[ { "id": 207424, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1975", "page_number": 192, "title": "RAS-1975", "content_text": "184\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nin September and December, and two each in October and November. In 1945 we had one intake in January, a tiny intake in February, one in March and two in June. I imagine that most of the tinned foods came from overseas. I learned later that two ship loads of Allied Red Cross stores had reached Hong Kong during the war having been transhipped to Japanese vessels.\n\nEffects of supplements upon the General Diet\n\nIn February 1943 I began to estimate and record the protein, fat and carbohydrate contents of the contributions from the three voluntary sources to the general diet. I started also to calculate the calorie values of our general diet, but the figures I arrived at were undoubtedly high partly due to the fact that I made no allowances for losses in preparation and cooking and partly due to assumptions I was forced to make when calculating the value of unknown varieties of flabby fish or lily roots or chrysanthemum leaves. I have not thought it worth while to burden readers with these calculations but making them occupied many hours of my time.\n\nFeeding the Patients\n\nI referred earlier to the problems of feeding patients suffering from acute infections and how these were tackled. In the case of the deficiency diseases some patients had turned against all food and went downhill in spite of everything that we could do for them. In these fatal cases the walls of the intestine had become as thin as a sheet of paper and were quite incapable of absorbing nourishment. Little that we could do therefore influenced the cases of these patients at all. Those among us who were able to eat a rice diet and who escaped major infections were indeed fortunate.\n\nOur system of feeding patients suffering from deficiency diseases and those in whom the acute stage of infection was passing was quite simple. Anything in the food store was available for them in as great quantities as they could take, the aim being of course to arrest the declining state of nourishment and to reverse this as soon as possible. This policy was undoubtedly the right one and certainly preserved many lives. It had less obviously good results in those with defects of vision and certain other neurological damage.\n\nPatients therefore had first call upon the extra food stuffs received from all sources. Reference to the tables showing food", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 207803, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1976", "page_number": 191, "title": "RAS-1976", "content_text": "176 \n\nA. D. BLUE \n\nChinese shipping in these years, and anti-Japanese boycotts led to the virtual disappearance of Japanese shipping for long periods. \n\nNot that these last few years were trouble-free for British ships. There were also anti-British boycotts, brushes with pirates, war lords, and lawless soldiers, and the famous 'Wanhsien Incident' of 1926 which has already been described. Then when Japan gained control of the Lower Yangtze at the end of 1937, the British presence on the Yangtze rapidly declined. Hankow became the capital before Nanking fell to the Japanese in December 1937, and Chungking succeeded Hankow before the latter fell in October 1938. As the Japanese moved up the river the British steamers moved ahead of them as far as possible, maintaining an increasingly restricted service, which by mid 1940 had been reduced to infrequent trips between Chungking and Wanhsien. During this period many Lower River steamers were abandoned. By mid 1940 the situation had become impossible, fuel was unobtainable, and the last few British officers were evacuated from Chungking by the new road to Kunming, then by the French railway to Haiphong, and finally by sea to Hong Kong. \n\nAt this time there were two Royal Navy gunboats still at Chungking, H.M. Ships Falcon and Gannet. The former remained to act as radio link for the British Embassy, while the latter was decommissioned and her crew sent to Hong Kong by the same route. \n\nSoon after this the Japanese occupied Indo-China, and the Haiphong-Kumming-Chungking lifeline was also denied China. The Chungking-Kunming road was then extended to Burma, and became China's most important route to the outside world, fulfilling the dreams of earlier generations of China traders. This was the famous Burma Road, sometimes identified with the whole 1,000 miles from Rangoon to Chungking, but more accurately with the 600 miles from Lashio (the railhead 130 miles above Mandalay) to Kunming. \n\nThus, after decades of neglect and oblivion, the Burma Road into China was restored to international importance. It was again disrupted when the Japanese conquered Burma in early 1943; but re-opened along a new western route when General Stilwell's American and Chinese forces built a road through North Burma to link Assam with the eastern section of the Burma Road. This route played a vital part in the Allied reconquest of Burma, Malaya, and Indo-China.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1976.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/hq382988q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209584, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1982", "page_number": 241, "title": "RAS-1982", "content_text": "219\n\nby their spotless virtues\". A claim that must have raised a few eyebrows.\n\nWhile the actresses were available, there seemed some doubt about the actors. Lord Saltoun, Commander of the Forces, noted on the 25 November 1842 that the Theatre was to open on Wednesday, \"But who are to be the actors, I have no idea. I believe some amateurs from the navy”.\n\nOnce opened, the life of the Theatre was short. Mr. Dutronquoy departed from Hong Kong quite suddenly on the 17th of December. It was alleged that he had to close his Hotel and Theatre under orders from the authorities and pay a fine of $500. This was denied by his agent who stated that the reason for the closure was because Mr. Dutronquoy had “received personal violence added to insult and abuse the preceding evening\". One wonders if the \"spotless virtues\" of the actresses may have been the cause of his troubles.\n\nThe next notice of dramatics is in December 1844 when a proposal to form a company of amateurs under the patronage of the Governor was announced. It was expressly stated that the authorities regarded the project as a \"protection against vice”. Little action took place, however, until the winter of 1845-46 when a group had been organized, a venue secured, and five bills put on between December and June at Aqui's Theatre in the Lower Bazaar.\n\nThis theatre had been erected some few months previous to the amateurs' first performance there. It was intended for Chinese entertainment, but, being available, it was used by the Hong Kong Amateurs even though it was in the heart of the Chinese section of the city, an area which was usually avoided by the European population of the day.\n\nLoo Aqui, the owner of the Theatre, was a leader of the Chinese community. It was alleged that he was allied with pirates but during the recent British-Chinese hostilities he had been very useful in securing provisions for the British forces. As a reward for these services he had been permitted to take up a number of lots in the Lower Bazaar, the area which was allotted to Chinese who had aided the British. On his property, Loo Aqui", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1982.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mk61z420p", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 209932, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1983", "page_number": 191, "title": "RAS-1983", "content_text": "169\n\nNOTES\n\n1 The shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes the three statements in a particular area to be mutually exclusive and of roughly equal ideological distance to one another. It is better to ask the respondent to react to each statement and indicate his agreement or disagreement with it along a three-point or five-point scale. This can avoid the problem of unwarranted assumptions, and make possible the application of more sophisticated statistical techniques to extract information from the data. But for the sake of comparability, I follow Nichols' approach in the present study.\n\nNichols' sample includes 65 directors and senior managers in 15 private companies employing over 500 workers in 'Northern City'. These companies were engaged in various lines of manufacture: chemicals, heavy engineering, light engineering, pharmaceutical, flour milling and animal foodstuffs, distribution and allied business, and packaging. See Nichols 1969: 247-248.\n\n* I use an alphabet and a number to denote the respondents. The former indicates whether the respondent is a chairman/managing-director (A) or just one of the directors (B). The latter stands for a particular spinning mill.\n\nA 'can-I-have-more' incident occurred during the 1973 annual general meeting of Mill 16 in which a share-holder protested, to no avail, against what he regarded as meagre dividends after successive profitable years for the company. See South China Morning Post, 31st August, 1973.\n\nList of References\n\nBendix, Reinhard, 1954. \"Industrial Authority and Its Supporting Value System\". In Industrial Conflict, ed. by A. Kornhauser et al., New York, MacGraw-Hill, pp. 170-175.\n\nand Social\n\n1956. Work and Authority in Industry. New York, Wiley.\n\n1959. \"Industrialization, Ideologies, Structure”, American Sociological Review 24, No. 6: 613–623.\n\nBergere, Marie-Claire. 1968. \"The Role of The Bourgeoisie\". In China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913, ed. by Mary Clabaugh Wright, New Haven, Yale University Press, pp. 229-295.\n\nChrist, Thomas. 1970. \"A Thematic Analysis of The American Business Creed\", Social Forces 49, No. 2: 239-245.\n\nChu, T'ung-tsu. 1957. \"Chinese Class Structure and Its Ideology\". In Chinese Thought & Institutions, ed. by John K. Fairbank, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 235-250.\n\nEngland, Joe, and John Rear. 1975. Chinese Labour Under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.\n\nEspy, John L., 1974. \"Hong Kong Textile Ltd.\". In Managerial Policy, Strategy and Planning for Southeast Asia, ed. by L.C. Nehrt, G.S. Evans, and L. Li, Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, pp. 273-282.