[
    {
        "id": 207369,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 137,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT\n\n129\n\nloyal service to the dynasty, he had shown himself to be ungrateful, greedy, power-hungry and difficult to control. Given the privileged position such Westerners enjoyed in China, transgressions by them could not easily be punished--even if they were to become Chinese subjects.77\n\nWhat could not be expected of Ward could hardly be expected of other foreigners in the Chinese military service. Emphasizing that Westerners did not delight in Chinese clothes and customs, Hsüeh and Li argued that China “need not force them to do what they find difficult.\" In their view, nothing was to be gained by foreign military employees going through the motions of either changing to Chinese clothing or registering as Chinese subjects. The throne voiced substantial agreement.78 Allowing foreigners to follow their own customs was, after all, consistent with the traditional policy of \"keeping [barbarians] under loose rein [chi-mi],” which did not exclude the idea of cultural submission, but neither did it demand it. Meanwhile, local officials were expected to devise effective means for establishing control over barbarian employees until such time as their services could be dispensed with.\n\nWhen Charles G. Gordon received command of the Ever-Victorious Army after Burgevine's dismissal, the throne did not require that he register as a Chinese subject or change to Chinese ways.79 It did, however, demand that he be effectively controlled. Unmoved by the prospect of material gain, and comparatively aloof, Gordon was a difficult barbarian to ensnare. Yet through a combination of flattery, honors, shrewd diplomacy, and administrative pressures (including the presence of Li Hung-chang's growing Anhwei Army) the Chinese succeeded in winning and maintaining Gordon's devotion.80 Throughout his career in China Gordon carried the stigma of being an \"unsubmissive\" foreign commander,81 but he received unprecedented honors from the throne. Eventually, with Li Hung-chang as his sponsor, Gordon achieved the exalted rank of provincial commander-in-chief (ti-tu) and the coveted yellow riding-jacket (huang ma-kua). By the end of his tumultuous career as head of the Ever-Victorious Army in 1864, he and Li Hung-chang had become fast friends, and they remained so for many years to come.\n\n82\n\nDuring the T'ung-chih period, a considerable number of other foreigners entered the Chinese military service. Some, such as A. E. LeBrethon de Caligny, Prosper Giquel, and Paul d'Aiguebelle, led foreign-officered contingents patterned after the Ever-Victorious",
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    {
        "id": 207378,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 146,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "138\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\n86 See Smith, \"Foreign-Training;\" also Yang-wu yün-tung [The “foreign matters\" movement] (Shanghai, 1961), 3: 463, 469, 492, 599, 613, etc.\n\n87 IWSM, TC 22: 12-13b; 23: 42-43.\n\n88 See the IWSM references cited in note 85. Pennell became fully sinicized, shaving his head, changing to Chinese clothing, learning Chinese, marrying a Chinese, and finally petitioning to be registered as a native of Ho-fei, Anhwei. Mesny, too, was attracted by Chinese civilization, thus reinforcing the persistent notion of barbarian \"transformation\". See especially the memorial by Wu Tang and Ch'ung-shih in 1870 requesting that Mesny be advanced to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (ts'an-chiang) and awarded the peacock feather for his efforts against the Miao. This memorial was in many respects a replica of Hsueh Huan's request for similar awards to be granted to Ward in 1862.\n\n89 Examples in IWSM and WCSL abound. See also Fairbank, \"The Early Treaty System,\" esp. 264-265; John Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 50. Traditional attitudes were, of course, reinforced by the examination system. One of the topics for the metropolitan examinations in 1880 was the following quotation: \"By indulgent treatment of men from a distance they are brought to resort to him from all quarters. And by kindly cherishing the princes of the states, the whole empire is brought to revere him.\" Cited in the North-China Herald, May 18, 1880.\n\n90 See, for example, WCSL 101: 9; 129: 17.\n\n91 See especially K. C. Liu, \"The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hung-chang's Formative Years, 1823-1866,\" HJAS, 30 (1970); David Pong, \"Confucian Patriotism and the Destruction of the Woosung Railway, 1877,\" Modern Asian Studies, 7.4 (1973).\n\n**\n\n92 For a discussion of the concept of r'i-chih, see Immanuel Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).\n\n93 See Ella Lonn's Foreigners in the Confederacy (Chapel Hill, 1940) and Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, 1951).\n\n94 See, for example, Ernst Presseisen, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1965); Noboru Umetani, \"Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,\" East Asian Cultural Studies, 10.1 (March, 1971).\n\n95 What differed was China's international situation. China had to endure far more political, economic and military pressure from the European powers than either the United States or Japan in the nineteenth century.\n\n96 The great majority of Japanese military employees in the latter half of the nineteenth century neither became Japanese subjects nor accepted Japanese culture. See, for example, Presseisen, 112.\n\n97 See the discussion in Smith, \"Foreign-Training.\"",
