[
    {
        "id": 208467,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 191,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "WOODBLOCK PRINTING,\n\nAN ESSENTIAL MEDIUM OF\n\nCULTURE INHERITANCE IN CHINESE HISTORY\n\nDAVID H. S. CHAU\n\nIntroduction: the development of writing and inscriptions\n\nIn ancient China, before characters had been developed, events were recorded by knotted cords and notched wooden sticks. Writing proper began from image forms of visible objects or ornaments. The First legendary Emperor Fu Hsi (伏羲) 2953 BC, the Third Emperor Huang Ti (黃帝) 2698 BC, and the Statesman Tsang Chich (倉頡) 2700 BC are the traditional inventors of the \"tadpole characters” (蝌蚪文) and the “bird-track script” (鳥跡文). They observed the animals and birds' tracks and imitated natural forms to create primitive characters and had them carved on stones.\n\nRecent excavations of ancient tombs in China revealed engravings in large quantity of tortoise shells and animal bones. These bones and shells are believed to have been used in the Shang Dynasty (商朝) 1600 BC by the priests or diviners of the court to communicate with the spirits of the dead, and since the dead consulted were mainly ancestors of the rulers, the bones were treated as sacred and were called \"Oracle Bones\" (甲骨). Whenever a prediction was needed --usually something to do with the weather or a battle--the priest or diviner would inscribe the question on a shell or a bone and then have it heated by fire. The bone or shell would become cracked after being burnt. It was believed that the diviner could read the signs showing on these cracks. The prediction was then also inscribed on the bone for record and future reference. The word \"predict\" in Chinese character is Pu (卜), which looks like a crack itself.\n\nInscriptions (銘文) were also found on Shang metallic wares. Most of the items recorded were in commemoration of certain ceremonies in the court or the glories of the battle.\n\nLater on, Chinese developed to use lacquer to record things on bamboo and wooden slips, and had a number of slips strung together to form books.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1978.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/8g84t8593",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214192,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1998",
        "page_number": 50,
        "title": "RAS-1998",
        "content_text": "13\n\nvariety of humour and just talking mo lei tau (nonsense, f). It all adds up to people coming out of a show and feeling good about themselves.\n\nChinese humour\n\nWhereas Westerners have been described as being seriously humorous, Chinese have been said to be 'humorously serious' (Kao, 1946; XVIII). Chinese humour is, by and large, down to earth, with a surfeit of action, with the hero's mother breaking a leg or the bully being beaten up. Much of it may, nevertheless, be, so called, mo lei tau, and include a certain amount of Western style slapstick.\n\nIt was not until the beginning of the 20th century (unlike the West where they became popular two or three centuries earlier) that cartoons became popular in China (Xu, 1989; preface). The reason was largely because China was a semi-feudal society and people did not have freedom to create works of humour and sarcasm. Today, under socialism, works considered 'in poor taste' are often still not accepted for publication. Often cartoons tend to be used as resistance to oppression and, like a dagger or javelin, aimed to do 'battle.' Having said all that, however, many Westerners (as well as many Hong Kong Chinese) believe humour in China is not subtle enough and it does not demand rapid thought. In the main it is straightforward, then there is a pause followed by the punchline.\n\n'Laugh talk' (slapstick), as it is sometimes dubbed, generally goes down well with Chinese, and, between the two World Wars, it is understood that on the first night of a show put on by the family of Sir Run Run Shaw, in Shanghai, an actor, purely by accident, fell through the floorboards. Because this was considered hilarious by the audience, the Shaw showbiz family made it a permanent part of the act.\n\nThe author recalls when he visited Hainan Island, in China in 1987, in an off-the-beaten-track village, a Chinese infant was placed on his shoulder. The child wore standard Chinese shorts, with a longish vertical split in the seat. This conveniently opened automatically when it squatted to do its business. As it sat on the author's shoulder its bare bottom rubbed against his face. What a joke! All the Chinese, espe-",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214736,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 151,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "THE BATTLE OF HONG KONG:\n\nA NOTE ON THE LITERATURE\n\nAND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEFENCE\n\nLAWRENCE LAI WAI-CHUNG\n\n115\n\nAbstract\n\nFrom the stance of a person growing up in Hong Kong, this short note re-assesses the Battle of Hong Kong of December 1941 as recorded in the English and Chinese literature largely found in the University of Hong Kong Library. It examines the views of political leaders, war historians, veterans, and civilians of different persuasions and makes some informed speculation about their focus. It argues that a common omission is the relative fighting power of the defender of Hong Kong. The essay argues that the performance of the Hong Kong garrison was much better than the defenders of Crete or Singapore. It makes a few speculative suggestions as to the effectiveness of the defence and concludes by making a case for further research into the Battle from historical and military science points of view.