\n\nFei, Hsiao-tung. 1946. \"Peasantry and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes\", American Journal of Sociology LII, No. 1: 1-17.\n\nFox, Alan. 1966. “Managerial Ideology and Labour Relations\", British Journal of Industrial Relations 4, No. 3: 366-378,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1983.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j9607p61v", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 210981, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1987", "page_number": 43, "title": "RAS-1987", "content_text": "18\n\nLes yeux fixés au large et les cheveux au vent Nous nous embarquerons pour la Mer des Ténèbres Avec le coeur joyeux d'un jeune passager.\n\nLL\n\nJust as in the old days we would leave for China Our eyes looking out to sea and our hair streaming in the wind We shall sail henceforward for the Sea of Darkness Cheerful and lighthearted as a young traveller.\n\nThis is a major reversal, from the China ‘trip' into the Sea of Darkness. This is a remarkable and prophetic insight on the part of Baudelaire, a poetic formulation which is most relevant to our present-day intellectual crisis. We shall refer to it again a little later.\n\n—\n\n12\n\nAs the nineteenth century went on, as French political involvement in China and Vietnam became more effective, it was not unusual for French intellectuals to visit China and to empathize with her but always as isolated individuals. Such a one was Father Huc,1 a Catholic missionary whose minority voice, uncertain as it was, insisted on the specific values of Chinese culture and habits. China was a source of inspiration for diplomats posted there, such as Eugene Simon, whose book La Cité chinoise is a minor classic modelled on Fustel de Coulanges's standard essay La Cité grecque, and later Paul Claudel, a young consul in Tianjin, expressing his emotions in Connaissance de l'Est, a collection of poems in the Symbolist manner. French visitors to China included naval officers such as Pierre Loti, who had witnessed approvingly another sack of Peking by Western Allied forces after the Boxer Rebellion, or Victor Segalen, poet and archaeologist. Later still, intellectuals turned into revolutionaries, such as the young André Malraux who was involved in the 1926-27 Communist revolution in Canton, and who drew on this experience for his two major novels, Les Conquérants and La Condition humaine. Huc, Simon, Claudel, Segalen, Loti and Malraux had indeed very little in common except that they were somehow marginal figures on the French intellectual scene of their time. Even for those who were later to achieve international fame, such as Claudel and Malraux, China had not been much more than an", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1987.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/rx919b522", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211312, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 28, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "social, demographic and economic situation of the late Ch'ien-lung and Chia-ch'ing periods led to an intensification of petty piracy as more and more gangs came into being, but not to any transformation of the phenomenon to a large scale or higher level of organization.\n\nThus we must next ask whether the growth in piracy was owing to outside patronage or support as was often the case with piracy throughout the rest of the world. In the first instance, the answer is \"yes\", for the immediate growth of piracy in China can be traced to the Tayson Rebellion in Vietnam and the creation of a privateer fleet by the Quang Trung Emperor (Nguyen Quang Trung). As a result of Tayson patronage, pirates, no longer forced to spend all of their energy on survival, could turn their attention to organization which became larger, more complex, and more permanent.\n\nWhereas pirate gangs of the pre-Tayson era had consisted of a score of men and a couple of vessels, by 1796 associations of a hundred men, and a dozen junks were not uncommon. Hierarchies comprised of patron-client relationships extending two, and sometimes even three, layers gradually appeared, and asylum in Vietnam allowed pirate leaders extraordinary opportunities for getting acquainted and cooperating in joint ventures. In creating privateers, the Tayson legalized piracy and thus radically transformed the status of its underworld practitioners who were instantly elevated from \"scourges of the sea\" to sailors in the king's navy. The result was a significant escalation in the scale of piracy.\n\nHowever, the heyday of the Tayson was short and their dethronement in 1802 left the Chinese pirates bereft once more of either a base or patronage. No longer were their activities regarded as \"legitimate” in any sense of the word and never would they be so again, yet, patronage notwithstanding, the pirates had come under Tayson sponsorship nowhere close to what would ultimately become their maximum growth. Thus, the Tayson era can be viewed as a kind of transition phase which allowed petty pirates to take the first and most crucial step in their own transformation. Yet, the period of the pirates' greatest strength still lay ahead and it came, not while they were allied to the Vietnamese, but rather after they had been forced out on their own into a hostile world in which they were regarded as the proverbial \"enemies of all mankind”.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211324, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 40, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "16\n\nNOT SO CALM AN ADMINISTRATION:\n\nTHE ANGLO-FRENCH OCCUPATION OF CANTON,\n\n1858-1861\n\nSTEVEN A. LEIBO*\n\nOne of the more persistent myths of early Sino-European relations is the calm which is said to have prevailed during the three year long Anglo-French occupation of Canton, 1858-1861. As described by one of the best recent histories of modern China:\n\nA few years later when Canton was occupied by the British in 1857, the Cantonese showed no sign of unruliness and foreigners could walk about unmolested, without the slightest sign of resistance or animosity.\n\nThe reality, though, was far different. The Cantonese, long resistant to British demands that they allow foreigners within the walls of their city, continued for quite some time to make life very difficult for the occupying forces. In fact, very considerable resistance was carried out against the foreign military establishment and the mixed units of Sino-European police which worked with them.\n\nThe purpose of this essay is to illustrate elements of the allied occupation, the administrative structure established for the city's governance and the various issues, among them the occupation itself, and the coolie trade, which at times made Allied control of Canton considerably more precarious than we have been led to believe.\n\nThe initial occupation\n\nThe origins of the Second Opium War, or Arrow War as it is often called, are well known and need no more than adumbration here. Certainly, the allied sense that the Opium War treaties, signed more than a decade before, needed revision, as well as long running difficulties between the British and the Cantonese over the right of the former to\n\n* Associate Professor, Dept. of History, Russell Sage College, New York.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211325, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 41, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "17\n\nenter the city walls added to the general tension. More specifically Governor-General Yeh Ming-chen, perceived by local Europeans as an obstacle to peace, as they understood it, was quite unwilling to meet the British demands. As for the French, certainly their desire to establish an influence for themselves equal to that of the British by championing the rights of missionaries added impetus to French interest in a confrontation. As is well known, pretexts once desired are usually found. For the British, the Chinese boarding of the Arrow near Canton was said to be an act of lèse-majesté against the British flag (regardless of the reality of the ship's status). And for the French the convenient death of a French missionary played its role in bringing the combined flotilla before the walls of Canton in late December 1857. There several thousand British and French soldiers soon gathered to make their assault.\n\nFor those not immediately responsible for the military assault the enormity of the undertaking they were involved in must have caused considerable reflection. They were about to attack and presumably occupy an enormous city of more than a million inhabitants. There was no telling, assuming a successful assault, how long they would be required to hold it. But Canton's future administration would be a quieter challenge and one less immediate than the more pressing matter of first taking the city. The actual assault has been often discussed. It suffices here to note that the city's capture, apparently due to the Governor-General's poor planning, was a reasonably simple affair.\n\nWithin days of occupying the city it was clear that the allies would be quite unable to govern it directly. The principal issue was that they were faced with the administration of a city of more than a million people when no more than three among the allied forces could even communicate in Chinese. Of the British only Harry Parkes, the future allied commissioner of the city, and Thomas Wade, later ambassador to Peking, knew Chinese.\n\nThe French, for their part, were without a senior officer able to communicate at all. Their only contribution in this regard was the presence of a certain Marques who was then serving the French mission as a Chinese secretary. For the French, more than for the British, the lack of Chinese linguists was to be a major impediment to their activities throughout China and for years to come. Almost ten months later Paris", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211330, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 46, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "22\n\n*\n\ncity was calming and civilian foreigners were cautiously venturing within the city walls. But confidence had hardly returned. As for their partner in the co-operation, the Governor Po-Kuei, the allies certainly did not trust him. In fact the French suspected that Po-Kuei, despite his apparent willingness to co-operate, was secretly working to undermine their authority,\n\nThe long summer of 1858\n\nAs mentioned above, despite the relative peace of the first weeks of the occupation, a calm which has often been assumed to have continued throughout the city's occupation, the allied forces soon found themselves caught up in a full-fledged resistance movement which lasted throughout the summer of 1858.