[
    {
        "id": 207484,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-1975",
        "page_number": 252,
        "title": "RAS-1975",
        "content_text": "244\n\nDONALD C. BOWIE\n\nsive demonstration of American air power. I do not know if any Japanese planes took part in the defence. After the raid we picked up a great many jagged fragments of bombs and shells in our grounds though the hospital itself suffered no obvious damage. The history of the war shows that this raid came from Admiral Halsey's Sixth Fleet which had passed to the north of the Philippine Islands and approached the China coast searching for some remaining ships of the Japanese fleet. On this occasion the attackers failed to find the ships which at the time were lying up much further to the south but we got enormous encouragement from the successes we saw. The bombing was very accurate but during one raid on another occasion a fleet of large American bombers came in from the sea aiming from high altitude no doubt at dockyards and Japanese headquarters. Unfortunately their bombs fell short and damaged a large part of Wan Chai. As maybe imagined we had no newspapers for some days after these occasions.\n\nOn 21 January bombs from another raid fell very close to the hospital and we lost a good deal of glass and plaster and picked up many fragments of shells and bombs in the grounds. Our guards never overcame their excitement during air raids and added their own defence contribution by rapid fire from their rifles at the attacking aeroplanes. It would be interesting to learn how much ammunition the Japanese had left at the date of their surrender.\n\nFrom the end of January 140 men from Sham Shui Po camp were accommodated on the top floor of the hospital which was wired off from the rest of the building. They were marched off daily to prepare ground in Happy Valley to grow vegetables there and were accompanied each day by one of our nursing orderlies. The original orders to me were to house the working party in the now vacant barrack block from which the hospital was by now wired off, but when these orders were changed Seino quite courteously apologised for the alteration. We cooked for the newcomers and helped their own 10 maintenance men to draw and hoist water daily to their quarters. The work in Happy Valley was arduous at first and the weather was cold and wet. Later the conditions were easier and the hours of work were less. The ration scale allowed by the Japanese for the working party was on a substantially higher level than that in the hospital in rice, fish, vegetables, beans, oil and sugar. I pressed this precedent and I got our official rice ration raised by 30 grammes to 510 grammes; the",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-1975.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/j0995146d",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215938,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 237,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "171\n\nCommunists and the China coast for Major Egerton Mott of the SOE. * Holmes referred to guerrillas who would be known to Kendall. He was convinced that the expansion of the Communists into British territory in the New Territories 'was planned in some detail before the Japanese attack on the Colony,' so working with this group required uncommon discretion and diplomacy on the part of any Britisher trying to win their support. Holmes, working with Kendall before the war and with the guerrillas later, would have been unusually well informed. He identified the Communist leader in the Hong Kong area as Tsoi Kwok Leung, a man ‘formerly connected with minor Chinese industrial enterprises in Hong Kong and Amoy and...consumptive.'\n\nSome form of SOE organisation was clearly in place in China, covertly, awaiting the Japanese attack before becoming fully activated. Col Chauvin had been removed from Hong Kong on 18th December, on the very day that the Japanese landed on Hong Kong Island, and sent to the British Military Mission in Chongqing. As the battle raged around them, Kendall, Talan and McEwan were stood by for special orders. Col. Harry Owen Hughes who had ostensibly been seconded to liaise with Chinese Armies in the 7 War zone, moved back to the Hong Kong area to await the arrival of something important. This was the arrival, in deep secrecy, of perhaps the most important escape party to ever leave occupied Hong Kong.\n\n[\n\nAt the very moment that Hong Kong surrendered to the Japanese, a car was hurrying towards Aberdeen harbour. Inside sat Admiral Chan Chak, the Chinese Nationalist government's chief representative in Hong Kong, and a number of his KMT assistants. The group was led by DM MacDougall, an official seconded to Hong Kong from London to work on political affairs. He had been assigned to look after the Admiral personally, and maintained twenty-four-hour contact with the Admiral's party during the hostilities. They were to rendezvous with five boats of the 2nd Motor Boat Flotilla, who had been held back in battle. Reaching the pier an hour after the surrender, they found the boats gone. The only functioning vessel they could find was a fifteen-foot launch but the party piled in, knowing that the Japanese would be on them at any moment. Hardly had they gone 500 yards when they were fired on by Japanese occupying a post on Brick Hill, opposite, on the southern side of Hong Kong Island. The boat's engine disintegrated under the heavy fire, killing several men and wounding others, including",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215939,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 238,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "172\n\nthe Admiral himself. The Admiral, who had lost a leg in battle in his youth, removed his wooden leg in which he had hidden $40,000xiii and dived into the sea. Fortunately, his ADC was Henry Hsu Heng, the tall, athletic championship swimmer. Hsu helped the injured Admiral swim through the choppy waters, torn by shellfire, and alive with dangerous stinging jellyfish, until they clambered onto the rocks on Ap Lei Chau Island. Still under fire, the party was able to reach the relative shelter of the oceanward side of the island.\n\nLt Commander G H Gandy, commander of the flotilla, was to tell the story of how he had received orders to withdraw from Aberdeen because the boats were coming under heavy fire, but, as I had not got the two important Chinese personages aboard and had no news of them, and as also movement by daylight would be obvious to the enemy, I consulted with Mr FWK with whom I had been told by the Commodore to collaborate in the matter of escape from Hong Kong, and decided to wait.