[
    {
        "id": 207650,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1976",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1976",
        "content_text": "STUDY OF MODERNIZATION IN CHINA & JAPAN\n\n23\n\n23 See Umetani Noboru, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n24 Ibid., 5-6.\n\n25 See Roger Hackett, \"The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo,\" in Marius Jansen, ed., Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization (Princeton, 1965).\n\n26 Yamagata Aritomo, \"The Japanese Army,\" in Okuma Shigenobu, comp., Fifty Years of New Japan (New York, 1909), 206.\n\n27 Ibid., 206.\n\n28 Ibid., 206-208.\n\n29 Presseisen, vii; also chapters 2 and 4.\n\n30 Ibid., esp. 135-136. As a professor at the Army Staff College and an adviser to the General Staff, Meckel helped to reorganize the Army Ministry, refine the General Staff, improve the system and content of Japanese military education, and develop the Japanese system of logistics and medical services. In addition, he helped restructure the army into divisions and taught the Japanese \"the demands of full-scale mobilization, which included a strategic railroad network, a new conscription act, and improved staff exercises.\"\n\n31 Mary Wright, The Last Stand, 220-221; Rawlinson, 167-204; Presseisen, 139-143; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China (New York, etc., 1975), 418-420; Yamagata Ariyoshi, \"The Army,\" in Albert Stead, ed., Japan by the Japanese (London, 1904), 107-109; etc.\n\n32 Cited in Roger Hackett, \"The Military: Japan,\" in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964), 328.\n\n33 Ike Nobutaka, \"War and Modernization,\" in Robert Ward, ed., Political Development in Modern Japan (Princeton, 1968), 209.\n\n34 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 346-348.\n\n35 See, for example, Ike, 196; also Shibusawa Keizo, ed., Japanese Life and Culture in the Meiji Era (translated and adapted by Charles Terry; Tokyo, 1958), 303-309, esp. 308-309.\n\n36 Hackett, \"The Military,\" 335.\n\n37 Ogawa Gotaro, The Conscription System in Japan (New York, 1921), chapter 3.\n\n38 Shibusawa, 306-307.\n\n39 H. Paul Varley, Japanese Culture: A Short History (New York, 1973), 163-164.\n\n40 Donald Keene, \"The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan,\" in Donald Shively, ed., Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture (Princeton, 1971).\n\n41 Ogawa, part 2.\n\n42 See Harry T. Oshima, \"Meiji Fiscal Policy and Economic Progress,\" in William Lockwood, ed., The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, 1968), esp. 372. See also Shibusawa, 305, 315; Fairbank, et al., 199-200; Ike, 205.",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q",
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    {
        "id": 208328,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 52,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "36 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\n38 Holcombe, 82-83; LWCK. Memorials, 27: 405. See also Wang Chia-chien, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang ti chuang-she chi ch'i yin-hsiang,\" Kuo-li T'ai-wan shih-fan ta-hsüeh li-shih hsüeh-pao (April, 1976), 3. \n\n39 LWCK, Letters to the Tsungli Yamen, 4: 39-41. \n\n40 Wang, Huai-chün, 203 and passim; LWCK Memorials, 35; 33b-34, 34b-35. On Wang, see also Bell, 2: 49. \n\n41 On Chou's army, see Japan, Ministry of War, comp. Rimpō heibi ryaku (1882), 3: 45b-46b; Bell, 2: 4, 57-59; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 128-130; FRUS, 1873, part 1, 182-188; CWCK, 1.4: 36b-32; etc. Chou's nien-p'u is included in CWCK. His writings and nien-p'u indicate a rather progressive outlook, including an appreciation not only of Western weapons and military methods, but also of certain aspects of Western science and medicine. \n\n42 CWCK, 2.2: 13a-b; also 1.4; 2b-3, 32-33. \n\n43 Ibid., see also 2.2: 1-8. On the attractiveness of Green Standard rank, consult K. C. Liu, “The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period: A Reappraisal,\" Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies, n.s. 10.2 (July, 1974), 210, and esp. 218. \n\n44 See, for example, CWCK 1.1.2: 24b; 1.4: 2-3, 5-13b, 19-24, 26b-27, 32-33b; 2.2: 1-2b; \"supplement,\" 1: 11-23, 44; etc. \n\n45 See, for example, CWCK, 1.1.2: 16b-17, 23-24, 27-28; 1.4: 3b-4, 10a-b, 27, 30-32; \"supplement,” 1: 7-24. \n\n46 CWCK, 1.1.2: 17b-18; 1.4: 30-41; etc. \n\n47 Ibid., 1.4: 33b. \n\n48 Bell, 2: 57; see also Cavendish, 721. \n\n49 Bell, 2: 57, 197; Great Britain, War Office, 33/34 (1880), 129, \"The Army of Li Hung-chang\"; CWCK, “supplement,\" 1: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b-37b; see also CWCK, 1.4: 36b-37. \n\n50 CWCK, 1.1: 19b; 1.1.2: 41b-42; 2.2: 22b. \n\n51 Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-tang,\" 3-4, 23-24, note 18. \n\n52 CWCK, 1.4: 34. \n\n53 CWCK, 1.4: 33b-34; also 1.1.2: 41b-42. \n\n54 See note 40. \n\n55 Knight Biggerstaff, The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China (Ithaca, 1961), 61-62; Cyrus Peake, Nationalism and Education in Modern China (New York, 1932), 10-12; Wang, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang,\" 7-8. \n\n56 Ibid. (Wang), 7-8. \n\n57 Chinese Times, April 30, 1887. The entrance examination consisted of three parts. The theme for the essay was: \"(When the people have been taught patriotism and loyalty) they may easily overcome their enemies.\" The theme for the discourse was: \"Much planning brings success.\" And the subject for the poetry exercise was: \"Though summer has come, nature is still mild and pleasant.\" Ibid. \n\n58 Biggerstaff, 63; NCH, April 13, 1887; Chinese Times, April 23, 1887, \"The Tientsin Military School\"; etc. The most complete discussion of the establishment, rise, structure, administration and influence of the Tientsin Military Academy is Wang Chia-chien's, \"Pei-yang wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang.\"",