\n\nEspecially common during the spring of 1858 were attacks on isolated individuals in the environs of the city. The assaults were serious and frequent enough for the French to carry out reprisals against those natives living in the vicinity of the attack. At first it was thought that such a show of force would be effective, but within weeks Cantonese anger had become so obvious that consideration was seriously given to re-establishing the blockade. Harry Parkes, despite his language skills, was, for example, reported to be no longer safe walking the streets without an armed guard. Assassination attempts against allied sentries and others had become commonplace.\n\n3.7\n\nGrowing alarmed, the allied commissioners met with Po-Kuei and demanded any information he had on potential Chinese attacks against the city. They also protested against anti-foreign proclamations which had appeared advertising rewards for the heads of foreigners or Chinese collaborators. To their frustration Po-Kuei's attitude seemed to be one of indifference. The commissioners insisted that the searches for arms, already begun by the military commanders, be endorsed by Po-Kuei.\n\nAs for the regular commercial life of the city, by May it was winding to a stop as tensions continued to increase. By June it was obvious that the provincial authorities were encouraging the Cantonese in their resistance. The new governor-general of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Huang Tsung-han, issued a long manifesto reminding the locals of their", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211332, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 48, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "24\n\nlife of the city was clearly grinding to a halt. Moreover the British, French and American consuls had withdrawn from the city. The French, seeking to demonstrate strength, had gone on the offensive, burning nearby suburbs. Undeterred, the Chinese forces continued to lob bombs at allied positions during the hours of darkness.\n\n44\n\nAs the summer proceeded the attacks became ever commonplace. Real antagonism had developed between the allied forces and the local population. Attacks on foreigners by armed braves were occurring daily, often in broad daylight, so brazen had the population become. Especially at risk were the British sepoys whom the Chinese had taken to carrying off at the rate of one or two a day,\n\n45\n\nIt was becoming an open state of siege. Many of the local Chinese, no doubt seeking to save themselves, had begun to abandon the city. In early July word came to Baron Gros that the Governor-General had put out a circular calling for the complete annihilation of the foreigners.\" It now seemed likely that a full-scale attack against the allied positions might soon take place. The allied leaders had certainly come to regret their decision to have the Chinese administer the city for them. Elgin was convinced that the arrangement had given a false impression of allied weakness and furthermore discouraged those who might have been willing to co-operate. It was clear in the opinion of Elgin and Gros that martial law needed to be proclaimed and the Chinese administrators removed from power. However, for reasons that are not clear, it does not seem that such martial law was ever proclaimed even temporarily. Again, language problems may have made such a decision impossible.\n\n49\n\nBy late July a full scale Chinese attack was launched against the city walls. Encouraged by provincial Chinese officials, the Kwangtung Militia even attempted unsuccessfully to retake the city from its captors. A large body of Chinese braves attacked the Eastern Gate, the very area the allies had successfully assaulted the previous winter. Unfortunately for the Chinese they were less successful. They took several hundred casualties and inflicted no allied wounds. In the immediate aftermath of the efforts to retake the city, the assaults diminished and it appears that the Chinese abandoned their effort to challenge the occupation seriously. 50 Nevertheless, harassment of individual foreigners continued to be quite", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211335, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 51, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "27\n\nThe first weeks of April were especially busy. Chinese officials, both those under Allied control as well as those elsewhere in the province, and the allied commissioners worked to outlaw illegal coolie traffic even as they moved to put into place a more regular system of contract labour.\n\nBoth Huang Tsung-han, the Governor-General, and Po-Kuei issued proclamations condemning the kidnapping while suggesting that a more regular method of recruitment, devoid of coercion, might be allowed. Po-Kuei even offered a reward for the capture of any kidnappers. As for the allied commanders, their own proclamation was issued on 7th April. Again they made it clear that while regular recruitment would be allowed, they would suppress the illegal trade with all the power at their command.\n\nThat summer and autumn plans were made to reorganise the system of recruitment. The new procedures included an elaborate system of recruitment, an interviewing process designed to ensure that everyone involved completely understood the terms of the bilingual contracts and was entirely willing. Altruism aside, the allied occupation forces had to deal with the kidnapping immediately or face a crisis which would have made the summer of 1858 look mild in comparison. It was one thing for the city residents to accept European occupation in place of the rather distant and at times unpopular Manchu control and quite another to have submitted to the authority of a government unwilling to suppress the kidnapping of their children and family members.\n\nNevertheless, the world labour situation did require cheap labour, and hence the necessity of searching for a means of satisfying both the local Chinese as well as the foreign coolie markets. It would be many months, however, before a full system was in place which met both obligations.\n\nRegularising the coolie trade\n\nIf it was obvious that the occupation simply could not continue while the locals were continuously outraged by the kidnappings of their relatives, it was no less clear that honest recruitment of labourers for work overseas was to be an important responsibility of the allied government. Therefore, by the autumn of 1859 the allied administration", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 211338, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1988", "page_number": 54, "title": "RAS-1988", "content_text": "30\n\nhad already departed. Of the original allied commissioners, only Harry Parkes was still there for the final ceremony which included a tri-national group of Chinese, French, and British dignitaries.\n\nIf the allied occupation of Canton was not as uneventful as some historical accounts record, it nevertheless had very successful elements to it and may have had an influential impact on future Sino-European relations. At least two employees of the Allied Commission, Robert Hart and Prosper Giquel, both young men at the time, went on to play major roles in future Sino-European co-operative ventures later in the century, Robert Hart as the famous director of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service and Prosper Giquel as the future European Director of the Foochow Dockyard and eventually head of several Sino-European Educational Missions of the 1870s and 1880s. That their earlier experiences had been in the somewhat more co-operative world of the Sino-European police forces and the Sino-European coolie emigration inspection teams is certainly likely to have proved significant in the careers of these two men who were later so much more able than most of their countrymen to work with the Chinese on an equal basis.\n\nNOTES\n\nAbbreviations\n\nAE Archives de la Ministère des Affaires Etrangères\n\nCCC Correspondence consulaire et commerciale\n\nCP Correspondence politique, Chine\n\nArmee Les Archives de l'Armee de Terre, Vincennes\n\nFO British Foreign Office\n\nPRO British Public Record Office\n\nSHM Service Historique de la Marine, Vincennes\n\nAN Archives Nationales\n\nRanbir Vohra, China's Path To Modernization: A Historical Review from 1800 to the Present (New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987) citing Christopher Hibbert, The Dragon Awakes. China and the West 1793-1911 (N.Y., Harper and Row, 1970), p. 229.\n\n2 Douglas Hurd, The Arrow War, Anglo-Chinese Confusion 1856-1860 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 121-125 and Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 121-125.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1988.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/ft84gb83q", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212666, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1991", "page_number": 220, "title": "RAS-1991", "content_text": "201\n\n# THE RE-OCCUPATION OF HONG KONG\n\n## IN AUGUST 1945\n\n### DAN WATERS\n\nIn May 1992, on a Royal British Legion pilgrimage to Italy to visit graves of comrades killed when my company fought there in World War II, I became friends with ex-company sergeant major John McLaren. We later exchanged letters and he enclosed comments by his stepbrother, a Fleet Air Arm naval rating, about the return of the Allied Forces to Hong Kong in August 1945. From Mr Roland Davidson's comments I have compiled the following. It should be remembered, of course, that recollections can become distorted over half a century.\n\nWhen the atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki both the American 7th Fleet and the British 5th Fleet attached to it were at sea ready for strikes at the Japanese mainland. Everyone was delighted that Japan had surrendered. As Singapore and Hong Kong were both holding out the 7th Fleet was dispatched to Singapore and the 5th Fleet to Hong Kong. We arrived quite quickly and American Admiral Bill Halsey lost no time in demanding the presence of the Hong Kong garrison Japanese commander aboard the flagship “Indomitable” on which I was a crew member. One of our aircraft, a Fairy Fulmar if my memory serves me right, was sent to pick this worthy gentleman up. After a short time the plane returned. I might add that our ship was still at sea in a state of readiness.