1838, with the text in Latin and Chinese and with a French commentary.\n\nA noteworthy work by an earlier French sinologue, Jean Joseph Marie Amiot (1718-1793), (in the book printed Amyot) a Jesuit missionary at Peking is the Dictionnaire Tartare-Mantchou-Français, 1789. It is a two-volume work. Unfortunately, the first volume is missing.\n\n11 靖海氛記", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1961.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/vd6724704", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204590, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1963", "page_number": 71, "title": "RAS-1963", "content_text": "60\n\nTHE OLD BRITISH LEGATION AT PEKING, 1860-1959\n\nBased on a lecture delivered on 20 August, 1962\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG, M.A.*\n\nOn the afternoon of March 26th, 1861, Frederick Bruce, the first British minister to China to reside in Peking, entered the grounds of the former palace of Duke I-liang, and the history of the old British Legation had begun. The desire of Great Britain to have a minister resident in the capital was of long standing, and had its origins in the eighteenth century. From at least 1760, some English merchants in Canton had been arguing that only when an ambassador from England resided at Peking would their grievances be properly represented to the Emperor of China and their position improve. Eventually, this point of view was strong enough to influence the Government of England. Indeed, one of the prime objects of the embassy of Lord Macartney to the Court of the Emperor Ch'ien-lung in 1793 was to secure for England just such permanent representation at Peking. However, there was not the slightest chance that such a request would be granted. All foreign embassies to China were regarded as tributary missions of a temporary nature, and all foreign countries as inferior. Even the first Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842, and the subsequent Treaty of Nanking failed to obtain this object. From the Chinese point of view, relations with the western barbarians were still a local matter to be carried on by the Governor-General at Canton or by the Governor-General at Nanking. The foreign powers, for their part, were still unable to gain direct communication with the Imperial Government at Peking, and therefore were unable to protest effectively when the treaties did not appear to be working properly, or when they wished to revise them. This was the background to the War of 1858-1860, in which English and French forces were used to secure the Treaties of Tientsin, by which the earlier treaties were revised. Article III of the British Treaty of Tientsin stated (in part): \"It is further agreed that Her Majesty's Government may\n\n* Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Hong Kong. Author of An Embassy to China, reviewed on page 136 of this Journal.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1963.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/4m90m091v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204614, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1963", "page_number": 95, "title": "RAS-1963", "content_text": "82\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG\n\nexpansion. Thus a new student-interpreters' mess was built and also a new house for the Counsellor in a pleasant garden. A barrack was also built for the Legation guard on the site of the former Chinese Board of Works, Board of War, and Court of State Ceremonies, an area with historic associations. The barracks were large enough to house 500 men though normally not more than 100 were stationed there at any one time. As a result of this enlargement the British Legation now covered about thirty-five acres, and was the largest foreign Legation in Peking. While this reconstruction was going forward the opportunity was taken to make the Legation more self-contained so that if ever it were again besieged it would be in a better state to resist. With this object in view the Ministry of Works built a thoroughly ugly electricity power-plant and a water tower. A large coal dump was also formed so that now the Legation had its own supply of water, coal and electricity.\n\nGradually memories of the siege became less vivid and life settled down into a routine which was much the same as before the siege. Perhaps the only difference was that by 1908 there were signs of some modernization in Peking itself such as macadam roads, handsome cabs and electric light. Meanwhile visitors to Peking continued to enjoy the hospitality of those living in the British Legation, and no clear change can be seen until 1928 when the Kuomintang was victorious over the Northern warlords and the capital was established at Nanking. As a result the British Ambassador moved south of the Yangtze and resided mainly at the British Consulate in Shanghai while the majority of his staff moved to Nanking, though the student-interpreters continued to study at the Legation in Peking which now became a Consulate. When war broke out between England and Japan in December 1941 some British nationals and American nationals, who were sick or elderly, were interned in the Legation. The Swiss Consul looked after the buildings, aided by Chinese employed by Her Majesty's Ministry of Works. The buildings were reoccupied as a Consulate at the end of the war, but in 1948 the Chinese Communists captured Peking, and at first the government of the Chinese Peoples' Republic refused to recognize the status of the British Consulate there. However, in January", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1963.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/4m90m091v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204618, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1963", "page_number": 99, "title": "RAS-1963", "content_text": "86\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG\n\nin the north-east quarter of the city, well away from the new diplomatic quarter.2\n\nAll accommodation for foreign embassies was to be concentrated in one area outside the east wall of the city, and about one and a half miles from a newly constructed gate, just near to the old astronomical instruments which can still be seen on top of the east wall. Eventually, after negotiations, the new British Legation was allotted two large houses and two blocks of flats in this new diplomatic quarter. The last christening was performed in the Legation chapel, the books in the small library were taken off their shelves, the flag at the gate was hauled down, and everything was packed.3 Among the more colourful of the closing scenes in the life of the old British Legation should be mentioned the two Commonwealth cricket matches played in the Autumn of 1958 between the Moonrakers, captained by Mr. Duncan Wilson, the British Chargé d'Affaires, and the Woolgatherers captained by the Indian Ambassador, Mr. G. Parthasaratly. The rules governing this diplomatic cricket were many and local but the chief rule of all was that if anyone hit a ball into the grounds of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security next door his whole side was out.\n\nFinally, in September 1959, the staff moved to their new quarters and thus after nearly one hundred years of continuous occupation the existence of the old British Legation in Peking came to an end. From an historical and sentimental point of view its loss was sad. But from a realistic point of view which\n\n20 This was built on a site which had been granted to Russia as far back as the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689). As a result of fighting between Russian settlers on the frontier between Siberia and Manchuria about a hundred Russian prisoners were brought to Peking in the period 1683-5. They were formed into a company, given a place of residence in the northeast corner of Peking, close to the Lama Temple, and intermarried with Chinese and Manchus. They retained their Greek Orthodox faith and were allowed to have their own priests. See Michel N. Pavlovsky, Chinese-Russian Relations (New York, 1949) 145-164. It was to this place, known as the Pei-kuan (\"Northern Hostel\") that the members of the Russian ecclesiastical mission transferred in 1861.\n\n30 Unfortunately the imposing Royal Coat of Arms which dignified the gateway of the old Legation was too large to fit properly into the new Legation buildings. Mr. Michael Stewart, the Chargé d'Affaires at the time of the move, arranged with Sir Robert Black, the Governor of Hong Kong, that the Coat of Arms should be sent to Government House in Hong Kong. It is now fixed onto the wall at the far end of the long ballroom of Government House, which it dominates by the brilliance of its colours,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1963.