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temporarily) of so many valuable amphibious vessels would have set back any invasion of Japan, or elsewhere."7
In addition, after Japan agreed to surrender in August 1945, several ships of the RN heading to Hong Kong to re-establish British rule over the territory were caught in a typhoon and suffered losses.58 In all four cases, together with the 1937 and 1946 typhoons that straddled the war, the Allies suffered substantial losses without being able to hit back - because there was nothing to hit! Hence, the Japanese got their "divine winds," but none were able to save them from defeat,
## Conclusion
It should be noted that neither of the two typhoons that consumed the Third Fleet nor the one that hit Okinawa right after the war were as powerful as the 1937 or 1946 typhoons that hit Hong Kong. Still, the typhoons were strong enough to rattle and even damage the largest and best-protected warships, including collapsing the forward flight decks of two aircraft carriers and slicing the bow off a heavy cruiser in the June 1945 incident. (The ships survived, but the cruiser and one of the carriers were knocked out of the war.)59 Support vessels, which are not as sturdy nor as fast as the biggest warships, would stand to suffer even more from a typhoon, as demonstrated by the October 1945 storm.
For the weather to prevail in a military campaign is one of the most cost-ineffective ways to lose the campaign. The enemy would have suffered few or no losses in return, which is damaging to morale. On the other side, however, if by a certain stage of the war the weather has become one's most formidable ally, then that is usually an indicator that he has shot his bolt, and has to depend on something outside of his control.
The weather factors examined range from seemingly trivial to potentially devastating. All, however, are capable of causing unnecessary losses if either side has paid insufficient heed to any of them. In land operations on terrain as mountainous as Hong Kong's, more weight is put on the ability of the foot soldier to achieve key objectives, because the help afforded by machinery would be relatively limited. But the foot soldier is usually more vulnerable to the elements than his supporting machinery. Certainly, machinery could be replaced,
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temporarily) of so many valuable amphibious vessels would have set back any invasion of Japan, or elsewhere."7
In addition, after Japan agreed to surrender in August 1945, several ships of the RN heading to Hong Kong to re-establish British rule over the territory were caught in a typhoon and suffered losses.58 In all four cases, together with the 1937 and 1946 typhoons that straddled the war, the Allies suffered substantial losses without being able to hit back - because there was nothing to hit! Hence, the Japanese got their "divine winds," but none were able to save them from defeat,
Conclusion
It should be noted that neither of the two typhoons that consumed the Third Fleet nor the one that hit Okinawa right after the war were as powerful as the 1937 or 1946 typhoons that hit Hong Kong. Still, the typhoons were strong enough to rattle and even damage the largest and best protected warships, including collapsing the forward flight decks of two aircraft carriers and slicing the bow off a heavy cruiser in the June 1945 incident. (The ships survived, but the cruiser and one of the carriers were knocked out of the war.)59 Support vessels, which are not as sturdy nor as fast as the biggest warships, would stand to suffer even more from a typhoon, as demonstrated by the October 1945 storm.
For the weather to prevail in a military campaign is one of the most cost-ineffective ways to lose the campaign. The enemy would have suffered few or no losses in return, which is damaging to morale. On the other side, however, if by a certain stage of the war the weather has become one's most formidable ally, then that is usually an indicator that he has shot his bolt, and has to depend on something outside of his control.
The weather factors examined range from seemingly trivial to potentially devastating. All, however, are capable of causing unnecessary losses if either side has paid insufficient heed to any of them. In land operations on terrain as mountainous as Hong Kong's, more weight is put on the ability of the foot soldier to achieve key objectives, because the help afforded by machinery would be relatively limited. But the foot soldier is usually more vulnerable to the elements than his supporting machinery. Certainly machinery could be replaced,
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