\n\nOut of the aircraft stepped this very well dressed, debonair Japanese army officer who treated the armed marine guard as if it was his guard of honour. Admiral Halsey was none too pleased and called down to the flight deck: 'Bring that man to the \"island\" (the bridge) at the double!' Documents of surrender were placed ready for signature on a small table.\n\nWhen the poor fellow arrived he was asked if he was indeed the Japanese commanding officer. He replied in perfect English that he was in fact the second-in-command. He said his commanding officer had absconded the previous day. The second-in-command was rather arrogant and swanky, and smartly dressed in uniform with high boots which had high heels. Halsey ordered a marine to break off the heel of his right boot who then had to hobble around the bridge and across the decks to the amusement of the ship's crew. I never saw a man's arrogance", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1991.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/k356gt84j", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212807, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 116, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "101\n\neach harnessed and stripped to the waist, fighting the torrent.\n\nTreaty ports: Ports opened to foreign trade and residence under what the Chinese have always regarded as 'unequal treaties'.\n\nTsung-li Yamen : The Foreign Affairs Bureau of the late Ch'ing dynasty, established after the capture of Peking in 1860 by the Allied forces. It was the channel of communication between foreign Ministers resident in Peking and the throne.\n\nTsung-tu #: the Viceroy or Governor-General of one or more provinces within which he had the general control of all civil and military affairs and was subject only to the throne.\n\nWai-sing Lottery: lit: examination of names, a kind of sweepstake, once a very popular form of gambling amongst the Cantonese, on the result of the public examination for the second degree. The holder of a successful candidate's name being the winner of a greater or lesser sum according to position on the published list.\n\nWei-yuan A: a delegate staff officer, a special delegate or Expectant Appointee on ad hoc duty.\n\nWhite Lily Sect [Pai-lien Chiao] was a more serious rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century. This secret society, originally founded in opposition to Mongol domination several centuries earlier, had been revived in order to get rid of the alien Manchu rule of the Ch'ing dynasty. It broke out in western Hupei in 1796 and for nearly nine years taxed China's resources to the utmost. Although Mesny was not involved his and their paths crossed on occasion.\n\nYamen : The official and private residence of any 'mandarin', officials who held a seal, a government office.\n\nYing #: usually a battalion but not uncommonly, a force of a number of battalions.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212823, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 132, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "117\n\nwithdrew partly into India and partly back into Yunnan. Kokang was left high and dry. Undaunted the Myosa from his own funds purchased what weapons he could from the retreating Chinese troops and the disbanded men of the Burma Rifles, who had been instructed to disperse to their villages with their weapons, which were to be retained for local protection until the British returned. He acquired several hundred rifles, a small stock of ammunition, and a few Bren guns, and organised his own force, the Kokang Defence Force. Fortunately the prowess of the force, which could scarcely have proved high in the face of the battle-trained troops of Japan, was not put to the test. The Japanese advance stopped at the Salween, a convenient barrier on which to consolidate their East Wall in Burma.\n\nThe Myosa, left thus in a most dangerous situation, in the front line, as it were, of the Allied positions, applied to the nearby ally, China, for assistance. The Chinese who were themselves receiving equipment from America for their forces in this part of the world, could spare him no equipment, but undertook to train officers for his force. The quality of the training so provided will grow evident as this story unfolds.\n\nIn 1943 the Myosa made the journey to Kun-ming to apply to the British authorities for assistance and it was at the British Consul General's* house in Kun-ming that I met him. I saw an alert slight figure, young looking and brisk for his 45 years, dressed in a western suit of Palm Beach cloth. He looked Chinese, but I believe there is also an admixture of tribal blood, possibly Shan; there is, of course, a good deal of intermingling throughout all that border country. The prince spoke Burmese and Chinese, but very little English: though his schooling on the border had probably been rough and ready, he possessed in a strong degree that charm, which goes with a courtesy so cultivated that it becomes natural and can conceal the aptitude for decision based on a habit of command. The prince was accompanied by his son, a capable young man in his early twenties, who had been educated at the Princes' School in Taungyi and spoke excellent English. The Myosa explained to us, his son serving as interpreter, the difficulties of his position, the trouble he was having with Chinese troops, a battalion of whom had been stationed in Southern Kokang, and the hope that we might be able to come to his support. We discussed the situation and the nature of the\n\n*Strangely, he had been the Consul at Kiu Kiang in 1927, from whose house we retired to the warships", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 212851, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1992", "page_number": 160, "title": "RAS-1992", "content_text": "145\n\nand probably compelled them to increase the area of opium cultivation. Obviously the crop was being passed on through the Chinese officers at the Puppet's headquarters. I had found there that they used his office as if it were their own. This may have been another reason for the grip the Chinese had taken of this small state. When Allied government is re-established in Burma it is to be hoped that serious attention will be paid to the question of opium. On the barren slopes of Kokang it is one of the only crops which grow, and so the problem is chiefly economic, the finding of a substitute crop. I noticed that no opium was planted in the Lihsaw villages; they were all Christians, converted by the American Baptist Mission—a mission which does the same as Dr. Seagrave's very excellent work in Burma, and they had been taught to grow potatoes instead. But the Lihsaws are not numerous, there are limits to the demand for potatoes, and further alternatives will be required.\n\nKokang was not self-supporting in rice. The normal flow of commerce is along the motor road from Kunlong to Hsenwi and Burma; that road was now cut by Japanese occupation, and Kokang had to depend on China for additional supplies. I believe the Puppet did his best to exchange part of his opium for rice, but not very successfully. Yunnan itself had inadequate supplies to feed the large forces of the C.E.F. for whom quantities of rice had to be imported from further afield. It was a difficult situation for the Puppet and one which put him the more under Chinese obligation.\n\nI got to know many of the headmen personally and well; with two exceptions, men recently appointed by the Puppet, they were hostile to him, and anxiously awaited the return of the Myosa, whose fair and just administration had left happy memories.\n\nI did not fathom the system of appointing circle and village headmen. The Myosa appeared to have the authority to make appointments, but I found in many places that the post was hereditary; many of the headmen too were of the Myosa's family. They often had managers, or Prime Ministers, who managed their affairs for them; and in at least some instances the function of manager to a circle headman was hereditary too.\n\nI returned from Sincheng to Lunghtang with a baffled feeling; the Bren gun teams were sent for training, but I felt they were the last the Chinese would allow to come, and the event was to prove my doubts justified. The despatch of further men was delayed on one pretext after", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1992.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/qf85tx75x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 213635, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1995", "page_number": 231, "title": "RAS-1995", "content_text": "206\n\ntrials, International Military Tribunals were established, and Russia took part in the Tokyo trial although it had been in the war against Japan for only one week before the surrender. In all the other trials, Tribunals of Officers were set up to hear the cases. The range of offences to be tried as war-crimes was never precisely defined, but broadly concerned “offences against humanity” including events causing cruelty, indeed often death, to prisoners and civilians in occupied territories. The notorious Kempetai (military police) had tortured, and indeed, killed, many thousands usually in an effort to extract confessions. Were these trials a \"Victor's Justice\"? It is true that the Japanese surrender had made the trials possible, but the catalogue of criminality left no doubt that those appearing in the dock deserved the punishment they received. There were acquittals mostly as a result of problems of identification, and some because the required standard of proof had not been satisfied. Tribunals did not attach much weight to affidavit evidence since cross-examination was not feasible. Documents which were contemporaneous on the other hand usually told their own story, although bonfires of such documents had been destroying such evidence in the interval between the Emperor's surrender broadcast and the arrival of the Allied forces.\n\nThe first trial was of General Yamashita, the \"Tiger of Malaya\", who became Supreme Commander of Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and this began in Manila on October 29th, 1945. He was sentenced to death. Other trials were conducted by U.S. Tribunals: 90 were sentenced to death. During 1945 and 1946, Nationalist Chinese Tribunals convicted 504 as war criminals. The French convicted 198, the Dutch 969, Australia 644, and in Singapore and Hong Kong, the United Kingdom Tribunals convicted 811.