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/4m90m091v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 204822, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1964", "page_number": 125, "title": "RAS-1964", "content_text": "105\n\nA RECONNAISSANCE OF MA WAN AND\n\nLANTAO ISLANDS IN 1794\n\nJ. L. CRANMER-BYNG AND A. SHEPHERD\n\nHistorical Background\n\nThe English East India Company started to trade at Canton at the beginning of the eighteenth century. By the last quarter of the century the trade had grown extensively, mainly because of the increasing demand for China tea in England. However, the more trade grew the more the Chinese officials at Canton controlled it through various regulations. Unfortunately many of these regulations were changed frequently, especially those concerning the dues and fees to be paid. The supercargoes of the East India Company were never certain how much money would be demanded of them from one year to another, and their complaints against what they often considered to be arbitrary exactions increased. At last the government of England was forced to take notice of the unsatisfactory relations existing at Canton between the supercargoes of the East India Company and the various Chinese officials. As a result it was decided to send an embassy direct to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung at Peking in the mistaken belief that if the Emperor knew of the grievances of the English merchants at Canton he would rectify them. At the same time the English government decided to use this opportunity to attempt to put the relations between Britain and China on a proper diplomatic footing as understood in the West. The man selected as ambassador was Lord Macartney, a skilled diplomat and administrator, who had been British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and recently Governor of the Presidency of Madras.\n\nIn order to impress the Chinese officials with the advanced state of civilization in Europe, and especially with Britain's skill in scientific inventions and technical achievements, Macartney was given a large suite which included a natural philosopher, an experimental scientist, a draughtsman, a metallurgist, a watch-maker, a mathematical instrument maker and a botanist. This was the first time that an English embassy had been sent to China, and certainly the first time that a group of Englishmen", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1964.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qz20zx09r", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205709, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 15, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "CHINESE UNOFFICIAL MEMBERS OF COUNCILS\n\nAs things turned out, Gibb did not return to Hong Kong, and Ng Choy was therefore appointed on a three-year term. This appointment was unfortunately interpreted by some members of the British community as an attempt to create an anti-English party feeling in Hong Kong.\n\nIn May 1880 when one of the magistrates went on leave, the Governor replaced him temporarily by Ng Choy who thus became the first Chinese to hold a senior appointment in the Hong Kong Government. This led to a question in the House of Commons as to why Ng Choy should combine a paid official post with an unofficial seat in the Legislative Council; but by the time these explanations were required the original holder of the post had returned to the Colony.\n\nThe attitude of the British community towards him and the Governor as a result of his appointment to the Legislative Council as well as this parliamentary question must have embarrassed Ng Choy very much. During this time, China having suffered repeated defeats from the hands of foreign powers, there was a movement in China to promote western technology and to modernize China, and any Chinese who had been trained or educated abroad would be welcome back to China. Thus when an invitation came from China for him to serve China, Ng Choy accepted it gladly. He left Hong Kong in 1882 before the expiry of the 3-year term in the Legislative Council, and later sent in his resignation from Tientsin.\n\nNg Choy became Secretary and Legal Adviser to Viceroy Li Hung-chang, one of the most important Chinese political figures of the time. Now known as Wu Ting-fang, he soon rose to become Chief Director of Railways and later Ambassador to the U.S.A. After the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1911, he held important appointments respectively as Minister of Judicial Affairs, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Financial Affairs. In 1917, when China entered the First World War, he was for a short time nominated as Premier. In 1922 he became Governor of Kwangtung and died the same year in office, soon after General Chan Kwing-ming's revolt in Canton.*\n\n* In his The Chinese (Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1909) p. 196, John Stuart Thomson praises Wu and styles him \"the Chesterfield of China in all the graces of speech and manners.\" Ed.\n\nPage 15\n\nPage 16", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205724, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 30, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "24 \n\nT. C. CHENG \n\nfounded a company named after himself. He was also General Manager of Chinese Estate, Ltd., and adviser to the Hong Kong and Yaumati Ferry Company. He was Honorary Adviser to the Chinese Government as well as the Kwangtung Provincial Government. In 1924, he turned down a Chinese offer to be ambassador to England. He was a member of the Legislative Council for 13 years, from 1923 to 1936, and a member of the Executive Council for 5 years from 1936 to 1941. He was created a knight bachelor in 1938.\n\nThe big strike of 1925 was followed by a boycott of British goods and shipping in China until 10 October 1926, resulting in a serious economic depression in Hong Kong. Mainly through the persuasiveness of Robert Kotewall a special loan of £1,600,000 with an interest rate of 5½%, was arranged from the British Government to assist the merchants of the Colony until normal trading was resumed. Because of this, the Chinese gave him the nickname of \"Silver Tongue\". Sir Robert Kotewall died after the war in 1949,27\n\nIn 1929, the Legislative Council was enlarged through the initiative of the Governor, Sir Cecil Clementi, who was a noted Chinese scholar. The number of officials was increased from eight to ten, including the Governor, and the number of unofficials was increased from six to eight. Of the two additional unofficial members, one was to be a Chinese and the other a Portuguese. Thus the number of Chinese unofficials was increased from two to three and the Portuguese community was represented for the first time on the Council by Mr. Jose Pedro Braga.\n\nIn addition to Sir Shouson Chow and Robert Kotewall, Dr. Tso Seen-wan became the third Chinese member of the Legislative Council in 1929. Dr. Tso, born in 1868, studied law in England. In 1896 he started his practice as a solicitor in Hong Kong together with a partner named Hodgson. In 1902, he, Dr. Ho Kai and some other Chinese leaders were responsible for the founding of St. Stephen's Boys College. He served on the Sanitary Board in 1918 and was appointed a J.P. the same year. As early as 1916, he was awarded the honorary degree of LL.D. by the University of Hong Kong, and in 1928 and 1935 was awarded the O.B.E. and C.B.E. respectively. He served on the Legislative Council from 1929 to 1937 when he resigned.\n\nPage 30\n\nPage 31", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 205796, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1969", "page_number": 102, "title": "RAS-1969", "content_text": "96 \n\nR. BRUCE \n\nlive in Bangkok and buy or rent property there, and within a distance from the capital measured by how far a local boat could travel within twenty-four hours. Beyond that the Siamese could not undertake to ensure their safe protection. British subjects, who must register with their Consul and carry identity documents, could observe their own religion and build churches. This provision was scarcely necessary when we recall Mongkut's welcome to the missionaries. The treaty also specified that British subjects could employ Siamese servants. \n\nBritish ships-of-war were allowed to sail up the Menam as far as Paknam about twenty miles from Bangkok - but no further without special permission. If an ambassador were to arrive he could sail all the way to the capital in his warship. \n\nThen followed the commercial articles. The monopolies of the King and his nobles were abolished and trade was made free. British merchants might buy from the producer direct and sell their imports to anyone without interference. The duties levied on ships according to their size were abolished, and all imports were to be subject to a tax of three per cent. Exports were to be taxed once only; the amount of the duty being specified in a schedule attached to the treaty. Opium was to be admitted without duty and sold to a single merchant. The export of rice was now permitted for the first time, but the treaty provided for a ban on its export and on the export of salt and fish - in times of scarcity. Permission was given to British companies to build ships in Siam. Article 10 was a \"most favoured nation\" clause: Bowring had the foresight to expect that other countries would follow the British example and he insisted that the terms they obtained would never be better than those he had just secured. Lastly, there was provision for the revision of the treaty in ten \n\nyears. \n\nEveryone was happy and especially King Mongkut. Bowring was received in Royal audience formally and for several hours in private. He visited the Second King, Mongkut's equally gifted younger brother, who held this peculiarly Siamese post of deputy monarch. Mongkut wrote a personal letter to Queen Victoria and entrusted it to Parkes who was to take back the text of the treaty to London for ratification. Elaborate gifts were collected for the Queen. The King was in excellent spirits, delighting in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1969.