\" It was providential that he decided to honour his original orders, for at 17:30 hours, one of his men signalled that someone was swimming out to his vessel. It was one of the men from the Chan Chak party. The group was rescued. The boats proceeded to Mirs Bay, where on the orders of Admiral Chan they anchored at Peng Chau Island. Kendall went ashore, bringing back with him the local village elder, whom Admiral Chan interviewed. Learning that it was safe to proceed, the flotilla headed towards the mainland at Nam O in Guangdong, where the boats were scuttled. From this point Kendall led the party, linking up with KMT guerrillas, led by a man called Leung Wing Yuen who escorted them to safety. Later, when the communists consolidated their control over all guerrillas in the region, Leung, who had been honoured for helping the KMT Admiral, had to escape the region himself.\n\nIntelligence and politics\n\nWhy was so much effort taken to help a Chinese Admiral escape from Hong Kong when, at the same time British Generals were being rounded up and made prisoners of war? Admiral Chan Chak was of such importance to the British that they were prepared to organise an elaborate escape, involving what eventually became some seventy men, including 15 senior officers, at the very moment when all was lost in Hong Kong, Admiral Chan represented the Chinese National Government in Hong Kong. MacDougall acknowledged that his leaving",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    },
    {
        "id": 215941,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 240,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "174\n\nwhich the Police Commissioner handed over $20,000 without question when advised of the plot, though it was claimed that the bribe money came from the Shanghai triads leader Tu Yueh Sheng, then a refugee, albeit wealthy, in Hong Kong. Whatever the truth behind the story, it gained currency as it made the escape of General Yee and Admiral Chan Chak palatable to colonials by portraying it as an honourable act by the British to reward Yee for his assistance in saving them.\n\nIt was almost certainly also a smokescreen to disguise the removal from Hong Kong of something important to the British. MacDougall claimed in 1942 that he had not planned to go but had been persuaded at the last moment by senior government officials. MacDougall however was circumspect, careful not to betray sensitive information in an open letter. He could, however, say that during the last two years his work had 'become increasingly political in character. Officially neutral in the Sino-Japanese War, I had nevertheless behind the scenes consistently exerted what influence I possessed toward blocking and hampering the propaganda and other activities of the Japanese and the adherents of the Wang Ching Wei....I had worked very closely with Chinese organisations and did all in my power, consistent with the interests of the Colony, to aid them.' It should also be noted that he was not an officer of the colonial establishment but belonged to the Ministry of Information. He was to return to Hong Kong on liberation to reinstate the administration. While no high-profile officers escaped with the Chan Chak group, it is probable that some were carrying information. There were men from Army, Navy, and Air Force, and they were chosen for the mission, only one man being a \"guest.\"\n\n* xviii Major Goring was to spend much of the war attached to various strategic planning groups in the China theatre.\n\nThe extent of KMT activity in Hong Kong was considerable. Hong Kong was a sort of open house where all factions of Chinese politics from left to right could operate, as long as they were discreet. Overt acts of terrorism and subversion in other colonies, like the Malayan federation, were suppressed. The territory was also the port through which arms and armaments flowed into China. Technically this was in breach of the Hague Convention as Britain was supposed to be neutral, but there were ways of smuggling and circumventing the system. Baileys, the Hong Kong shipyard, built river gunboats that were outfitted with guns once they entered China. The same technology that enabled\n\nPage 240\n\nPage 241",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
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    },
    {
        "id": 215946,
        "series_id": 26,
        "series_slug": "histsyn-rashkb-journal-engine",
        "series_title": "RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊",
        "series_use_hku_proxy": false,
        "document_key": "RAS-2002",
        "page_number": 245,
        "title": "RAS-2002",
        "content_text": "179\n\npolitical understanding. Boxer's approaches to Chiang Kai Shek came at an opportune time, and might have developed into more, had circumstances so evolved. By spiriting Admiral Chan right from under the noses of the Japanese the British were making a political statement that they, too, could deliver. This was important as the Chinese had perfectly effective escape and intelligence systems of their own: General SK Yee, for example, was able to escape from Apleichau Island, even though the Japanese were almost certainly hot in pursuit and there appeared to be no means of escape for him when he was left behind, believed killed, as the two MTBs flotilla sailed away. Nonetheless to retain their credibility and their claim on Hong Kong, the British had to demonstrate their own ability to create a functional resistance and gain the respect of the Chinese.\n\nBeing realistic about defeat meant that British military strategists could plan pragmatically for occupation and resistance. It was those who clung to colonialist values who could not envisage that there might in fact be quite sophisticated planning behind the scenes. Quietly and unobtrusively, the British developed a comprehensive and effective network ready to activate as soon as the Japanese attacked. They were not \"caught on the hop\" by defeat by any means, nor unprepared. The groundwork was developed and networks in place and in some cases already operating. Support was brokered with the Chinese National Government and also with the Communists, and with the influential left wing faction of the KMT as well. The hinterland behind Hong Kong had been surveyed and alliances were in place to support any resistance in occupied Hong Kong. The British military may have surrendered Hong Kong on Christmas Day, but the next phase, war by other means, was poised and ready to unfold.\n\nChange of direction\n\nJust as refugees had poured into Hong Kong to escape the Japanese conquest of south and central China, refugees began pouring out of Hong Kong within days of the Japanese attack. Throughout January 1942, people were pouring out of Hong Kong by any form of transport they could find: some villagers reported 100 or more passing through each day. At first, the Japanese neither had the inclination to stop them, nor the apparatus in hand to organise an orderly evacuation. Even in POW camps it was easy enough even for men to discreetly remove",
        "txt_file_path": "txt/dfo323lmgvd/RAS-2002.txt",
        "external_url": "https://digitalrepository.lib.hku.hk/catalog/mp4901278",
        "rank": 0
    }
]