\n\nAccused were permitted legal representation, and given interpreters and the assistance of an Allied officer, and this was strictly adhered to in the British trials. We had the assistance of Army Investigation Units which collected evidence. One problem was that mistreated P.O.W.s wanted to get home to England or Canada as soon as practicable for rehabilitation, and tribute should be paid to the public-spirited few who agreed to return as witnesses.\n\nMy first case in Hong Kong concerned atrocities in Kinkaseki Camp, Formosa, and its \"Hell Mine\", and one of my star witnesses was", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1995.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/95941j25g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214131, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1997", "page_number": 199, "title": "RAS-1997", "content_text": "170\n\nlocated. The Seventh Day Adventist Church, which stands at numbers 6-8 on the tree-lined Sun Yat-sen Road (formerly part of Tung Sui Road), was on the site of a building used during the war years as an officers mess (see Plate III). The clinic, which now stands at No. 28 Shui Dong Kai (Water East Street), is on the site where a 'hospital' and the BAAG headquarters were situated during World War Two. Then, Huizhou stood in a kind of ‘no-man's-land'. It was not part of 'Free China' nor was it really in Japanese occupied territory. But the Japanese did make regular incursions into the city which was an undercover centre for Chinese guerillas and the British Army Aid Group.\n\nMembers of the Allied Forces would occasionally escape from prisoner-of-war camps in Hong Kong and make their way, with the help of Chinese guerillas, to Sai Kung. From there they would sail over to the coast of China and proceed on up to Huizhou to link up with the 'East River Column' of guerillas. After rest and medical attention escapees would make their way to the hinterland and Free China proper. Huizhou was well positioned as an escape route which was provided by a road network, of sorts, and the East River which flows along to the Bocca Tigris in the Pearl River Delta.\n\n5\n\nMen who managed to escape included Colonel Anthony Hewitt (at the time Captain) of the ‘Die-Hards', the Middlesex Regiment, who gave a talk in November 1996, to the RASHKB entitled 'The Defence of Leighton Hill during the 1941 Battle for Hong Kong'. Colonel L.T. Ride also escaped to set up and head the British Army Aid Group. Sir Lindsay, who was Vice Chancellor of the University of Hong Kong from 1949 to 1964, was also a founder member of the RASHKB, in 1960, when it was reestablished. He was President of our Branch from 1969 to 1972.\n\nAlthough members of our RAS Group saw a considerable amount of new building as we drove from Shenzhen to Huizhou on that November day in 1997, one was struck by the number of walled villages and watch towers. This part of China was, obviously, a pretty lawless region at one time, and, to some extent, it still is. One occasionally sees cars plying the roads without number plates and right-hand drive vehicles which have probably been smuggled in, one assumes from Hong Kong.\n\nT", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1997.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/wp98g7579", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214481, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1998", "page_number": 339, "title": "RAS-1998", "content_text": "308\n\nof his time, during the War, he served as an interrogator of the Japanese having earlier undergone army language courses.\n\nAlso included in Arnold Graham's material is a photocopy of the Extra to the Kobe Herald, in English, for Saturday January 3, 1914. This was seven months before the outbreak of World War I. The subscription rate for the newspaper at the time, incidentally, was two yen per month. There are also photocopies of various accounts of the Lisbon Maru, a Japanese ship which was sunk by a torpedo from an American submarine. This resulted in considerable loss of life among the Allied prisoners of war aboard.\n\nAlso included among the items sent by Arnold Graham's daughter are two identification cards issued by the British Consulate in 1938 and 1939, during the Sino-Japanese War.\n\nOther interesting papers are the Surrender of Japanese and Japanese Controlled Armed Forces in Borneo and the Netherlands East Indies East and Exclusive Lombok to the Commander in Chief Australian Military Forces (September 1945). There is also a Chinese translation (interspersed with some Japanese characters) of this surrender document as well as a speech by Lieutenant-General Teshima, Commander Second Japanese Army which he delivered on that occasion. There is also a newspaper cutting about a letter written by a Japanese who, as a wounded soldier captured in 1943, was nursed back to health by a British nurse.\n\nAmong the many items sent by Arnold Graham's daughter is a souvenir programme of the centenary dinner of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, held in April 1954, at the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club. On the back of the programme is printed the song \"Maloo Memories\". Arnold Graham composed the words; the first verse of which goes as follows:\n\nLet us sing of that old city in the North we knew so well\n\nWhere to sing to love and laugh we used to dwell,\n\nFrom the Seven Seas foregathered to the Bund and Bubbling well", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1998.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/1g05n0794", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214749, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 164, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "128\n\nclaim that the defenders faced shortages in ammunition, notably for mortars. However, the movement of the defenders' guns within the defence perimeter throughout the Battle was rather hectic, aided by at least 20 armoured cars and more than 3,000 motor cars and 600 trucks. This indicated that the artillery arm of the garrison was playing a key role in prolonging the duration of the defence. Therefore, the effective firepower of the defenders did not appear to be as weak as frequently represented in publications up to now on the Battle of Hong Kong. The story of the defence of Hong Kong apparently could well have been distorted in favour of the winner.\n\nConclusion: a Plea for Further Research\n\nThe above points are just informed speculation and the Battle of Hong Kong is certainly an under-researched military episode in the Second World War. This being the case, it should be just a matter of interest not only to those directly involved.\n\n...\n\nIn broad historical terms, the significance of the Battle of Hong Kong should not be limited to a matter of war relics or past history. It has implications for the post-war political development of Hong Kong, a living issue that affects the present both physically and socially. We have mentioned the credibility of the defence of Hong Kong as a matter of responsible government and a matter of fact but not as an apology for British colonialism. There are still unknown numbers of unexploded bombs, both Japanese and Allied, yet to be unearthed in highly congested urban sites. There are also quite a number of old people in Hong Kong (and elsewhere in Asia) who still hold Japanese military currency, forced upon them when their convertible currencies were expropriated during the occupation, in the vain hope of obtaining compensation by the Japanese government (Keniti; Kobayasi Hideo and Isida Jimtarou, 1995).\n\nThe military aspects of the fighting itself should be interesting case study materials for the military scientist. Many other questions remain unanswered. The size and role and size of the \"fifth columnists\", the tactics of the Japanese and the useful value of occupied Hong Kong to the Japanese are just a few examples. Though these questions for a minor theatre of war may not catch the attention of those who are only interested in the broad-brush views of Liddell Hart (1970), they should", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 214903, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-1999", "page_number": 318, "title": "RAS-1999", "content_text": "294\n\nI don't for one moment think they had. The Japanese invasion of Hong Kong was a \"natural extension\" of their campaign in China in the sense that they had already occupied southern China - across the border from Hong Kong - a considerable time before. Also, although there are innumerable examples to show that invasion from the sea can be a costly business if the beaches are in any way defended, in Hong Kong's case they weren't. A number of gun emplacements had been built on Hong Kong Island before the war but these would not have prevented an invasion at Deepwater Bay. And there certainly weren't any Allied troops around. The Japanese knew all this. I rather suspect that they invaded from the New Territories rather than assault Hong Kong Island at the outset because they believed that if and when they overran Hong Kong Island, the Allied forces would cross to Kowloon and thence to the New Territories and continue to wage guerrilla warfare for months, if not years. The Japanese had every reason to think that conquering the New Territories and Kowloon first would result in the Allied forces retreating to Hong Kong Island - which they did - where they could be \"bottled up\" - which they were.\n\nIn the round, however, this discussion is academic. The hard fact of the matter is that Hong Kong was simply not defendable with the forces available in December 1941. A successful defence would have required a force of enormous size and superbly equipped, supported by comprehensive fortifications. The \"protective buffer\" of the New Territories was never any more than an illusion. These arguments, incidentally, were as valid in 1897 as they were in 1941 and to that extent The Back Door was both disingenuous and unhelpful. September 1897 was evidently what the media refer to as a \"slow news\" month!\n\nHong Kong Invaded! A '97 Nightmare is a 'new, integrated and corrected' edition of The Back Door. Incidentally, although The Back Door was written in 1897, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that Gillian is having a gentle swipe at the momentous event in Hong Kong's history that occurred exactly 100 years later.