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9g553n20d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208577, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 34, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n7\n\ncould not refuse point blank either because, significantly, no American support could be expected in taking this stand, and the Chinese were likely to refuse to sign the treaty under the circumstances. The only alternative left was to endeavour to obtain postponement of the question by using the formula laid down by, surprisingly, the Colonial Office for the future status of Hong Kong earlier in August: \"should the post-war reconstruction of the Far East to be undertaken jointly by all the United Nations require special contributions from Hong Kong, the British government would not 'regard the maintenance of British sovereignty over the Colony [here applied only to the New Territories] as a matter beyond the scope of... discussion.\" Such, plus the argument that the New Territories were leased territories and therefore unrelated to the question of extraterritoriality, was the British reply to the Chinese at the beginning of December,28\n\nBy mid-December, all outstanding obstacles in the American-Chinese negotiations had been removed, but the problem over the New Territories persisted in the Anglo-Chinese talks. The Chinese would not accept a settlement which did not include the cancellation of the Kowloon lease. The United States indicated that she would sign her treaty with China on New Year's Day 1943. Obsessed with the desire to sign the Anglo-Chinese treaty simultaneously, Britain informed the Chinese government through her ambassador at Chungking that \"the future of the New Territories was outside the scope of the extraterritoriality treaty, but if the Chinese government desired [my italics] that 'terms of the lease of these territories should be reconsidered'\", this should be done when war was over.29 Thus the British had clearly conceded to China the initiative to raise the question in future.\n\nThe Chinese, however, remained adamant. On 28 December the Foreign Office decided to omit the words \"terms of\" before \"lease\" in her statement to China, having learned earlier of the suspicion of T.V. Soong, the Chinese foreign minister, of the words in question. But it was to be Britain's very last concession, even at the risk of sacrificing the treaty as a whole.30\n\nAt the war cabinet meeting that day Eden obtained permission to ask for the support of the United States, in deference to whose opinion Britain had conceded a number of important points in her negotiations with China, as a last attempt to save the situation.31 The State Department, however, did not comply with the Foreign", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208578, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 35, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "8\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\nOffice's wish. The Far Eastern division in the department believed that \"the sympathy of the American public would lie almost entirely with China and would be strongly critical of this Government,”32 The American government was fortunately spared the embarrassment of having to reject the British request in that the Chinese, for some still unknown reasons, agreed on 31 December not to raise the question of the New Territories in connexion with the extraterritoriality treaty.33 Under the changed circumstance, Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, was given to understand that the American government would have been prepared to indicate its displeasure had China been obstinate over the inclusion of the New Territories in the treaty.34 The interesting question remains as to what attitude the United States would have adopted had China requested her support.\n\nMeanwhile, the Institute of Pacific Relations was actively preparing for a conference to be held at Mont Tremblent in the United States at the beginning of December. The conference attracted the serious attention of all those countries concerned with Pacific affairs because of the increasingly wide publicity enjoyed by the Institute since Pearl Harbour through its large publishing programme of books, pamphlets, and periodicals. From late spring onwards, earnest preparations for attending the conference were made by Chatham House, the British national council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, together with the Foreign Office which, despite its earlier apprehension of \"the risk of a lot of washing of dirty linen in public' ”, had now decided to make full use of the conference as a platform from which Britain could educate the American opinion about the British empire. From the beginning the Foreign Office was alive to the danger that the question of Hong Kong would arouse great attention at the conference. However, it was decided that the British delegation would not be briefed on Hong Kong because it was feared that the idea of returning Hong Kong on terms after the war, a point the British government had conceded after much painful inter-departmental consultation and deliberation, would be badly received by the Americans and Chinese who would denounce anything short of an outright retrocession,35\n\nThe Chinese delegation was equally well prepared. Pressure coming from the Chinese delegates, who explicitly expressed their desire for Hong Kong, was so intense that Sir John Pratt, the British delegate charged with the duty to speak on China, Japan, and", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208588, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 45, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "18\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\n23 W. Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (University of Georgia Press; 1959), p. 105.\n\n24 This is according to the observation of Ashley Clarke, head of the Far Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, during his one month visit to the Department of State early in the summer of 1942; see his report on his visit to A. Eden, secretary of state for foreign affairs, 11 June 1942, FO371/31804. See also Ministry of Information to Colonial Office, 22 October 1942, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/31774.\n\n25 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", pp. 266-272.\n\n26 Brenan's minute, 3 December, on J. G. Winant, American ambassador to London, to Eden, 2 December 1942, FO371/31664.\n\n27 Eden to Winant, 7 December 1942, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), China, 1942 (Washington, 1956), p. 390.\n\n28 \"The Abrogation of British Extraterritoriality in China 1942-43: A Study of Anglo-American-Chinese Relations\", op. cit., pp. 284-5.\n\n29 Ibid., pp. 287-8.\n\n30 Ibid., pp. 288-9.\n\n31 War cabinet conclusions 173 (42), 28 December 1942, Cab65/28. Also Eden to Winant, 29 December; and Eden to Lord Halifax, British ambassador to Washington, tel. 8264, immediate, 29 December 1942, FO371/31665.\n\n32 Thorne, op. cit., p. 179, and note 53, p. 198, referring to G. Atcheson to Hornbeck, 29 December 1942, Department of State, Decimal and Other Files, National Archives (Washington D.C.) 793.003/12-2942.\n\n33 W. L. Tung in his book V. K. Wellington Koo and China's Wartime Diplomacy (New York, 1977), based on the Wellington Koo Papers deposited with Columbia University, gives a possible explanation: \"Koo was then Chinese Ambassador to Great Britain and returned to Chungking for consultations. As an experienced diplomat well familiar with the attitude of British official and unofficial circles, he counselled the government to conclude the treaty on the relinquishment of extraterritoriality but reserve the right of later negotiations on the Kowloon question”, p. 53.\n\n34 Halifax to Eden, tel. 6310, immediate, 31 December 1942, FO371/35679.\n\n35 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)\", pp. 58-68.\n\n34 Ibid., p. 68.\n\n*7 See memorandum in Hornbeck Papers, box 466.\n\n** Cordell Hull, secretary of state, to United States chargé d'affaires in London, tel., 4 April 1943, in FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, The Far East, 1943 (Washington, 1963), III, pp. 46-7. Also see R. E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948), p. 707.\n\n30 For American interest in India, especially early in the war, see for example, M. S. Venkatramani and B. K. Shrivastava, \"The United States and the Cripps Mission\", India Quarterly, XIX, no. 3 (July-September, 1963), pp. 214-65. See also author's article, \"Britain's Reaction to Chiang\n\nPage 45\n\nPage 46", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208590, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 47, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "20\n\nCHAN KIT-CHENG\n\n62 \"The Hong Kong Question during the Pacific War (1941-45)”, p. 72.