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    {
        "id": 208020,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1977",
        "page_number": 59,
        "title": "RAS-1977",
        "content_text": "A JOURNEY TO YENAN, 1946\n\nW. A. REYNOLDS*\n\nIntroduction\n\nThe purpose of this paper is to record some experiences of a truck journey in early 1946 from Chungking, the wartime capital of the Republic of China, to Yenan, the Headquarters of the 18th Group Army, the Chinese Communist Party and capital of the Kansu-Ninghsia-Shensi Border Region, and back. This three-truck convoy carrying medical supplies was the first delivery to take place for a period of about four years, and a very brief review of the political background is perhaps required to set the scene.\n\nFollowing the Sian incident of December 1936, there were moves towards a united anti-Japanese front between the Nationalist Government (Kuomintang) under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists (Kungchangtang). This was followed on July 7, 1937, by the Marco Polo Bridge fighting and the start of the Japanese invasion of the heartland of China. In this period, there was a nominal united command of Kuomintang and Kungchangtang with Marshal Chiang Kai-shek as Supreme Commander. The New Fourth Army, based in Anhwei, had been formed from the Communist guerilla groups left behind in Central China, but friction developed between this and the Kuomintang forces, and in January 1941, it was attacked in South Anhwei and partly destroyed. This marked the end of the united front, and the Kuomintang re-introduced the blockade of the Liberated Areas under 18th Group Army control. These Liberated Areas were basically the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Suiyuan, Honan, Hupeh, Hopeh, Shantung, Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Jehol. Much of these areas were also under Japanese occupation of the cities, railways, and roads, but the countryside was effectively under the control of the Liberated Areas Regional Councils.\n\nThe reintroduction of the blockade meant that a proportion of the Kuomintang troops were engaged in this exercise rather than\n\n* Paper delivered to a meeting of the Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch on 31st May, 1977. Mr. Reynolds is head of the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Hong Kong.",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208313,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 37,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n21\n\nWestern-style weapons, since they lived in designated garrisons that were \"comparatively easy to guard.\" This early attempt to confine knowledge of foreign weapons to Banner forces, although ultimately unsuccessful, is nonetheless suggestive. As alien conquerors, the Manchus remained somewhat paranoid.28\n\nAnother serious problem with foreign-training programs in the 1860's and 70's was that they were not designed specifically as officer-training schools. Although the Tientsin program did train officers for the Peking Field Force and some Green Standard units as well, it trained the rank and file at the same time, in the same basic way. The emphasis was on military drill rather than on modern officer-education, and immediate military needs were always paramount. As long as rebellion raged, there were compelling reasons to continue producing Western-armed, Western-trained Chinese officers and men, despite the many difficulties involved in employing foreigners. But as the internal threat in a given area subsided, so did enthusiasm for reform; and as it did, the foreign-training programs quickly withered away.29 What remained was a certain number of Western-drilled troops and some low-ranking instructors, but very few officers with a real grasp of Western military knowledge. Again, there was little premium on acquiring it.\n\nBy the mid-1870's, the major rebellions in China had been suppressed, lulling the dynasty into a false sense of security. But it was far less Western-style military education and tactics than a new-found acquaintance with Western-style weapons that brought victory to the Ch'ing forces.30 With superior arms, traditional Chinese strategy and tactics usually sufficed against internal rebels, but such techniques were much less effective against rapidly modernizing external enemies.31 After 1875, the rise of foreign aggression on China's land and maritime frontiers complicated the dynasty's military choices, and made recourse to foreign military assistance all the more difficult.32 Yet in the absence of sufficient numbers of qualified Chinese military personnel for Western-style training, reform-minded Chinese officials continued to look to the West for aid.\n\nPerhaps the most prominent and powerful of these officials was Li Hung-chang, who, with substantial foreign assistance dating from the early 1860's, had by the 1870's built his Anhwei Army into the finest military force in the empire. An examination of",