\n\nThe actual story occupies but 56 pages of Gillian's book, including illustrations by Arthur Hacker. These, incidentally, are a disappointment. They are supposed to be illustrating a serious account of a battle fought to the last, with heroism and heavy loss of life on both sides. One would have thought, therefore, that they would have been", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1999.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/s178b887x", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215001, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2000", "page_number": 97, "title": "RAS-2000", "content_text": "53\n\nOf those from the Chinese Customs Service in Shanghai who served with the Allied Forces, the names of 23 are on their Roll of Honour and have been buried or commemorated not only in the UK, Belgium and France but also in Greece and Turkey.\n\nDecorations\n\nMany Chinese members of the CLC received the British War Medals but this is a subject into which I have not carried out any research. The Meritorious Service Medal for devotion to duty was awarded to Zhao Wende [30828] and Wang Chenjing [30064], both Labourers of the 57th Company CLC, and to Liu Dianzhen, Class One Ganger of the 108th Company CLC. Also to Wang Yushao [15333] Labourer of the 59th Company CLC [of Da Cheng county in Zhili] for bravery, his citation reading:\n\nNear Marcoing [near Cambrai] on June 6th, 1919, he observed a fire on a dump of ammunition situated close to a Collecting Station. On his own initiative he rushed to the dump with two buckets of water which he threw on the fire and then seized a burning British 'P' Bomb [apparently the cause of the outbreak] and hurled it to a safe distance from the dump. He then continued to extinguish the burning dump which had spread to the surrounding grass in which rifle grenades and German shells were lying. By his initiative, resource and disregard of personal safety this Labourer averted what might have been a serious explosion.\n\nYan Dengfeng [91085], Class One Ganger of the 130th Company CLC was also awarded this decoration for:\n\nOn 23rd May 1919 at Bailleul [near Armentieres] following an explosion, he worked constantly for four hours removing tarpaulins from the stacks of ammunition and drenching them with water.\n\nSgt W J Yaxley [553653] British Army, serving with the 60th Company CLC was also awarded this medal.\n\nThe Chinese Order of Wenhu [The Order of the Striped Tiger]", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2000.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/nk328168n", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215675, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 452, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "404\n\nIan Morrison's Last Dispatch\n\nPOHANG IN HANDS OF\n\nNORTH KOREANS\n\nAnnex\n\nTOWN IN FLAMES\n\nFrom Our Special Correspondent\n\nBIHAR ARMY HEADQUARTERS, August 12 —\n\nA serious situation has developed at Pohang on the east coast. North Korean forces, who for several days past were known to be working their way south through mountainous country inland from the coast, and who yesterday were reported at a point seven miles north-west of Pohang, attacked the town early this morning and are now threatening the airfield five miles to the south-east. Fires are burning in the town and it may become necessary to evacuate the airfield.\n\nFor several weeks past the South Korean forces based on Pohang have been fighting in and around Yongdok, a small town 25 miles north of Pohang. Their supply line has been the road which runs along the coast. The mountains to the west are some of the steepest in Korea, but they have not deterred the North Koreans from making the obvious outflanking movement. The exact strength of the North Korean force is not known. Three days ago it was reported as two regiments. Probably it consists of a nucleus of regular troops and several hundred guerrilla troops who have long been established in these mountains.\n\nThe allied command apparently minimized their threat, because it was only yesterday that reinforcements were hurriedly rushed to this coastal sector. These consisted of South Korean infantry and a small American task force equipped with light tanks. Exactly what happened is still obscure, but the American convoy was ambushed soon after midnight on the main road 15 miles south of Pohang and pinned down until dawn. Air support was called for, which eventually drove off the North Koreans, believed to have been a number of guerrilla troops, and permitted the convoy to continue after considerable delay.\n\nMustangs were still using the airfield up to 5 o'clock this afternoon, and in some cases pilots were firing their guns only two or three minutes after taking off. The North Koreans had moved south of Yongdok, and pilots claimed to have destroyed two tanks, 10 vehicles, and two ammunition cars. Transport aircraft also were still flying into the airfield this evening and bringing out certain unessential staff such as ground engineers.\n\nAccording to these arrivals, North Korean mortar shells were landing in the general area of the airfield, but it was not under small arms fire. American gunners who have been supporting South Korean infantry in this coastal sector were shelling North Korean positions on the ridge about two miles north of the airfield between the airfield and the port. Large numbers of Korean civilians who had evacuated the town had gathered round the airfield, which is situated close to the shore of the bay, and two ships were standing by offshore in case evacuation should become necessary.\n\nLieutenant-General Walker, commander of the Eighth Army, and Major-General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air Force, flew over the area this morning.\n\n97", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215676, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2001", "page_number": 453, "title": "RAS-2001", "content_text": "INTELLIGENCE Pohang is the only port on the east coast of Korea held by the allied forces capable of taking ships of any size. It was here that the 1st Cavalry Division disembarked with all its equipment early last month. More important than the port is the airfield known as K3, the best natural airfield possessed by the allies in Korea. Mustangs based here have been giving constant support to ground troops in this coastal sector. Its loss would mean that air craft henceforth would have to operate either from Taegu, 49 miles to the west, or from Pusan, 60 miles to the south.\n\nThis Pohang affair, even if the situation is restored once again, shows up the whole weakness of the allied position in Korea. Intelligence must have been gravely at fault to permit such a situation to develop. Held on the coastal road between Yongdok and Pohang the North Koreans simply worked their way round the flanks as they have done on many other occasions in the campaign. Strategically and tactically, the northern command, exploiting the terrain and their superior man-power, have shown considerable skill in avoiding a full-scale frontal battle where superior American fire-power would tell, and in concentrating on feeling out the weak point in the allies' flank and rear.\n\nThe Naktong River line, which is being held only with difficulty, guards the western flank of the allied bridgehead in Korea. Across the north there is no such natural barrier, only 30 miles of mountain ridges. Again one is obliged to wonder exactly how large a bridgehead the allies can expect to hold with the forces at their disposal.\n\n405", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2001.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/zg651950g", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215804, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 103, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "36\n\nafter Britain lost Hong Kong, the closest Allied power to the territory was its original owner China. Then there was Hong Kong's status as a port. Any mainland port that touched the Pacific attracted the attention of the USN, because it was in its interest that China continued to keep the bulk of the Japanese Army occupied on the continent while the U.S. seized Japan's possessions in the Pacific. Hence, Allied commanders like Admiral Ernest King, the USN's highest-ranking officer and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), thought that the U.S. had a major responsibility to help keep China in the war,\n\nIn 1943, China was tying down 20 per cent of the Japanese Army. No major fighting had occurred there for a while, but the Allies knew that this relative calm might not last. The fear that Japan would resume her efforts to knock China out of the war was real, and Allied planners wanted to prevent this by keeping the Chinese Army (of the Nationalist government) battle-worthy. To do this, they had to establish and maintain secure lines of communication (LoC) into China. As Japan had already occupied China's ports and the lone road into China from Burma (the Burma Road), the sole means of supplying China was through a risky, costly, and feeble air route over the Himalayas (the Hump).\n\nThe best method of supplying China was to recapture a port on the China Coast and establishing LoC to the interior of China. Initially, the Chinese Army was allotted the bulk of this task - if it could be strengthened by deliveries over the Hump and (if the Allies could retake it) the Burma Road. But by 1943, supplies over the Hump remained minuscule, the Burma Road was not reopened, and the Chinese (Nationalists, Communists, and third-party elements) preferred to fight among themselves rather than against the Japanese. With the Allied drives in the Pacific gathering momentum, the main responsibility for a campaign to recapture a port on the China Coast eventually fell to the U.S.\n\nHong Kong and Shanghai have long been the two best ports on the China Coast, with each possessing excellent harbour facilities. But Hong Kong rated ahead of Shanghai as the initial port to be opened up in China because of the strong Japanese presence around Shanghai. In the Hong Kong-Canton area during 1943, the Japanese still occupied only a beachhead. As long as Hong Kong remained a beachhead, and the Chinese forces ringing it maintained a measure of resolve, Japanese", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215805, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 104, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "37\n\nforces to the north would tire themselves out trying to link up with the beachhead. Should the Chinese collapse in the face of a Japanese attack, then an Allied campaign to recapture Hong Kong would be jeopardized.