\n\n63 Brigadier A. J. H. Dove of the War Office to C. H. M. Weldock of the Admiralty, 12 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46251, and Admiralty to commander-in-chief, British Pacific Fleet, tel. 131957A, important, 13 August 1945, communicated to the Foreign Office, FO371/46252.\n\n64 Seymore to Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary, tel. 857, most immediate and top secret, 16 August; tel. 865, most immediate and top secret, 17 August; tel. 909, most immediate and top secret, 23 August; and Bevin to Seymore, tel. 984, 25 August 1945, FO371/46252.\n\n**Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York, 1965), I, p. 492.\n\n**Thorne, op. cit., p. 649.\n\n67 General Hurley, now United States ambassador at Chungking, to secretary of state, tel. 1414, 21 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945 (Washington, 1969), VII, pp. 507-8.\n\n**Truman, op. cit., pp. 493-4.\n\n*Hurley to secretary of state, tel. CFB$633, 23 August 1945, in FRUS, The Far East, China, 1945, op. cit., p. 511.\n\n70 Truman, op. cit., pp. 494-5.\n\n71 Truman, ibid., p. 496.\n\n72 G. B. Endacott, A History of Hong Kong (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 302.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210873, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1986", "page_number": 224, "title": "RAS-1986", "content_text": "207\n\nwife. He began his career as a teacher of English in Government Chinese schools. After two years, he was appointed an interpreter in the Police Magistrate's office. His brother-in-law, Ng Mun-sow, was already in the office and when he was dismissed, A-lloy stepped up into his position.\n\nHe left Hongkong Government service in 1867 and accepted a position under the Viceroy of Kwangtung.\n\nHe was to be in charge of an opium tax collecting office in Hongkong for the Chinese Government. Much opposition to this was voiced in the English language press, and A-lloy was attacked as a tool used to subvert British authority in Hongkong.\n\nHe then left Hongkong to become legal adviser on foreign affairs to the Governor of Fukien. He had received no formal legal training, but his years as interpreter in the courts of Hongkong gave him, as a newspaper account mentioned, “a surprisingly intimate knowledge of the forms and routines of our country.”\n\nHis activities in Fukien roused the indignation of the Hongkong papers. One of them characterised him as \"this peripatetic conglomeration of legal imposture and contemptible impudence.\"\n\n**\n\nWhatever his reputation in Hongkong, in China it had been enhanced by his acquiring, either by purchase or conferment, the degree entitling him to wear a white button on his hat.\n\nIn 1879 a change of policy in the Fukien provincial government resulted in the dismissal of most of their English-speaking Chinese employees, Ho Shun-chee, as A-lloy was then calling himself, left and joined the Chinese diplomatic mission to the United States. The Ambassador, Chen Lan-pin, was a Canton man and had recruited most of his staff from the Canton-Hongkong area. Ho Shun-chee served as interpreter.\n\nIn 1880 he passed through London. He took the opportunity to send a note to Dr. Legge, saying: \"Shortly before leaving Hongkong for America to join the Chinese Embassy under His Excellency...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1986.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/jq08c7063", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211257, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 318, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "293\n\nPamela Atwell had taken it for granted that her readers had not needed any such historical background information. The story of Weihaiwei under British administration during this highly turbulent era as well as its return to Chinese rule was the focus of her research, embracing hundreds of documents in the Public Records Office in London, a number of unpublished private papers in England and Scotland, as well as sources in Japanese and Chinese but not Chinese archival documents.\n\nA meticulous researcher and skilful writer who also provided the readers with clear and interesting photographs, Dr. Atwell has produced a book that is a joy to behold indeed, both for the specialist reader and the non-specialist. She has shown admirable understanding of Chinese institutions and British thinking, and thus has recreated an area that had needed a thorough examination by historians looking at imperialism in China. Dr. Atwell has found, for instance, that the leasing of Weihaiwei was not a simple and straightforward matter. The Chinese had first proposed the leasing through Robert Hart of the Imperial Customs Service and Ambassador MacDonald at Peking to a reluctant British cabinet. Then, even as the British cabinet were being convinced of the value of leasing Weihaiwei, the Chinese had second thoughts. Together with other diplomatic and political complications, it was not until 24 May 1898, after the Japanese forces withdrew, that the British ensign was finally hoisted over the port.\n\nResearching as a political scientist, Dr. Atwell's major interests resided in the juxtaposition of government authorities. She had observed that the British administration at Weihaiwei was noteworthy in several ways. The British never claimed sovereignty over the port. They had maintained that Weihaiwei \"remained part of a foreign country within which Britain exercised legal jurisdiction, but it was not a colony and the Chinese living there were not British citizens.\" (p. 12). British administrators were simply superimposed over traditional Chinese rural community elders and magistrates who represented the central government in these localities.\n\nEarly conflicts over such issues as taxes and militia were resolved when Britain began to send civilian commissioners experienced...", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211325, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "17\n\nenter the city walls added to the general tension. More specifically Governor-General Yeh Ming-chen, perceived by local Europeans as an obstacle to peace, as they understood it, was quite unwilling to meet the British demands. As for the French, certainly their desire to establish an influence for themselves equal to that of the British by championing the rights of missionaries added impetus to French interest in a confrontation. As is well known, pretexts once desired are usually found. For the British, the Chinese boarding of the Arrow near Canton was said to be an act of lèse-majesté against the British flag (regardless of the reality of the ship's status). And for the French the convenient death of a French missionary played its role in bringing the combined flotilla before the walls of Canton in late December 1857. There several thousand British and French soldiers soon gathered to make their assault.\n\nFor those not immediately responsible for the military assault the enormity of the undertaking they were involved in must have caused considerable reflection. They were about to attack and presumably occupy an enormous city of more than a million inhabitants. There was no telling, assuming a successful assault, how long they would be required to hold it. But Canton's future administration would be a quieter challenge and one less immediate than the more pressing matter of first taking the city. The actual assault has been often discussed. It suffices here to note that the city's capture, apparently due to the Governor-General's poor planning, was a reasonably simple affair.\n\nWithin days of occupying the city it was clear that the allies would be quite unable to govern it directly. The principal issue was that they were faced with the administration of a city of more than a million people when no more than three among the allied forces could even communicate in Chinese. Of the British only Harry Parkes, the future allied commissioner of the city, and Thomas Wade, later ambassador to Peking, knew Chinese.\n\nThe French, for their part, were without a senior officer able to communicate at all. Their only contribution in this regard was the presence of a certain Marques who was then serving the French mission as a Chinese secretary. For the French, more than for the British, the lack of Chinese linguists was to be a major impediment to their activities throughout China and for years to come. Almost ten months later Paris", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211631, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "21\n\nto be regarded as such by mankind and to be revered only as the representation of that power. However, over the centuries, he has developed into a god in his own right, depicted as a gilded image of an emperor sitting on a throne, and is accepted by the masses as the ruler of the Heavenly bureaucracy.