\n\nIntroduction\n\n\"Memories of the war in Hong Kong, of the sharp and bitter struggle which ended with the capture of the Colony on Christmas Day, are kept on a more realistic plane than most other places....It was by tacit agreement decided that the war in Hong Kong had best be forgotten.” This statement in a publication of Ricci Hall of the University of Hong Kong (Ricci Hall 1954) reflected the peculiar political context of Hong Kong as a Crown Colony in China. The Union Jack as a symbol of British reign in Hong Kong has gone, and the ruins of the Second World War, associated with Hong Kong's immediate colonial past, lie wasting. The military cemeteries in Stanley and Sai Wan, however, have been as well maintained as before. The respect for those who sacrificed their lives for a just cause has not been altered by a change in governance.\n\nAuthors from the belligerent countries have intensively studied military operations in Europe and North Africa in the Second World War since the end of hostilities. The intensity of the studies is",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214744,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 159,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "123\n\nThe performance of a military force is always a relative term in many senses. Authors writing about the Battle of Hong Kong have not rigorously compared the performance of the Hong Kong garrison with that of the Japanese invaders, save statistics of casualties and strength. Nor have they compared the performance of the garrison with British garrisons in other theatres of war.\n\nIt is true that the performance of the Hong Kong garrison did not prevent the fall of Hong Kong. Yet, it should be recognised by the military historian that the Hong Kong garrison, notwithstanding its inferior strength, did not only (a) manage to hold out for a much longer period of time; but also (b) sustain a much lower loss rate, as weighed by relative strength, than its adversary relative to the latter's strength. The former was probably the true mission of the garrison as contemplated by Churchill and both (a) and (b) testified to the battle worthiness of the garrison.\n\nEvidence of these two points is adduced in Table 1, which compares several dimensions of the Battles of Crete, Hong Kong and Singapore. These battles all involved British forces repulsing invading well-prepared Axis forces which had either absolute or relative local air superiority and which succeeded eventually in overrunning the defended territories, taking a large number of prisoners. Each battle has attracted much post-war criticism of the failure of Churchill's strategy or tactics about defence of the island concerned. In all cases, the battles were mainly fought on land, though the German invaders of Crete were air-borne. In the cases of both Hong Kong and Singapore, the conflict was largely between infantries supported by artillery and there was no naval support during the hostility as the navy either was absent or had been wiped out. Evacuation by sea was only possible for a part of the Crete garrison.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214746,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 161,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "Luis osses \n\n[loss rate] \n\nPENYA BARU PE \n\n6.580 \n\n(6000 paratroopers) \n\n2.096 \n\n(Killed in action: 683) \n\n5.093 \n\n(killed in action: 1715) \n\n[30%] \n\n[15%] \n\n[15] \n\n[Battle of Malaya: 125 dead, 9.612 3.507 wounded, 6,105] \n\nRatio of British/Axis losses \n\n2.39 \n\n(Y) \n\n2.11 \n\n(killed in action: 31) \n\n0.73 \n\nBattle of Malaya: 14 431 \n\nRelative loss rate of defenders to invaders in combat \n\n4.60 \n\n0.68 \n\nweighted by relative strength of invaders to defenders \n\n1.74 \n\nBattle of Malaya: 28.861 \n\n(Y/N) \n\nThe British defenders of Crete and Singapore outnumbered their invaders. The German forces that invaded Crete had a strength that was only about 50% of the British garrison. The garrison in Singapore had a numerical superiority of more than 2 to 1. Yet, Crete yielded in 14 days and Singapore surrendered in one week. The outnumbered garrison in Hong Kong, however, was able to hold out for more than half a month.\n\nThe loss rates for the three invasions for both sides were high in the Battle of Crete. The Axis loss, including missing figures, was 30%, which also meant a hard blow on Hitler's paratroopers' strength. The British loss was 5% higher and was almost 40%. In the case of Hong Kong, the loss rate of the British forces measured in terms of killed and wounded alone amounted to 34% whereas the Japanese incurred just 5%. If we compare only these rates of Hong Kong with those of Singapore, it would seem that the Hong Kong garrison was less effective in inflicting casualties on the enemy. Both the Crete and Hong Kong garrisons had sustained a relative loss rate of more than 2 to 1. However, if we weigh the relative loss rate of the British garrison by its relative strength vis-à-vis the invaders for each battlefield, then we might come to the conclusion that the Hong Kong garrison was most effective in inflicting disproportionate casualties upon the invader. As",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214747,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 162,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "126\n\nindicated in Table 1, the Japanese outnumbered the Hong Kong garrison by 3.09 (X). However, they could only inflict a casualty rate of 2.11 (Y). The Singapore garrison, by comparison, fared better than its counterpart in Crete.