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    {
        "id": 208314,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 38,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "22 \n\nRICHARD J. SMITH \n\nLi's approach to officer education during his tenure as governor-general of Chihli from 1870 to 1895, at the apex of his power, may shed some light on the many problems involved in China's late nineteenth century effort to create a modern officer corps.34 \n\nThroughout his illustrious career up to 1895, Li continually drew upon foreign talent to instruct (and occasionally to lead) his forces.35 But in 1876, he took the unprecedented step of sending Chinese military men abroad for training, entrusting seven petty officers to one of his best German drill instructors, a man named Lehmayer. Li's plan was to employ these men as instructors in the Anhwei Army upon their return to China.36 Li had as early as 1874 inquired into the possibility of sending Chinese students to West Point, and in 1875 had discussed the establishment of a military academy in China with the American general Emory Upton.37 But political difficulties in the United States stood in the way of the first plan, and financial constraints made the second impossible.38 Li's writings in the mid-1870s indicate a full awareness of the value of military academy education, but apparently the need at the time was not sufficiently great to justify the cost of establishing a full-fledged military academy on Chinese soil.39 \n\nOf the seven men sent to study in Germany, two were recalled before completion of their planned three-year program of study because of their frivolous attitude and poor progress. One became sick and died, three successfully completed their infantry training, and one—Wang Te-sheng—stayed on in Germany until 1881, receiving additional specialized instruction in Berlin. Of the seven, only Wang emerged as a prominent figure in the Anhwei Army, heading Li's crack “personal guard unit” (ch'in-ping), and eventually achieving the rank of tsung-ping. Overall, the educational experiment fell far short of complete success, and was marked by numerous problems, including disputes with the German supervisor, language difficulties, and, of course, high costs.40 \n\nAs one of the three regular graduates of the German training program, Cha Lien-piao's experience as an instructor in the Anhwei Army is illuminating. Cha served in Chou Sheng-ch'uan's 10,000-man Sheng-chün—perhaps the best detachment of the Anhwei Army in all of China up to the time of Chou's death in 1885.41 Convinced of the value of Western training and drill from long exposure to foreign instructors in Li's force (dating from the Taiping period),",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208315,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 39,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n23\n\nChou lamented the fact that the spirit of foreign drill had not more fully permeated the Anhwei Army. Hoping to remedy the situation, and appreciative of Cha's contributions to the overall efficiency of the Sheng-chün, Chou urged Li to \"break the rules\" by giving Cha a salary increase in order to reward and encourage him.42 Significantly, however, Chou did not recommend Cha for high-level promotion within the Green Standard system—a reward which most yung-ying officers especially esteemed.43 Although Chou's voluminous writings repeatedly emphasize the importance of Western-style drill, it is apparent that Chou himself was not prepared to request maximum rewards for those who had mastered it.45 How much more of a problem must this have been in other, less progressive military forces?\n\nAnother difficulty in the Anhwei Army was a certain hostility to foreigners and foreign influences. Although Chou took obvious pride in his knowledge of Western military science and technology,46 and took pains to point out that his foreign-trained officers were trusted by their men,47 it is clear that the acceptance of foreign influences within the Anhwei Army as a whole was less than complete. In the words of one well-informed observer of Li's force, \"to be smart [in Western drill] is to be like a hated foreigner and to lose caste.