\n\nIn T'aishan in Shantung province it was claimed that the Jade Emperor in mortal life had been merely a learned doctor of medicine who had lived during the 12th century AD at the Sung court in Kaifeng. He attended the emperor Hui Tsung during a serious illness and saved his life with a miraculous cure. He was known as Chang Yu-huang, but, on his death, he, like many a hermit, was deified by imperial decree.\n\nBritish representatives met the imperial representative, Li Hung-chang in 1876 in the temple (Yuh Huang T'ing) dedicated to the Jade Emperor to the west of Yent'ai (Cheefoo) in Shantung province to arrange the Chefoo Convention. Another incident involving the British in North China and connected with the Jade Emperor concerned Sir Meyrick Hewlett of the China Consular Service at the turn of the century during the clearing up after the siege of the British Embassy during the Boxer Rebellion. He found in the house of Sir Ernest Satow, HM Ambassador in Peking, a tablet with a background of sky-blue, framed in rich gold and inscribed with the four characters in gold — 'Huang T'ien Shang Ti'. Prince Ch'ing identified it as an item from the Temple of Heaven which had been missing for more than a year. When Sir Ernest asked how to restore it to its rightful place, the Prince begged the Ambassador not to send it round to his palace as should it be placed in the entrance he could neither leave nor enter his home without kowtowing twenty-seven times before it. Another more enlightened official helped out by bearing it off at dead of night in a Peking cart to the vaults of a European bank where it awaited a favourable day for restoring it to the Temple of Heaven. Some thirty-five years later, Sir Meyrick, paying his farewell visit to Peking, visited the Temple of Heaven and asked the attendants whether he could see the tablet, kept with the other tablets sacred to the emperors of the Ch'ing dynasty in a small temple opposite the Altar of Heaven. They replied that this was quite impossible, since even in post-imperial Kuomintang days no-one was allowed to see it. Sir Meyrick related the story of its recovery, upon which the attendants agreed to show him the tablet together with the tablets to the 28 Major Constellations, to Thunder and Lightning, and to the other forces of nature, but said that the tablets to the emperors were all lost after their", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212024, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1989", "page_number": 439, "title": "RAS-1989", "content_text": "414\n\nThe British stayed at Weihaiwei until 1930, when it was returned to Chinese administration. During the interim, the Kaiser and the Tsar had collapsed and China had gone through the Boxer uprising, a series of reforms, a revolution that toppled the Ch'ing dynasty, a period of disunity and warlord rule, and, finally, the establishment of the National Government at Nanking led by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. The rise of Chinese nationalism increased demand for return of all foreign concessions in China, including Weihaiwei.\n\nPamela Atwell has taken it for granted that her readers do not need any historical background information. The story of Weihaiwei under British administration during this highly turbulent era as well as its return to Chinese rule was the focus of her research, embracing hundreds of documents in the Public Records Office in London, a number of unpublished private papers in England and Scotland, as well as sources in Japanese and Chinese but not Chinese archival documents.\n\nA meticulous researcher and skilful writer who also provided the readers with clear and interesting photographs, Dr. Atwell has produced a book that is a joy to behold, both for specialist readers and non-specialists. She has shown admirable understanding of Chinese institutions and British thinking, and thus has recreated an area that had needed a thorough examination by historians looking at imperialism in China. Dr. Atwell has found, for instance, that the leasing of Weihaiwei was not a simple and straightforward matter. The Chinese had first proposed the leasing through Robert Hart of the Imperial Customs Service and Ambassador MacDonald at Peking to a reluctant British cabinet. Then, after the British cabinet were convinced of the value of leasing Weihaiwei, the Chinese had second thoughts. Together with other diplomatic and political complications, it was not until 24 May 1898, after the Japanese forces withdrew, that the British ensign was finally hoisted over the port.\n\nResearching as a political scientist, Dr. Atwell's major interests were in the juxtaposition of government authorities. She had observed that the British administration at Weihaiwei was noteworthy in several ways. The British never claimed sovereignty over the port. They maintained that Weihaiwei \"remained part of a foreign country within which Britain exercised legal jurisdiction, but it was not a colony and the Chinese living there were not British citizens\", (p. 12), British administrators were simply superimposed over traditional Chinese rural", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1989.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8336pm92h", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212174, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 116, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "93\n\nthe British community to celebrate the event. H.M.S. \"Cornwall\", one of the 10,000 ton County class cruisers came up for the occasion. On Coronation morning, May 12th, a service was held on board. I had not previously seen those \"Chicago pianos\" which were supposed to be so effective an answer to the dive bomber. With their eight evil looking spouts, they looked formidable enough; but five years later they proved insufficient to save this fine ship from Japanese air attack off Ceylon.\n\nIn the evening there was to be a ball at the British Embassy. We went a bit of a splash for the occasion and gave a dinner party before going on to the ball. I remember in addition to some of our Chinese friends there were a couple from the American Embassy, a German officer and his wife, two officers from the British cruiser, the local manager of the Standard Oil Company, an Englishman with a Russian wife, and some visitors from Shanghai. Our cook, unknown to us, had decided he too would go a bit of a splash. For the fish course he produced a samli. In China the samli is considered the best of all fish, an opinion with which I disagree as it is too bony for my lazy nature. The cook's samli was a large fish, I suppose it must have weighed every bit of ten pounds. He served it whole and had excelled himself by inserting in each eye-socket a small electric bulb, connected to a battery concealed somewhere in the fish. To my wife's astonishment, as the chief guest helped herself, one eye gave a most suggestive wink, and the performance was repeated each time a portion was removed; a postmortem revealed that the winking was due to a short in the circuit and not to any humorous intention on the part of the cook.\n\nThe ball given by Sir Hughe and Lady Knatchbull-Hugessen at the Embassy was a brilliant affair. For weeks, of course, all the women had been talking clothes, Gay toilettes set off sparkling eyes; diplomatic, naval and military uniforms shone with gold lace, and the Ambassador's excellent champagne animated the conviviality. We did not know that within a few weeks he would be lying at death's door with a Japanese bullet through his back. In August when motoring from Nanking to Shanghai, the Ambassador's car, over which a large Union Jack was stretched, was attacked by Japanese aircraft and pierced by many machine-gun bullets. The Ambassador was shot through the back near the spine.\n\nIn the old days you could walk along the great wall of Nanking", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212197, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1990", "page_number": 139, "title": "RAS-1990", "content_text": "116\n\ncontrolling the rackets of the Shanghai underworld. With the advent of the Japanese they no longer felt safe there and so had taken refuge in Hongkong. The long-gowned men were their bodyguards. These were the gangster chiefs, well regarded by the Chinese government, who had been responsible for the communist purge ten years previously. You can imagine what sort of a strain the presence of such men placed on the vigilance of the Hongkong police.\n\nThe police, however, did trip up badly once. One day a well-dressed, good-looking Chinese gentleman landed from the Chungking passenger plane. He had no passport or credentials and refused to say who he was. So he was detained. He turned out to be Mr. Tai Li, the formidable head of Chiang Kai Shek's dreaded Gestapo. The detention, although very brief, involved a loss of face, and it took a special visit of the British Ambassador to China to Hongkong to smooth the affair over. It is said Mr. Tai Li has ever since used his influence in a direction unfavourable to Britain.