\n\nJapan had an incentive to retain Hong Kong. Besides being a part of Japanese-held China, Hong Kong also lay just outside Japan's Inner Zone. This zone included Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Ryukyus, and the Japanese half of Sakhalin Island. Well before the war, the British had already gained an appreciation that a Hong Kong in Japanese hands would augment the defence of the Inner Zone. Moreover, Hong Kong helped guard Japan's LoC to points west and her oil supplies in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese could still afford to trade space for time by forfeiting many other parts of their Pacific empire to the Allies, but they were certain to defend their Inner Zone and the positions that anchored their LoC to and from it with the utmost vigour. If the Japanese lost Hong Kong, this would provide hope to people living under Japanese rule elsewhere, while it would send a message to the Japanese people that the war was proceeding unfavourably for them.\n\nBy late 1943, the Allies had gained the upper hand over the Japanese in the Pacific. It was the Allies who could dictate where the next move would fall. As China was still in the game, Allied planners began to take a closer look at the feasibility of a Hong Kong campaign. One opponent the Allies couldn't overcome, however, was Mother Nature, so heed was paid to Hong Kong's weather and how it could affect an Allied campaign there.\n\nA timeless enemy\n\nNature at its cruellest is a phenomenon that humanity's best efforts still cannot match. Even during a high-technology conflict like World War II, the weather proved to be as indomitable a nemesis as it had been throughout the history of war.\n\nWith World War II being fought over a greater expanse of the planet than any other war in history, its participants had to endure extreme variations in the weather, like the freezing cold of the Arctic and the Soviet Union to the sweltering heat of New Guinea, or the oppressive humidity of the South Pacific to the barren aridity of North", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215807, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 106, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "39\n\npart of the year (May to August). In fact, it rained about two out of every three days during the months of June and July, with June having a better than 40 per cent chance of experiencing three or more consecutive days, and even a 25 per cent chance of having at least an entire week, of rain.\n\nIn a largely undeveloped place like Hong Kong during the war, heavy rains falling on land usually translated into mud. Thus far in the war, both sides had already experienced the difficulty of moving across mud in various theatres. In Hong Kong, only the urban areas had all-weather roads, so its roads and terrain outside of the urban areas were trafficable only during periods of dry weather.10\n\nThen one must remember that 75 per cent of Hong Kong was mountain. By the nature of their sloped sides and rocky terrain, mountains are already difficult to traverse in good weather. In times of bad weather, mountains are even harder to negotiate, especially if they have been stripped of vegetation. This was the case with Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation. As the war dragged on, supply shortages of everything became acute. Whereas coal was the preferred fuel for industrial and residential use, the increasing difficulty of importing this item into Hong Kong forced people to switch to firewood. This resulted in the felling of trees throughout the territory, thus depriving the mountains of the foliage that anchored their soil, and increasing the chances of erosion and landslides.\n\nMachinery was the epitome of the Allied arsenal, and embodied from its factories, to its logistical functions, and finally to the fighting machines on the frontline. But machinery was also very susceptible to the weather. In Hong Kong, with its high rainfall and lack of all-weather roads outside of the city, construction activities would be needed to improve its roads for the vehicle-oriented Allies. But construction would be curtailed during periods of heavy rainfall.\n\nWithout a suitable system of roads, the Allies would be unable to take full advantage of their superior mechanised transport in Hong Kong. The necessity of supporting China with a strong LoC inland from Hong Kong would have taxed its inadequate roads past their limit. Estimates for the portion of supplies landed each day that could be transported inland to support the Chinese amounted to no more than 25 per cent,", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215808, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 107, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "40\n\nand this was on a good weather day. An alternative was to utilize the sole railroad in the territory - the Kowloon-Canton Railway (KCR). However, the KCR was primarily a passenger railway, so rolling stock for transporting freight was in short supply,12\n\nA third option was to transport the supplies by water via the Pearl River and its tributaries, which lead up to Canton and points beyond. This method, if fully operational, would greatly increase the amount of supplies headed inland. It too was dependent on various factors, like Allied control of both banks of the Pearl, the availability of suitable river craft (Canton could still handle large vessels, but as the river branches out and tapers off, smaller vessels would be needed), and the weather.13 Without modifications, the mediocre communications inland from Hong Kong would not do justice to its generous port capacity.\n\nAs for ground operations, the Allies enjoyed a crushing supremacy over the Japanese in the quantity and quality of their armour, but Hong Kong's mountainous terrain would have ensured that armour could see only limited duty there.\n\nOn a bad day, mechanised transport would become bogged down on Hong Kong's muddy roads. The Allies would have felt Hong Kong eerily similar to Italy, a place that was also mountainous and experienced high rainfall. There, the Allies had armour superiority, but it was of limited value, and their advance was slow. Their advances along the coast were a bit faster because it was relatively flat, just like Hong Kong's. However, during bad weather days, a lack of natural ground in many of the coastal areas (due to urbanisation) to absorb rainfall could cause flooding. In addition, there was human-induced flooding. Southern China was still mainly an agrarian region, where farmers would deliberately flood their fields in April of each year to fertilize their crops.14 That added at least a month to the flood season.\n\nInfantry would also find the combination of rainfall and challenging terrain as harsh for them as they would be for their vehicles, if not more. Without substantial support from mechanised forces, infantry would be deprived of a vital factor to combat the Japanese.\n\nAir support, a key ingredient in offensive operations worldwide, and one in which the Allies enjoyed superiority and obviously hated to", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215809, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 108, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "41\n\ndo without, would also be affected by heavy rainfall. Incendiary bombing, which would become a favourite strategy with the Allies against Japanese targets elsewhere as the war progressed, would naturally be less effective during the middle part of the year in Hong Kong. Heavy rainfall also affects the performance of propeller aircraft by cooling their engines excessively.1 Overall, air operations of all kinds would be less effective or even grounded during periods of heavy rainfall.\n\nThe flip side of air operations is anti-aircraft defence. A simple, inexpensive device employed as an anti-aircraft measure was the barrage balloon. This was a large hydrogen-filled, dirigible-shaped balloon attached to a steel cable anchored to the ground or a ship and floated several hundred to several thousand feet above it. The cable was stronger than it looked, and was meant to discourage low-level air attacks by having the ability to damage or clip the wings of a low-flying aircraft. This forces the aircraft to fly higher, which decreases its attack accuracy, and aids the effectiveness of one's own anti-aircraft artillery and intercepting aircraft.16\n\nHowever, a hydrogen-filled barrage balloon (in the days before helium use was common) is highly flammable. This is a liability during a thunderstorm, during which a spark of lightning could turn a barrage balloon into an incendiary hazard that is more dangerous to its user than to the enemy.\n\nCloud and fog.\n\nCloud and fog often went hand-in-hand with heavy rainfall to restrict air operations. Reconnaissance of Japanese positions would be very difficult. High level bombing or close support, favoured by the Allies and employed extensively in other theatres, would have to be cut back or even cancelled. If cloud and fog were present at the beginning of the amphibious stage of the Allied assault on Hong Kong, when the Allies would be at their most vulnerable, crucial air support would be inadequate or even lacking. If the Japanese contested the landing, and this was expected, the Allies would be faced with a precarious and probably dangerous situation.\n\nWhile cloud and fog are most prevalent during the beginning of", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215810, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 109, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "42\n\nthe year, relatively clear months like July and August might also be problematic since the middle of the year was the rainy season. Air power, one of the Allies' biggest assets, might not realize its full potential over Hong Kong.\n\nAnother factor in which the Allies were much better endowed than their opponents was artillery, including naval gunfire. The latter had been, and would continue to be, invaluable in pulverising land targets before the actual amphibious landings. But naval and land-based artillery were very dependent on aerial and ground observers to achieve accuracy. If these were limited by cloud and fog, enemy targets would be inadequately softened up or even missed, thereby leaving more of the work to the ground forces. Then the role of Hong Kong's ubiquitous mountains would become even more prominent. Even on a good day, artillery cannot completely neutralise an enemy who is well dug into a mountain. But it can still keep the enemy pinned down, making it hard for him to shoot back or launch counterattacks. A deficiency or absence of artillery and aerial support brought about by cloud and fog provides the enemy with a chance to come out and pull off a few surprises, especially an enemy who lives by the sneak attack like the Japanese.