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    {
        "id": 209473,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1982",
        "page_number": 130,
        "title": "RAS-1982",
        "content_text": "108\n\nW. ALLYN RICKETT\n\nwere usually removed and their activities closely controlled by whatever leftist faction happened to be in control at the moment. At this time, the procuratorate was eliminated, as had been the Ministry of Justice in 1959. One of the most important developments during this period was the expansion in the cities of so-called non-criminal sanctions, generally ranging from warnings to three years reform through labour, imposed by local mediation or residents' committees in conjunction with the local police station. The mediation of neighbourhood disputes and the handling of petty local crime and anti-social behaviour by properly supervised local institutions has been, in principle, one of the more constructive developments in China since the Revolution. However, during the Cultural Revolution a vast expansion of informal and arbitrary punishment, including beatings and long-term imprisonment or deportation to the countryside, was instituted by Red Guard and other leftist groups operating in such places as schools, factories, government organizations. These leftist groups merely charged their victims with being \"rightists\" and then proceeded to take any suppressive action that seemed desirable to them.\n\nViolence and factionalism reached such proportions that in September 1967 the Army was ordered to restore order, but major outbreaks continued to occur throughout 1968 and into 1969. In April 1969 the Ninth Party Congress was held, this marking the official end of the Cultural Revolution, and though some semblance of stability began to emerge thereafter, tension throughout the society continued, especially as many purged Party officials were returned to office and the split between Mao and Lin Biao intensified. During the early 1970s, the Party machinery was restored and under the leadership of Zhou En-lai the country seemed to be entering a new period of stability. However, even after the death of Lin Biao, the leadership remained divided, with the Cultural Revolution forces now being represented by what was later to be called the Gang of Four. It was not until January 1975 that the NPC met to pass a new Constitution designed to formalize the changes in China's political and social life over the past twenty years. According to the new Constitution, the People's Republic was no longer a \"people's democratic state,\" but a \"socialist state of the dictatorship of the",
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    {
        "id": 212778,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1992",
        "page_number": 87,
        "title": "RAS-1992",
        "content_text": "72\n\nbasic elements of the social network and were such obvious facts of life that Chinese took them for granted and did not think of them as in any way unusual.\n\nThe Army of the Hsiang was an important Field Force raised in Hunan, especially in the area of the Hsiang River, a sort of counter-balance to the Huai River Army, raised about the same time for the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in the valley of the Yangtze and elsewhere. The Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan was the C-in-C of the Hsiang-chün consisting of Hunan troops which had at first been designated as the Ch'u-chün or Army of Ch'u, a name derived from the ancient state of Ch'u, which comprised the provinces of Hunan and Hupei, as well as other provinces including the whole or part of Anhui and Honan. The Ch'u-chün was commanded by Tso Tsung-t'ang. The Hsiang Army was divided into several army corps or divisions, each numbering from ten to twenty, or even thirty battalions each of five hundred men. Each corps had a distinct designation or appellation, derived from the locality where it was actually organised or from the name or part of the name of the commander of the particular corps. One corps however, the principal one, was styled the Hsiang-ying from its having been organised in the prefecture of Changsha Fu on the banks of the Hsiang River. When more corps were required, however, the name Hsiang-chün was brought into use as with the Huai-chün, to represent all the corps of each army.”\n\nAlthough Mesny obliquely mentioned a higher command, the Ministry of War in Peking, regrettably he did not offer any information which would explain the subordination and chain of command other than telling us that the commander of the Szechuan Force, General T'ang, took his orders from the Viceroy of Szechuan and obtained supplies and funding, when they were forthcoming, from the Szechuanese provincial authorities in Ch'eng-tu.\n\nThe plan now was for the main body of the Ko-i Brigade to advance and occupy the city of Chung-an [Szu] on the Chung-an River by way of Ta-ngai and Chung-pai (later renamed Chung-sheng), whilst another element of the brigade would advance and occupy Huang-p'ing Hsin-chou [New Town].