\" This attitude, together with an inherited distaste for active involvement in drill, undoubtedly compromised the military effectiveness of the Anhwei Army's officer corps. Although Chou repeatedly admonished his battalion and company officers to become actively involved in the training process, it is evident that they continued to resist such direct and degrading participation. Chou's writings, as well as independent foreign observations, note this crucial and persistent problem, but little could be done to remedy it.49\n\nSeveral times during the early 1880's, Chou confessed that the vaunted Sheng-chün had declined, that after two decades it had lost much of its sharpness and acquired a \"twilight air.\" The experienced officers, he complained, lacked vigor, while the new and brave officers lacked knowledge.50 In order to alleviate the problem, and to bring the force more in line with Western practice, Chou suggested shortly before his death the establishment of a foreign-style Chinese military academy (Wu-pei yüan).51 Apparently fearful of upsetting vested interests within the Anhwei Army, Chou emphasized...",
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    },
    {
        "id": 208316,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 40,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "24\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nphasized that it would “not be necessary to teach many commanders\":\n\n52 but he did encourage Li to establish a \"public office\" (kung-so) as soon as possible to provide systematic instruction for Chinese soldiers under German supervision.53 The immediate incentive was three-fold: the military demands of Sino-French conflict, the support of other Anhwei Army commanders, and the presence of a core group of capable German instructors,54\n\nLi's initial proposal for a military academy (Wu-pei hsüeh-t'ang) at Tientsin was quite modest. In part because of financial limitations, but also because of military exigency (and perhaps in deference to Chou), Li decided to train about one hundred petty officers and troops (pien-ping) selected from the Anhwei Army and lien-chün units, as well as some civil personnel (wen-yuan) who were \"willing to learn about military affairs.\" The simplified curriculum, taught by German officers with the aid of Chinese interpreters, consisted of astronomy, geography, science, surveying, drafting, mathematics, fortifications, and military drill and operations. Li expected the students to complete their education in one year (it actually took two), after which time they would return to their original units to transmit the newly-acquired information to their comrades.55 In all, about 1,500 \"cadets\" were probably trained in this fashion from 1885 to 1900. Most served only as instructors, however; few became ranking officers. On the whole they were neither given authority nor esteemed by their older colleagues and superiors.56\n\nIn the spring of 1887, Li added a five-year program to the Tientsin Military Academy. In contrast to the short course, this program aimed at producing officers. Stringent requirements were imposed on the applicants, who ranged in age from thirteen to sixteen.57 Forty students were accepted at first. Each had to guarantee to study for five full years without asking for leave, taking the civil service examinations, or getting married. The five-year course of study was comparatively demanding. During the first three years, the students took a foreign language (German or English), arithmetic, algebra, geometry, mechanics, astronomy, natural science, geography, map-making, and, of course, Chinese history and the Classics. During the last two years, they studied gunnery, military drill, fortifications, and other technical subjects. Periodic examinations determined class standing, and provided the",
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    {
        "id": 208319,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "document_key": "RAS-1978",
        "page_number": 43,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n27\n\nestablishment of a Directorate for Military Affairs (Tu-pan chün-wu ch'u) in early November, 1894, did virtually nothing to alter the course of the war, and the nearly useless Naval Board (Hai-chün ya-men) was disbanded even prior to the end of the fighting. Neither body found it possible to effectively coordinate land fighting or to insure cooperation between the army and navy.76 Meanwhile, poor field communications and transport facilities, inadequate preparation, faulty intelligence, and widespread corruption in pay and supply, made it virtually impossible for Chinese forces to fight efficiently.77 Ammunition shortages, worthless shells, and lack of standardization in weapons proved especially troublesome at sea. On land, ammunition shortages seem to have been less acute, but morale undoubtedly suffered from the absence of a modern hospital corps and ambulance service such as Japan possessed.78\n\nSurprisingly, Chinese forces did not always do poorly, in spite of these handicaps. Portions of Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army under Chang Kao-yüan, for example, performed admirably during the war, as they had done a decade earlier under Chang on Taiwan during the Sino-French hostilities. Chang, who had once served with the Ever-Victorious Army, received the praise of foreign observers not only prior to Sino-Japanese War but also during and after the conflict for his tactical ability and the training, discipline, and effective weapons of the troops under his command.79 I-k'o-tang-a, a Manchu general, also gained plaudits from foreigners, including the Japanese, who acknowledged that he had surprising tactical talent for \"a Chinese warrior of the old school.