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7.3 Ending hostilities:
In many cases, especially during a civil war, a clear military victory may be immensely costly in terms of combatant and civilian lives. A priority for a government or other party may be simply bringing the armed conflict to an end. But a combatant party may be unwilling to give up its armed power, if it means that the party retaining arms will wreak vengeance.
In this situation, many governments have offered amnesties during the conflict to persuade the parties to lay down their arms. Without some kind of amnesty, it may not be possible to persuade the combatants to give up fighting. Sometimes amnesties have applied to all combatants, including the leadership, while at other times governments have tried to drive a wedge between leaders and followers by excluding leaders from the amnesties.
In the Cambodian situation, the Khmer Rouge remained a powerful military force well into the 1990s, and continued to have support from abroad. In these circumstances, the Cambodian government repeatedly offered amnesties - and even inclusion in the government - to persuade the leadership of the Khmer Rouge to give up their military campaigns, and offered Khmer Rouge combatants incorporation in the government's armed forces, at equivalent ranks.
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One result of such a policy is that perpetrators and victims may find themselves together in the post-conflict society, with all their issues unresolved.
The existence of these amnesties will create a problem for the Tribunal. Article 11 of the draft agreement initialled in March 2003 provides that the Royal Government will not provide amnesties. Only one amnesty, in 1996, is recognised, and the validity of that amnesty will be a question for the Tribunal to resolve.
7.4 Building a post-conflict society:
After a long period of conflict, a common desire is to move on to a new and peaceful situation. In this process, participants feel the need to put the past behind them, and get on with their new lives. While
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7.3 Ending hostilities:
In many cases, especially during a civil war, a clear military victory may be immensely costly in terms of combatant and civilian lives. A priority for a government or other party may be simply bringing the armed conflict to an end. But a combatant party may be unwilling to give up its armed power, if it means that the party retaining arms will wreak vengeance.
In this situation, many governments have offered amnesties during the conflict to persuade the parties to lay down their arms. Without some kind of amnesty, it may not be possible to persuade the combatants to give up fighting. Sometimes amnesties have applied to all combatants, including the leadership, while at other times governments have tried to drive a wedge between leaders and followers by excluding leaders from the amnesties.
In the Cambodian situation, the Khmer Rouge remained a powerful military force well into the 1990s, and continued to have support from abroad. In these circumstances, the Cambodian government repeatedly offered amnesties - and even inclusion in the government - to persuade the leadership of the Khmer Rouge to give up their military campaigns, and offered Khmer Rouge combatants incorporation in the government's armed forces, at equivalent ranks.
23
One result of such a policy is that perpetrators and victims may find themselves together in the post-conflict society, with all their issues unresolved.
The existence of these amnesties will create a problem for the Tribunal. Article 11 of the draft agreement initialled in March 2003 provides that the Royal Government will not provide amnesties. Only one amnesty, in 1996, is recognised, and the validity of that amnesty will be a question for the Tribunal to resolve.
7.4 Building a post-conflict society:
After a long period of conflict, a common desire is to move on to a new and peaceful situation. In this process, participants feel the need to put the past behind them, and get on with their new lives. While
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