\n\nConversely, barrage balloons benefit from low ceilings because they could hide in the overcast sky, with only their thin wires exposed, and wait for unsuspecting enemy aircraft that may be flying low. Barrage balloons could be worthy supplements to the progressively effective Allied combat air patrol (CAP), which was a constant umbrella of aircraft patrolling the skies over any Allied position. When the CAP is limited by cloud and fog, barrage balloons can partially fill the void. The winter months in Hong Kong (the beginning of the year) were generally the best time to employ barrage balloons.\n\nTemperature and humidity\n\nHong Kong's temperatures only go in one extreme - upwards. Even during winter, they almost never approach freezing (32°F/0°C). February, Hong Kong's coldest month, averages a tolerable 59°F (15°C) Certainly Hong Kong would not be mistaken for the Soviet Union or Alaska.\n\nBut the mid-spring to summer months (April to September) would", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215813, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 112, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "45\n\nthe mountains to evade Allied radar, and then pouncing on Allied positions at the last minute, thereby achieving a measure of surprise. Depending on the strength of the Japanese response to the invasion, the Allied CAP may or may not have been able to handle all of the attackers.19 Moreover, the CAP would have been highly dependent on radar. Barrage balloons could partially compensate by being placed near a mountain pass where the enemy could be expected to pass through. This tactic, however, would be negated in the presence of strong winds, which can blow through a mountain pass faster than over a peak.20\n\nBut air operations could be negatively affected by the wind too. Air drops of supplies depend on calm weather, lest the supplies become lost or fall into enemy hands. The same applies to bombing operations. In a compact setting like Hong Kong, a bomb that is blown even slightly off its target can fall on friendly territory or civilians. The dropping of airborne forces to secure certain objectives, already risky during good weather, is made infinitely more difficult when performed during periods of strong winds. (A wind of just 16 mph/26 kph is enough to blow a paratrooper well off course.) If airborne forces land too far from their objective, surprise would be lost because they would have to fight their way to reach the objective and sustain casualties in the process. Should they reach their objective, they would have to take additional casualties holding it. Sometimes they are left to their fate.\n\nOn the other hand, strong winds can benefit incendiary bombing, which depends on the wind to spread the flames farther - as long as they don't spread in the wrong direction. All it takes was for a wind of more than 18 mph (30 kph) to do the job, and this was most common during the early months of the year in Hong Kong.\n\nWhile Hong Kong was at its windiest during the winter and early spring, this was minor compared to the proliferation of typhoons during the summer (which, incidentally, is the mildest part of the year when there are no typhoons). A typhoon was the weather phenomenon that could do the greatest damage to a military operation in the Pacific.\n\nSimply defined, a typhoon, which comes from the Chinese term tai fung,21 is known in meteorological circles as a tropical cyclone, which is a very strong mixture of wind and rain with sustained wind", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 215822, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 121, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "54\n\nremained an integral part of Allied strategy to defeat Japan. Even if her expected contribution to Allied victory over Japan had been downgraded and a squadron of B-29s based on the mainland was not as promising as a combat-ready Chinese Army, the politics of basing such a new and promising weapon on Chinese soil were thought to be enough to boost Chinese morale.53\n\nThe issue is in doubt\n\nBy the end of 1943, Allied planners had not settled on a decision to drop Hong Kong from the list of future objectives, nor did they elevate its status to that of a territory whose possession was beyond debate. In short, if a campaign in China was likely, a port on the China Coast would need to be opened up, and Hong Kong was a leading candidate for such a port. The development of the war in 1944-1945 would determine Hong Kong's importance.\n\nAs the USN's Central Pacific offensive gathered momentum in early 1944, the adjacent Southwest Pacific offensive under General Douglas MacArthur also stepped up its pace so as not to be left behind. The competing dual advances sped up the Allied timetable, and brought the Allies to within striking distance of Japan by summer 1944.\n\nIn China, it was a different story. Chinese forces here had not faced a major Japanese attack since 1938. When the Japanese attempted to link their possessions in the south (including Hong Kong) with the large portion of China they held north of the Yangtze River with a major offensive in the summer, the Chinese forces standing in the way largely disintegrated without offering much resistance. By early 1945, the Hong Kong beachhead had linked up with the rest of Japanese-held China. By now, the prospect of recapturing Hong Kong from the sea, while still not entirely infeasible, was made harder due to the potential ease with which the Japanese could reinforce Hong Kong from the interior of China. Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese probably intended to wage a last-ditch defence of Hong Kong like they were already doing in the Pacific.54\n\nJ\n\nThe Japanese eventually overextended themselves in China, while China belatedly began to receive supplies in some quantity once the road link from Burma was reopened and the air link over the Hump", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216003, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 302, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "236 \n\nmonths he had physically broken down, and was dead in April, 1871. The loss for Chinese Protestants at the time was irreparable, for he was the only ordained Chinese pastor with lengthy experience and a notable record of creative publications in all of China at the time. Details on this event are given in Pfister's \"A Transmitter but not a Creator\"\n\n94. The fact that Bruce was the younger brother of Sir Elgin, who ordered the burning of the imperial Summer Palace in 1860, is of some importance especially for impressing and reminding the Qing officials at the time of the destructive power of the British and allied forces.\n\n95. See Legge's long letter including copies of the offending note sent by Bruce to Russell and Russell's response in China Mail #955 (June 4, 1863), p. 90. It is quite by coincidence that at the end of the 20th century in Chinese language the date \"June Fourth\" (liùsì) also immediately brings up images of persecution.\n\n96. Much evidence for this exists in the South China correspondence with the London Missionary Society Directors for this period.\n\n97. A note gleaned from the archives of Carl T. Smith in Hong Kong.\n\n98. See Bóluóxiàn zhì, p. 330, where it simply states, \"[We are] lacking any other materials.\" The total number of Chinese believers associated with the church work initiated by the Basel missionaries was over 300 in 1941.", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 }, { "id": 216104, "series_id": 26, "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine", "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊", "series_use_hku_proxy": false, "document_key": "RAS-2002", "page_number": 403, "title": "RAS-2002", "content_text": "337\n\nMeters, flyovers and service charges\n\nIt was not until 1962 that Hong Kong had its first parking meters and at about the same time service charges were first levied in restaurants. Also at this time, in spite of high immigration figures, unemployment consistently stood at well below two per cent. Inflation was negligible. The Territory saw its first flyover, outside Saint Teresa's Church on Prince Edward Road in Kowloon, in 1963.\n\n‘One damn thing after another'\n\nIn the early 1960s, we are referring to a time when something like 30 million inhabitants died of starvation on the Chinese Mainland. This was as a result of the failure of the 'Great Leap Forward.' There were long queues in Hong Kong post offices sending food parcels to relatives in China. All in all, the 1960s was a challenging decade and, as one government servant phrased it, 'It was one damn thing after another.' But the Territory was a great survivor and frequently managed to come back stronger than ever.\n\nTyphoons\n\nWhen I first arrived in Hong Kong my boss told me there is a bad typhoon every seven years. In fact, there is no set pattern if you check as I have. An estimated 11,000 people died in the 1937 typhoon, more than the 8,750 total Allied forces, Japanese and Chinese estimated to have been killed when the Japanese attacked Hong Kong in December 1941. There was an inadequate typhoon warning system in those days. Up until the 1930s a gun was fired from Blackhead Point, in Kowloon, either when a typhoon was approaching or when the mail ship arrived. Not infrequently, the two events were confused.\n\nTyphoon Wanda, in 1962, is sometimes remembered as the last typhoon from which bitter lessons were learned on how to batten down. It coincided with a high tide, with an 11-foot rise in water level and a storm surge that caused bad flooding. This happened right up to Tsang Tai Uk (the big house of the Tsang family), the fine, Hakka walled village at the end of Sha Tin Hoi (Sea). This Hoi has long since been reclaimed. With Wanda, something like 2,000 ships and small craft were sunk or damaged. There were 130 deaths. With gusts of 164 mph", "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt", "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278", "rank": 0 } ]