\n\nSome Speculative Thoughts Regarding the Merits of the Defence\n\nConstrained by the statistics available to the author, the above analysis is crude indeed. However, it raises the point that the Hong Kong garrison, however unprepared and poorly equipped, had fought quite well. There are indeed sources that suggest a much higher casualty rate for the Japanese. Why was this the case?\n\nAny answer to this question surely requires a much more rigorous study. A number of speculative points and observations worthy of attention are raised below. Firstly, the geography of Hong Kong rendered defence more effective than that of Singapore. It is a cliché that the Japanese forces were well trained and prepared. Yet, they did suffer great losses. Most such losses were incurred when they made attempts to cross the harbour and in fighting for control of the hills and gaps on Hong Kong Island. In both the Battle of Singapore and the Battle of Hong Kong, the Japanese forces aimed at capturing reservoirs as their tactical targets, as they had anticipated long resistance and the loss of water supply would erode the morale of the defending forces and their ability to continue fighting. Unlike the Island of Singapore, Hong Kong Island is much larger in size, and is highly rugged in relief with several reservoirs in different parts of the upland areas.\n\nSecondly, the size of the garrison was also a factor. Comparing again Hong Kong and Singapore, a smaller garrison operating in a more defensible topography proved to be more battle worthy than a large number of troops congested in a much smaller flat island devoid of air cover and was running out of fresh water.\n\nThirdly, notwithstanding criticism of the design weakness of the Gin Drinkers Line, the Hong Kong garrison fought in an orderly manner according to a pre-conceived plan with defence structures well in place. As soon as the under-powered Shing Mun Redoubt was lost, the garrison evacuated the New Territories and Kowloon to prepare for",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214754,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 169,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "133\n\nAppleton-Century-Cross, 1943.\n\nProulx. B. Underground from Hong Kong, New York, E.P. Dutton Co 1943\n\nA Record of the Actions of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps in the Battle for Hong Kong, December 1941, Hong Kong. Law speed.\n\n1953\n\nRicci Hall. Ricci: Souvenir Record of the Silver Jubilee of Ricci Hall. Hong Kong University 1929-1954, Hong Kong, Ricci Hall, University of Hong Kong, 1954.\n\nRollo, D. The Guns and Gunners of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, the Gunners' Roll of Hong Kong. 1992.\n\nSimpson, R. K.M. \"These Defenceless Doors: a Memoir of Personal Experience in the Battle of Hong Kong, and After,” unpublished mimeograph.\n\nSimpson, T. Operation Mercury: the Battle for Crete, 1941. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981.\n\nSiu, K.K. Forts and Batteries: Coastal Defence in Guangdong During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Hong Kong, Urban Council, 1997.\n\n1965.\n\nStokes, G. Hong Kong in History, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1965.\n\nTakagi Keniti; Kobayasi Hideo and Isida Jimtarou. Hong Kong Japanese Military Currency and Post-war Compensation, Chinese translation by Ming Pao Publishing, 1995, (Chinese publication)\n\nThrower S.L. Hong Kong Country Parks, Hong Kong, Government Printer, 1984.\n\nTse, W.K. The Fall of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Commercial Press, 1995. (Chinese publication)\n\nTsui, Y.C. Partisan Activities in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Joint",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 214757,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1999",
        "page_number": 172,
        "title": "RAS-1999",
        "content_text": "136\n\n13 Yip (1982): 94.\n\n15\n\nFigures on losses for the Battle of Crete include those of killed, wounded, captured and missing. Source: Arbeitskreis für Wehrforschung (1994)\n\nFigures on losses for the Battle of Hong Kong are those on casualties only, i.e. those of killed and wounded. Source: Ko and Wordie (1996)\n\n16 Figures on British losses are estimated by deducing total casualties in the Malaya campaign as reckoned by Leasor minus those losses incurred on the Malay Peninsula loss recorded by Liddell Hart. Japanese losses for the Battle of Singapore are those on casualties only, i.e, those of killed and wounded. Source: Leasor (1968); Liddell Hart (1970)\n\nhttp://www.crete.tournet.gr/crete-intro-Location_and_Size-15-en.html\n\n* Annual Report, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Government Printer, 1938.\n\n19 Singapore Year Book, Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1965,\n\n20 According to Rollo (1992), this figure includes six x 18 pdr; six Lewis guns; two Bofors; four x 2 pdrs; eight x 4.5 inch guns; 23 x 3.7 inch guns. The total figure is very close to the numbers of field guns claimed to be captured by the Japanese: 47 guns.\n\n21 According to Rollo (1992), this figure includes three x 9.2 inch Mark VII; five x 9.2 in March V; 12 x 6 inch CP II; two x 6 inch naval; two x 4.7 inch; four x 4 inch naval; two x 60 pdrs guns. Most of these guns were in active use in the defence.\n\n2 Except those with asterisks, the references are those available in the University of Hong Kong Main Library and those quoted in Birch and Cole (1979); Tse (1995); and Ko and Wordie (1996).",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt",
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    }
]