\n\nHongkong carried imperial liabilities. It was less irresponsible than Shanghai: nor was it a place like Shanghai where Japanese bagmen flocked in the wake of their army as instruments of Japanese policy with the dual role on the one hand of beguiling the foreign businessman, and on the other of reaping a rich commercial harvest from the trade restrictions imposed by the army on all business which did not pass through Japanese channels. Hongkong knew it had nothing to expect from Japan. It guessed the defences and the garrison were both inadequate; two weak British battalions, one Indian battalion, four out-of-date aircraft, and a small assortment of guns. Yet small as they were, the armed forces looked to their defences. Workmen set to to build concrete pillboxes to cover the beaches, of which there were a large number; alternative sites were prepared for light anti-aircraft guns, roads were built to link weak points in the system, bomb shelters were tunnelled out of the hillsides, and the British civilians, enrolled as volunteers, went into military training. Others served as watchers of the fixed minefields laid off the island, and small naval vessels were set to patrol the adjacent waters outside the boom which floated ready to stretch across the harbour entrance.\n\nBut the Japanese had their spies everywhere. The excellent barber's shop on the ground floor of that English stronghold, the Hongkong", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1990.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/d79206299", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214957, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 53, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "8 \n\nposed as to whether the Chinese as a whole were \"anti-commercial\" or whether it was only the government. Greenberg believes that \"trade in the long run mattered little to the Chinese economy.\"2 A further factor contributing to distrust of foreigners and the consequent restriction in contacts and trade was fear of European expansionist policy apparent to the Chinese in Tibet, the East Indies, the Philippines, Burma, and Nepal. \n\nBy the 1830s British demand for tea had become enormous; tea worth twenty million pounds sterling was imported into Britain annually. It was paid for from huge profits made on the sale of smuggled opium. Many foreign firms in Guangzhou, other than British, had engaged in the lucrative trade, with two notable exceptions,13 Britain accounting for more than 80% of the trade. Dissatisfied with the capricious nature of its trade in Guangzhou, Britain made three high-level attempts to form full diplomatic relations with Beijing, sending embassies under Macartney in 1793, Amherst in 1816, and Napier in 1834; all failed. The last two reached no further than Guangzhou before being unceremoniously sent back. But it may be of interest to deal in some length with Macartney's Mission because it seemed to succeed; that it failed was the most significant disaster in relations between the two nations, eventually leading to war. \n\nAfter a long journey, Macartney's Embassy embarked on Chinese boats to proceed up Baihe (Peiho) River on the 9th of August 1793. The following day they reached Tianjin (Tientsin) where they met the Emperor's envoy at a formal ceremony, which, however, lasted a mere 20 minutes. After staying in Beijing for some two weeks, they set out for Chengde (Jehol) where, on the 30th of September, they met Emperor Qianlong (1736-1795). Lord Macartney was graciously permitted to dispense with kowtow; it was agreed that the salutation was to be made on the right knee. According to Macartney, the Emperor was polite, and the conversation, conducted through interpreters, was lively and interesting. Moreover, the various scientific instruments, which were brought as gifts, were examined with obvious interest. The Embassy was told that they should depart on the 7th of October. Three days' grace was promised but immediately withdrawn, ostensibly because the Emperor was concerned that an early onset of cold weather would inconvenience the Ambassador. To reach their ships at Zhoushan (Chusan) Island, the Embassy had to travel across China, partly overland and partly by rivers - a journey that took nearly two months. It has", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214958, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 54, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "been claimed that during this journey Macartney tried to obtain information about tea growing in China but was unsuccessful. This is incorrect. In fact, he was allowed to collect shoots of tea plant. These were later carefully transported to Bengal with samples of soil where they flourished and very likely gave rise to present Indian tea. This was perhaps the only success of Macartney's Embassy.\n\n14\n\nWe know of Macartney's open instructions on his mission, which included negotiating opening ports for trade and establishing full diplomatic relations with China. There is also a strong conjecture that Macartney was authorised to offer the Chinese active British efforts to stop opium trade, if negotiations achieved their principal aims. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to obtain confirmation of this very important directive. Although Macartney's Embassy was unsuccessful, the Ambassador wrote a rosy account of the mission suggesting that it was not a total failure but had achieved a great deal of goodwill between the two nations. Not so, writes Dr. James Dinwiddie, member of the Embassy, whose official duties as astronomer and scientist were to demonstrate the scientific instruments brought as presents. If we are to believe this meticulous observer with scientific training, it became apparent early during their sojourn in Beijing, and later in Chengde, that the Chinese including the Emperor were not impressed either by the members of the mission or the elaborate scientific instruments offered as presents. \"These things are good enough to amuse children,' the Emperor was supposed to have said after briefly examining them. Their reception, wrote Dr. Dinwiddie, was at best perfunctorily polite, at worst impatient and abrupt. From the day they stepped onto Chinese territory, a feeling of fear and mistrust seemed to pervade the motions of Chinese officials who appeared to check every move of the members of the Embassy; soldiers constantly guarded the Embassy. They were warned, early during their stay in Beijing, that their visit would be terminated shortly, and it seemed clear to the good doctor that the mission was doomed from the start. Even if Dinwiddie was unduly sensitive to the attitude of their hosts, it seems clear that the Embassy had achieved little towards establishing friendly relations, or an atmosphere of mutual trust, between China and Britain. Macartney's mission has been aptly summed up by Peter Auber1 as 'Received with the utmost politeness, treated with the utmost hospitality, watched with the utmost vigilance, and dismissed with the utmost civility.' Subsequent embassies were not so well treated.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215198, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 294, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "258\n\nFrom 1964, she has been a full-time writer of autobiography/history, fiction, and sociopolitical essays/written testimonies. She once said: 'I write as an Asian, with all the pent-up emotions of my people. What I say will annoy many people who prefer the more conventional myths brought back by writers on the Orient. All I can say is that I try to tell the truth. Truth, like surgery, may hurt, but it cures.' She was acquainted with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. She presently lives with Vincent in Lausanne, Switzerland and is also known as Elizabeth C.K. Comber.\n\nHan Suyin and her husband with Zhou Enlai, 19708\n\nJan Morrison was born in May 1913 and was the son of the well-known Australian doctor and journalist (first Peking correspondent for The Times of London, 1897-1912) George Ernest Morrison (1862-1920). He was schooled at Winchester, England and was a graduate of the University of Cambridge. After going down from Cambridge, he became Professor of English at the Imperial University of Hokkaido, Sapporo.\n\nHe visited China in 1937, for the first time, to 'watch the Japanese occupation of Tientsin and the invasion of north China.' Later that year he became private secretary to the newly appointed British Ambassador to Japan, in Kyoto. In 1939, he went to Shanghai and became the representative in China of The British and Chinese Corporation, a London financial house. He traveled extensively throughout China for the next two years.\n\nHe arrived in Singapore in October 1941 and became deputy director of the Far Eastern Bureau of the (U.K.) Ministry of Information.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215665, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 442, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "394\n\nremainder of the War. In 1946, he married Steffi Neubauer, a Czech and continued for a while with the Hong Kong Government. He took early retirement to be with his family during the school years of his three daughters in Winchester, U.K., where he became a school master. He died on 31 December 1990.