\n\nThe advance began on 18 March 1869. Several days later Chung-an had been occupied and fortified, as had Huang-p'ing New Town. Chung-an was overlooked by hills and mountains occupied by",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215934,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 233,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "167\n\nsocieties in the Japanese Army, though in his memoirs he downplayed this role. When Mrs Bush, a Japanese, was later forced to work as a Kempeitai interpreter, she talked to a prisoner who was in American Naval Intelligence about their mutual friend Charles Boxer. Bill Kendall, of whom more below, was told by Boxer that the Japanese were on the move: when he saw the zeros flying overhead, and knew that the attack had finally started.\n\nBeyond military intelligence\n\nFW Kendall was a Canadian from Vancouver who had lived in Hong Kong since childhood, and spoke not only fluent Cantonese but other dialects as well. He had had a mining business in China, but after the Japanese occupied east Guangdong and Chekiang his business was cut off. He then moved back to Hong Kong and worked for the Government organising refugee relief, building and running the main large camp at Kam Tin. Early in 1940 Kendall was approached by Col LA Newnham, in his capacity in charge of Military Intelligence, and asked to set up a small unit of civilians and volunteers. Being non-military personnel, they could undertake training in the use of sabotage and \"ungentlemanly warfare,\" which the official armed services could not legitimately carry out. The unit was given the cover name Z Force. Allocating £1,500 for this 'unit for independent action behind enemy lines' had to be done outside normal accounting channels, GOC Hong Kong told the War Office in September 1941, because of the need for absolute secrecy in a small place like Hong Kong.\n\nThe Special Operations Executive, under the Ministry for Economic Warfare, had been established in Europe for some years to assist resistance. They trained agents for the specific purpose of operating behind enemy lines using espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare. Specialist SOE units created miniature code machines, wireless facilities and concealed weapons, known by the cheerful name of 'toys.' Where strategically useful, SOE created facilities for specialised sabotage. The whole point of SOE was to facilitate war in situations such as in occupied countries where traditional warfare was impractical. Its methods were ideally suited to the situation in China, where the front was so large and diverse that Japanese supply lines were stretched to vulnerability. The populace was strongly motivated for resistance, and the Japanese, whose control was weak beyond urban areas, were",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215941,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 240,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "174\n\nwhich the Police Commissioner handed over $20,000 without question when advised of the plot, though it was claimed that the bribe money came from the Shanghai triads leader Tu Yueh Sheng, then a refugee, albeit wealthy, in Hong Kong. Whatever the truth behind the story, it gained currency as it made the escape of General Yee and Admiral Chan Chak palatable to colonials by portraying it as an honourable act by the British to reward Yee for his assistance in saving them.\n\nIt was almost certainly also a smokescreen to disguise the removal from Hong Kong of something important to the British. MacDougall claimed in 1942 that he had not planned to go but had been persuaded at the last moment by senior government officials. MacDougall however was circumspect, careful not to betray sensitive information in an open letter. He could, however, say that during the last two years his work had 'become increasingly political in character. Officially neutral in the Sino-Japanese War, I had nevertheless behind the scenes consistently exerted what influence I possessed toward blocking and hampering the propaganda and other activities of the Japanese and the adherents of the Wang Ching Wei....I had worked very closely with Chinese organisations and did all in my power, consistent with the interests of the Colony, to aid them.' It should also be noted that he was not an officer of the colonial establishment but belonged to the Ministry of Information. He was to return to Hong Kong on liberation to reinstate the administration. While no high-profile officers escaped with the Chan Chak group, it is probable that some were carrying information. There were men from Army, Navy, and Air Force, and they were chosen for the mission, only one man being a \"guest.\"\n\n* xviii Major Goring was to spend much of the war attached to various strategic planning groups in the China theatre.\n\nThe extent of KMT activity in Hong Kong was considerable. Hong Kong was a sort of open house where all factions of Chinese politics from left to right could operate, as long as they were discreet. Overt acts of terrorism and subversion in other colonies, like the Malayan federation, were suppressed. The territory was also the port through which arms and armaments flowed into China. Technically this was in breach of the Hague Convention as Britain was supposed to be neutral, but there were ways of smuggling and circumventing the system. Baileys, the Hong Kong shipyard, built river gunboats that were outfitted with guns once they entered China. The same technology that enabled\n\nPage 240\n\nPage 241",
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