[ { "id": 204500, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1962", "page_number": 132, "title": "RAS-1962", "content_text": "BRITAIN AND CHINA\n\n117\n\nnot altogether the fault of the author, who has written the book as part of a series on Britain in the world today—though it detracts slightly from its value, does not in practice make it any the less interesting.\n\nThe question of recognition of the Communist government by Britain is very ably dealt with; the whole trend of opinion at the time, both in Britain and in the rest of the world is summed up. In 1949 Britain's commerce with China still far exceeded that of any other western country, and since the division into blocs was less rigid then than now, (though Britain consulted both the U.S. and the major Commonwealth countries) recognition was still a matter for each country to decide for itself. Happily the British government waited only three months to take this step; had it delayed another six, it would never have been taken, for the Korean war broke out. At the time international comment, even from the United States, was fairly favourable. It was realised that Britain had followed her usual pragmatic policy of recognition where a government was clearly in control as opposed to the U.S. ideological path of recognising only where it approved. Commercial groups and other British residents in China were influential in bringing this about; strangely enough, looking back over the last thirteen years, this was because the Communists appeared more honest and efficient than the KMT, and it was hoped that after recognition British interests would be able to expand.\n\nMr. Luard shows how quickly this hope became vain. For with the Korean war the new China entered on to the world stage with a vengeance, and came face to face with the United States.\n\nIn this conflict the British government always seems to have been slightly more aware of possible Chinese sentiments than the U.S., and to have hesitated rather more than the U.S. at the 38th parallel; and when President Truman began to talk of extending the war to Manchuria and of using the atom bomb, Mr. Attlee at once flew to Washington to make certain that U.N. forces were not to be committed to any extension of the fray without consultation with the other powers involved. Mr. Luard relates this episode in a particularly effective deadpan style which contrasts vividly with the drama of the events.\n\nThis British intervention epitomises the new role that Britain has since played in the world; she has been a mediator between", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1962.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/9s166f47f", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 208547, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1979", "page_number": 4, "title": "RAS-1979", "content_text": "THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG 1941-45\n\n15\n\nurgent consent of the United States Chiefs of Staff to detach a British naval force from the British Pacific Fleet to accept Japan's surrender and assume full powers of military administration in the colony.63 The Japanese accepted defeat on 14 August. However, the British Pacific Fleet assigned for service at Hong Kong, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Cecil Harcourt, did not arrive until 30 August. During this interval of a fortnight, the question of Hong Kong sorely tried the British government and placed the United States government in an uncomfortable position.\n\nHong Kong again became a serious point of contention between Britain and China. This time the argument was not whose sovereignty was to be set up but who was to receive Japan's surrender there. Despite the assurances given by Chiang Kai-shek on 16 August, and repeated on 24 August, that China had \"no territorial ambitions\" in Hong Kong and regarded it \"as a matter which would require eventual settlement through diplomatic channel\", the British Foreign and Colonial Offices insisted that Sir Cecil Harcourt receive Japan's surrender on behalf of Britain by virtue of her sovereignty over Hong Kong.64\n\nThe prime minister, now C.R. Attlee, appealed to the American president for assistance. Fortunately for Britain, Truman, who had assumed the presidency on Roosevelt's death in April, was in favour of a cautious policy. While being conscious of his predecessor's views regarding the future status of Hong Kong, he, however, decided to adhere to the \"recognition of the established rights\", although he told both Britain and China that such recognition \"did not in any way represent U.S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong.\" General Douglas MacArthur was therefore instructed to arrange for the surrender of Hong Kong to the British commander.65 Again fortunately for Britain, MacArthur was known for \"his support for the cause of the British Empire in the Far East.\" In fact in October 1944 he had specifically expressed that he \"fully appreciated the need for British forces to recapture Hong Kong.\"66\n\nChiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, insisted on his right to accept Japan's surrender at Hong Kong as commander-in-chief of the China theatre. He was therefore most distressed by Truman's agreement with the British. To avoid embarrassing Truman, Chiang now suggested that the Japanese forces in Hong Kong should surrender to his representative in a ceremony in which both", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1979.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/2801w5938", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213967, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 36, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "ARTICLES\n\nTHE DICKINSON REPORT: AN ACCOUNT OF THE BACKGROUND TO, AND PREPARATION OF, THE 1966 WORKING GROUP REPORT ON LOCAL ADMINISTRATION\n\nTREVOR CLARK\n\nMuch commentary on Hong Kong's internal affairs before its return to China focused on the alleged anomaly of having delayed the introduction of a wider franchise until the very last years of a century-and-a-half's span of power. There was also dispute over whether the evident split of faith among the indigenous Hong Kong leadership was in reality between those openly \"pro-China\" and those supposedly \"anti-China\"; or whether it was not more truly between those who are \"pro-Hong Kong's people\" and those simply (and more pragmatically) \"pro-business.\" It is in this context that the death of William Vivian Dickinson MBE(Mil) reminded his past colleagues of 'The Dickinson Report', otherwise known as Report of the Working Party on Local Administration'. The recent discussion and controversy over institutional changes make a backward glance at this document and its provenance a matter for poignant reflection.\n\nIt will be remembered that Britain's immediately post-war Labour Secretaries of State for the Colonies had required all Governors to accelerate the long-accepted progress towards dominion status, as independence with full membership of the Commonwealth had been known: pressures from the United States of America and the new institutions of the United Nations had demanded no less. Attlee's government was happy to require action, by way primarily of building upwards from local government reform, coupled with improved labour and trades union legislation, and attention to education - all this backed by development and welfare plans funded by acts of parliament, which had started with the ground-breaking Colonial Development & Welfare Act passed in the dark wartime year of 1940.\n\nHong Kong had been treated no differently, and Sir Mark Young had returned as Governor after the Pacific War with plans for appropriate initiatives. These included a Municipal Council, with Mayor, 30", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215663, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 440, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "392\n\nMs. Han did not practice medicine in China in the 1950s or at any other time\n\n*\n\nMs. Leon Comber was a superintendent (not assistant superintendent) with the Malayan police, and acted as assistant commissioner\n\nOn the morning of Sunday, 25 June, 1950, communist forces from North Korea crossed the border into South Korea. The next day, on 26 June, President Harry S. Truman ordered American air and naval forces to go to the assistance of South Korea, and Clement Attlee in the House of Commons expressed support for Mr. Truman's actions.\n\nOn 27 June, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution recommending that all members of the UN furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to meet the armed attack.' The Korean War had begun.\n\nThe unexpected outbreak of the Korean War took all newspapers by surprise but The Times had Ian Ernest McLeavy Morrison, a member of its staff, in the Far East at that time. By August of that year he would be dead.\n\nBorn in Beijing on 31 May 1913, he was the son of the famous Australian journalist, Dr. George Ernest Morrison (4 February 1862-29 May 1920) and a New Zealander Jennie Wark Robin (1889 – 20 June 1923), Dr. Morrison's former secretary who he had married in 1912. Dr. Morrison was known as \"China Morrison\" and was himself a correspondent for The Times during 1897-1912 and later political adviser to the Chinese Government.\n\nHis brother, Alastair Gwynne Morrison was born on 24 August 1915. He ultimately joined the Diplomatic\n\nDr. Morrison and his three sons, Ian, Colin and Alastair, 1917, (Mitchell Library)", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 } ]