\n\nIan Morrison was educated at Winchester and Trinity College, Cambridge. He then became Professor of English at the Hokkaido Imperial University in Sapporo, Japan, where he remained until 1937. An interest in diplomacy and politics led him to accepting the position of private secretary to Sir Robert Craigie, then British Ambassador in Tokyo, a position he held from 1937 until 1939. Eager to further his knowledge of Asian affairs, he then became representative of the British and Chinese Corporation in Shanghai until October 1941. This was followed by a short stint as deputy director of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Ministry of Information in Singapore.\n\nIn December 1941, two days after the Japanese launched their attack on Pearl Harbor and began their conquest of the countries in the area, Mr. Morrison was appointed a war correspondent.\n\nIan Morrison, circa. 1940\n\nChristmas card from Ian Morrison showing route out of the Malayan Peninsula and Java in 1942", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215931, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 230, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "164 \n\nlaconically states that, even on what was actually his honeymoon visit, Boxer had not lost his 'powers of observation.' \n\nIn accordance with the policy of withdrawing resources to Singapore, supposedly an impregnable fortress, the FECB was downscaled and most of its men and resources moved. Boxer was promoted to Major, with a small staff, which included his close friend and best man, Alf Bennett. Ironically, this gave him greater flexibility to use his own initiative. \n\n4 \n\nUnable to make much headway with London, Boxer flew to Chongqing to see the British Ambassador, Sir Alexander Clarke-Kerr. Boxer then made contacts with key figures in the Chinese military. He was received by none other than General Dai Li, head of the formidable Juntong or Bureau of Statistics and Military Intelligence. After the Generalissimo himself, to whom his loyalty was almost feudal, General Dai was perhaps the most powerful man in China. An extremely shrewd strategic thinker, he was in many ways the power behind the throne. His organisation, fiercely secretive and ruthless, has been described as a sort of Chinese Gestapo, prepared to use any means, including murder, to achieve its aims. Dai was fanatically devoted to Chiang Kai Shek, and shaped the Juntong to be a dreaded political as well as military machine, spying on all perceived enemies of the state, Communists and fellow Guomindang as well as Japanese. The Juntong organisation was highly effective, operating through cells united by family and social bonds, whose members were expected to subsume all private needs to the pursuance of state aims, however lethal. It has been demonstrated that General Dai and his followers modelled themselves on folk heroes from Chinese history who operated through secret societies and who believed that extreme action such as assassination, was justified in the interests of the common good. Dai was known to be anti-western, for he believed that western countries with their imperialist policies were the cause of China's humiliation, and were exploiting its weakness for their own aims. Many assumed that Dai's anti-British stance was on the personal embarrassment of having been mysteriously arrested in Hong Kong, thus conveniently sidestepping questions raised by decades of opium and gunboats. Dai also believed that any western country operating in China should function under Chinese control, an idea anathema to westerners used to extraterritoriality and getting their own terms. Boxer, however, found Dai co-operative and willing to ...\n\nbased", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215942, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 241, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "175\n\nHong Kong shipyards to do marine engineering could also be used to make armour cladding for ships and vehicles. Hong Kong was also the base from which British aircraft manufacturers wanted to penetrate the Chinese market - the Far East Flying School wanted to train Chinese to fly so they would buy British rather than American or German planes. Hong Kong was also a centre for financial transactions both within and outside the banking system, a source for remittances and money transfers, more secure than Shanghai after the Japanese conquest. A large KMT community operated out of and lived in Hong Kong: almost a parallel government. While there was sympathy for the Nationalists, the colonial administration was uncertain how to maintain a balance between the Japanese and the Chinese Government. Riots against Japanese living in Hong Kong had been suppressed, and no protests made against Japanese attacks on the junk fleet. When the St Johns Ambulance wanted to send an ambulance to bombed Canton, the Colonial Office refused permission. Groups of Chinese 'terrorists' were arrested and deported from time to time. As late as May 1941 the colony's police force raided premises at 98 Robinson Road and destroyed a wireless transmitting station which had been operating for three years. The leader of this group was Chan So, an agent of General Wu Te Ching. When Governor Northcote sought guidance, the Colonial Office was advised by the Foreign Office that British policy had to vary according to circumstances, and support for China should be rendered 'compatible with the safety of Empire and avoidance of actual hostilities with the Japanese.'xix Nonetheless, there was a significant understanding between the Goumindang and the British when it came to matters of mutual benefit. When war officially broke out, their clandestine relationship could come out into the open. When Phyllis Harrop,\n\na civilian consultant working with the police reported for duty right after the outbreak of hostilities, she was assigned to work with the KMT who had already started to occupy offices with the police.\n\nThe Japanese were all too aware of the importance of Hong Kong to the KMT. The Japanese Foreign Minister had softly but firmly reminded the British Ambassador to keep the KMT under control. Even before their push to the south, the Japanese had identified KMT activists and targeted educated, articulate overseas Chinese as a threat and source of resistance. In Malaya and Singapore, they were to massacre thousands of Chinese in the wake of their advance, a fact obscured by the emphasis on the sufferings of Europeans interned in camps. In Hong Kong, on", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215955, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 254, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "188\n\ndeaths of Chinese persons within these fourteen personal absences Legge experienced, one stood out over time because it became so formative in shaping Legge's public image in Hong Kong. The images of both Legge and this seminal Chinese figure were first promoted through extracted letters and reading literature of missionary journals where the story about Ch'ea Kam-Kwong first appeared. After Ch'ea's murder, however, it became a festering and frustrating element within the larger political scenario of the unequal treaties period in foreign policy between the Qing Manchurian empire in China and the newly established British ambassador. Legge made the issue all the more prominent in 1863 by publicly challenging British officials' complacence about the matter and condemning attempts by Sir Frederick Bruce (1814-1867), the first British ambassador to the Qing empire, to defuse the whole tragedy by general claims about missionary incompetence.\n\nThe period from 1861 to 1863 was pivotal in Legge's missionary-scholar career because of three books and two supremely “felt” public absences. In February and November 1861 he published the first two of the eight-tome-five-volume series he entitled the Chinese Classics. In October and at the very beginning of 1862 he faced news about the deaths of Ch'ea Kam-kwong and his eldest brother George respectively, writing special memorials to both men in the subsequent months. In the latter case, James Legge edited and introduced his brother George's selected lectures and sermons (an introduction of just over 100 pages!), an act of filial respect simultaneously Scottish Nonconformist, Ruist/Confucian, and Victorian in style and content.\n\n2\n\nYet Ch'ea's death in October 1861 and its consequences had a power over Legge's career he himself could not fully anticipate. So influential was it that in the balance of the decade of the 1860s Legge was regularly referred to in local Hong Kong and overseas missionary literature as \"James Legge of Hong-kong and Poklo.\" Here we will explore the meaning of Ch'ea's death for Legge's life, and the broader implications it had on a surprising range of “larger issues\" in the study of cross-cultural interactions during the later decades of the Manchurian Qing dynasty. Part of the significance is shown in a negative fashion in Paul Cohen's early work of the", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215983, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 282, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "216\n\nforces of the British and French armies were departing Canton, so that whether these events had any correlation may be an additional issue. Nothing seems to have been consciously planned as an attack on the Governor-General, though he felt threatened by the riot (the events in Poklo being some 40 miles east of Canton). At the very least the vigilantes were acting \"in flagrant violation of the stipulations of the [1860] Treaty,\" \"stirring up the hatred of the people toward foreigners, and their dislike to Christianity.