48
for Tolo Harbour), its entrance faced the northeast, which was like an open door for a typhoon. The 1937 typhoon took advantage of such a tailor-made entrance to surge through it with a tidal wave.3
30
If a typhoon during peacetime could cause so much damage, then one of similar magnitude during wartime, when the stakes are higher, could really set back the Allied timetable. The Tai Po Road would likely have served as a conduit to funnel supplies north to China, and a disruption to its service (even temporarily) would do much to hurt the supply situation. Moreover, if LoC by land into China were that vulnerable, then LoC by sea to Hong Kong would be even more precarious. Such a supply line would likely come from the southeast and pass through the strait between Luzon and Formosa. This region also happened to be a major alleyway for typhoons, not to mention an area of strong Japanese concentrations if either Luzon or Formosa (or both) continued to be in enemy hands.3
31
Due to their extensive commitment in the Atlantic, Allied merchant shipping and its escorts were more precious commodities in the much larger Pacific. The Japanese had not made it a policy to attack supply vessels thus far in the war, but that did not mean they would not alter this policy as the Allies pushed closer to the home islands. A typhoon, however, would not wait nor discriminate. While ships at harbour enjoy a little bit of protection from a typhoon, ships at sea don't have this benefit. The only option was evasion, and that depended on knowing the whereabouts of the typhoon. As noted earlier, this was an extremely difficult task during World War II.
32
Another category of shipping in which the Allies weren't as well endowed as they would have liked was landing craft. These vessels were mandatory for Allied operations in the Pacific. But Europe received first priority for landing craft for much of the war, leaving just enough for the Allies to take to the offensive in the Pacific. Hong Kong's ability to serve as a lifeline into China depended entirely on a secure LoC that could be established to it by sea, and this in turn depended on the ability of the Allies to secure Hong Kong from the sea by an amphibious assault. The more landings the Allies carried out, the greater the toll on their landing craft, as the same craft would be used over and over. But landing craft were rather lightly-protected ships, which also made them prone to attrition through enemy action, breakdowns, and the weather.
48
for Tolo Harbour), its entrance faced the northeast, which was like an open door for a typhoon. The 1937 typhoon took advantage of such a tailor-made entrance to surge through it with a tidal wave.3
'
30
If a typhoon during peacetime could cause so much damage, then one of similar magnitude during wartime, when the stakes are higher, could really set back the Allied timetable. The Tai Po Road would likely have served as a conduit to funnel supplies north to China, and a disruption to its service (even temporarily) would do much to hurt the supply situation. Moreover, if LoC by land into China were that vulnerable, then LoC by sea to Hong Kong would be even more precarious. Such a supply line would likely come from the southeast and pass through the strait between Luzon and Formosa. This region also happened to be a major alleyway for typhoons, not to mention an area of strong Japanese concentrations if either Luzon or Formosa (or both) continued to be in enemy hands.3
31
Due to their extensive commitment in the Atlantic, Allied merchant shipping and its escorts were more precious commodities in the much larger Pacific. The Japanese had not made it a policy to attack supply vessels thus far in the war, but that did not mean they would not alter this policy as the Allies pushed closer to the home islands. A typhoon, however, would not wait nor discriminate. While ships at harbour enjoy a little bit of protection from a typhoon, ships at sea don't have this benefit. The only option was evasion, and that depended on knowing the whereabouts of the typhoon. As noted earlier, this was an extremely difficult task during World War II.
32
Another category of shipping in which the Allies weren't as well endowed as they would have liked was landing craft. These vessels were mandatory for Allied operations in the Pacific. But Europe received first priority for landing craft for much of the war, leaving just enough for the Allies to take to the offensive in the Pacific. Hong Kong's ability to serve as a lifeline into China depended entirely on a secure LoC that could be established to it by sea, and this in turn depended on the ability of the Allies to secure Hong Kong from the sea by an amphibious assault. The more landings the Allies carried out, the greater the toll on their landing craft, as the same craft would be used over and over. But landing craft were rather lightly-protected ships, which also made them prone to attrition through enemy action, breakdowns, and the weather.
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