\"80 A few other Ch'ing commanders, such as Tso Pao-kuei, at least received praise for their bravery against the Japanese. But overall, Chinese troops were poorly-led and unsuitably trained. Lack of effective leadership exacerbated all of China's military problems and undermined both discipline and morale. The overwhelming majority of China's field commanders and middle-grade officers were not graduates of China's two infant military academies, and although some such individuals served with distinction in low-ranking positions, their mere presence within a given army was seldom enough to inspire confidence among either officers or the rank and file.81\n\nGenerally, the Chinese were extremely timid on land and sea, encouraging the Japanese to attempt daring and highly successful tactics that would ordinarily be considered too hazardous for use",
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    {
        "id": 208320,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "page_number": 44,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "28\n\nRICHARD J. SMITH\n\nagainst a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battlefield, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or outlandishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.\n\nAnother serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since \"it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers.\"88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90\n\nAt sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of",
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    {
        "id": 208323,
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        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
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        "page_number": 47,
        "title": "RAS-1978",
        "content_text": "MILITARY EDUCATION in CHINA, 1842-1895\n\n31\n\nChinese society.103 The new content of military education, which emphasized technical skills and diluted traditional values and loyalties somewhat, created a new professional elite that was significantly different in outlook from even such relatively progressive (and rare) individuals as Chou Sheng-chuan.104 For all his innovativeness, Chou remained bound by the inhibiting institutional structure of the Anhwei Army as well as the limits of his own educational experience within that force. As a result, he was never able to resolve certain fundamental conflicts in his self-image, attitude, and approach toward military affairs and reform.105\n\nOne is tempted to see in Chou the tensions of becoming \"modern\" and remaining \"Chinese\" suggested by Joseph Levenson, and even a kind of nineteenth-century version of the \"red versus expert\" dilemma of more recent times. Although Chou obviously admired Western military organization and repeatedly solicited foreign military advice, he was also anxious to demonstrate that the Chinese yung-ying model was in many respects equivalent or superior to the Western model, and he often reacted quite defensively to foreign criticisms.106 Chou admired foreign technology (at one point maintaining that bullets were more important than rations), but he also repeatedly stressed the human factor in warfare, down-playing on occasion foreign advantages in organization and weapons, emphasizing the importance of \"will\" (chih-ch'i), and periodically suggesting to Li Hung-chang the utility of rapidly recruiting volunteers (i-yung) and employing them as \"surprise troops\" (ch'i-ping).107\n\nObsessed with the need for intensive drill, Chou nonetheless continually employed the Sheng-chün in non-military tasks which undoubtedly compromised its fighting effectiveness—work on military agricultural colonies (t'un-t'ien), land reclamation, flood and famine relief work, and so forth.108 Finally, although Chou seems to have considered himself to be a professional soldier, and was anxious to foster positive attitudes toward the military, he, like virtually all of his fellow officers and commanders, esteemed civil status and sought identification with the civil bureaucracy.109\n\nThe more genuinely professional education provided by the Tientsin Military Academy after Chou's death helped resolve some of the tensions that seem to have plagued Chou.110 Certainly, it allowed the many Tientsin-trained commanders in Yüan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang Army to accept more readily the modern principle and",
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