\" Whether they had other \"ambitious ends\" hidden under the banner and their rhetoric remained a serious, but moot, question.\n\nFollowing normal protocol for this kind of emergency, Chalmers acting on behalf of the London Missionary Society presented their complaints to the consul at Canton. The missionaries had been given no indication of the Governor-General's intentions, but Legge specifically adds that, if all else failed, they could refer the matter \"to our Ambassador at Peking.\" His attitude toward the Qing bureaucracy was unqualified and negative: \"The [Qing] Government is effete. The foundations are destroyed.” Although this might seem like an overstatement, the feelings reflected a fairly realistic evaluation of the disarray of an empire overcome by foreign powers in the capital and unable to handle the massive Taiping Rebellion which continued to defy imperial armies and ruled over much of the centre of the empire at the time. Other means for dealing with the crisis were also at hand. Daily prayer about the whole situation and its continuing problems became the self-imposed discipline by the Chinese Christians in Hong Kong, prompting Legge to compare this \"painful and discouraging\" situation in Poklo with the \"primitive forthgoing of Christianity” where persecution was also a stimulus for expansion.\n\nIt was part of the \"cunning of history\" that Legge's life and name for the next decade were identified with two major issues of the year of 1861: Poklo and his Chinese Classics.90 In missionary publications he became \"Dr. Legge of Hong Kong and Poklo,” and in Hong Kong itself, the memories were more vivid and even more powerful in creating around him a kind of aura as a “folk hero\" in the Carlylean sense of the term. At least one major event later in", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215985, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 284, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "218\n\nthe Zongli yámén, he cannot be faulted for missing this major tragic event among Chinese Protestants in southeast China, because it was apparently never reported or discussed by British and Qing officials.\n\nMaybe the \"oversight\" happened because the turn of events shifted attention to the military problems associated with the resistance of Tàiping forces during the next three years before they were destroyed. They had become the target of a common effort by the Qing armies as well as some foreign (and particularly British/Scottish) militia under General Gordon, probably causing a host of special problems demanding the \"immediate attention\" of the British Ambassador, Sir Frederick Bruce.4 Nevertheless, it was against the Ambassador that Legge expressed his most piercing salvo of Protestant Dissenter displeasure in 1863, nearly two years after the riots in Poklo and Ch'ëa's murder had taken place.\n\nIn a brief note leaked to the public a year after it had been written, Sir Bruce explained his opinion to Lord John Russell (1792-1878), then Secretary of State, that missionaries should not be permitted to enter into China because of the troubles they caused and the dangers they faced. His arguments stood in blatant opposition to the conditions codified by the 1860 treaty, but were nevertheless read with approval by Lord Russell. This occasioned an outburst of righteous anger from Legge, who took Bruce's letter apart piece by piece, and showed its insensitivity to missionary work as well as its incoherence in the face of the recent treaty conditions. In and of itself, this letter written by Legge, first published in the Patriot in London and soon afterward in the local China Mail in Hong Kong, was one of the most perceptive and articulate pieces of political analysis he ever wrote. But the coup de grâce came in the end, where the level of frustration Legge felt against British bureaucratic reticence and its discounting of missionary and Chinese Christians' rights had grown to a new height.\n\n95\n\nI will conclude this long letter by referring to a case in point,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216055, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 354, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "288\n\nconsul was nearly hit by a bullet that entered his office through the window. This same consul was involved during student protests later the same year when the police quarters were set alight and the students rampaged through the town intent on killing foreigners. He and his family were only saved by the timely arrival of Chinese soldiers, and escaped by river down to Shanghai.\n\nToday the Zhenjiang Museum occupies the former British Consulate at 85 Boxian Lu in Boxian Park at the heart of the old town. Amongst the items on display in the grounds is an anchor said to have been from H.M.S. Amethyst, the frigate of the British Yangtze Flotilla, which, after weeks of being blockaded, stuck on a sand bank, escaped downstream despite having been badly damaged by shell fire from the PLA [People's Liberation Army] during their thrust south across the River in 1948 to liberate China from the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. British efforts to seek a diplomatic solution involved Edward Youde, a twenty-four-year-old third secretary at the Embassy, who volunteered to reach the senior PLA military officer at Yangzhou to seek a safe-conduct pass for the Amethyst to sail unmolested downstream back to Shanghai. He first had to obtain passes to permit him to cross the line between the Nationalists and the Communists. After several days of adventures and lengthy cross-country hikes, sometimes under fire, Youde reached the senior PLA officer and his request was forcibly rejected. His mission a failure, he returned, again amidst numerous adventures to report to his Ambassador in Nanjing. He later became better known as Sir Edward Youde, one of the last Governors of Hong Kong.\n\nChristian missionaries\n\nThere were Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries, Anglicans and the 'faith missions', Baptists, Presbyterians and the Lutherans, and so on, as well as the individual evangelicals, zealous saviours of souls. The most important aspect of this work, though most would not see it in this light, was by setting an example, though this in no way belittled their social, medical and educational work. Medical missionaries, another dedicated breed, were an exception with their professional abilities being widely welcomed not only by Chinese but also by the Europeans within both treaty ports as well as in the remoter parts of China in which they lived and worked.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216407, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2003", "page_number": 166, "title": "RAS-2003", "content_text": "116\n\nJapanese cruiser YAHAGI11 was due to arrive at 2200 hours that evening.\n\nIn the interim the freighter MADRAS MARU2 arrived. She attempted a rescue operation but this was not successful. Indeed the seas were so high that it was not even possible to contemplate sending the nine survivors across to her for repatriation to Japan.\n\nSince all these Japanese flag ships had appeared or were due to appear at the scene of the grounding Captain Mackinnon informed NASHI that he would sail for Hong Kong that afternoon, and take with him the nine men. Later he was to write:\n\n'Many friendly and complimentary flag signals were exchanged with all ships present, including the wreck. At 1700 I proceeded to Hong Kong leaving the Japanese destroyer NASHI in charge of the situation.'\n\nOn Saturday 7 November HERMES returned to her buoy at Hong Kong and a short while later the nine rescued seamen were landed ashore.\n\nIt is pleasant to be able to record that in due course official thanks were rendered by the Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Baron Kijuro Shidehara. His letter was addressed to the British ambassador to Tokyo, H.E. Sir Francis Oswald Lindley who forwarded these thanks to the Foreign Office in London from where, in turn, they were passed to the Secretary to the Admiralty.\n\nA year later, on 6th December 1932 at Hong Kong, the C. in C. came onboard our ship to present Lloyds Silver Medals to the three officers, and Bronze Medals to the six ratings who had taken part in the rescue. Also a bronze shield, mounted on a wooden base, was presented to the ship by the Committee of Lloyds.\n\nIn December 1931 an epidemic of diphtheria struck Hong Kong. Amongst those taken ill was Captain Mackinnon. Commander Baxter temporarily assumed command until the arrival of the ship's new commanding officer, Captain W.B. Mackenzie, on 25th February 1932.\n\nCaptain Mackinnon duly returned home and on 21 January 1933", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2003.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2v242g390", "rank": 0 } ]